Carter v. Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart et al

Filing 63

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 2/15/2017. Mailed notice. (mgh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DARRYL CARTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY,
THOMAS J. DART, and THE
COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15 C 1407

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Darryl Carter (“Carter”) has sued Cook County
Sheriff, Thomas J. Dart, (“the Sheriff”)1 and Cook County,
Illinois (“the County”), alleging discrimination, hostile work
environment, and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

1

Claims under Title VII are properly brought only against an
individual’s employer. See, e.g., Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle
Cty., Illinois, 243 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2001). Since the
Sheriff, not the County, is Carter’s employer, the County cannot
be held independently liable for the Title VII violations Carter
alleges. Id. Similarly, because the Sheriff has the sole
responsibility for operating the Cook County Jail, the County
cannot be held liable for the Monell violations Carter alleges.
See, e.g., Jacoby v. DuPage Cty. Ill., No. 12 CV 6539, 2013 WL
3233339, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2013). However, the County is
responsible for paying any judgments entered against the
Sheriff. See, e.g., Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle Cty., Illinois,
324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003). Thus, the County is properly
named as a defendant in the suit only for purposes of
indemnification.

Carter also asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that the Sheriff violated his civil rights by failing to address
his complaints of discrimination and harassment. The Sheriff has
moved for summary judgment as to all of Carter’s claims. For the
reasons below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I.
Carter was hired as a Cook County Sheriff’s Officer in June
1988. In November 2007, he circulated a memorandum to the Cook
County Board President, the Cook County Board of Commissioners,
and the Sheriff, claiming that he had consistently been passed
over for promotion because of his race (African-American). The
following month, Carter was promoted to the position of
correctional sergeant.
Since that time, Carter has applied for further promotion
on several occasions but with no success. He applied for the
position of correctional lieutenant in 2009, 2011, 2013, and
2015. In each case, Carter was informed that his application had
been denied because he failed to achieve a passing score on the
lieutenant’s examination, and also because his applications were
untimely. In August 2010 and March 2012, Carter applied for
promotion to the higher-ranking position of correctional chief.
In both cases, Carter was informed that he was ineligible for

2

the position because he did not hold the position of lieutenant,
which the job announcement listed as a minimum requirement.2
During this time, Carter also began complaining of
harassment. In July and August 2010, he circulated memos to his
superiors and other officials claiming that he had been
disciplined for minor infractions routinely overlooked in the
case of non-African-American employees. He also complained that
he had been disciplined for failing to carry out tasks that he
was never trained to perform. The record does not indicate how,
if at all, the Sheriff responded to Carter’s complaints at this
time.
On or about April 3, 2012, while assigned as a sergeant in
Division 1 of the Cook County Jail, Carter went to the office of
his superior, Superintendent Mario Reyes (“Reyes”), to collect
his payroll stub. The words “Dick sucker bitch” were written on
the envelope.3 On or about the same day, Carter discovered a
flier featuring a picture of an unidentified naked black man

2

Carter’s March 2012 application for the position of chief was
also denied as untimely.
3

Carter is unclear about the extent to which he believes Reyes
was involved in this incident. Carter does not allege that Reyes
was responsible for the writing on the envelope. However, in the
internal complaint Carter subsequently filed in connection with
the incident, Reyes is listed as one of the individuals accused.
See Defs.’ Ex. 24. At the same time, in connection with his
hostile workplace claim, Carter specifically disclaims any
contention that his supervisors were involved in his harassment.
See infra at 18-19.
3

