Adefeyinti v. Enloe et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 7/19/2016:Mailed notice(kef, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ADEKUNLE ADEFEYINTI, (#M32077),
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN VARGA,1 Warden, Dixon
Correctional Center,
Respondent.
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Case No. 15 C 0704
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Adekunle Adefeyinti’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court denies
Petitioner’s habeas petition and declines to certify any issues for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2).
BACKGROUND
When considering habeas petitions, federal courts must presume the factual findings
made by the last state court to decide the case on the merits are correct unless the habeas
petitioner rebuts those findings by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);
Miller v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 2016). Where Petitioner has not provided clear
and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, the following factual background is based on
the Illinois Appellate Court’s findings in People v. Adefeyinti, No. 1-12-3388, 2014 IL App (1st)
1
John Varga is the Warden of Dixon Correctional Center where Petitioner is
incarcerated. The Court thus substitutes Varga as the named Respondent in this lawsuit. See
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 436, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004); Fed. R. Civ. P.
25(d).
12388-U (1st Dist. July 22, 2014) (unpublished).
I.
Factual Background
The State charged Petitioner by indictment in connection with a June 12, 2011 incident
involving an individual identified as J.C. At Petitioner’s 2012 bench trial, J.C. testified that on
June 12, 2011, she was in the vicinity of 47th Street and Cicero Avenue on the south side of
Chicago working as a prostitute. She explained that Petitioner drove up to her in a black
limousine, after which they agreed to oral and vaginal sex in exchange for $150. Further, J.C.
testified that Petitioner wanted her to go with him to his house and smoke marijuana, but he had
to first switch his car and change out of his work attire at the limousine company where he
worked. Initially, J.C. rode in the front seat of the limousine, but later moved to the back
because Petitioner did not want anyone to see her. After driving on the expressway, Petitioner
parked the limousine in a parking lot and climbed into the back seat. At that time, J.C. asked
him for money. Petitioner showed J.C. his wallet, but did not give her any money. Petitioner
and J.C. then had oral and vaginal sex. They left the limousine and went to Petitioner’s car.
Shortly thereafter, J.C. asked Petitioner if she could smoke in the car. When Petitioner
said no, J.C. exited Petitioner’s car and smoked a cigarette near the passenger side of the vehicle.
She scratched the license plate number on a pack of matches because she thought the situation
was suspicious. Next, J.C. testified that Petitioner then “tried to beat her to the door” of the car,
hit the gas, and pulled away while J.C. was hanging off the side of the car. She specifically
testified that Petitioner “saw me standing right there, he looked right at me and hit the gas and
tried to run me into ... a yellow minivan.” After Petitioner fled, J.C. made her way to a Chicago
Transit Authority (“CTA”) train station and asked a man for a phone so she could call home.
2
Her next memory was of waking up in the hospital.
At the hospital, J.C. spoke to Chicago Police Detective Joan Burke, who later took J.C. to
certain locations in Chicago to trigger her memory, at which time J.C. located Petitioner’s
limousine at a limousine housing station. Later, J.C. identified Petitioner from a photographic
array and a physical lineup at the police station. J.C. also testified about the severity of her
injuries, including her facial paralysis, as well as the damage to her clothing and a ring that she
had been wearing on the day of the incident.
On cross-examination, J.C. denied meeting Petitioner two or three weeks prior to the
June 12, 2011 incident. She also denied that she called Petitioner on the day of the incident to
meet him and go to a party. She stated, however, that she could not recall if she told Detective
Burke that Petitioner planned on withdrawing $600 from an ATM to split with her. Instead, she
testified that Petitioner wanted her “to swipe the card to get some money off the card” and that
she would receive $150 while Petitioner would keep the rest of the money. She further stated
that Petitioner told her that he shares his ATM card with his wife and that Petitioner’s wife did
not know he had the card at that time. Petitioner told J.C. that if she swiped the card for him, his
wife would think the card was stolen. Furthermore, J.C. recalled Petitioner receiving telephone
calls from a female while they were in the car and that Petitioner explained to the female how to
fix a television.
