Carlson v. Christian Brothers Services

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Robert Blakey on 3/5/2015. Mailed notice(gel, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JACQUELYN M. CARLSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTIAN BROTHERS SERVICES,
Defendant.

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Case No. 15 C 1154

Honorable John Robert Blakey

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jacquelyn Carlson has sued her former employer, Christian
Brothers Services (“CBS”), alleging discrimination based upon a perceived
disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). CBS has
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim [8] pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Carlson’s discrimination charge was
untimely. The motion is granted.
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court must construe the operative complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts and drawing all
reasonable inferences in her favor. E.g., Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911, 915
(7th Cir. 2013)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074,
1081 (7th Cir. 2008)). But the Court “need not accept as true statements of law or
unsupported conclusory factual allegations.”

Id. (citing McCauley v. City of

Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011)). Thus, although Carlson alleges in her
complaint that she filed a timely charge with the Illinois Department of Human
Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, see complaint [1], ¶6,
the Court need not accept that as true. And, in fact, the documents attached to the
complaint belie the allegation.
“The ADA, like Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), whose procedures and
jurisdictional prerequisites it incorporates, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)(2), requires an
individual to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the
alleged discriminatory conduct.” Hathaway v. R.R. Donnelley Mendota, Inc., No. 01
C 3270, 2002 WL 31875465, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 24, 2002)(citing Bullard v. Sercon

Corp., 846 F.2d 463, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1988); Winters v. Iowa State Univ., 768
F.Supp. 231, 237 (N.D. III 1991)).

In her charge (and in her complaint), Carlson

alleges that the allegedly discriminatory action – her firing – took place on
February 1, 2012.

Complaint [1], ¶¶15-19; EEOC Charge [1-1] (identifying the

“basis” of her charge as her “discharge, February 1, 2012, due to perceived disability
(mobility impairment)”). She filed her charge February 27, 2013, well beyond the
300-day window. Although there is a possible exception to the 300-day rule for
continuing violations, e.g., Filipovic v. K&R Express Systems, Inc., 176 F.3d 390,
396 (7th Cir. 1999), Carlson does not allege a continuing violation; her
discrimination charge was based on a single discrete act, her firing on February 1,
2012.

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CONCLUSION
Because Carlson filed her EEOC charge more than 300 days after the alleged
act of discrimination, her ADA claim is time-barred. Accordingly, CBS’s motion to
dismiss [8] is granted, and the complaint is dismissed. Carlson is given leave to file
an amended complaint (or a motion to reconsider citing supplemental authority)
within 14 days, to the extent she is able to do so consistent with Rule 11. If nothing
is filed by March 19, 2015, the case will be terminated.
Dated: March 5, 2015
Entered:
_______________________________
John Robert Blakey
United States District Judge

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