Local 591, Transport Workers Union of America et al v. American Airlines, Inc.
Filing
36
OPINION and ORDER Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/19/2015: Defendant's motion to dismiss 27 is granted. Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction 19 , plaintiffs' motion to supplement 34 , and defendant's motion for leave to file response to motion to supplement 35 are denied as moot. Case dismissed. Civil case terminated.Mailed notice(mad, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LOCAL 591, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA, and individuals GARY
PETERSON, BRIAN FRIEDMAN, WILLIAM
CARPENTER, AND STEVEN LOSOS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AMERICAN AIRLINES INC.,
Defendant.
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Case No. 15 C 652
Judge Joan H. Lefkow
OPINION AND ORDER
On January 22, 2015, plaintiffs filed suit alleging violations of the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (“RLA”). (Dkt. 1.) After amending their complaint, plaintiffs asked the
court to enter a preliminary injunction. (Dkts. 17, 19.) In response, defendant moved to dismiss,
arguing that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, that plaintiffs had
failed to state a claim. (Dkt. 27.) For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion to dismiss is
granted.
BACKGROUND 1
I.
The Parties
Local 591, Transport Workers Union of America (“Local 591”) is one of three local
unions established by the Transport Workers Union of America (“TWU”), which has been
certified by the National Mediation Board as the collective bargaining agent for mechanics at
1
The facts are drawn from plaintiffs’ first amended complaint unless otherwise stated. Because
defendant raises a factual challenge to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, however, the court is not
constrained by plaintiffs’ complaint and can consider evidence proffered by defendant. Apex Digital Inc.
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443–44 (7th Cir. 2009).
1
American Airlines. (Dkt. 17 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 6.) Local 591 represents mechanics at all but
one of American Airlines’ maintenance stations, including the Chicago and Dallas stations. (Id.)
Gary Peterson is the president of Local 591 and Brian Friedman is the central region vice
president. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) Steven Losos and William Carpenter are chairpersons at the Chicago
station. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) American Airlines, Inc. is a commercial airliner based in the United
States. (See id. ¶ 11.)
II.
The Facts
In 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) determined that American
Airlines had violated certain federal regulations. (Id. ¶ 12.) Four years later, the FAA filed suit
against American Airlines in bankruptcy court. (Id.) In 2013, the bankruptcy court approved a
settlement between the FAA and American Airlines that reduced proposed fines against
American Airlines on the condition that it comply with industry standards. (Id. ¶ 13.)
Plaintiffs allege that, despite its promise to comply with the standards, American Airlines
has been pressuring employeesspecifically its aircraft maintenance technicians (“AMTs”)to
ignore the standards in order to keep planes operating and, in plaintiffs words, “in revenue
service.” (Id. ¶ 15.) According to plaintiffs, American Airlines has even threatened and
retaliated against AMTs who insist on compliance with the standards. (Id. ¶ 16.)
After learning of this intimidation, Local 591 advised AMTs to file complaints with
American Airlines’ human resources department. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 20.) But American Airlines’
human resources representatives either failed to respond to the complaints or steered the AMTs
back to the managers who were harassing them. (Id. ¶ 20.) After some discussion with Local
591, the Chicago-based AMTs decided to file a whistleblower complaint with the United States
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Department of Labor under 49 U.S.C. § 42121, a statute that protects employees from employer
retaliation for reporting air carrier safety violations. (Id. ¶ 22.)
The Department of Labor forwarded a copy of the complaint to the FAA, which initiated
its own investigation. (Id. ¶ 26.) In the process, the FAA visited American Airlines’ Chicago
station to interview the AMTs. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) According to plaintiffs, American Airlines
managers told plaintiffs that they, and not the managers, would be subject to an FAA
enforcement action. (Id. ¶ 27.) Fearful of the FAA, and of retaliation by defendant, the AMTs
requested their union representatives be present for the interviews. (Id. ¶ 29.) American Airlines
refused, and a manager warned the union representatives that if they tried to sit in on the
interviews they would be subject to disciplineincluding termination. (Id.) The next day,
however, American Airlines changed its position and allowed Local 591 to provide
representation for the AMTs during the interviews. (Dkt. 28-5 ¶ 4.)
Still concerned with the alleged intimidation of AMTs, Local 591 decided to investigate
further. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) On December 4, 2014, Peterson, the president of 591, and
Friedman, the vice president, visited American Airlines’ Dallas station in order to observe
maintenance practices. (Id. ¶ 33.) According to plaintiffs, Peterson and Friedman were
immediately followed by an American Airlines supervisor. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that when
Peterson complained to Station Manager William Roper that the monitoring “prevented him
from communicating with his members,” Roper threatened to have the union representatives
arrested. 2 (Id.)
