Knapp v. Evgeros, Inc. et al

Filing 156

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order written by the Honorable Gary Feinerman on 8/24/2017.Mailed notice.(jlj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KITTY KNAPP,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EVGEROS, INC., d/b/a Olympic Star Restaurant,
Defendant.

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15 C 754
Judge Gary Feinerman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Kitty Knapp filed this suit against her former employer, Evgeros, Inc., alleging violations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Illinois Human
Rights Act (“IHRA”), 775 ILCS § 5/1-101 et seq. Doc. 1. During discovery, the court imposed
a $2,380 discovery sanction on Knapp in connection with a motion to compel. Docs. 62-63
(Brown, M.J.) (reported at 2016 WL 2755452 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2016)). After discovery, the
court granted summary judgment to Evgeros and entered judgment in its favor. Docs. 97-98
(reported at 205 F. Supp. 3d 946 (N.D. Ill. 2016)). Knapp’s attorney, Jason R. Craddock, Sr.,
then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Docs. 153-154 (reported at 2017 WL
3592663 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2017)).
The final open matter on the docket is Evgeros’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions, which
seeks relief on the ground that Knapp and Craddock continued to pursue Knapp’s ADA claim
after her deposition testimony made clear that her alleged disability did not substantially limit
any major life activity. Doc. 112. The motion is denied.

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Background
The procedural and factual background of this case is set forth in the court’s summary
judgment opinion. The story concerning the present sanctions motion began on March 23, 2016,
when Evgeros’s counsel sent Craddock a letter stating, in its entirety:
Pursuant to FRCP 11, dismiss counts I and II with prejudice as there is no
liability based on your client’s own testimony. When asked “What activities
did you [sic] elbow limit, if any?” Ms. Knapp testified, “I really didn’t think
anything.” When asked “Prior to the surgery, did the elbow ever interfere
with your duties at work?” Ms. Knapp testified, “No, I did them.” Your
client’s alleged impairment does not substantially limit any major life activity.
Dismiss your claim by Friday March 25, 2016, or I will seek sanctions.
Doc. 112-1 at 1. A week later, Craddock responded:
At this time, I believe a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
Plaintiff was ‘regarded as having a disability’ which could preclude summary
judgment (see Best v. Shell Oil Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7452, pp. 1011), and so we decline to dismiss these counts.
Doc. 112-2 at 3. A day later, Evgeros moved for summary judgment. Doc. 57. As noted, the
court granted the motion and entered judgment. Doc. 98. Evgeros moved for Rule 11 sanctions
a month later. Doc. 112.
While the sanctions motion was pending, Evgeros’s counsel filed a complaint against
Craddock with the Northern District of Illinois Executive Committee arising from Craddock’s
use of “gender-based, vulgar insults against opposing counsel.” 17 MC 27, Doc. 1 at 1. The
Executive Committee ruled: “Craddock’s use of slurs against defense counsel was intended to
intimidate her in the representation of her client. This conduct, along with its underlying intent,
meets the definition of harassment or discrimination on the basis of sex, and violated Rule of
Professional Conduct 8.4(g).” Id. at 2. Craddock was suspended from the General Bar of this
court for twelve months and stricken from the Trial Bar. Id. at 4.

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Discussion
“Under Rule 11, sanctions are proper when a party or attorney signs a pleading or motion
that is not well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law.” Blow v. Bijora, Inc., 855 F.3d
793, 807 (7th Cir. 2017); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (stating, in relevant part, that “[b]y presenting
to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper … an attorney … certifies that to the best
of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, … the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; [and] the factual contentions
have evidentiary support”). In determining whether that burden has been met, the court “must
undertake an objective inquiry into whether the party or his counsel should have known that his
position is groundless.” Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc’y v. Office & Prof’l Emps. Int’l Union, Local 39,
443 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, “[t]he decision
to grant or deny a motion for Rule 11 sanctions is within the sound judgment of the district
court.” Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 523 (7th Cir. 2013).
A party seeking sanctions must comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Rule
11(c)(2), which provides in relevant part:
A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion and
must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b). The
motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to
the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is
withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within
another time the court sets.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). The Rule’s text states that the moving party must serve the proposed
motion on the other party and may file it only after 21 days have passed. But circuit precedent
holds that “a letter informing the opposing party of the intent to seek sanctions and the basis for
the imposition of sanctions … is sufficient for Rule 11 purposes.” Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l

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Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 649 F.3d 539, 552 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). That precedent
is on life support—earlier this year, the Seventh Circuit came within a cat’s whisker of
overruling it. See N. Ill. Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 883-89 (7th Cir. 2017).
But precedent it remains, and this court must follow it until the Seventh Circuit says otherwise.
See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Olson v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 1986).
As noted, Evgeros served Craddock with a letter, not a motion, notifying him of its
intention to seek sanctions if Craddock did not withdraw Knapp’s ADA claim. Although a letter
suffices (at least for now) under Rule 11(c)(2), and although Evgeros waited more than 21 days
after serving the letter to file its Rule 11 motion—the court will assume without deciding that
Evgeros’s waiting more than 21 days satisfied the 21-day requirement even though its letter gave
Knapp only two days to dismiss the ADA claims—Evgeros can seek Rule 11 sanctions only on
the grounds set forth in the letter. After all, Rule 11(c)(2) says that the movant must serve a Rule
11 motion 21 days before filing it, which means that the filed motion must be materially identical
to the served motion. The same necessarily holds for a letter served in lieu of a motion, meaning
that the court may not consider any grounds set forth in the motion that were not articulated in
the letter.
The sole ground for sanctions articulated in Evgeros’s letter is that Knapp’s deposition
testimony showed that her “alleged impairment does not substantially limit any major life
activity.” Doc. 112-1 at 1. Evgeros’s argument rests on the premise that a person can qualify as
disabled under the ADA only if her alleged disability substantially limits a major life activity.
That premise is wrong. As the court explained in its summary judgment opinion:
An ADA plaintiff must prove that she has a “disability” in order to prevail.
See Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Comm. Coll., 795 F.3d 698, 706 (7th

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Cir. 2015). The ADA defines a “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities …; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment (as described in paragraph 3)).” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Paragraph
(3) clarifies that an individual can be “regarded as” having a disability
“whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life
activity.” Id. § 12102(3)(A).
205 F. Supp. 3d at 954. Thus, Knapp’s testimony that her impairment did not substantially limit
a major life activity did not foreclose her ADA claims, so long as she was “regarded as” having a
disability. See Silk, 795 F.3d at 706. That was precisely the holding of the Best v. Shell Oil Co.
case that Craddock cited in his response.
So on the only issue raised in Evgeros’s letter, Craddock was right and Evgeros was
wrong. Rule 11 sanctions cannot issue under these circumstances.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Evgeros’s sanctions motion is denied.

August 24, 2017
United States District Judge

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