Also on cross-examination, J.C. clarified that when Petitioner drove away, her feet were
on the running board of the car. She explained that by the time she got on the running board,
Petitioner looked at her and then took off. In addition, she testified that as the car was moving,
Petitioner was looking at her while she was trying to jump off the running board, but that she
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could not move. At that time, she looked up and saw that she was going to run into another
vehicle before she blacked out.
Also at Petitioner’s 2012 bench trial, Anthony Harris, a CTA Security Officer, testified
that on the day of the incident he was working at the CTA Brown Line Stop at 4645 North
Damen Avenue on Chicago’s north side. At approximately 5:00 a.m., he noticed a woman
dressed in torn clothing without shoes, who had blood on her face and hands. The woman
approached him to ask if she could use his phone. Harris then testified that the woman, later
identified as J.C., was unable to dial the number because something was wrong with her arm.
After Harris noticed blood coming from J.C.’s mouth, he called an ambulance. He then noticed
a gash on her head “four inches wide and maybe like six or seven inches long.”
In addition, Chicago Police Detective Rich Szczepkowicz testified at Petitioner’s bench
trial that he was assigned to investigate the incident and interview J.C. at the hospital. Detective
Szczepkowicz testified that in relation to J.C.’s injuries, “[t]he nurses and doctors speculated it
was consistent with either being dragged by a car, run over by a car, [or] perhaps hit by a car.”
Later, Detective Szczepkowicz received information that led him to the 1800 block of West
Leland Avenue near the Damen Stop on the CTA Brown Line. There, residents had noticed
blood trails on their property. In addition to blood, an evidence technician found a braid of hair
and a broken ring.
Detective Joan Burke testified at trial explaining that J.C. told her that the injuries were
caused by a male in his early 30’s and described a limousine housing station. A few days later,
Detective Burke took J.C. to two limousine housing stations, one of which J.C. immediately
identified as the spot where Petitioner had taken her. Once there, J.C. identified the exact
4
limousine Petitioner drove the day of the incident because it was parked in the same spot and she
recognized some damage to its back end. Based on her conversation with J.C., Detective Burke
began looking for “a male Jamaican in his 30’s, a limousine driver, black suit.” The owner of
the limousine company, A–1 Limousine, provided Detective Burke with a “run worksheet” from
the day of the incident, which lead her to Petitioner.
After Detective Demetrius Kolliopoulos and Detective Burke arrested Petitioner,
Detective Burke told Petitioner that she was investigating J.C.’s injuries. At trial, Detective
Burke testified that Petitioner then told her that he met a girl around 79th Street and Stony Island
Avenue on the south side of Chicago while he was driving a black limousine and that they
decided to go to the north side of Chicago. He explained that after changing vehicles to his own
car, he became tired and did not want to drive the girl back to the south side of Chicago. Also,
Petitioner told Detective Burke that he explained to J.C. that he would give her money to take
the train south, but that he was not going to drive her. He further stated that he pulled the car
over to an ATM machine and got out of the car, at which time J.C. also got out of the car to have
a cigarette. Detective Burke testified that Petitioner also told her that when he returned to his
car, “he felt that he was just done with her and he got in, he saw her at his back passenger door
and he locked the car doors.” He stated that he then “hit the gas and pulled away.” Petitioner
told Detective Burke that “all he heard was boom.”
Kamana Mbekeani, a trauma, surgery, and critical care physician, also testified at
Petitioner’s 2012 bench trial. More specifically, Dr. Mbekeani testified that J.C.’s head and
scalp wounds were life-threatening, and that it is common for people with head injuries to black
out. Further, she stated that in cases such as J.C.’s, where her scalp was pulled off, the most
5
common cause is “the person being dragged at a different speed than the hair itself.” Dr.
Mbekeani explained that J.C.’s scalp appeared to have been “pulled on an object and the object
moved forward and she was dragged with it.” When shown pictures of J.C.’s knees and toes, Dr.
Mbekeani testified the injuries were consistent with being dragged on the ground. When asked
on cross-examination whether J.C. made any indication that sexual activity took place on the
night of the incident, Dr. Mbekeani responded that J.C. “was incomprehensible” on the night of
the accident and unable to effectively communicate with the medical staff.