Defendant offers a different version of Peterson and Friedman’s visit. According to
defendant, Peterson and Friedman called a meeting of AMTs during work hours. (See dkt. 28-6
2
The first amended complaint says that Roper threatened to have “the union representatives”
fired; it is unclear whether this refers to Peterson and Friedman only or other representatives as well.
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¶¶ 2–3.) American Airlines’ management learned of the meeting when airport control tower
employees informed them that a large crowd of AMTs was gathered on an outdoor maintenance
pad. (Id. ¶ 2.) After the meeting, Roper asked a shift supervisor to monitor Peterson and
Friedman to prevent any further disruptions. (Id. ¶¶ 4–6.) Defendant maintains that Roper did
not threaten to have Peterson arrested; he simply warned Peterson that he would call airport
security if necessary. (Id. ¶ 7.)
A little more than a month later, plaintiffs filed the instant complaint, alleging four
violations of the RLA: (1) that defendant has not made “every reasonable effort” to make and
maintain labor agreements and settle disputes under Section 2, First; (2) that defendant has
interfered with plaintiffs’ choice of representatives under Section 2, Third; (3) that defendant has
interfered with plaintiffs’ right to organize Section 2, Fourth; and (4) that defendant failed to
“treat,” or negotiate, terms and conditions of employment with plaintiffs’ certified bargaining
representative. (See dkt. 1; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 61–68.)
Plaintiffs allege that since filing the complaint, they have been subject to increased
intimidation. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38–39.) According to plaintiffs, Regional Maintenance Director
Evita Rodriguez ordered American Airlines managers to keep track of what Friedman and
Thomas Ceplecha, a regional chairperson, do each day. (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiffs also claim that
Rodriguez issued a directive that all union representatives be subject to disciplinary investigation
if they are involved in any delays. (Id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiffs claim that one representative has been
subject to such an investigation. (Id.) Defendant disputes these claims. According to defendant,
Friedman and Ceplecha are not monitored; American Airlines managers simply keep track of
their work assignments to ensure productivity. (Dkt. 28-5 ¶¶ 7–8.) Defendant also states that
there is no policy of investigating union representatives specifically, and that the representative
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at issue was investigated because he caused a delay, not because he is affiliated with the union.
(Id. ¶¶ 11–12.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant can assert a “lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction” defense to a plaintiff’s claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). These defenses can
be facial (that the plaintiff’s allegations, even if true, fail to support jurisdiction) or factual
(conceding that the allegations are sufficient but offering contrary evidence). Apex Digital Inc.
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443–44 (7th Cir. 2009).
Defendant does not say whether its challenge is facial or factual. Although its briefs
appear to accept plaintiffs’ allegations as true (suggesting a facial challenge), these briefs were
submitted with four declarations and eight exhibits (suggesting a factual challenge). (Dkts. 28,
33.) Plaintiffs argue that defendant’s challenge is factual in their response (see dkt. 32 at 2), and
defendant does not dispute this in its reply, (see dkt. 33). Thus, the court will treat defendant’s
challenge as factual.
In a factual challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction, once a defendant produces evidence
calling the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction into question, “[t]he presumption of correctness
that we accord to a complaint’s allegations falls away.” Apex Digital, Inc., 572 F.3d at 444–45
(alternation in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to provide “competent proof” that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Id.
When considering a motion that launches a factual attack, “‘[t]he district court may properly
look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been
submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.’” Evers v.
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Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2008) (alternation in original) (quoting St. John’s United
Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007)).
ANALYSIS
I.
Whether Plaintiffs’ Allegations Raise Major or Minor Disputes
As stated above, plaintiffs allege four claims: a claim under Section 2, First for failure to
resolve disputes arising from a collective bargaining agreement; claims under Section 2, Third
and Fourth for interference with representation rights; and a claim under Section Two, Ninth for
failure to negotiate with the certified bargaining representative. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 61–68.)
Defendant argues that these claims arise from minor disputes and thus are subject to mandatory
arbitration—depriving the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. 3
A.
Legal Standard
The RLA, which applies to railroads and airlines, promotes stability in labor-management
relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes. 45 U.S.C.
§ 151a; see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 129 L.
