Crockwell v. Dart et al
Filing
88
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 10/20/2016: Defendants' motion for reconsideration, 86 , is denied. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff.(psm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RAYMONE CROCKWELL,
Plaintiff,
No. 15 CV 825
v.
THOMAS DART, SHERIFF OF COOK
COUNTY, and COOK COUNTY,
Judge Manish S. Shah
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants move for reconsideration of the court’s alternative holding for
granting Crockwell summary judgment on liability on his ADA claim over bathroom
access at the Leighton courthouse. [81].1 For the following reasons, the motion to
reconsider, [86], is denied.
I.
Legal Standard
“Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Caisse Nationale de
Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996). A “manifest
error” occurs when “the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a
decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has
made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.” Bank of Waunakee v.
Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). Issues appropriate
1
Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket.
for reconsideration “rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally
rare.” Id.
II.
Analysis
Crockwell was granted summary judgment on liability as to his ADA claim
relating to bathroom access at the Leighton courthouse for two reasons: (1) based on
the undisputed record, Crockwell was denied use of an accessible bathroom during
his near-monthly appearances at the Leighton courthouse, resulting in him soiling
himself on multiple occasions; and (2) defendants were precluded from relitigating
the issue of intentional discrimination against wheelchair-using detainees at the
Leighton courthouse prior to April 2014 by Lacy v. Dart, No. 14 C 6259 (N.D. Ill.).
[81] at 11–15. Defendants only seek reconsideration on this second, alternative
holding relating to issue preclusion—they do not seek reconsideration of (or even
address) the first reason for granting Crockwell summary judgment on this claim.
Crockwell’s opening summary judgment brief argued that issue preclusion
barred the defendants from relitigating the issue of intentional discrimination
against wheelchair-using detainees at the Leighton courthouse prior to April 2014
by Lacy v. Dart, No. 14 C 6259 (N.D. Ill.). [67] at 12–15. Defendants responded that
issue preclusion was inapplicable because there had not been a final judgment in
Lacy and because it would be fundamentally unfair to bind defendants to the ruling
in Lacy when they did not yet have the opportunity to appeal. [73] at 10–14. In their
motion for reconsideration, defendants argue that issue preclusion is inapplicable
because the Lacy ruling was not a final order and because it deprives defendants of
2
the due process right to establish that they provided Crockwell with an ADA
accommodation.
Defendants’ argument that the Lacy ruling was not a final order merely
rehashes its unsuccessful summary judgment and is therefore not appropriate for a
motion for reconsideration. See Caisse Nationale, 90 F.3d at 1270. Defendants’
arguments also fail on their merits. They contend that Bell v. Taylor, 827 F.3d 699
(7th Cir. 2016), cited in the summary judgment opinion, is distinguishable from the
instant action because it involved res judicata, not issue preclusion, in a copyright
infringement suit between the same parties. That Bell involved copyright
infringement is not a material distinction, and the distinctions between claim and
issue preclusion, as discussed below, do not support reconsideration.
Defendants argue that in Bell, res judicata applied to the same parties, but
the parties in Lacy are not the same as the parties here. This is a distinction
between res judicata—which requires an identity of the parties or their privies,
Bell, 827 F.3d at 706—and issue preclusion—which does not require an identity of
both parties. But that is not a reason to reconsider my decision. Issue preclusion
requires that the party against whom issue preclusion is invoked must have been
fully represented in the prior action, and that element has been met in this case.
Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); see Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326–31 (1979) (federal law no longer requires
mutuality for the “offensive” use of issue preclusion, application of which is within
the “broad discretion” of the trial court).
3
Moreover, while Bell involved res judicata, it explained that “finality for
purposes of appeal is not the same as finality for purposes of preclusion,” 827 F.3d
at 707 (citing Wright & Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure § 4432), and recognized
that the concept of finality is more flexible for issue preclusion than it is for res
judicata. Id. This is because “the need for a final judgment [in the case as a whole]
is not as compelling when the question is whether the determination of a single
issue actually decided in the first action should be given conclusive effect in a later
action between the parties on a different claim.” Gilldorn Sav. Ass’n v. Commerce
Sav. Ass’n, 804 F.2d 390, 393 (7th Cir. 1986). Under the facts particular to Bell, the
“relaxed concept of finality, at least for purposes of collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion” was also expanded to res judicata. 827 F.3d at 707.
Defendants argue, however, that the circumstances here should weigh in
favor of finding a lack of finality. Bell explained that whether a judgment is “final”
depends upon “the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative),
the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review.” 827 F.3d at 707
(quoting Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir.