After the Circuit Court denied defense counsel’s motion for a directed finding under 725
ILCS 5/115-4(k), Petitioner testified at trial. Specifically, he stated that he first met J.C. and her
two friends three weeks before the incident at a restaurant on 79th Street and Stony Island
Avenue in Chicago. He explained that he gave one of the girls his business card and that J.C.
told him her name was Kelly. The other girls were named Dollar and Nicki. Petitioner testified
that on the night of the incident, he received a call from Dollar and Nicki, after which Petitioner
told them that he got off of work at 3 a.m. He testified that Dollar and Nicki told him that they
would call him when he got off work. Further, he testified that after dropping off his customers,
he drove back to A–1 Limousine to pick up his own car. One of the girls called him and told
him that she was at a party in a motel at Cicero Avenue and Roosevelt Road. Petitioner further
testified that he told the girl he could not come to the party, but he could pick her up at a nearby
gas station.
When Petitioner arrived at the gas station, J.C. came out to the car and asked to hang out.
Petitioner offered his place, but told her he had to first go back to get his chauffeur license from
the limousine. He testified that thereafter he pulled up behind the limousine he had been driving
6
earlier and went to the limousine to get his license. When he came back, J.C. told him that she
had never been in a limousine before. Petitioner then allowed her to look inside. He testified
that they then went back to his car and drove towards his house. While driving, Petitioner took
$700 out of his wallet, which he counted for his rent, while J.C. was by his side. He testified that
he then put the money back in his wallet. Petitioner’s girlfriend then called him, asking his
whereabouts and inquiring when he would be home. Once Petitioner hung up the phone, he told
J.C. that they could not go to his house, but that they could meet in the future. Petitioner told
J.C. that he would try to drop her off where she could take the train, but J.C. demanded that he
take her to 75th Street and Coles Avenue on Chicago’s south side. Further, Petitioner testified
that his girlfriend kept calling, but that he did not answer the phone. Eventually, he answered the
phone and his girlfriend asked him how to operate “Netflix” on the television.
Furthermore, Petitioner testified that J.C. was upset after his conversation with his
girlfriend. According to Petitioner, J.C. then pulled out a razor and demanded that he take her to
75th Street and Coles Avenue, but he refused. He then testified that J.C. cut his leather car seat,
after which he stopped the car at a gas station and offered to give J.C. money, namely $20, to
take the train. He also testified that J.C. told him that she wanted to smoke and got out of the
car. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner got out of the car and locked the car door with his remote
control. He went to an ATM while J.C. was walking back and forth about 10 or 15 feet away.
Petitioner testified that he jumped in his car and drove off. He stated that he heard J.C. hit his
car and it sounded like a “boom.” Also, Petitioner testified that he did not expect that his
girlfriend would be home and that although he intended to have sex with J.C., they never did.
Petitioner denied that he and J.C. were ever in the backseat and he further denied knowing that
7
J.C. was holding on to his car, but testified that he “heard her hit my vehicle in the back, you
know. Like somebody hit your car like twice, boom, boom.” He testified that he did not know
that an accident involving J.C. occurred until three weeks later when he was taken into custody.
On cross-examination, Petitioner stated that J.C. never told him she was a prostitute and
that they never agreed to have sex for money. He explained that he went to the ATM to get $20,
because he did not want to give her any of the $700 he had on him, which were “all hundreds.”
Further, he testified that he could not see out of his back window because it was tinted. Also, he
clarified that he did not know if J.C. grabbed the rear passenger door, but stated that she did
“bang on the passenger side door on the back.” When asked whether he saw J.C. at the back
door before pulling away, he answered: “No. I heard her knock on the back of the vehicle,
boom, boom, twice.” Also on cross-examination, Petitioner denied that he told the police that he
saw J.C. at the back door. He further testified that he did not stop his vehicle when he heard the
two knocks on the back of the vehicle. Last, Petitioner admitted that he did not check on J.C.
and he did not call the police after the accident.