Ed. 2d 203 (1994); Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 831 (7th Cir. 2014). The statute
channels disputes into two categories—major and minor—and prescribes different resolution
procedures for each. Carlson, 758 F.3d at 831. Although major disputes can be heard in court,
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It is possible that a failure to comply with the RLA’s arbitration provision does not have
jurisdictional implications, and that instead of depriving the court of subject-matter jurisdiction it simply
defeats the claim. “Jurisdiction,” as the Supreme Court has observed, “is a word with many, too many,
meanings”; the Court has recognized that multiple statutory requirements that have been deemed
jurisdictional are actually just elements that must be satisfied for a plaintiff to state a claim. Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens
for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 90, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Although the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that there is a question as to whether the
RLA’s arbitration requirement is jurisdictional, it has not yet answered it, see Carlson v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 831 (7th Cir. 2014), and thus the court treats the issue as one of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
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the RLA requires minor disputes “be resolved in arbitration before an adjustment board
established by the employer and union.” Id. (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 512 U.S. at 252).
A major dispute involves the “formation or modification of a collective bargaining
agreement.” Id. at 832 (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 512 U.S. at 252; Chicago & N.W. Transp.
Co. v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 908 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1990)). A minor dispute arises “out
of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions.” 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i). Thus, “major disputes seek to create
contractual rights, minor disputes seek to enforce them.” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 512 U.S. at
253 (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 302, 109 S. Ct. 2477,
105 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1989)).
When parties disagree about whether a dispute is major or minor, it is left to the courts to
decide, but “the party seeking to establish that a dispute is minor and under the exclusive arbitral
jurisdiction of a RLA Adjustment Board faces a ‘relatively light burden.’” Bhd. of Maint. of
Way Employees Div./IBT v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 745 F.3d 808, 813 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Consol. Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 307). Indeed, an employer’s reliance on a contractual right
ordinarily is enough to confirm the existence of a minor dispute unless it is clear that the
employer’s claim is “insincere” or founded on “insubstantial grounds.” Consol. Rail Corp., 491
U.S. at 306 (citations omitted). A carrier’s claim is founded on “insubstantial grounds” only if it
would undermine the RLA’s prohibitions against unilateral imposition of new contractual terms.
Id. (citations omitted). In making its determination, the court must be careful not to consider the
merits of the underlying dispute: “its role is limited to determining whether the dispute can be
characterized as involving the proper application or meaning of a contract provision.” Ry. Labor
Execs. Ass’n v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 833 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1987).
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B.
Count I
Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ first claim—that American Airlines failed to resolve
disagreements arising from the parties’ collective bargaining agreement—is nothing more than a
dispute over the processing and scheduling of grievances, and, because this dispute implicates a
contractual right, can properly be classified as minor under the RLA. The court agrees.
Defendant contends that plaintiffs’ first claim triggers the grievance provisions of the
parties’ collective bargaining agreement, outlined in Articles 29–32. (Dkt. 28 at 9.) Article 29
covers union representation, Article 30 discusses grievance procedures for corrective or
disciplinary action (including dismissal), and Article 31 covers grievance procedures for
contractual disputes. (Dkt. 28-2 at 164–80.) Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ dispute can be
resolved by an interpretation and application of these articles. This argument is not “insincere”
or founded on “insubstantial grounds.” See Consol. Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 306. Nor does it
“compel[] the inference that defendant is trying to circumvent the major dispute procedures of
the RLA.” See Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Union Pac. R. Co., 358 F.3d 453, 457 (7th
Cir. 2004).
Plaintiffs’ supporting facts—including the allegation that defendant’s human resources
department either failed to respond to complaints of harassment or “steered the complainants
back to the management representatives who were harassing them”—support this conclusion.
(See Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Even if the court takes these allegations as true, they do not establish a
dispute that involves the “formation or modification of a collective bargaining agreement.” See
Carlson, 758 F.3d at 832 (citation omitted). Rather, they suggest a dispute arising “out of
grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions.” See 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i).
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Plaintiffs try to convert their claim into a major dispute by arguing that any attempt to
resolve the claim through the parties’ collective bargaining agreement would be futile due to the
“enormous backlog of grievances,” “the insufficiency of arbitration hearing dates available to
Local 591,” and “the limitations on arbitral remedial authority.” (Am Compl. ¶ 21.) It is
unclear, however, how inconvenience involves the “formation or modification of a collective
bargaining agreement.” Carlson, 758 F.3d at 832 (citation omitted). The court need not answer
this question, however, as defendant has submitted evidence that American Airlines’
management continues to meet regularly with Local 591 representatives to attempt to resolve
disputes before arbitration. (Dkt. 28-5 ¶¶ 15–18.) Defendant also notes that the hearing dates
available to Local 591 are determined by an agreement between defendant and TWU (Local
591’s parent organization), which further supports the conclusion that the dispute is one that can
be resolved by the interpretation and application of existing agreements. (Dkt. 28 at 9–10.)
