Catinella v. County of Cook et al
Filing
42
Enter MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 4/27/2016. Mailed notice (jdh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Michael Catinella
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
v.
) Case No. 15 C 1400
)
)
County
of
Cook,
Cook
County )
Department
of
Transportation
and )
Highways
)
)
Defendants.
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action arises out of plaintiff’s termination from his
employment as a machinist with the Cook County Department of
Transportation and Highways (“CCDOTH”).
Complaint
(“FAC”),
discriminatory
plaintiff
and
claims
retaliatory,
and
In his First Amended
that
his
that
procedural and substantive due process rights.
termination
it
violated
was
his
He seeks damages
and reinstatement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
I
dismissed
plaintiff’s
original
complaint without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) and granted him
leave to amend after he acknowledged that his federal claims
“require[d]
further
clarification.”
As
explained
below,
however, the additional material set forth in the FAC does not
clarify his claims.
various
events
Indeed, plaintiff’s scattershot account of
preceding
his
termination
does
not
raise
a
reasonable inference that defendants violated his constitutional
or
civil
rights.
Accordingly,
I
grant
defendants’
12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.
I.
The FAC recounts the following facts, which I assume to be
true for purposes of this opinion. Plaintiff, a Caucasian man,
was hired as machinist for CCDOTH in January of 1994, and he
performed his duties to defendant’s satisfaction at all times.
Plaintiff was highly regarded by his peers and his supervisors.
Around 2009, plaintiff was promoted to a supervisory position.
He was not disciplined at any time prior to January 2013.
FAC
¶¶ 10-15.
In or around August of 2012, Cook County awarded a fuel
pump contract to a bidder.
After bidding had closed, a losing
bidder that had previously been awarded Cook County contracts
complained (the FAC does not say to whom) and attempted to make
a second bid after being informed of the winning bid amount.
Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.
The FAC provides no additional facts about the
fuel pump contract, the bidding process, or the losing bidder’s
complaint, nor does it indicate whether or how plaintiff was
involved in these matters.
2
On
approximately
August
15,
2012,
plaintiff
and
his
attorney met with the Office of the Inspector General (“OIIG”) 1
“regarding an investigation into bidding for fuel pumps with
CCDOTH.” Id. at ¶ 18.
“urged
Plaintiff
to
During that meeting, OIIG investigators
sign
two
documents
relating
to
the
investigation of the fuel pump bids,” but did not allow him to
consult with his attorney.
Although the investigators warned
plaintiff that he could lose his job if he refused to sign the
documents, plaintiff refused to sign.
Id. at 19-23.
The FAC
does not allege the nature of these documents.
After
plaintiff
refused
to
sign
the
documents,
investigators asked him if he had any weapons on him.
OIIG
Plaintiff
produced from his back pants pocket a small knife that he used
in
his
work
and
handed
it
over
to
his
attorney.
OIIG
investigators did not inspect or handle the knife and did not
notify the police that plaintiff was in possession of it.
at
¶¶ 24-28.
Plaintiff
was
subject
to
no
further
Id.
inquiry,
complaint, investigation or discipline of any kind as a result
of
that
meeting.
information
and
Id.
belief,
at
that
¶ 29.
he
did
Plaintiff
not
warning of rights form at this interview.
1
receive
alleges,
or
sign
on
a
Id. at ¶ 69.
I assume that this refers to the Cook County Office of the
Independent Inspector General.
3
On or around January 24, 2013, five CCDOTH employees filed
a grievance complaining that plaintiff had been assigned to a
higher
rated
provided
position
with
overtime.”
an
than
they,
automobile,
Id. at ¶ 31.
a
“and
that
cell
phone
[plaintiff]
and
was
significant
The five grievants’ names appeared to
have been written in the same hand on the grievance form, and
only one of the grievants signed the form.
Id. at ¶ 33-34.
A little over a week later, on February 2, 2013, defendants
informed
plaintiff
that
he
was
being
placed
on
emergency
administrative leave with pay pending an investigation, and that
he would receive a letter about the investigation.
Id. at ¶ 36.
Plaintiff received a letter on February 4, 2013, informing him
that he was being placed on emergency suspension as a result of
unspecified
allegations
that
he
had
violated
Section
(“major causes”) of the Cook County Personnel Rules.