II.
Procedural Background
On August 15, 2012, after Petitioner’s bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, the Circuit Court judge found Petitioner guilty of the following charges: (1) failure to
report an accident after leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving personal injuries;
(2) aggravated battery causing great bodily harm; (3) aggravated battery with a deadly weapon
other than a firearm; (4) aggravated battery upon a public way; and (5) leaving the scene of a
motor vehicle accident involving personal injuries. On October 4, 2012, the Circuit Court judge
sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of 12 years in prison.
8
On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions
of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving personal injuries, failure to report an
accident, and aggravated battery. Petitioner also argued that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. On July 22, 2014, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District,
affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. Petitioner brought the same arguments in his
petition for leave to appeal (“PLA”), which the Supreme Court of Illinois denied on November
26, 2014.
III.
Habeas Petition
On January 22, 2015, Petitioner filed the present pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.2 Construing Petitioner’s pro se allegations in his habeas petition liberally, see Carter v.
Duncan, 819 F.3d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 2016), he asserts: (1) a sufficiency of the evidence claim
under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); and (2)
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Petitioner has exhausted his habeas claims except for one
basis of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, namely, that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue that certain trial witnesses were not credible when moving for a directed finding.
Although Petitioner has not exhausted this claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the Court may
deny this habeas claim on the merits notwithstanding his failure to exhaust it, as discussed
below. See Bolton v. Akpore, 730 F.3d 685, 696 (7th Cir. 2013).
2
On March 2, 2016, the Northern District of Illinois Executive Committee reassigned
the present habeas matter to this Court.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), the Court
cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of federal law clearly established by the Supreme Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 402-03, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Corcoran v. Neal, 783 F.3d 676, 682
(7th Cir. 2015). Clearly established federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the
holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the United States Supreme Court. See White v. Woodall, ___
U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014). The Supreme Court has explained that
a state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law “if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law” or “if the
state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court
precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405.
Under the “unreasonable application” prong of the AEDPA standard, a habeas petitioner
must demonstrate that although the state court identified the correct legal rule, it unreasonably
applied the controlling law to the facts of the case. See id. at 407; see also White, 134 S.Ct. at
1702. To be sufficiently unreasonable, the state court’s application of federal law must be more
than incorrect, it must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Corcoran, 783 F.3d at 683; see also
Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 (“unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
incorrect application of federal law”) (emphasis in original). To be considered objectively
unreasonable, a state court’s decision must be “well outside the boundaries of permissible
differences of opinion.” Corcoran, 783 F.3d at 683 (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court
teaches, to be objectively unreasonable, the state court ruling must be “so lacking in justification
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that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility
for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178
L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (“habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal
justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”).
ANALYSIS
I.
Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim
Petitioner first argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the following convictions: (1) failing to report an accident;
(2) leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident; and (3) aggravated battery. The clearly
established Supreme Court law that applies to this habeas claim is set forth in Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Jackson holds that due
process is satisfied if – when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
– “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Jones v. Butler, 778 F.3d 575, 581 (7th
Cir. 2015) (Jackson standard “is a rigorous one”). The Jackson standard “gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319. Because the Court is considering Petitioner’s claim on collateral review, the
AEDPA imposes an additional layer to this inquiry, namely, the Court may grant relief only if
the Illinois Appellate Court applied the Jackson standard unreasonably to the facts of Petitioner’s
case. See Jones, 778 F.3d at 581-82. The Court thus turns to the Illinois Appellate Court’s
decision in this matter.
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Prior to addressing Petitioner’s specific arguments concerning his Jackson claim, the
Illinois Appellate Court discussed the relevant constitutional parameters for Petitioner’s due
process claim. See People v. Baskerville, 963 N.E.2d 898, 907, 357 Ill. Dec. 500 (Ill. 2012)
(citing People v. Davison, 233 Ill.2d 30, 43, 329 Ill.Dec. 347, 906 N.E.2d 545 (Ill. 2009)
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).3 In
addressing Petitioner’s arguments that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of his guilt
for failing to report an accident and leaving the scene of an accident, the Illinois Appellate Court
stated:
Defendant argues that the evidence at trial did not show that he knew that
he was involved in an accident involving another person. He contends the
evidence shows that he did not even know about the accident until three weeks
later. Defendant acknowledges that J.C.’s testimony indicates that he saw her
hanging from his car as he drove away, but characterizes her testimony as
incredible.