posted in the lobby of Division 1. The flier included the
following text: “EVERY THINGS GOES”; “THE FIRST PERSONS GETS A
HEAD JOB BY THE ONE AND ONLY MR. D-CARTER...”; and “FREE FOOD.”
See Compl. Ex. D. Carter’s street address was also included on
the flier (“VERA SON DARYL CARTER IS HAVING A PARTY @ OUR HOME
12717 S. ELIZABETH CALUMET PARK.”), as was as his previous phone
number (“CALL ME 1708-926-9116”). Id. It turned out that between
180-200 copies of the flier had been posted in various places
throughout Division 1, including areas to which the jail’s
detainees had access. There is evidence to suggest that the
pictures had been on display for the entire previous week,
during which Carter had been on vacation.
At the time, Carter told Superintendent Reyes that he
believed two of his subordinates, both African-American females,
were responsible for the incident. Carter told Reyes that he
suspected the employees had posted the fliers to get back at him
for disciplinary citations he had issued to them. The next day,
Reyes held a roll call and reminded personnel of the Sheriff’s
Office’s policy against harassment. Reyes also began locking up
employee paystubs, which until that time had been left in an
unattended area. In addition, Reyes suggested to Carter that he
discipline his subordinates verbally before writing them up, so
as to avoid the appearance that Carter was singling out anyone
for punishment. Lastly, Reyes advised Carter to fill out a

4

“complaint register” to initiate an investigation by the
Sheriff’s Office of Professional Review (OPR). Carter did not
submit the complaint register until December 2013. However, on
June 11, 2012, a complaint register regarding the incident was
separately filed by Daniel Moreci (“Moreci”), an assistant
executive director in the Sheriff’s Office.
During April and May 2012, Carter was offered three
opportunities to transfer out of Division 1. He turned each of
these down.4 Carter declined a transfer to Division 10 of the
jail, stating that the mother of his child worked there and that
the two did not get along. He declined a transfer to Division
11, stating “that’s just another part of the jail, it won’t
change anything,” Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 27. Carter also
refused an offer for an administrative transfer.5

4

In his response to the Sheriff’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement,
Carter purportedly denies that he turned down the transfers;
however, he provides no explanation or citation to the record in
support of his denial. See Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 27-30.
Carter makes similar unsupported denials in response to many of
the Sheriff’s other statements of material fact. In each of
these instances, I have deemed the Sheriff’s allegations
admitted. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B) (requiring that a
party’s disagreement with a moving party’s statement of material
facts make “specific references to the affidavits, parts of the
record, and other supporting materials relied upon”).
5

The parties do not explain the difference between an
administrative transfer and the other transfers Carter was
offered.

5

A second incident occurred on August 24, 2013, when Carter
reported to work and found pictures of his face posted in open
view in Division 1’s security office and sergeant’s office. The
following comments had been written on the pictures: “Kool Mo
Dee”; “(Skooly B)”; “Ugly”; and “R.I.P.” Carter filled out a
report in connection with the incident, but the record is
unclear as to what actions, if any, were taken at the time.
However, in November 2013, Carter sent memos to a number of
individuals, including OPR Director Johnathan Myslinski,
complaining that he had been subjected to racial discrimination
and a hostile work environment. In the memos, Carter stated that
his superiors, Superintendent Salomon Martinez (“Martinez”) and
Commander Vincent Cozzolino (“Cozzolino”), had been disregarding
a large number of the disciplinary citations that he and other
African-American sergeants were issuing to their subordinates,
instead of reporting the incidents further up the chain of
command. According to Carter, the citations issued to white and
Hispanic employees were being dismissed at a higher rate than
those issued to African-Americans. Carter stated that his
superiors’ actions had resulted in a hostile work environment
for African-American sergeants because their subordinates felt
that they were able to defy them with impunity. In November
2013, Carter also filled out a complaint register based on these
allegations, initiating a second investigation by the OPR.

6

On July 29, 2014, after having successfully bid for a
transfer to Division 6, Carter found several pictures of the
faces of various unidentified black males taped to the wall in
open view in the sergeant’s office. One of the pictures included
handwritten comments stating: “Sgt. Carter”; “Are they serious?
The broad whipped my ass!”; and “Don’t you mean your boyfriend!”
A second picture featured the same individual with stitches
drawn on his face and the caption “Domestic Battery.” Other
comments on the picture stated: “Sgt. Carter” and “True Playa fa
Real Baby. Don’t hate.” Three other pictures of black males were
posted elsewhere throughout Division 6. One picture featured the
handwritten comment, “Were my onge belt!!”; another with “I’m
all fried out!!!”; and the third featured the caption, “Domestic
Battery,” with the handwritten comment, “Ya heard me!!!” Carter
discovered another picture of one of the same males in the men’s
restroom, with the comments “Judge Mathis says:”; “Sgt. Carter”;
and “True Playa fa Real Baby. Don’t hate.”
Carter reported the incident to his superior, Lieutenant
Joe Hurd (“Hurd”), who determined later the same day that the
pictures had been posted by an employee named Cordell Lyons
(“Lyons”). Hurd spoke with Lyons and concluded that the incident
had not been malicious. Hurd also held a roll call and advised
employees that “joking, playing, signifying or making references
pertaining to sexual preferences, race, and gender are