8.03
Id. at
¶ 37.
After
Cook
from
plaintiff
County
was
Sheriff’s
Investigator
placed
Police
Ruffolo
on
emergency
Department
of
the
suspension,
received
Cook
County
the
information
Bureau
of
Administration that plaintiff “may be a threat to shoot up the
workplace.”
Ruffolo
Id. at ¶ 38.
brought
Varnagis,
Crane,
four
On February 5, 2013, Investigator
witnesses
Stiff,
and
to
police
Pijanowski—to
alleged threats to this effect.
4
headquarters—Messrs.
report
plaintiff’s
Two of the witnesses—Varnagis
and
Pijanowski—were
among
the
individuals
who
had
filed
the
grievance relating to plaintiff’s position and benefits several
weeks earlier.
The
four
plaintiff’s
hearsay.
Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.
witnesses
threats.
In
gave
Some
addition,
of
inconsistent
the
Varnagis
accounts
statements
and
were
Pijanowski
based
were
of
on
not
physically present at District 3, where plaintiff worked, and
thus could not have witnessed the alleged threats.
Finally, the
witness statements were inconsistent with the account of another
individual,
Gary
Roden,
who
“stated
he
had
never
seen
Plaintiff make any alleged threat at all relevant times.” 2
at ¶ 40.
the
Id.
Varnagis signed a complaint for disorderly conduct.
Id. at ¶ 41.
Thereafter,
the
advised
plaintiff
of
conduct
complaint
and
Cook
the
County
Sheriff’s
investigation 3
requested
2
that
Police
and
plaintiff
the
Department
disorderly
“turn
himself
It is not clear when or in what context Gary Roden gave his
account, as he is not among the witnesses alleged to have
accompanied Ruffolo to the police station, and the only other
reference to him in the FAC states that his name was printed on
the January 24, 2013, grievance form. FAC at ¶ 33.
3
It appears from context that “the investigation” here refers to
law
enforcement’s
investigation
into
plaintiff’s
alleged
threats, but the reference is not entirely clear.
Indeed, the
FAC
and
plaintiff’s
response
brief
refer
to
multiple
investigations, including the OIIG’s investigation into fuel
pump bidding, defendants’ investigation into to the January 24,
2013, grievance, and the OIIG’s investigation into plaintiff’s
possession of a pocket knife, and plaintiff’s allegations and
arguments do not always make clear which investigation is at
issue.
5
in.”
Id.
at
¶ 42.
Plaintiff
self-surrendered
on
February
6,
2013, and he was arrested for disorderly conduct. He was advised
of his Miranda rights and refused to speak to investigators or
to sign any documents.
a $120 bond.
Plaintiff was processed and released on
Id. at ¶¶ 42-45.
On February 8, 2013, 4 the OIIG “issued a summary report...in
which
it
violated
made
a
Cook
quasi-criminal
County
finding
Personnel
Rule
unauthorized possession of weapons.”
not
have
evidence
of
the
that
the
8.03(b)(5)
Id. at ¶ 46.
alleged
weapon,
and
Plaintiff
prohibiting
The OIIG did
it
issued
the
report without affording plaintiff notice and the opportunity to
be
heard.
Id.
The
report
also
stated
that
plaintiff
had
violated the Illinois Criminal Code, although it lacked “the
authority to make that decision” and did not provide plaintiff
“any type of due process.”
Id. at ¶ 48.
On February 22, 2013, CCDOTH notified plaintiff that a predisciplinary
Plaintiff
was
meeting
not
would
be
informed
held
that
he
on
February
could
have
28,
an
attorney
present at that meeting and believed that he could not.
¶¶ 53,
56.
investigators
On
February
and
stated
25,
2013,
that
he
Pijanowski
had
“only
Catinella in possession of legal pocket knives.”
4
met
2013.
Id. at
with
OIIG
observed
Mr.
Id. at ¶ 54.
The FAC identifies the date as February 8, 2015, but I assume
this is a typographical error.
6
Plaintiff attended the February 28, 2013, pre-disciplinary
meeting, as did a member of the CCDOTH and a member of the OIIG.
Plaintiff refuted the charges against him, stating that the OIIG
investigation was “flawed and that he did not have an illegal
knife, let alone two illegal knives as alleged against him.”
