Taylor v. Stark et al

Filing 25

ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 10/20/2015: Plaintiff's motion 23 is denied. This case remains closed. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PAUL DONNELL TAYLOR
(#2014-0724284),
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER STARK, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14 C 10517
Judge Manish S. Shah

ORDER
Plaintiff’s motion [23] is denied. This case remains closed.
STATEMENT
On 3/11/15, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b) based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s order of 1/23/15. [6].
Judgment was entered the same day. [7]. On 3/13/15, Plaintiff submitted a motion
for an extension of time to file an amended complaint and proposed amended
complaint. [9]. Although the case had already been dismissed, the Court reviewed
the proposed amended complaint, but did not accept it because it did not cure the
defects in the original complaint. [11]. Plaintiff submitted another proposed
amended complaint, [12], a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal,
[13], a motion for reconsideration, [14], and two motions for appointment of counsel.
[15, 16]. Later, it became apparent to the Court that Plaintiff had failed to fully
disclose his litigation history at the time he filed the instant lawsuit. Accordingly,
the Court sanctioned him by striking the documents at nos. 12-16 on the docket
from the record.
On 9/21/15, Plaintiff filed a motion purportedly pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion is
denied.
A motion filed under Rule 59(e) is one to alter or amend a judgment. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e). “A motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) may be
granted to correct a manifest error of law or fact.” Duran v. Town of Cicero, 653 F.3d
632, 642 (7th Cir. 2011), citing Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, Rule 60(b) permits the Court to relieve a party from

an order or judgment based on six enumerated grounds: mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party; the judgement is void; the judgment has been
satisfied, released or discharged; or any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy “designed to address
mistakes attributable to special circumstances and not merely to erroneous
applications of law.” Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2009). A
Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within 28 days after entry of the judgment. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e). A Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment must be filed within a
reasonable time and, if seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), must be filed
no more than one year after entry of the judgment or order. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(c)(1).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s motion, to the extent it arises under Rule
59(e), is untimely. Judgment was entered on 3/11/15, and Plaintiff filed the instant
motion nearly six months later on 9/21/15. Plaintiff does not indicate under which
subsection of Rule 60(b) he seeks relief.
In any event, Plaintiff fails to offer any grounds under Rule 59(e) or 60(b) for
which this Court could grant him the relief he seeks. Plaintiff does not contend that
the Court committed a manifest error of law or fact in deciding to dismiss his
complaint (or in later imposing sanctions for failing to disclose his litigation
history). Similarly, his motion does not support reconsideration based on any of the
enumerated grounds under Rule 60(b). Rather, Plaintiff asserts, as a generalized
contention, that the Court erred by “not giving this case a chance.” He provides no
explanation as to how or in what way the Court allegedly erred in dismissing this
case and/or in imposing sanctions upon determining that Plaintiff failed to disclose
his litigation history at the time he filed suit. Rather, he simply maintains that the
claims raised in his complaint are meritorious and that he has evidence to support
them. He also asserts that he is “starting to pay[] [his] filing fee” and that “this
should be [his] right to start [his] lawsuit.” None of these reasons, however, are
proper grounds for reconsideration under either 59(e) or 60(b). Plaintiff is
essentially arguing with the Court’s decision to dismiss the case without
substantively considering the “merits” of it. However, mere disagreements with a
district court’s legal reasoning are properly expressed by filing an appeal, which
Plaintiff failed to do (and the time to do so has now passed). See Parke-Chapley
Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n appeal or motion
for a new trial, rather than a FRCP 60(b) motion is the proper avenue to redress
mistakes of law committed by the trial judge . . . .”).
Moreover, as noted above, the Court dismissed this case pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b) because Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court’s order of 1/23/15,
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which instructed him to submit an amended complaint limited to a single core
claim. Subsequently, Plaintiff submitted an amended complaint. Despite the fact
that the case had already been dismissed, the Court reviewed the proposed
amended complaint, but did not accept it because did not cure the defects in the
original complaint. Then, in yet another attempt to revive the case, Plaintiff
submitted a proposed amended complaint and various related documents. When it
became apparent to the Court that Plaintiff had failed to fully disclose his litigation
history at the time he filed the instant lawsuit, the Court sanctioned Plaintiff by
striking the proposed amended complaint (and related documents).
Throughout Plaintiff’s repeated attempts to revive this case, he has not and
does not now provide any reason as to why he failed to comply with the Court’s
1/23/15 order (which formed the basis of the 3/11/15 dismissal order), and/or why he
failed to disclose his prior litigation history at the time he filed this lawsuit (which
formed the basis of the Court’s 8/18/15 sanctions order). Although it is not entirely
clear, Plaintiff appears to be suggesting that although he has not complied with
applicable rules and Court instructions, he should still be permitted to proceed with
this case because he is proceeding without the assistance of counsel. The Court,
however, cannot overlook Plaintiff’s failure to comply with applicable rules and
Court instructions simply because he is proceeding on a pro se basis. See Jones v.
Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “pro se litigants are not
entitled to a general dispensation from the rules of procedure or court-imposed
deadlines”). Moreover, and in any event, Plaintiff’s position is rather dubious given
that he is an experienced litigator who has been warned in the past about the
implications of failing to fully and honestly disclose his litigation history, and, yet,
he continues to engage in a practice of doing so.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. He has no further recourse in this
Court. The case remains closed.
ENTER:
Date: 10/20/15

_____________________________
Manish S. Shah
U.S. District Judge

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