7

unprofessional, against department policy and could lead to
discipline or termination.” Pl.s’ Resp. to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1
Stmt. ¶ 43. Additionally, Hurd spoke with Carter, suggesting
that Carter might be encouraging such incidents by frequently
engaging in playful banter with his subordinates.
The OPR conducted an investigation into the April 2012
incident and concluded in April 2014 that there was insufficient
evidence to implicate the employees whom Carter believed had
been responsible. The OPR also investigated Carter’s November
2013 complaint register and concluded in December 2015 that
there was insufficient evidence to support his claims regarding
racial disparities in the handling of disciplinary citations.6
In the meantime, Carter continued to write memos to various
officials regarding his situation, and on September 26, 2014, he
filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of
Human Rights (IDHR) and the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had been
subjected to “different terms and conditions of employment than
non-Black employees, including, but not limited to, promotions
and discipline.” Compl. Ex. A. He also stated that he had been
subjected to harassment and a hostile work environment and that
he had suffered retaliation as a result of his complaints. On
6

It is undisputed that the OPR never contacted Carter about the
resolution of his complaints.

8

November 19, 2014, the Department of Justice issued Carter a
right-to-sue letter.
On February 13, 2015, Carter filed the instant suit. Count
I of his complaint asserts claims under Title VII, alleging that
the Sheriff failed to promote him, failed to train him, and
subjected him to a hostile work environment on account of his
race. Count II asserts a claim for retaliation under Title VII.
Count III asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), alleging
that the Sheriff’s failure to establish adequate procedures for
addressing employee complaints resulted in the violation of his
civil rights.
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). I must construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving
party, and may grant summary judgment only “if, on the record as
a whole, a rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party.” Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, 330 F.3d 991,
995 (7th Cir. 2003).
A.

Count I

9

1.

Failure to Promote

In Count I of his complaint, Carter claims that the Sheriff
failed to promote him on account of his race. As noted above,
Carter applied for promotions on multiple occasions between 2009
and 2015. With respect to several of these applications,
Carter’s claim is time-barred. “According to statute, a
plaintiff ... must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
or equivalent state agency within 300 days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice.” Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc.,
236 F.3d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted).
“The 300-day limit ... begins to run when the defendant has
taken the action that injures the plaintiff and when the
plaintiff knows she has been injured.” Id. (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Here, Carter’s EEOC charge was filed
on September 26, 2014. Thus, Carter cannot base his claim on any
promotions he was denied prior to November 30, 2013.
Carter argues that these earlier incidents are actionable
by virtue of the “continuing violations” doctrine, which “allows
a court to consider as timely all discriminatory conduct
relevant to a claim, so long as there is sufficient evidence of
a pattern or policy of discrimination.” Haugerud v. Amery Sch.
Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 690 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks
omitted). It is well settled, however, that an employer’s
failure to promote an employee is a discrete act, and thus is

10

not subject to the continuing violation doctrine. See, e.g.,
Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 860 (7th
Cir. 2005) (“[D]iscrete discriminatory employment actions such
as termination, failure to promote, denial of a transfer, or
refusal to hire are deemed to have been taken on the date they
occurred, even if they form part of an ongoing practice or are
connected with other acts.”). It follows that Carter cannot base
his failure-to-promote claim on the denial of his applications
for correctional chief in August 2010 and March 2012, or his
applications for lieutenant in 2009 and 2011. This leaves only
the denial of Carter’s 2013 and 2015 applications for
lieutenant.7
Even putting the problem of untimeliness aside, however,
Carter’s failure-to-promote claim fails on the merits. In
opposing the defendants’ summary judgment motion, Carter
proceeds under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting method.
This requires the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case in
support of his claim by producing “evidence showing that: (1)
she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for
the position sought; (3) she was rejected for the position; and
(4) the employer promoted someone outside of the protected class
7

