Camarena v. Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc.
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. For the reasons stated in the Opinion, Defendant's motion to transfer 23 is granted. The case is transferred to the Eastern District of Tennessee. The status hearing of 07/02/2015 is vacated. Civil case terminated. Emailed notice(slb, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANGELA CAMARENA,
Plaintiff,
v.
VANDERBILT MORTGAGE and
FINANCE, INC.,
Defendant.
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No. 15 C 00656
Judge Edmond E. Chang
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Angela Camarena has sued Defendant Vanderbilt Mortgage and
Finance, Inc., alleging that Vanderbilt violated the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (commonly known as the TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, by calling her cell phone
without permission and using an automated dialing system to do so.1 Vanderbilt
now moves to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Tennessee, where the
company is based. Camarena, who lives in California, prefers to litigate the matter
here in Chicago. For the reasons explained below, Vanderbilt’s motion is granted.
I. Background
In 1997, Angela Camarena’s father took out a loan from Vanderbilt to finance
the purchase of a mobile home. R. 1, Compl. ¶ 5. According to the complaint,
Vanderbilt is the leading issuer of credit for mobile homes in the United States, and
services loans in all 50 states. Id. ¶ 4. After Camarena’s father became ill and fell
1Federal-question
jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
behind on his loan payments in mid-2013, Vanderbilt began calling Camarena and
her father demanding payment on the loan. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. Camarena resides in
Brawley, California. Id. ¶ 3.
Camarena alleges that she tried unsuccessfully to clarify with Vanderbilt’s
representatives whether her father had carried an insurance policy to cover the loan
upon his death. Id. ¶ 9. In the meantime, Vanderbilt’s calls continued into 2014,
including being placed to Camarena’s brother and grandmother as well, threatening
foreclosure and repossession of the mobile home. Id. ¶ 11. Camarena never provided
her number to Vanderbilt, never authorized the communications, and repeatedly
asked Vanderbilt to stop calling. Id. ¶ 13.
Camarena believes that Vanderbilt used “skip tracing,” a method involving
“pulling credit histories and searching publicly available databases” to obtain
contact information for persons that may be “obligated for consumer debts,” as well
as something called “Automatic Number Identification” to find her number. Id.
¶¶ 14, 15. Camarena alleges that Vanderbilt operates large-scale call centers across
the country that use automated dialing systems to repeatedly call individuals
believed to be debtors, including herself. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21, 28. Camarena brought suit
here in the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of a nationwide class of persons
who have been contacted by Vanderbilt’s automated dialing systems in this way,
which allegedly violates the TCPA. Id. ¶¶ 29, 30; see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).
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II. Legal Standard
“For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). To justify a transfer of venue,
several factors must be satisfied: (1) venue must be proper in the transferor district,
(2) venue would be proper in the transferee district, (3) the transferee district would
be more convenient for the parties and witnesses, and (4) transfer would serve the
interests of justice. See Jaramillo v. DineEquity, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913
(N.D. Ill. 2009); see also Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1986). “Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to
adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case
consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Coffey,
796 F.2d at 219 (“The weighing of factors for and against transfer necessarily
involves a large degree of subtlety and latitude, and, therefore, is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge.”). The moving party has the burden of
establishing “that the transferee forum is clearly more convenient.” Coffey, 796 F.2d
at 219-20.
III. Discussion
To begin, for the purposes of this motion, neither party contests that venue is
proper in this District and also would be proper in the proposed transferee district,
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the Eastern District of Tennessee.2 The Court therefore turns to whether transfer
would provide convenience and serve the interests of justice. Both factors weigh
strongly in favor of transfer.
A. Convenience
In assessing convenience, “courts generally consider the availability of and
access to witnesses, … each party’s access to and distance from resources in each
forum[,] … the location of material events[,] and the relative ease of access to
sources of proof.” Research Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l., Inc., 626
F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). On the whole, the elements favor
litigating this case in Tennessee.
First, most of the relevant witnesses in this case are in Tennessee.
Vanderbilt’s headquarters are in Maryville, Tennessee, located in the Eastern
District of Tennessee, where nearly 900 of its 1053 employees work (and where
former employees who might be called to testify also reside), including those likely
to have direct knowledge of the calls made to Camarena and the policies and
procedures behind such communications. R. 23-1, Affidavit of Vice President of
Collections David Barton ¶¶ 2, 4, 5. These include Vanderbilt’s Vice President of
Collections, Chief Financial Officer, and other managers and team leaders (all of
whom have knowledge of the loan servicing and telecommunication systems and
2Vanderbilt,
while having raised an affirmative defense of improper venue in its
answer, concedes that for purposes of this motion, “the Court may assume venue is proper
in the transferor venue.” R. 32, Def.’s Reply Br. at n.2 (citing Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S.
Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 579 (2013)) (“[Section] 1404(a) does not
condition transfer on the initial forum’s being ‘wrong.’”). Similarly, Camarena does not
contest that venue would be proper in the Eastern District of Tennessee.
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records
of
communications
with
borrowers
and
customers).
Id.
¶
5.
Telecommunications employees of a corporate affiliate of Vanderbilt that might very
well have been involved in the calls also reside in the Maryville area. Id. ¶ 7. If the
case continues to be litigated and goes to trial in Chicago, all of these witnesses,
whose testimony would cover Vanderbilt’s relevant practices, would have to incur
travel expenses, which are a “central measure of [in]convenience.” Craik v. Boeing
Co., 37 F. Supp. 3d 954, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Thus, Vanderbilt has met its burden of
identifying potential non-party witnesses and explaining the subject matter of their
testimony, supporting its contention that there is greater convenience in litigating
in Tennessee. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th
Cir. 1989) (party moving for transfer is “obligated to clearly specify the key
witnesses to be called and make at least a generalized statement of what their
testimony would have included”).
Second, transfer to Tennessee would mean improved access to resources for
Vanderbilt, without any identifiable downside for Camarena. Camarena urges the
Court to consider the time and expense of travel she would incur in getting to
Tennessee. R. 31, Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 7. However, she chose to bring the action in a
location thousands of miles from her home to begin with. There may not be any nonstop flights between San Diego (her home airport) and the Eastern District of
Tennessee, as Camarena asserts, but she offers no specifics about just how much
longer and more expensive a trip would be to Tennessee compared to Illinois. See id.
In any event, even if she were to provide those details, it would not matter as much,
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as the convenience of non-party witnesses outweighs that of the parties. Amorose v.
C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 731, 736 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“The
convenience of party witnesses is less relevant than the convenience of non-party
witnesses, since party witnesses normally must appear voluntarily.”) (citation
omitted). No one likes connecting flights, but that fact is not enough to tip the scales
of convenience in Camarena’s favor.
Third, at least some of the material events underlying the lawsuit can be said
to have occurred in Tennessee. The unsolicited calls were made, at least in part,
from a call center located at Vanderbilt’s facilities in Tennessee. See Barton Aff. ¶ 4.
By contrast, there is no way of connecting the alleged events to Illinois. To argue
otherwise, Camarena points to past lawsuits filed in Illinois courts against
Vanderbilt for similar unlawful activity (against unrelated plaintiffs), the fact that
Vanderbilt has a registered agent in the state, and that the conglomerate that owns
Vanderbilt has a nationwide network of retail outlets that include locations in
Illinois. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5-6. All of that, it should go without saying, is neither here
nor there as far as the material events alleged in this lawsuit are concerned. (If any
other venue might be implicated by the alleged events, it would be Camarena’s
home district in California, where she presumably received the alleged unlawful
calls. But, despite the convenience it would provide her, Camarena does not argue
in the alternative for a transfer there.)
Finally, as for access to sources of documentary proof (as distinct from
witness testimony), this factor does not weigh in favor of either venue. With the
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advent of electronic discovery, where records are actually stored is less of a factor
because “documents now are easily scanned, stored, and electronically transmitted”
and “moving them no longer creates the onerous burden it may once have imposed.”
Landis v. Warner Chilcott (US), LLC, 2010 WL 5373664, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15,
2010) (citation omitted). Because there is no reason to doubt that in this action, as
in most cases today, discovery of the relevant call records and other corporate
documents will be handled electronically, “the location of the documents is a neutral
factor.” Lewis v. Grote Indus., Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(citation omitted). “[T]he location of and ease of access to physical evidence” that is
not reducible to electronic reproduction is, on the other hand, still “accorded more
weight.” Craik, 37 F. Supp. 3d at 961 (citing Lewis, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1053-54)
(emphasis added). Vanderbilt argues that this type of evidence will come into play
in this case and is located in Tennessee, but Vanderbilt does not identify what this
physical proof might be, in any shape or form. This speculation is therefore of no
moment. See Qurio Holdings, Inc. v. DIRECTV, LLC, 2015 WL 1943278, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 29, 2015) (movant for transfer “fails to meet its burden to ‘clearly’ show”
convenience where it does not point to specific physical evidence).