Id. at ¶¶ 55, 57.
The FAC does not indicate what evidence, if
any, was presented to support the allegations against plaintiff.
It states, however, that OIIG investigators did not have any
physical evidence of the alleged knife or knives and were not
qualified to determine what kind of knife plaintiff had in his
possession.
Id.
at
¶¶ 58-59.
Plaintiff
was
not
allowed
to
question OIIG investigators during the hearing. Id. at ¶ 61.
Plaintiff was never arrested, charged, or convicted for being in
possession of an illegal knife, and his disorderly conduct case
had not been adjudicated by the time of his pre-disciplinary
hearing. 5 Id. at ¶ 63-64.
5
In recounting the factual narrative set forth in the FAC, I
have
at
times
reordered
its
allegations
to
reflect
my
understanding of how plaintiff views the various events it
describes as related and why he claims they are unlawful.
In
some instances, however, the allegations are difficult to
situate in the proper context.
For example, plaintiff asserts
in ¶ 65 that “[u]pon information and belief, the Plaintiff was
not allowed to confront any alleged complaining witnesses
regarding the alleged threats.” Based on where this allegation
appears in the complaint, the statement seems to refer to the
pre-disciplinary hearing about the knife.
Yet, the references
to “complaining witnesses” and “alleged threats” suggest that it
might instead relate to the workplace threats leading up to the
disorderly conduct charge.
7
Defendants
2013,
citing
Behavior’
terminated
the
and
plaintiff’s
“major
causes
‘Unauthorized
of
employment
‘Fighting
Possession
of
on
or
March
5,
Disruptive
Weapons’”
as
the
reasons for his termination, and relying on the OIIG’s February
8, 2013 OIIG report. Id. at ¶ 66, 67.
plaintiff’s
alleged
workplace
Defendants also cited
threats
in
support
of
the
“Fighting or Disruptive Behavior” ground for his termination.
Defendants
further
identified
several
“non-major
cause
violations,” which plaintiff claims are subject to progressive
discipline and are not grounds for immediate termination under
the County of Cook Personnel Rules.
Id. at ¶ 70.
On March 7, 2013, the OIIG interviewed Darryl Stiff (one of
the
witnesses
department
Chapman
who
to
(one
had
report
of
the
accompanied
Ruffolo
plaintiff’s
alleged
individuals
whose
to
the
threats)
name
police
and
appeared
Andrew
on
the
January 24, 2013 grievance, but who was not involved in the
police
report)
individuals
was
acknowledgment.
about
the
given
alleged
a
threats.
warning
FAC at ¶¶ 73-73.
of
Each
rights
of
these
form
and
During his interview, Chapman
produced a three-inch spring knife that was used to cut hoses at
work.
The OIIG took pictures of Chapman’s knife and confiscated
it “until further research of governing statutes is conducted to
determine
lawful
possession
of
the
discharged for possessing the knife.
8
knife.”
Chapman
Id. at ¶¶ 74-78.
was
not
Plaintiff grieved his termination on March 27, 2013.
grievance
was
“summarily
denied
at
Steps
1
and
2
by
His
his
immediate supervisor and the CCDOTH” and was denied at Step 3
“by the hearing officer.” Id. at ¶¶ 80-82.
that
the
hearing
officer’s
Plaintiff asserts
decision
“had
multiple
inconsistencies,” citing the conflicting testimony of witnesses
to
plaintiff’s
“there
are
two
alleged
workplace
decisions
threats,
upholding
the
and
the
fact
termination
that
that
are
signed but contain different formatting and information.” 6 Id. at
¶ 83.
On October 4, 2013, the disorderly conduct charge against
plaintiff
was
dismissed
because
Varnagis,
the
complaining
witness, “refused to appear and testify since Plaintiff had been
terminated from his position.”
The
FAC
overlapping,
culminates
counts.
in
Id. at ¶¶ 84.
four
Counts
I
separate,
and
II
but
are
substantially
both
captioned
“Violation of Plaintiff’s Procedural and Substantive Due Process
Rights” and assert § 1983 claims.
asserts
that
his
termination
In these counts, plaintiff
violated
due
process
rights
enshrined in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because he was
6
Plaintiff also cites as an inconsistency in the hearing
officer’s decision that “the original workplace grievance of
January 24, 2013 was filed due to Plaintiff being given
preferential consideration for a temporary special assignment.”
