United States of America v. Riney
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order written by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 11/25/2015: For the reasons stated and those set forth in the Court's August 14, 2015 decision, the Court directs the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing Guy Riney's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court also declines to issue a certificate of appealability, because none of Riney's claims was fairly debatable. Mailed notice. (pjg, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.
GUY RINEY
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Case No. 15 C 1155
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Guy Riney filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court ruled
against him on each of the claims made in his motion and first amended motion. See
United States v. Riney, No. 15 C 1155, 2015 WL 4880919 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2015).
Riney also filed a second amendment to his section 2255 motion, presenting a claim
regarding his sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. §
924(e). In its decision overruling Riney's other clams, the Court set a schedule for the
government to respond to Riney's new claim and for Riney to reply to the government's
response. The government filed a timely response. Riney did not file a reply by the
date the Court set and did not seek an extension of time. The Court therefore proceeds
to rule on his remaining claim.
The indictment in Riney's case charged him with possessing a firearm after
having been convicted by a felony and also alleged that he was subject to an enhanced
sentence under the ACCA. A jury found him guilty on the firearm charge. At
sentencing, the Court concluded that Riney was subject to an enhanced sentence under
the ACCA based on his three prior Illinois burglary convictions as well as a prior Illinois
domestic battery conviction. The Court made the following determinations:
All right. I think the government has adequately shown, not necessarily by
the nature of the statutory charge itself, but by the nature of the charging
documents in the particular cases, that at least three burglary convictions
that Mr. Riney has from 1984 and 1985 qualify under the Armed Career
Criminal Act.
So Illinois has what's referred to as a generic burglary statute. Well, it has
a statute that defines as burglary things that do qualify for treatment as
prior violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act and things that
don't. The ones that would fall in the latter category I would presume
would be things like burglary to an automobile. It's not a structure. The
charging documents in the three cases that I referred to here which the
government provided along with its memorandum reflect that in each one
of the situations Mr. Riney was charged with and pled guilty to committing
a burglary on a garage, which is a structure. And that's true of all three of
them. And therefore I think those qualify under the Armed Career Criminal
Act. And additionally, as Mr. Perconte has pointed out, the aggravated
domestic battery charge I think on its face would qualify.
So there's four, and you only need two. And the two that Mr. Riney was
charged with at or around the same time, each qualifies as a separate one
because they're two different crimes. So I think the government's
adequately shown that Mr. Riney qualifies as an armed career criminal
under the statute.
United States v. Riney, No. 11 CR 115, Feb. 14, 2013 Tr. at 6-7 (dkt. no. 103).
The ACCA says that a person who violates the felon-in-possession statute and
has "three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense" is
subject to an enhanced sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The term "violent felony" is
defined as any felony that has as an element the actual, attempted, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another or any felony that "is burglary, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The last
part of the definition—covering offenses that "otherwise involve[ ] conduct that presents
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a serious potential risk of physical injury to another"—is commonly called ACCA's
"residual clause."
Riney's claim is that his sentence should not have been enhanced under the
ACCA. His claim appears to be based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551
(2015), in which the Supreme Court ruled that ACCA's residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague. When this Court sentenced Riney, however, it did not rely on
the residual clause. Rather, it based Riney's enhancement on his burglary convictions
and on his conviction for domestic battery, an offense that "has as an element" the use
of physical force within the meaning of section 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
Putting Johnson aside, the Court's imposition of an ACCA-enhanced sentence
was proper and not erroneous. A court typically determines whether an offense is a
violent felony under the ACCA by examining the statutory elements of the crime, an
analysis called the "categorical" approach. If, however, a statute criminalizes both
conduct that qualifies as a violent felony and conduct that does not, a court uses the
"modified categorical approach," examining the terms of the charging document, the
guilty plea agreement, or the guilty plea colloquy, to determine whether the offense
qualifies as a violent felony. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 468 F. App'x 623, 626
(7th Cir. 2012).
Most of Riney's potentially qualifying offenses were convictions for burglary.
Burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA only if it is a "generic burglary," namely,
unlawful entry into a building or other enclosed structure with the intent to commit a
crime. See id. The Illinois burglary statute under which Riney was convicted is a
"nongeneric burglary" statute because it defines burglary to include unlawful entry to an
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automobile, which is not a structure. For this reason, the Court used—appropriately—
the modified categorical approach to determine whether his convictions constituted
violent felonies under the ACCA. See id. Specifically, as reflected by the above-quoted
excerpt from the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the Court determined that in each
of the three burglary cases, "[t]he charging documents . . . reflect that in each one of the
situations Mr. Riney was charged with and pled guilty to committing a burglary on a
garage, which is a structure." United States v. Riney, No. 11 CR 115, Feb. 14, 2015 Tr.
at 7 (dkt. no. 103). Riney offers nothing in his amended section 2255 motion that would
suggest the Court erred.
In sum, Johnson does not affect Riney's ACCA-based sentence, nor was the
imposition of an ACCA-based sentence otherwise erroneous. The Court therefore
overrules Riney's remaining claim.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above and those set forth in the Court's August 14, 2015
decision, the Court directs the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing Guy Riney's motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court also declines to issue a certificate of appealability,
because none of Riney's claims was fairly debatable.
Date: November 25, 2015
________________________________
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge
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