The exact date of Carter’s 2013 application for lieutenant is
not clear; however, the Sheriff concedes that Carter’s claim is
timely insofar as the 2013 and 2015 applications are concerned.
See Defs.’ Mem. Summ. J. at 2.

11

who was not better qualified for the position.” Riley v. Elkhart
Cmty. Sch., 829 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2016). If the plaintiff
succeeds in making the necessary showing, the burden shifts to
the employer, who “must articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, at
which point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to submit
evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted).
Although Carter correctly sets forth the framework, he
fails to adhere to it. Carter begins by asserting that the
defendants have failed to “establish that the proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons were the actual basis for Carter’s
promotion denial.” Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5. According to Carter,
this is because there is no evidence that John Konrad, the
author of the memo informing Carter that his application for
correctional chief had been denied in 2010, “was personally
involved in the decision not to promote Carter or that he had
first hand knowledge of the decision-maker’s reasoning.” Id.
This response suffers from several flaws. To begin with,
even assuming that Carter had raised a sufficient basis for
questioning the Konrad memo, his argument would address only the
denial of Carter’s 2010 application (which, in any event, is
time-barred). More fundamentally, Carter ignores the fact that,
under the burden-shifting framework, questions concerning the

12

legitimacy of the Sheriff’s reasons for failing to promote him
arise only after Carter has made out a prima facie case of
discrimination. This Carter has failed to do -- or even attempt.
He cites no affirmative evidence that he was qualified for
either the chief or lieutenant positions. He does not address
his failure to achieve a passing score on the lieutenant’s
examination or the fact that his applications were untimely. Nor
does Carter point to any non-African-American candidate who was
promoted to the chief or lieutenant position and who was no
better qualified than he. In fact, Carter’s brief identifies no
comparators at all. Carter’s complaint alludes to three unnamed
individuals who were promoted from sergeant to superintendent.
See Compl. ¶ 22. In his Local Rule 56.1 Statement, Carter
identifies the individuals as Sammie Young, Juan Diaz, and
Prentiss Jones. However, there is no mention of these employees
in his brief. And in any case, the evidence shows that none of
the three can properly serve as comparators. As the Sheriff
points out, two of the individuals -- Young and Jones -- are
African-American and thus are not outside the protected class;
and all three individuals were promoted to the higher-ranking
position of superintendent, whereas Carter’s claim is based on
the Sheriff’s failure to promote him to lieutenant or chief. It
is undisputed that the superintendent position differs from the
lieutenant and chief positions in important respects. For

13

example, unlike the lieutenant and chief positions,
superintendent is a non-career position. Moreover, anyone can
apply for the superintendent position, including individuals not
currently employed by the Sheriff’s Office.
Carter contends that the Sheriff has a policy of
“meritorious promotion,” which allows individuals to be promoted
without taking an examination. The Sheriff argues that this
contention is not supported by the evidence on which Carter
relies. I disagree. Carter’s argument is based on the testimony
of Lieutenant Hurd, who, when asked whether merit promotion
might allow an employee to be promoted without having to take a
test, responded “It can be done.” Hurd Dep. (Def.’s Ex. 6) at
24:12-15. It is true that Hurd later qualified his testimony,
stating that being “promoted without taking a test is not a
policy in the department.” Id. at 24:23-25:1. But regardless of
whether it is a matter of formal policy, Hurd’s testimony
indicates that promotion without taking a test is possible.
Ultimately, however, Carter’s argument is unavailing. For
the fact remains that Carter has failed to make a prima facie
showing that the Sheriff’s refusal to promote him had anything
to do with his race. Carter makes no attempt to show that he was
qualified for merit promotion to the position of lieutenant or
chief, or that any similarly-situated, non-African-American