Plaintiffs do not offer any evidence to the contrary.
C.
Counts II and III
In Counts II and III, plaintiffs allege that defendant has interfered with their
representation rights under Section 2, Third and Fourth of the RLA. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63–66.)
Section 2, Third provides that “neither party shall in any way interfere with, influence, or coerce
the other in its choice of representatives” and Section 2, Fourth makes it unlawful “for any
carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees.” 45 U.S.C. § 152 Third,
Fourth.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant interfered with their representation rights in a number of
ways. First, plaintiffs claim that American Airlines prevented union representatives from
attending FAA-conducted interviews. (Am. Compl. ¶ 29.) According to plaintiffs, even though
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they specifically requested union presence, an American Airlines manager told Local 591
representatives that if they attempted to provide representation they would be subject to
discipline, including termination. (Id.) Plaintiffs also allege that American Airlines monitored
its president and vice president, Peterson and Friedman. (Id. ¶ 33.) According to plaintiffs,
when Peterson contacted Roper, the station manager, to complain that the monitoring kept him
from communicating with Local 591 members, Roper threatened to have the union
representatives arrested. (Id.)
Plaintiffs further allege that the monitoring has intensified since they filed the suit. (Id.
¶¶ 38–39.) Specifically, plaintiffs claim that Regional Maintenance Director Rodriguez ordered
the American Airlines manager on duty to account for what Friedman and Ceplecha (the region
chairperson) do each day and that she issued a directive requiring American Airlines supervisors
to conduct disciplinary investigations into union representatives any time they are involved in a
delay. (Id. ¶¶ 40–41, 46.)
Defendant argues that these claims raise minor disputes because they implicate express
provisions of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement—specifically Articles 28 and 29.
(Dkt. 28 at 10.) For example, defendant contends that Article 29(f), which outlines the
circumstances in which employees are entitled to have a union representative present, governs
plaintiffs’ claim that an American Airlines manager refused to let union representatives attend
the FAA interviews:
In meetings for the purpose of investigation of any matter which
may eventuate in the application of discipline or dismissal or when
written statements may be required, or of sufficient importance for
the Company to have witnesses present, or to necessitate the
presence of more than one Company supervisor, or during
reasonable cause or post accident drug/alcohol testing as provided
in Article 29(h), the Company will inform the employee of his
right to have Union representation present.
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(Dkt. 28-2 at 165.) Defendant argues that the FAA interviews did not involve any of the
circumstances outlined above, and that therefore it thought it was not obligated to allow
representatives to take time off work to attend. (Dkt. 28 at 13.) This interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement is neither “insincere” nor founded on “insubstantial grounds.”
See Consol. Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 306. Thus, defendant has met its “‘relatively light burden.’”
See Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 745 F.3d at 813 (quoting Consol. Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 307). It is also
worth noting that the parties resolved the dispute the next day, when defendant allowed
representatives to attend the meetings. (See dkt. 28 at 13.) Plaintiffs do not dispute this.
Defendant further argues that plaintiffs’ allegations that defendant monitored union
representatives trigger Article 28(b) of the parties’ agreement, which provides, in part, that “the
Union recognizes that the Company will have sole jurisdiction of the management and operation
of its business, the direction of its working force,” and “the right to maintain discipline and
efficiency in its handers, stations, shops, or other places of employment.” (Dkt. 28-2 at 161.)
Defendant argues that Peterson and Friedman had already caused a significant disruption, and
that it had the right, under the parties’ agreement, to take actions to prevent additional
disruptions of maintenance operations. (Dkt. 28 at 11.) Defendant also submits a declaration
from Roper stating that, while he told Peterson he would call security if Peterson caused any
further disruptions, he did not threaten to have Peterson arrested. (Dkt. 28-6 ¶ 7.) Defendant
further argues that any additional monitoring of Friedman and Ceplecha is not really monitoring
at all—defendant simply keeps track of their work assignments (as it does with other AMTs) to
ensure productivity. (Dkt. 28 at 11–12.) As noted above, an employer’s reliance on a right set
forth in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement ordinarily is enough to confirm the existence
of a minor dispute unless it is clear that the employer’s claim is “insincere” or founded on
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“insubstantial grounds.” Consol. Rail Corp., 491 U.S. at 306. Neither exception applies. Thus
the court agrees that these allegations raise only minor disputes.
