Hopkins v. Dart

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 10/20/2016: Mailed notice (mw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DARREN L. HOPKINS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS DART,
Defendant.

No. 15 C 410

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant Cook County Sheriff Thomas
Dart’s motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is
granted.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Darren L. Hopkins (Hopkins) is allegedly a detainee confined by the
Cook County Department of Corrections. Hopkins alleges that on November 10,
2014, in an inmate common area, Hopkins was punched in the face by another
inmate during a physical altercation (Altercation). Hopkins claims that a nearby
prison guard watched the fight and did not try to break-up the Altercation. Hopkins
also contends that he was not given prompt medical care after the Altercation.

1

Hopkins contends that his constitutional rights were violated and brings a claim
against Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983). On June 5, 2015,
this court granted Hopkins leave to proceed in forma pauperis and appointed counsel
to represent him. On November 11, 2015, the court granted his counsel’s motion to
withdraw, and Hopkins is again proceeding pro se. Defendant now moves to dismiss
the claims in the instant action.

LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)), the court must draw all reasonable inferences
that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in
the complaint. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th
Cir. 2012); Thompson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.
2002). A plaintiff is required to include allegations in the complaint that “plausibly
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a
‘speculative level’” and “if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.”
E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.
2007)(quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007));
see also Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d at 622 (stating that “[t]o survive
a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and that “[a] claim has
2

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged”)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009))(internal quotations
omitted).

DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss the individual capacity claims and the official
capacity claims.

I. Individual Capacity Claim
Defendant argues that Hopkins had failed to allege sufficient facts to suggest
individual liability by Defendant. A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 cannot hold a
supervisor liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior “for conduct of a
subordinate that violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Chavez v. Illinois State
Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting
Lanigan v. Vill. of E. Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1997))(stating that
“[s]upervisory liability will be found, however, if the supervisor, with knowledge of
the subordinate’s conduct, approves of the conduct and the basis for it” and that
“[t]he supervisors must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone
it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see”). In the instant action,
Hopkins fails to allege facts that would suggest that Defendant, as the Cook County
Sheriff, would have any personal knowledge of or personal involvement in dealing
3

with the Altercation or the immediate medical treatment after the Altercation. Nor
has Hopkins provided allegations that would suggest personal knowledge on the part
of Defendant that would suggest deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to
Hopkins’ health or safety. See Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 554
(7th Cir. 2016)(stating that “[d]eliberate indifference occurs when a defendant
realizes that a substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner exists, but intentionally
or recklessly disregards that risk”(internal quotations omitted)(quoting Berry v.
Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010)). The Seventh Circuit has indicated
that “the personal involvement of senior jail officials, such as Dart, can be inferred at
the motion to dismiss stage, where . . . the plaintiff alleges potentially systemic, as
opposed to clearly localized, constitutional violations.” Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304,
310 (7th Cir. 2015). In the instant action, however, the allegations merely relate to
one isolated incident. There are not allegations in the amended complaint that would
suggest any systemic basis for any alleged constitutional violations. Hopkins argues
in response to the instant motion that “[p]ursuant to municipal and supervisory
liability, Thomas Dart is totally liable for his employee’s actions.” (Resp. 1). As
explained above, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not available for Section
1983 claims and a supervisor is not “totally liable” for a subordinate’s actions.
Hopkins cannot hold Defendant individually liable merely based on his supervisory
status. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the individual capacity claim is
granted.

4

II. Official Capacity Claims
Defendant argues that Hopkins had failed to allege sufficient facts to suggest
official liability. A plaintiff can pursue a Section 1983 Monell claim against a
municipal entity if the plaintiff can show that “the defendant[‘s] official policy,
widespread custom, or action by an official with policy-making authority was the
moving force behind his constitutional injury.” Daniel v. Cook Cty., 2016 WL
4254934, at *4 (7th Cir. 2016)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting Dixon v. County
of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2016))(stating that “[a]n unconstitutional policy
can include both implicit policies as well as a gap in expressed policies”). In the
instant action, Hopkins alleges that one prison guard chose not to intervene in a fight
on one occasion and that certain medical staff did not provide him prompt medical
care on that occasion. There are not allegations in the amended complaint that
suggest that the alleged misconduct was the result of any county custom or policy or
the decision of any person with policy-making authority. Hopkins has thus failed to
state a valid Monell claim. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the official
capacity claims is granted.

5

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.

___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: October 20, 2016

6