14

employees received merit promotions to these positions despite
being no more qualified than he.
I note that this conclusion does not depend on Carter’s use
of the burden-shifting framework. The Seventh Circuit has
emphasized that, regardless of the method of proof, “the sole
question that matters” is whether a reasonable juror could
conclude that the plaintiff would have been promoted “if he had
a different ethnicity, and everything else had remained the
same.” Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th
Cir. 2016). Carter has offered no evidence from which a
reasonable juror could draw such a conclusion in his case.
Carter has shown only that the Sheriff has failed to promote
him. He has presented no evidence that the Sheriff’s failure to
promote him was unjustified, much less that the Sheriff’s
failure to promote him was based on his race.
Accordingly, the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment is
granted as to Carter’s failure-to-promote claim.
2.

Failure to Train
Count I of Carter’s complaint also asserts that the Sheriff

discriminated against him by failing to train him. This claim is
based on Carter’s allegation, asserted in memos he circulated in
2010, that he was disciplined for failing to carry out tasks
that he was never trained to perform.

15

As an initial matter, since the conduct on which the claim
is based occurred in 2010, and since the continuing violation
doctrine does not apply to failure-to-train claims, see, e.g.,
Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 2002)
overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965
(7th Cir. 2013), the claim is untimely. In addition, Carter’s
failure-to-train claim fails because, as Carter appears to
concede, he did not mention it in his EEOC charge. See, e.g.,
Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 550
(7th Cir. 2002) (“Generally a plaintiff may not bring claims
under Title VII that were not originally brought among the
charges to the EEOC.”) (quotation marks omitted). True, a claim
not included in an EEOC charge may be asserted in a Title VII
suit if the charge and the complaint “describe the same conduct
and implicate the same individuals.” Id. But that is not true
here. Carter’s complaint does not identify any individuals by
name in connection with his failure-to-train claim. And the
conduct at issue in the EEOC charge (i.e., denial of promotions
and subjection to harassment) is unrelated to the conduct on
which his failure-to-train claim is based. Carter does not
assert, for example, that he was denied promotion to lieutenant
or chief because he was never properly trained for these
positions. Rather, Carter’s failure-to-train claim alleges that

16

he was unfairly disciplined for improperly carrying out tasks he
was never trained to perform.
In any case, Carter’s failure-to-train claim fails on the
merits. “In a failure to train claim the plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2)
that the [defendant] provided training to its employees; (3)
that he was eligible for training; and (4) that he was not
provided training under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination, i.e., that he was denied training
given to other similarly situated employees who were not members
of the protected group.” Malacara v. City of Madison, 224 F.3d
727, 729 (7th Cir. 2000). Carter has offered no evidence or
argument addressing any of these elements.
The Sheriff is therefore entitled to summary judgment on
Carter’s failure-to-train claim.
3.

Hostile Work Environment
Lastly, Count I of Carter’s complaint asserts that he was

subjected to a hostile work environment on account of his race.
“To prove a claim for hostile work environment based on race, an
employee must show that: (1) he was subject to unwelcome
harassment; (2) the harassment was based on his race; (3) the
harassment was severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions
of the employee’s work environment by creating a hostile or
abusive situation; and (4) there is a basis for employer

17

liability.” Cole v. Bd. of Trustees of N. Illinois Univ., 838
F.3d 888, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). The
Sheriff concedes that the incidents described by Carter
constitute “unwelcome harassment” and that the harassment was
severe enough to alter the conditions of his employment.
However, the Sheriff contends that there is no evidence that the
harassment was racially-motivated and no evidence that would
support a finding of employer liability.
a.

Employer Liability

For purposes of a hostile work environment claim, an
employer’s liability can be established by showing either that
the employee’s supervisors were directly involved in the
harassment, or that the employer was negligent in discovering
and/or remedying the harassment. See, e.g., Williams v. Waste
Mgmt. of Illinois, 361 F.3d 1021, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004). Carter
does not allege that his supervisors were involved in the
harassment. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 9. He must therefore show
that the Sheriff was negligent in addressing his harassment.
This requires Carter to show that the Sheriff “failed to take
prompt and appropriate corrective action reasonably likely to
prevent the harassment from recurring.” Cole v. Bd. of Trustees
of N. Illinois Univ., 838 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Cir. 2016)
(quotation marks omitted).