The FAC does not explain the relevance of this allegation to the
hearing officer’s decision, however, nor does it explain the
putative inconsistency.
9
not afforded a hearing, the opportunity to confront witnesses,
or progressive discipline.
“Discrimination
Based
on
Counts III and IV are both captioned
Retaliation.”
Count
III
asserts
a
violation of § 1981, stating that plaintiff’s termination was
“politically
motivated
within the CCDOTH.”
and
in
retaliation
for
his
position
Count IV is based on § 1983 and claims that
defendant’s termination was baseless, was effected without due
process, and violated his equal protection rights because of
defendants’
“disparate
treatment
to
violations or assert lawful rights.”
employees
who
report
Plaintiff seeks damages,
reinstatement, and attorneys’ fees.
II.
Before
examining
a
few
of
the
specific
reasons
the
FAC
fails to state an actionable claim, I pause briefly to address
its overarching flaw, which is that a careful reading of its
allegations
produces
no
clear
understanding
of
plaintiff’s
theory of how the various events it describes add up to either a
cognizable
violation.
constitutional
claim
or
a
plausible
civil
rights
The salient portions of plaintiff’s narrative seem
to be: 1) plaintiff’s refusal to sign documents at the August
15, 2012, meeting about the fuel pump bidding; 2) plaintiff’s
production of a knife at that meeting; 3) a grievance filed by
five coworkers regarding plaintiff’s superior job position; 4)
plaintiff’s
placement
on
emergency
10
administrative
leave
and
emergency
suspension;
plaintiff
for
termination.
5)
the
instigation
disorderly
conduct;
of
charges
and
6)
against
plaintiff’s
While the labels plaintiff affixes to his claims—
including “due process,” “equal protection,” and “retaliation”—
broadly identify possible legal theories, labels and conclusions
such as these do not suffice to withstand dismissal. Bell Atl.
Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The pleading standards of Rule 8 are not exacting, but they
require plaintiffs, at a minimum, “to present a story that holds
together.”
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th
Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff
against
The FAC does not satisfy this lenient standard.
evidently
him
documents
–
the
but
OIIG
believes
for
that
what?
For
presented
him
his
employer
failing
with
in
to
retaliated
sign
August
whatever
of
2012?
Without some indication of what those documents were, how they
related
to
plaintiff’s
employment,
or
how
signing
them
(or
refusing to sign them) amounted to protected conduct, we are
left
with
process,
no
equal
extracted. 7
facts
or
context
protection,
or
from
civil
which
a
rights
plausible
claim
can
due
be
As for the knife, the grievance, the investigation,
7
Based on the scant facts the FAC provides, plaintiff’s claim,
if any, may be better suited to a theory of retaliatory
discharge under state law, or possibly of retaliation for the
exercise of his First Amendment rights.
See, e.g., Darchak v.
City of Chicago Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2009).
The FAC does not assert either type of claim, however.
11
the
suspension,
and
the
disorderly
conduct
charge,
it
is
impossible to discern from the FAC’s account of these episodes
how
they
coalesce
into
a
claim
Constitution, § 1981 or § 1983.
redressable
under
the
For this reason alone, the FAC
must be dismissed.
But there is more.
suffers
from
discussion.
Each of plaintiff’s specific claims
numerous
defects,
not
all
of
which
require
I begin with his claim for procedural due process,
to which the Seventh Circuit takes a two-step approach.
The
first question is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a
protected liberty or property interest, and second is whether
the deprivation occurred without due process.
Pro’s Sports Bar
& Grill, Inc. v. City of Country Club Hills, 589 F.3d 865 (7th
Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s claim does not cross the first hurdle.
Because
plaintiff
was
employed
in
Illinois,
I
look
to
Illinois law to determine whether he had a protectable property
interest in his employment.
(7th Cir. 2007).
Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 700
“Under Illinois law, a person has a property
interest in his job only where he has a legitimate expectation
of
continued
entitlement.”
employment
Id.
based
on
a
legitimate
claim
of
A legitimate claim of entitlement, in turn,
“can arise from a statute, regulation, municipal ordinance, or
an express or implied contract.” Border v. City of Crystal Lake,
75 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996).