1961)). Defendants contend that the Lacy rulings were non-final, as the only
injunctive relief ordered related to wheelchair ramp access (not bathroom access)
and the summary judgment opinion was an interlocutory order. But finality for
issue preclusion means a decision that “was not avowedly tentative,” Bell, 827 F.3d
at 707, and “[t]he ultimate question is whether the ‘prior adjudication . . . is
determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.’” Gilldorn, 804
4
F.2d at 393 (quoting in part Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 605
F.2d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 1979)); see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13.
Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2015), is cited by
defendants for the proposition that a dismissal based on claim preclusion was
improper based on the district court’s interim ruling denying leave to add a
defendant, which was a non-final decision. As explained in Bell, however, the
concept of finality for issue preclusion is more flexible than finality for claim
preclusion. Moreover, in Skylarsky, the plaintiff was directed to bring a second suit,
which was then dismissed under claim preclusion.
The
Lacy
holdings
on
defendants’
failure
to
provide
bathroom
accommodations for wheelchair-using detainees at the Leighton courthouse prior to
2014 were sufficiently firm and non-tentative to be accorded conclusive effect. The
Lacy opinions on the injunction (for wheelchair ramp accommodations) and
summary judgment (on ADA liability for five individual plaintiffs) made several
factual findings as to the inadequacy of the overall bathroom accommodations for
wheelchair-using detainees at the Leighton courthouse prior to 2014, which formed
the basis for the court’s determination that defendants had intentionally
discriminated
against
wheelchair-using
detainees
attending
the
Leighton
courthouse prior to 2014. See Lacy v. Dart, No. 14 C 6259, 2015 WL 5921810, at
*11–12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2015) (“[T]he evidentiary record establishes that plaintiffs
have historically been denied access on the same basis as non-disabled detainees to
bathroom facilities at the six courthouses,” and “[g]iven that defendants did not . . .
5
provide a reasonable accommodation to allow wheelchair-using detainees to use
holding cell bathroom facilities on the same basis as non-disabled detainees, the
court finds that defendants have, in the past, violated plaintiffs’ rights pursuant to
the ADA.”); Lacy v. Dart, No. 14 C 6259, 2015 WL 7351752, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19,
2015) (“[T]he record establishes that defendants deliberately failed to act to protect
plaintiffs’ rights until 2014” because “[d]efendants did not begin providing any
accommodations to wheelchair-using detainees with respect to the bathroom
facilities until the Spring of 2014.”).2 There is nothing avowedly tentative about
these rulings. Defendants also argue that the Lacy rulings should not be
precedential because subsequent damages trials for three of the five Lacy plaintiffs
resulted in two jury awards of $0 in compensatory damages and one of $600. This
argument, however, is not of great weight here because the undisputed record—
aside from issue preclusion—established defendants’ liability on the bathroom
issue. Moreover, there is undisputed evidence in the record that Crockwell soiled
himself several times, and so the record indicates that Crockwell incurred actual,
compensable damages.
Defendants argue that they were not afforded an adequate hearing in Lacy,
despite having the opportunity to litigate the issue over seven days of hearings, plus
the summary judgment briefs and intermittent status reports from the parties with
evidentiary submissions. The Lacy court noted that some of parties’ factual
statements had been mooted by the injunction order and that it would not consider
2
Crockwell was in custody at the Cook County Jail from 2012 to 2013.
6
some of plaintiffs’ factual statements that did not abide by Local Rule 56.1. These
statements, however, do not show that defendants had an inadequate hearing. In
the summary judgment briefs in this case, even Cook County described the
proceedings in Lacy as a “six day bench trial,” [72] at 7, and it is clear that the
parties had the opportunity to develop an extensive record, including witness
testimony and multiple evidentiary submissions, on top of the parties’ summary
judgment submissions.
Defendants argue that application of issue preclusion violates their due
process rights to defend themselves through evidence of accommodation. But at
summary judgment, defendants presented no evidence of accommodating Crockwell
to support such a defense at trial. Defendants cite to no such evidence in their
motion for reconsideration, and their due process argument ignores the other basis
for granting summary judgment on liability for the Leighton courthouse bathroom
issue. The undisputed record showed that the defendants knew of his disability and
did not provide him with accommodations, resulting in him soiling himself on
multiple occasions. [81] at 11. Defendants had the opportunity to raise a genuine
factual dispute on an accommodation defense but were unable to do so, and they do
not point to any evidence that was overlooked during summary judgment.
Regardless of issue preclusion from Lacy, Crockwell would have been granted
summary judgment on liability for this issue. Defendants’ due process rights were
not violated.
7
Defendants have not shown a manifest error of law or fact requiring
reconsideration of the alternative holding for defendants’ liability on Crockwell’s
ADA claim based on bathroom accommodations at the Leighton courthouse.
III.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion for reconsideration, [86], is denied.
ENTER:
___________________________
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: 10/20/2016
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