18

There is evidence in the record from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that the Sheriff failed to take prompt and
appropriate action in response to Carter’s complaints of
harassment. In connection with the April 2012 incident, the
record indicates that 180 to 200 copies of the offensive picture
were on display for a week in various locations throughout
Division 1. A jury could reasonably conclude that Carter’s
superiors were aware of the pictures for some time and acted
negligently by failing to take them down sooner or otherwise
address the situation until Carter complained.
Similarly, there is evidence from which a jury could
conclude that Carter’s supervisors were negligent in dealing
with the July 2014 incident in Division 6. According to the
Sheriff’s General Order 11.4.5.0, supervisors are responsible
for providing victims of discrimination and harassment with a
specific form, which the supervisor is then required to forward
to the OPR. See Pl.’s Ex. E. at 5 (“Upon receiving a complaint
of alleged discrimination or harassment/sexual harassment, it is
the responsibility of the complainant’s supervisor to inform the
complainant that he/she may file a complaint with OPR and
provide the complainant with a Discrimination/Harassment/Sexual
Harassment Form.... The supervisor must forward ... [the] Form
to OPR.”). It is undisputed that Carter’s supervisor at the
time, Lieutenant Hurd, did not provide Carter with the form.

19

Hurd testified that this was because he did not believe the
posting of the pictures to have been malicious and thus did not
consider Carter to have been a “victim.” However, other
witnesses, such as Superintendent Salomon Martinez (“Martinez”),
testified in his deposition that he believed the incident was
malicious. See Martinez Dep. (Pl.’s Ex. B) at 106:2-5. Further,
there is evidence that Hurd was aware of the previous incidents
involving Carter in Division 1. See Hurd Dep. at 57:15-58:2. On
this record, a jury could reasonably find that Hurd should have
taken more aggressive action in dealing with the matter to
prevent the incidents from recurring.8
Hence, Carter has offered sufficient evidence to support a
finding of employer liability for his harassment.
b.

Racial Motivation

The Sheriff next argues that there is no evidence that
Carter’s harassment was based on racial animus. According to the
Sheriff, there is no explicit reference to race in any of the
pictures forming the basis for Carter’s harassment complaints.
In addition, it is undisputed that the individuals Carter
suspected of posting the pictures in April 2012 were themselves

8

In addition, as previously noted, there is no evidence
suggesting that any investigation or action was taken following
the August 2013 incident. This, too, could support a finding
that Carter’s supervisors were negligent in remedying the
harassment.
20

African-American, and that, at the time of the incident, Carter
did not complain that the harassment was racially-motivated.
Nevertheless, when the record is viewed in the light most
favorable to Carter, a jury could reasonably find that Carter’s
harassment was racially-based. As an initial matter, the fact
that the comments written on the pictures made no explicit
mention of race is not dispositive. See, e.g., Cole v. Bd. of
Trustees of N. Illinois Univ., 838 F.3d 888, 896 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“[F]orms of harassment that might seem neutral in terms of race
(or sex or other protected status) can contribute to a hostile
work environment claim if other evidence supports a reasonable
inference tying the harassment to the plaintiff’s protected
status.”). Here, Superintendent Martinez agreed during his
deposition that the pictures from the July 2014 incident were
“[c]lear examples of somebody being discriminated against at the
very least for racial reasons and potentially other ones.” See
Pl.’s Ex. B, Martinez Dep. at 106:2-5.
Similarly, the fact that the individuals alleged to have
posted the pictures were African-American does not preclude a
finding that Carter’s harassment was racial in nature. See,
e.g., Ross v. Douglas Cty., Nebraska, 234 F.3d 391, 396 (8th
Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have no doubt that, as a matter of law, a
black male could discriminate against another black male because
of such individual’s race.”) (quotation marks omitted); cf.