12
Plaintiff does not allege
that the property interest he asserts is rooted in any such
authority, nor does he claim that any state statute, common law
rule, or collective bargaining agreement constrained defendants’
ability to terminate his employment.
to
his
satisfactory
job
Instead, plaintiff points
performance,
his
high
regard
among
colleagues and supervisors, his promotion, and the fact that he
“did not lose his job after being threatened by the OIIG” as
establishing
his
protected
property
interest.
He
cites
no
authority, however, holding that allegations of this sort state
a protected property interest.
Plaintiff also cites his “understanding” that under “Cook
County policies and procedures...he could not be terminated from
his employment unless the steps were followed.”
Resp. at 6.
This appears to be a reference to the FAC’s allegation that
certain of defendants’ asserted grounds for his termination were
“subject to progressive discipline pursuant to County of Cook
Personnel Rules.”
FAC at ¶ 71.
But none of plaintiff’s cited
authorities supports the view that this unadorned reference to
progressive
discipline
is
sufficient
to
state
a
protected
property interest in his job.
Indeed,
in
four
of
plaintiff’s
cited
cases,
declined to find a protected property interest.
the
court
See Covell v.
Menkis, 595 F. 3d 673, 675-676 (7th Cir. 2010) (state agency’s
administrative
rules
and
bylaws
13
did
not
create
protected
property
interest
in
agency
director’s
employment);
Moss
v.
Martin, 473 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2007) (Illinois Department of
Transportation’s Personnel Policy Manual did not give rise to
employee’s protected property interest); Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d
519 (7th Cir. 2010) (landlord had no protected property interest
in future Section 8 Housing Assistance Payment contracts); and
Ruiz v. Kinsella, 770 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (home
buyers
had
no
protected
interest
enforcement of building code).
distinct
factual
plaintiff’s
claim
employment.
See
contexts,
to
a
Mathews
City
of
Chicago’s
The remaining two cases arose in
and
neither
protected
v.
in
property
Eldridge,
424
remotely
supports
interest
U.S.
319
in
his
(1976)
(recipient of social security benefits had protected interest in
continued receipt of benefits); Pro’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc.
v. City of Country Club Hills, 589 F. 3d 865 (7th Cir. 2009)
(holder of unrestricted municipal liquor license had a protected
property interest in license to operate during the same hours as
all
license
holders).
Accordingly,
plaintiff
has
no
viable
procedural due process claim. 8
8
Because plaintiff’s claim fails the first prong of the
procedural due process inquiry, I need not proceed to the
second.
I note, however, that even assuming plaintiff could
establish a protected property interest in his employment, his
allegations regarding the pre-discipline meeting at which he
“refuted” the allegations against him as well, as the three step
grievance process—which, by his own account, included a hearing—
14
Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim fares no better.
Because
“this
fundamental
sort
of
rights,”
fundamental,
“an
claim
and
is
limited
to
employment-related
alleged
wrongful
violations
rights
termination
are
of
of
not
public
employment is not actionable as a violation of substantive due
process unless the employee also alleges the defendants violated
some
other
constitutional
inadequate.”
right
or
that
state
remedies
were
Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir.
2010) (citing Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir.
2007).
Plaintiff
violation,
nor
has
has
not
he
pled
claimed
an
additional
that
state-law
constitutional
remedies
were
inadequate.
Plaintiff
process
claim
conduct
by
argues,
nevertheless,
that
survives
defendants’
motion
defendants
that
Belcher, 497 F.3d at 753.
“shocks
the
his
substantive
because
he
conscience,”
due
alleges
citing
He points specifically to allegations
that defendants placed him on emergency leave as a result of a
stale grievance, 9 relied on inconsistent evidence to suspend him
for disorderly conduct, and enforced rules prohibiting knives at
blunt the force of his claim to have been terminated without
adequate process.
9
Actually, the FAC does not assert that the investigation
prompting plaintiff’s administrative leave related to the
grievance.
In fact, one might guess from the reference to
“major causes” in the letter plaintiff received shortly after
being placed on emergency leave that the investigation related
to the knife incident.