People v. Adefeyinti, No. 1-12-3388, 2014 WL 3644329, at *9 (Ill. App. Ct. July 22, 2014)
(unpublished). The Illinois Appellate Court quoted the statutory language for both offenses,
namely, 625 ILCS 5/11-401(a), (b), highlighting that:
A conviction under either subsection (a) or (b) of section 11–401 requires
that the offending motorist had “knowledge that he or she was involved in an
accident that involved another person.” Circumstantial evidence may be used to
prove the knowledge requirement. Additionally, “knowledge that another person
was involved in the accident may be imputed to a driver from the circumstances
of the accident.”
Id. at *10 (internal citations omitted).
3
Section 2254(d) does not require the Illinois court to expressly consider federal or
Supreme Court law, rather, the court can rely on state court decisions, as long the cases do not
contradict federal law as set forth by the Supreme Court. See Miller v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 275,
282 (7th Cir. 2016); Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 905 (7th Cir. 2015).
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The Illinois Appellate Court – applying the controlling law to the evidence presented at
trial – then held:
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant left the scene of a motor
vehicle accident involving personal injury. J.C. testified defendant “tried to beat”
her to the car door, looked at her, and then quickly pulled away. She testified
defendant “tried to run [her] into ... a minivan.” She also testified concerning the
injuries she sustained. Detective Burke testified defendant told her that he saw
J.C. at his back passenger door, locked the car doors, pulled away, and heard a
“boom.” Dr. Mbekeani testified J.C.’s injuries were consistent with being
dragged on the ground. J.C., Detective Burke, Anthony Harris, and Dr. Mbekeani
all testified to the seriousness of J.C.’s injuries. Defendant admitted that he
“jumped in” his car before driving off, and heard J.C. hit his vehicle, but denied
seeing J.C. hanging onto his car. There was sufficient evidence to sustain
defendant’s convictions for leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident
involving personal injury. A reasonable trier of fact could have concluded based
on the evidence presented that defendant had the requisite knowledge that he was
involved in an accident with J.C. and that he then left the scene.
We additionally hold that the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, was also sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for
failing to report a motor vehicle accident. Defendant admitted at trial that he did
not report the accident and testified that he did not find out about the accident
until his arrest three weeks later. Defendant’s admission that he did not report the
accident, in addition to the evidence that he knowingly left the accident scene
under section 11–401(a), provided sufficient evidence for his conviction under
section 11–401(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
Defendant’s argument addressing his convictions under both section
11–401(a) and 11–401(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code is based on his contention
that J.C.’s testimony was incredible. We remind defendant, however, that it is the
trier of fact’s responsibility to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicting evidence,
and make credibility determinations. Accordingly, we hold, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, that the evidence was sufficient
to sustain defendant’s convictions for leaving the scene of a motor vehicle
accident and for failing to report the accident.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The Illinois Appellate Court’s decision concerning Petitioner’s sufficiency of the
evidence claims as related to his convictions for leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident
13
and for failing to report the accident does not lie “well outside the boundaries of permissible
differences of opinion.” Corcoran, 783 F.3d at 683 (citation omitted). To clarify, the Illinois
court applied the proper legal standard pursuant to Jackson when viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State. Further, the Illinois Appellate Court pointed to the underlying
evidence – both direct and circumstantial – that supported these convictions and properly
rejected Petitioner’s credibility argument. Also, the Illinois court recognized that a conviction
under either Section 11–401(a) and 11–401(b) required that the driver knew he was involved in
an accident with another person and that this knowledge can be established by circumstantial
evidence.
