Gaston v. Dart et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 2/16/2016: Denying Defendants' partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint 41 . Mailed notice(mw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SHELLEY GASTON,

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Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS DART, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 15 C 828

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s amended complaint. For the reasons stated below, the partial motion to
dismiss is denied.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shelley Gaston (Gaston) alleges that he was a pre-trial detainee at the
Cook County Jail (Jail) from September of 2012 until July of 2015. Gaston claims
that he is a disabled individual and that when he entered the Jail, medical personnel
recognized that he required a wheelchair and daily prescription medication to prevent
rejection of a transplanted organ. Gaston contends that there was an insufficient
number of health care providers to attend to the health care needs of detainees and

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that he did not receive his anti-rejection medication in the manner ordered by
medical staff. Gaston also contends that he was provided with a wheelchair but was
not assigned to a housing unit capable of accommodating his disabilities, and that as
a result, he was unable to use the Jail’s toilets, showers, beds, or common area
facilities on the same basis as other detainees.
Gaston filed the instant action and includes in his amended complaint claims
alleging violations of Section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
U.S.C. § 12132, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983). Gaston is suing Defendant Cook County and
Defendant Thomas Dart (Dart) in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Cook County.
Defendants now move to dismiss Gaston’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.

LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court
must draw all reasonable inferences that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations
of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all
well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012); Thompson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof’l
Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff is required to include
allegations in the complaint that “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to
relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level’” and “if they do not, the
plaintiff pleads itself out of court.” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496
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F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)(quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)); see also Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d at
622 (stating that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,” and that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged”)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009))(internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Gaston has failed to state a valid claim against
Defendants in their official capacities under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
(MTD. 3). To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, the plaintiff must prove: (1)
“that he is a qualified individual with a disability,” (2) “that he was denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or otherwise
subjected to discrimination by such an entity,” and (3) “that the denial or
discrimination was by reason of his disability.” Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586,
592 (7th Cir. 2015)(quoting Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir.
1996)(internal quotations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A claim under the
Rehabilitation Act is “functionally identical” to a claim under the ADA, in that it
requires the plaintiff to allege: (1) that “he is a qualified person,” (2) “with a
disability,” and (3) “the [state agency] denied him access to a program or activity
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because of his disability.” Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 592 (citing Jaros v. Illinois Dep’t of
Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012)). Moreover, the analysis of both the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act “is the same except that the Rehabilitation Act includes as
an additional element the receipt of federal funds, which all states accept for their
prisons.” Jaros, 684 F.3d at 671.

I.

ADA Claims
Defendants argue that Gaston’s ADA claim should be dismissed because

Gaston fails to allege facts that plausibly support the third element of his claim.
(MTD 4). Specifically, Defendants contend that Gaston has failed to plead the
required element of “a denial of access to programs, services and activities on
account of a person’s disability.” (MTD 4)(emphasis in original). The amended
complaint alleges that Gaston is disabled and “requires a wheelchair to move from
place to place.” (A Compl. 1). Gaston claims that Defendants have deprived him of
his rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by failing to assign him to a
housing unit capable of accommodating his disabilities. (A Compl. 2). Gaston also
argues that he “was unable to use the jail’s toilets, showers, beds, or common area
facilities on the same basis as other detainees.” (A Compl. 3).
The Seventh Circuit has held that “[a]dequate food and facilities to wash and
use the toilet are among the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’” that
must be afforded to prisoners. Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has reasoned that while
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“incarceration is not a program or activity, the meals and showers made available to
inmates are.” Jaros, 684 F.3d at 667 (stating that “[r]efusing to make reasonable
accommodations is tantamount to denying access”). In this case, Gaston has alleged
that he has a disability which Defendants were aware of, and that he was unable to
use the Jail’s facilities on the same basis as other detainees. Thus, Gaston has
alleged sufficient facts, which must be accepted as true at this juncture, to state a
valid ADA claim against Defendants. See id. (holding that plaintiff’s claims of a
“refusal to accommodate [inmate]’s disability [which] kept him from accessing meals
and showers on the same basis as other inmates” were sufficient to “plead a plausible
claim for failure to make reasonable accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act”);
(Resp. 3). However, at the summary judgment stage, Gaston will need to point to
sufficient evidence to support his claims. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
the ADA claim is denied.

II. Rehabilitation Act Claims
Defendants also argue that Gaston’s Rehabilitation Act claim should be
dismissed for failure to plead that he was denied access to any programs. (MTD 45). As noted above, the analysis of a claim under the Rehabilitation Act is the same
as a claim under the ADA, except for an additional element of the receipt of federal
funds. As stated above, the court has found that Gaston has pled sufficient facts to
allege an ADA claim at this juncture. In addition, Gaston has alleged the additional
required element that Defendant Dart “has received federal funds since at least
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2003.” (A Compl. 2). Thus, Gaston has alleged the required elements and sufficient
facts, which must be accepted as true at this juncture, to state a valid claim under the
Rehabilitation Act. See Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672 (plaintiff “must plead facts which
plausibly (even if improbably) support each element of his claim”)(citing Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 662). Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim
is denied.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss is
denied.

___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: February 16, 2016

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