15
the
workplace
in
a
non-uniform
fashion.
Resp.
at
7.
But
neither Belcher nor any other case plaintiff identifies held
that allegations of this sort stated a substantive due process
claim.
To the contrary, the scope of such claims is extremely
narrow,
and
though
“[c]ases
thoroughly
conscience.”
abound
in
disapproved
which
of—was
the
government
found
not
to
action—
shock
the
Tun v. Whitticker, 398 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir.
2005) (citing as a “notable” example County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), which involved a high-speed chase in
which a patrol car skidded into a sixteen-year old motorcycle
passenger,
propelling
inflicting
massive
him
seventy
injuries
feet
that
led
down
to
his
the
road
death).
and
The
allegations in the FAC clearly do not describe conduct anywhere
near as egregious as the conduct alleged in County of Sacramento
(which
the
Supreme
Court
nevertheless
found
wanting),
and
plaintiff offers neither argument nor authority to support his
substantive due process claim on the facts asserted.
I now turn to plaintiff’s claims for “discrimination based
on retaliation,” which do not require lengthy discussion.
As
noted
or
above,
no
clear
theory
of
either
discrimination
retaliation can be pieced together from the FAC’s narrative of
the
events
response
suspension
to
that
preceded
defendants’
and
plaintiff’s
motion,
termination
were
16
termination,
plaintiff
the
argues
result
of
but
that
in
his
“reverse
retaliation.”
liability
Resp.
is
at
8.
appropriate
He
further
because
argues
the
FAC
that
Monell
articulates
an
“unconstitutional reverse discrimination based policy, practice
or custom.” Id. at 8-9.
But the FAC’s substantive allegations
do not support either argument.
Plaintiff is correct that in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,
553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008), the Supreme Court held that § 1981
encompasses
claims
for
Court acknowledged
employment-related
that
a
right
of
retaliation.
action
exists
The
under
that
section for an individual “who suffers retaliation because he
has
tried
to
help
a
different
individual,
suffering
direct
racial discrimination, secure his § 1981 rights.” Id. at 452.
That holding, however, has no application to the present case.
The FAC does not allege the race of any individual other than
plaintiff,
much
less
does
it
assert
that
any
individual” was subject to racial discrimination.
“different
For these
reasons alone, the FAC fails to state a viable retaliation claim
under § 1981.
Additionally,
claiming
as
plaintiff
reverse-discrimination
circumstances
sufficient
to
acknowledges,
must
demonstrate
allege
that
the
Caucasians
“background
particular
employer has reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously
against whites...or evidence that there is something fishy about
the facts at hand.” Hague v. Thompson Distribution Co., 436 F.3d
17
816,
820
omitted).
however,
(7th
Cir.
2006)
(internal
quotations
and
citation
The FAC is devoid of any allegations of this sort,
fatally
discrimination.
undermining
any
claim
of
race-based
Finally, to the extent plaintiff’s § 1983 claim
is premised on some other, non-race-related protected activity
(e.g., “political” activity), the FAC’s allegations are far too
sparse and muddled to support any such claim.
Because plaintiff’s § 1981 and § 1983 claims fail for the
reasons discussed above, I comment only briefly on plaintiff’s
additional failure to articulate a basis for municipal liability
under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which
is an independent reason for dismissing the latter.
A Monell
claim requires plaintiff to allege: “(1) an express municipal
policy; (2) a widespread practice constituting custom or usage;
or (3) a constitutional injury caused or ratified by a person
with final policymaking authority.” Darchak, 580 F.3d 622 at
629.
Despite plaintiff’s conclusory assertion to the contrary,
the FAC plainly contains no allegations of this nature.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion is granted. 10
10
Mindful that federal courts have a duty to satisfy themselves
of their own jurisdiction, see Stearnes v. Baur’s Opera House,
Inc., 3 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1993), I have considered
defendants’ additional argument that the FAC should be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and I conclude that it
has no merit.
The gist of the argument is that plaintiff’s
18
ENTER ORDER:
_____________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: April 27, 2016
allegations, properly construed, state a claim, if at all, for
violation of his CBA, and that the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.
But the FAC does not purport to advance such a claim, and
indeed, plaintiff’s response explicitly disavows it.
Resp. at
4.
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?