Nevertheless, Petitioner argues that J.C.’s testimony was not credible – pointing to
instances where his defense counsel impeached her testimony and the inconsistencies in her trial
testimony. Petitioner also highlights other witness testimony that he finds not credible arguing
that “their testimony cannot be reconciled with reality.” It is well-settled law, however, that in
making a determination under Jackson, courts do not weigh the evidence or second guess the
factfinder’s credibility determinations. See United States v. Mire, 725 F.3d 665, 678 (7th Cir.
2013). Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show that the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision
regarding his convictions under 625 ILCS 5/11-401 was objectively unreasonable because it was
not “so lacking in justification” that it is “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.
Next, as to Petitioner’s argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of
guilt as to his aggravated battery conviction, the Illinois Appellate Court explained:
Defendant argues the State failed to prove the requisite mental state for his
aggravated battery causing great bodily harm conviction. Defendant contends he
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was not consciously aware that his conduct would cause great bodily harm
because he did not know J.C. was hanging on to his car. He acknowledges that
J.C. testified he looked at her immediately before driving away, but claims her
testimony is incredible.
People v. Adefeyinti, 2014 WL 3644329, at *11. The Illinois Appellate Court then set forth the
relevant statutes and supporting case law:
A battery is committed when a person “intentionally or knowingly without
legal justification and by any means ... causes bodily harm to an individual.” 720
ILCS 5/12–3. Section 12–4(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines the offense
of aggravated battery as when “[a] person ... in committing a battery, intentionally
or knowingly causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or
disfigurement.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/12–4(a). “A person acts
knowingly if they are consciously aware that their conduct is practically certain to
cause great bodily harm.” People v. Vasquez, 315 Ill.App.3d 1131, 1133 (2000).
Id.
Applying the trial evidence to the Illinois criminal statutes, the Illinois Appellate Court
concluded:
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we
hold the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed
aggravated battery causing great bodily harm. J.C. testified that after she got out
of defendant’s car to smoke a cigarette, defendant “tried to beat [her] to the door.”
Defendant then looked at her and “hit the gas and pulled off.” J.C. testified
defendant’s windows were down and stressed that defendant saw her prior to
pulling away. J.C. further testified defendant “tried to run [her] into ... a yellow
minivan.” Detective Burke testified defendant told her that he “felt he was done
with” J.C., locked the doors, and quickly pulled away. Detective Kolliopoulos
testified that defendant told him that he saw J.C. at the back door and that it was
her choice to hold onto the car. J.C., Detective Burke, Anthony Harris, and Dr.
Mbekeani testified to the seriousness of J.C.’s injuries. Defendant testified that
he “jumped” into his car before driving off. He denied seeing J.C. as he drove
off. J.C.’s testimony, in addition to the testimony of Detectives Burke and
Kolliopoulos, Anthony Harris, and Dr. Mbekeani, provided sufficient evidence
for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude defendant knowingly caused great bodily
harm to J.C. by driving while she was hanging on to his car. J.C.’s testimony that
it seemed as though defendant was trying to run her into another car provided
further evidence of defendant’s intent to harm her. Defendant again questions
J.C.’s credibility. As previously discussed, however, it is trier of fact’s
15
responsibility, and not this court’s, to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicting
evidence, and make credibility determinations. Accordingly, we hold the record
shows sufficient evidence to uphold defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery
causing great bodily harm.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Again, Petitioner argues that J.C.’s trial testimony was not credible because she gave two
versions of the incident. He explains that J.C. misrepresented where she was standing when she
was outside of the car before he drove off. Specifically, Petitioner points to impeachment
evidence and argues that the Court should disregard J.C.’s trial testimony in relation to
Petitioner’s knowledge or intent. As discussed above, in analyzing Petitioner’s sufficiency of
the evidence claim, the Court must defer to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, and thus
Petitioner’s argument is unavailing. See, e.g., United States v. Resnick, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL
2641860, at *4 (7th Cir. May 4, 2016). Also, the State presented more than just J.C.’s testimony
to support this conviction. Indeed, Detective Burke testified that Petitioner told her “he felt that
he was just done with her and he got in, he saw her at his back passenger door and he locked the
car doors.” Detective Kolliopoulos testified that Petitioner told him that he saw J.C. at the car’s
back door. In addition, Detective Burke, the CTA Security Officer Anthony Harris, and Dr.