Moving beyond convenience, Camarena argues that she is nevertheless
entitled to deference in her choice of forum. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5. It is true that “there
is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981). But there is an exception that
applies here: “When the plaintiff’s choice is not its home forum, … the presumption
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in the plaintiff’s favor applies with less force, for the assumption that the chosen
forum is appropriate is in such cases less reasonable.” Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454
U.S. at 255-56) (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained above, the balance
of convenience factors does not support Camarena’s chosen forum, which is not in
any case her home. Because three of the relevant elements play to Vanderbilt’s
argument, and the fourth is neutral, the Court concludes that transfer of the case to
Eastern Tennessee would be more convenient for the parties and witnesses.
B. Interest of Justice
“The ‘interest of justice’ is a separate element of the transfer analysis that
relates to the efficient administration of the court system.” Research Automation,
626 F.3d at 978 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 626-27 (1964)). For this
element, courts compare the transferor and transferee districts for a variety of
factors, including “docket congestion and likely speed to trial,” “each court’s relative
familiarity with the relevant law,” “the respective desirability of resolving
controversies in each locale,” and “the relationship of each community to the
controversy.” Id. (collecting cases). The interest of justice “may be determinative in
a particular case, even if the convenience of the parties and witnesses might call for
a different result.” Coffey, 796 F.2d at 220 (citations omitted). All in all, it too
weighs in favor of transfer to Tennessee.
Docket congestion and likely speed to trial is a neutral consideration here.
Vanderbilt argues that the Eastern District of Tennessee is less congested, pointing
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out that in the year ending in September 2014, there were 286 civil cases filed there
per judge versus 473 in this District. R. 24, Def.’s Br. at 12 (citing Federal Court
Management Statistics). Camarena does not contest this statistic but, as she points
out, Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 9-10, these raw totals are somewhat misleading. According to
one “weighting” system that compares dockets across federal district courts by
adjusting for the varying complexity of cases, the combined caseload per fulltime
judge in the Eastern District of Tennessee was 461 versus 389 in this District for
the one-year period ending June 2014. See Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, “As Workloads Rise in Federal Courts, Judge Counts Remain Flat,”
available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/364/#f2, at Table 2. Both parties
agree that the median time for a case to reach trial is 29.9 months in Tennessee’s
Eastern District and 35.3 months here. Def.’s Br. at 12; Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 9. Those
numbers are comparable and do not reflect a significant disparity. Thus, overall,
neither the transferor nor transferee district has any clear advantage in terms of
congestion and speed to trial.
Also neutral is each court’s relative familiarity with the relevant law.
Camarena argues that this District is “far more competent” to adjudicate her claims
because “numerous” TCPA cases have been filed here since the law was enacted,
noting a recent observation in another opinion (dealing with an unrelated
procedural question) that more TCPA suits have been heard here than in any other
district. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 9 (quoting Wolfkiel v. Intersections Ins. Servs. Inc., 303
F.R.D. 287, 294 (N.D. Ill. 2014)). This argument is not compelling. Expertise with
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relevant law might be a slight factor where federal courts sit in diversity and are
tasked with applying state law, in which case deferring to a district court that
regularly interprets that particular law could make sense. But see Peterson v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 624 F. Supp. 44, 46 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (“[F]amiliarity with state law does
not weigh heavily in consideration of a motion to transfer since a change of venue
under § 1404(a) is to be ‘but a change of courtrooms.’”). But all federal courts are
“presumed equally capable and experienced with respect to matters of federal law.”
Midas Int'l Corp. v. Chesley, No. 11 C 8933, 2012 WL 1357708, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
19, 2012); see also Amorose v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 731,
737 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“Because this case concerns federal law, the familiarity with
applicable law is neutral here.”). Indeed, Camarena’s logic would suggest that this
District become a specialty court for TCPA disputes across the country despite the
lack of any real articulable connection to the particular parties or conduct in
question.
It is Tennessee that has a real connection to this dispute, not Illinois. The
case concerns the allegedly unlawful behavior of a Tennessee corporation. The
material events occurred in that state, in the sense that the automated calls were
planned and originated there. Thus, Tennessee has the greater interest in resolving
this controversy and the more meaningful relationship with it. See, e.g., Sickman v.
Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC, 2015 WL 1911431, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2015).
Certainly more than Illinois, whose only link is Camarena’s bald assertion that “it
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is likely that many class members will be from” here, Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 10, which is
supported by nothing except speculation and thus adds nothing to the analysis.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the interest of justice, like the convenience
of the parties and witnesses, weighs overall in favor of transferring the case to the
Eastern District of Tennessee.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Vanderbilt’s motion to transfer venue is
granted.
ENTERED:
s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: July 1, 2015
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