Brigadier Roofing, Inc. v. Roofer's Unions Welfare Trust Fund

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 33 is granted and therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 30 is stricken. Defendant shall answer Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint on or before 11/24/15. Status hearing set for 12/16/15 at 9:30 a.m. See Order for further details. Signed by the Honorable James B. Zagel on 10/27/2015. Mailed notice(ep, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
BRIGADIER ROOFING, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 1:14 C 10496
Judge James B. Zagel

ROOFER’S UNIONS WELFARE TRUST
FUND,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Plaintiff Brigadier Roofing, Inc.’s (“BRI”) Motion to Strike
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed this restitution case against Defendant Roofer’s Unions Welfare Trust
Fund (“the Fund”), alleging that BRI paid out $79,598.98 in contribution payments to the Fund
but never received the employee health and welfare benefits they were promised in exchange. In
February 2015, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the original complaint and Plaintiff
responded with a Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint. Defendant objected, and
I presided over a hearing on these issues on June 16, 2015 at which I granted Plaintiff leave to
file its Amended Complaint. Defendant promptly responded with a Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint, which is comprised of the same arguments put forth in their opposition
motion to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint. Specifically,
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) and argues that ERISA preempts
Plaintiff’s Counts II and III. Plaintiff now seeks to strike this Motion to Dismiss, arguing that it
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merely revives claims that were already briefed and decided at the June 16 hearing.
II. Discussion
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts should freely grant a party leave to
amend a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). But that liberal standard is heightened when the
opposing party bases its objection on the argument that an amendment is futile because it would
not survive a motion to dismiss. In this context, the court looks to whether the amended pleading
would survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Gandhi v. Sitara Capital Management, LLC, 721
F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Brunt v. SEIU, 284 F.3d 715, 720-721 (7th Cir. 2002)). In
other words, the court applies identical standards to futility objections as to motions to dismiss,
deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a “claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and
whether the plaintiff has pleaded something more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This is the standard I
used when I considered and denied Defendant’s Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File a First Amended Complaint, just as I would if I were to evaluate Defendant’s
pending Motion to Dismiss.
There is a strong presumption against revisiting matters that have already been decided in
the course of the litigation, such as the ones before me today. See Minch v. City of Chicago, 486
F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 2007). This is a well-established doctrine that serves judicial interests in
consistency, finality, and conservation of resources. Id. Rarely, a court may reconsider an earlier
ruling for a “compelling reason, such as manifest error or a change in the law.” Id. (citing
Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 F.3d 570, 572 (7th Cir. 2006). No such circumstances
are present here, and as a result it would not be appropriate for me to reexamine these arguments.

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Defendant argues that its claims have not been considered on the merits under the more
stringent pleading standard of Federal Rule 12(b)(6). This is incorrect. I applied the 12(b)(6)
standard when considering Defendant’s futility objection, and I concluded that the Amended
Complaint could survive a motion to dismiss. Defendant also asserts that the June hearing only
addressed Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend, rather than the merits of Defendant’s claims.
But the two sets of claims -- Plaintiff’s motion, and Defendant’s opposition to that motion
(reiterated in its Motion to Dismiss) -- are intertwined. In considering the former, I necessarily
weighed Defendant’s arguments in opposition. Because these are the same arguments they have
revived in their present Motion to Dismiss, and because I substantively considered and ruled on
them in June, I will not consider them again.
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted. Defendant is
ordered to answer Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint by November 24, 2015.
ENTER:

James B. Zagel
United States District Judge
DATE: October 27, 2015

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