Mbekeani all testified to the seriousness of J.C.’s injuries. Finally, the Circuit Court found
Petitioner’s testimony incredible, stating it did not “believe the defendant when he said he didn’t
see [J.C.]. He knew when he knocked her off the car. And he had the knowledge, in my view,
the State proved knowledge in their case.” Adefeyinti, 2014 WL 3644329, at *7.
In sum, Petitioner’s argument regarding J.C.’s credibility does not establish that the
Illinois Appellate Court’s decision was objectively unreasonable, namely, that it was “so lacking
in justification” it was “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement,” see Harrington,
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562 U.S. at 103, especially in light of the other testimony presented at trial. See Stern v.
Meisner, 812 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 2016) (petitioner “must show complete absence of
reasonableness in [] appellate court’s decision.”). The Court thus denies Petitioner’s habeas
claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson.
II.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Next, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to
make certain arguments in support of the motion for a directed finding under 725 ILCS 5/1154(k). To establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment,
Petitioner must show that (1) his trial attorney’s performance “fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness,” informed by “prevailing professional norms” and (2) “but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “To reflect the
wide range of competent legal strategies and to avoid the pitfalls of review in hindsight, [the
Court’s] review of an attorney’s performance is highly deferential and reflects a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Groves v. United States, 755 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To
establish prejudice, it is not enough “to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding,” instead Petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Petitioner v. Butts, 760 F.3d 631, 635 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94).
If Petitioner fails to make a proper showing under one of the Strickland prongs, the Court need
not consider the other. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“a court need not determine whether
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counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant”);
Groves, 755 F.3d at 591 (If petitioner “is unable to make a sufficient showing of one of the
Strickland prongs, we need not consider the other.”). Finally, as the Supreme Court teaches,
because the “standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’” when
“applying the two in tandem, review is ‘doubly so.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations
omitted).
Petitioner’s first ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on trial counsel’s failure
to emphasize during his argument on the motion for a directed finding that the State did not
prove that he failed to report the accident within thirty minutes in accordance with 625 ILCS
5/11-401(b). At the hearing on the motion for a directed finding, defense counsel focused on
Petitioner’s intent, namely, that he did not intend for the accident to occur. As to the other
charges, defense counsel argued that there was no evidence that Petitioner had any sexual
contact with J.C. The Circuit Court granted Petitioner’s motion on the attempted murder charge,
but found that the State had met its burden as to the remaining counts of the indictment.
In discussing Petitioner’s argument concerning counsel’s performance at the hearing on
the motion for a directed finding, the Illinois Appellate Court applied the Strickland standard as
outlined in People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 317, 736 N.E.2d 975, 249 Ill.Dec. 537 (Ill. 2000)
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.) Considering the proper legal framework, the Illinois
Appellate Court held that:
[D]efendant has not satisfied his burden of proving ineffective assistance of
counsel because he cannot overcome the presumption that his counsel’s actions
were a matter of trial strategy. Initially, we point out that the record shows
defendant did mo[ve] for a directed finding and the trial court’s ruling on the
motion addressed all counts of the indictment. The trial court granted the motion
as to count I, for attempted murder; but denied the motion as to the remaining
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counts. Defendant has not challenged the circuit court’s ruling on the motion for
a directed finding. Rather, he bases his argument on how defense counsel orally
argued the motion and how a proper argument may have changed the circuit
court’s ruling on the motion for a directed finding. Our review of the record
shows defense counsel’s strategy in this matter was to argue that defendant did
not have sex with J.C. and that he had no knowledge that an accident occurred. It
follows that if defendant did not know that an accident occurred, then he could
also not subsequently report an accident. Had the strategy been effective,
defendant would not have been convicted of the counts at issue here as knowledge
is an element the State had to prove to show defendant left the scene of a motor
vehicle accident involving personal injuries, failed to report the accident after
leaving, and aggravated battery. Defense counsel’s focus on defendant’s lack of
knowledge of the accident was ultimately unsuccessful. A failed strategic
decision, however, does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that his
counsel’s actions in orally arguing the motion for a directed finding were a matter
of trial strategy.