Finally, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ allegation that a union representative was subject
to a disciplinary investigation also implicates Article 28(b), which states that American Airlines
has a right to discipline employees, as well as Article 29(f), which states that American Airlines
has a right to manage, supervise, and make inquiries of employees. (Dkt. 28 at 12–13.) The
court agrees.
D.
Count IV
Plaintiffs’ final claim is that defendant failed to negotiate with the certified representative
in violation of Section 2, Ninth of the RLA. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 67–68.) This claim appears to be
based on the same allegations as the violations of Section 2, Third and Fourth. Thus, for the
reasons stated above the court finds that this claim raises a minor dispute subject to mandatory
arbitration under the RLA.
II.
Whether There is an Alternative Basis for Jurisdiction
Although plaintiffs do not clearly articulate it in their response to defendant’s motion to
dismiss, there may be an alternate basis for jurisdiction: a federal court may exercise jurisdiction
over violations of the RLA without regard to the court’s characterization of the dispute as major
or minor where judicial intervention is required to give effect to statutory rights. See Bhd. of Ry.,
Airline & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. & Station Employees v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 847 F.2d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Switchmen’s Union of
N. Am. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 300, 64 S. Ct. 95, 88 L. Ed. 61 (1943). This
jurisdiction is limited to exceptional circumstances: “In those disputes in which the RLA’s
extrajudicial dispute-resolution mechanisms are capable of adequately protecting the rights of the
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parties, federal courts may not interfere with the statutory process.” Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 847 F.2d at 409 (citations omitted)
Plaintiffs argue that defendant has engaged in “intimidation tactics” such as “threatening
and spying on union leaders,” and that these tactics evince an anti-union animus. (Dkt. 32 at 8.)
Plaintiffs further argue that defendant’s actions have undermined the union’s ability to function
as intended under the RLA. (Id. at 9.) This is an overstatement. Even giving them the benefit of
the doubt, plaintiffs allege only one true threat: Roper’s threat to have Peterson arrested. And
defendant’s monitoring of union representatives, whatever the motivation, cannot fairly be called
“spying.” Thus, taking plaintiffs allegations as true, they have alleged one threat, the monitoring
of union representatives, and what could fairly be characterized as anti-union policies (for
example, Rodriguez’s order that managers monitor Friedman and Ceplecha, or her directive that
union representatives be subject to a disciplinary investigations whenever they are involved in a
delay). But as noted above, the court does not have to take plaintiffs’ allegations as true. This is
a factual challenge to jurisdiction, and the court may “‘look beyond the jurisdictional allegations
of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine
whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.’” See Evers, 536 F.3d at 656–57 (quoting St.
John’s United Church of Christ, 502 F.3d at 625). Thus, the court may consider Roper’s
assertion that he did not threaten to have Peterson arrested (but merely warned Peterson he
would call security) and Rodriguez’s statement that Friedman and Ceplecha were monitored out
of concerns over their productivity. (Dkts. 28-5 ¶¶ 7–8, 28-6 ¶ 7.) Without making any factual
findings, the court is left with either a threat to call the police or a warning to call security, the
monitoring of union representatives to interfere with their responsibilities or to avoid disruption
and ensure their productivity, the disciplinary investigation of one employee out of anti-union
13
animus or concern over delay, and a single day where union representatives were not allowed to
accompany members to FAA-conducted interviews. These are not the “exceptional
circumstances” courts have found are necessary to support subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed,
plaintiffs have not shown that judicial intervention is required to give force to their statutory
rights. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 847 F.2d at 409. Because the limits to the
court’s jurisdiction have been drawn out of respect for the remedial scheme created by the RLA,
reluctance to expand this narrow jurisdiction is particularly justified where, as here, the employer
argues that its actions were allowed under the collective bargaining agreement. See id.; see also
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 813 F.2d
1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over allegation of statutory
violation that could be resolved by interpretation of parties’ collective bargaining agreement);
Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Texas Int’l Airlines, Inc., 656 F.2d 16, 19–24 (2d Cir. 1981)
(discussing limited role of federal courts in enforcing the RLA). Thus, the court declines to
exercise jurisdiction over the case. Because the court has concluded it has no jurisdiction, it does
not reach defendant’s arguments under Rule 12(b)(6).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant’s motion to dismiss (dkt. 27) is granted.
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (dkt. 19) is denied as moot. The case is terminated.
Date:
June 19, 2015
________________________________
U.S. District Judge
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