Adefeyinti, 2014 WL 3644329, at *13.
The Illinois Appellate Court’s decision regarding this ineffective assistance of counsel
claim was objectively reasonable. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103; Corcoran, 783 F.3d at 683.
As to the Strickland performance prong, the Illinois Appellate Court’s conclusion that trial
counsel’s strategy did not amount to a constitutionally deficient performance is supported by
Strickland’s teaching that “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689 (citation omitted). As the Illinois court explained,
defense counsel’s strategy was to focus on Petitioner’s lack of knowledge that an accident
occurred and – had the Circuit Court agreed – it would have granted the motion as to all counts
requiring knowledge, not just the failure to report claim. In addition, although counsel’s
arguments in support of the directed finding were not completely successful, the Circuit Court
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granted the motion on the attempted murder charge, which vitiates Petitioner’s argument that
defense counsel’s performance was deficient. Moreover, because Petitioner failed to establish
that counsel’s performance – as a whole – was deficient under the first Strickland prong, the
Court need not examine the Strickland prejudice prong. See Groves, 755 F.3d at 591.
Petitioner’s second claim under Strickland is that his trial counsel provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the credibility of the State’s
witnesses, namely, J.C., Detective Burke, and Detective Kolliopoulos, when moving for a
directed finding. As discussed above, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that defense
counsel’s decision to directly challenge whether the State presented evidence of Petitioner’s
knowledge was a sound trial strategy under Strickland. Petitioner also fails to explain how
defense counsel’s failure to challenge the credibility of these witnesses when moving for a
directed finding “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” informed by “prevailing
professional norms.” See Strickland 466 U.S. at 668, 688.
Also, in relation to his argument concerning the State’s credibility of witnesses,
Petitioner has not argued, let alone established that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” as
required to show prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Consequently, Petitioner has failed
to show that the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103; Stern, 812 F.3d at 610. Therefore, the Court denies Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in regard to counsel’s decision not to challenge the
witnesses’ credibility when moving for a directed finding under 725 ILCS 5/115-4(k).
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On a final note, for the first time in his reply brief filed on June 9, 2015, Petitioner argues
that his defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to “build a defense when
given the opportunity for rebuttal [and] Petitioner’s counsel declined” and “failed to impeach
state witness [J.C.] during cross-examination.” Not only is it well-established that arguments
made for the first time in a reply brief are waived, Petitioner has failed to develop these bareboned statements. See United States v. Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir. 2015) (the “[c]ourt
has long warned that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are deemed waived.”); Darif v.
Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 336-37 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief are waived.”). Moreover, in his habeas filings, Petitioner admits that defense counsel
consistently impeached J.C. with her inconsistent statements. Last, Petitioner fails to argue how
he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance. As such, these newly-made
arguments fail.
II.
Certificate of Appealability
Under the 2009 Amendments to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings, the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a
final order adverse to the applicant.” Accordingly, the Court must determine whether to grant
Petitioner a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) in the present ruling.
See Gonzalez v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 641, 649 n.5, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012).
A habeas petitioner does not have the absolute right to appeal a district court’s denial of
his habeas petition, rather, he must first request a certificate of appealability. See Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); Flores-Ramirez v.
Foster, 811 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2016). A habeas petitioner is entitled to a certificate of
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appealability only if he can make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336; 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, Petitioner must
demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)).
Here, Petitioner has not established that reasonable jurists would debate that the Court
should have resolved his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in a different manner,
especially because there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Groves, 755 F.3d at 591. Further,
Petitioner has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists would debate that the Court should have
resolved his sufficiency of the evidence claims under Jackson in a different manner. As such,
the Court declines to certify any issues for appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court denies Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
declines to certify any issues for appeal. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(c)(2), 2254(d).
Dated: July 19, 2016
ENTERED
AMY J. ST. EVE
United States District Judge
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