21

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) (“Because of the
many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume
as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will
not discriminate against other members of their group.”). Nor in
any case is it clear that all of the individuals alleged to have
been involved in Carter’s harassment were African-American.
While the suspects behind the April 2012 incident were AfricanAmerican, the record appears unclear as to who might have been
behind the August 2013 incident; nor do the parties identify the
race of Cordell Lyons, the individual apparently responsible for
the July 2014 incident.
In short, the record contains evidence sufficient to
support a finding that Carter’s superiors were negligent in
addressing his harassment and that the harassment was raciallymotivated. As a result, while I grant the Sheriff’s motion for
summary judgment as to Carter’s failure-to-promote and failureto-train claims, I deny the motion as to Carter’s hostile work
environment claim.
C.

Retaliation
In Count II of his complaint, Carter asserts that he

suffered retaliation as a result of his complaints of
discrimination and harassment. “To succeed on a Title VII
retaliation claim, plaintiffs must present evidence of (1) a
statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action

22

taken by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the
two.” Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 F.3d 378, 383
(7th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).
The Sheriff argues that Carter cannot show that he was
qualified for any of the promotions he was denied, and that,
consequently, he cannot show that he suffered any adverse
employment action as a result of his complaints. Being turned
down for promotion, however, is only one of the adverse
employment actions that Carter alleges. Carter additionally
claims that he was subjected to a hostile work environment as a
result of his complaints. See Compl. ¶ 62; Smith v. Ne. Illinois
Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 568 (7th Cir. 2004) (subjection to a
hostile work environment constitutes an adverse employment
action for purposes of Title VII).
The Sheriff also argues that Carter has failed to adduce
any evidence of a causal relationship between his complaints and
the harassment he experienced. The Sheriff notes that the
complaint register pertaining to the April 2012 incident was
filed by Assistant Executive Director Moreci in June 2012 and
that Carter’s EEOC charge was filed in September 2014. According
to the Sheriff, Carter did not experience any incidents of
harassment near these times. This argument ignores the complaint
registers that Carter filed in November and December 2013. It
also overlooks the fact that Carter’s protected activity is not

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limited to formal filings such as the complaint registers and
the EEOC charge. Informal complaints may constitute protected
activity as well. See, e.g., Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se.
Wisconsin, L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n
informal complaint may constitute protected activity for
purposes of retaliation claims.”) (quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, even when these other instances of protected
activity are taken into account, there is no evidence of any
causal relationship between Carter’s complaints and the
retaliation. In addition to the complaint registers filed in
June 2012, November 2013, and December 2013, and EEOC charge
filed in September 2014, Carter circulated memos complaining of
harassment and/or discrimination in July and August 2010 and in
April, August, September, and October of 2014. The episodes of
harassment, however, took place in April 2012, August 2013, and
July 2014. While there is no bright-line test for determining
the degree of temporal proximity necessary to support an
inference of causation, see, e.g., Hicks v. Forest Pres. Dist.
of Cook Cty., Ill., 677 F.3d 781, 789 (7th Cir. 2012), the time
between the 2010 complaints and any of the episodes of
harassment is far too great. See, e.g., Argyropoulos v. City of
Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2008) (seven-week interval
between complaint and adverse employment action, without more,
did not support a finding of causation). Moreover, there can be

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no causal relationship between the harassment and the memos
Carter circulated in August, September, and October of 2014,
since the latter occurred after any of the instances of
harassment.
There is a potentially plausible degree of temporal
proximity between Carter’s April 2014 memo and the July 2014
incident involving the posting of the pictures in Division 6.
But even assuming these two events were sufficiently close in
time, Carter is unable to make a showing of causation because
there is no evidence that the July 2014 incident was anything
but a continuation of the harassment to which he had already
been subjected. In order to support an inference of causation,
Carter must show that something changed following his complaints
-- that the harassment was “ratcheted up” after he spoke out.
See, e.g., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir.
1996) (no evidence of causation for purposes of retaliation
claim because the “allegedly retaliatory conduct was merely the
continuation of the conduct giving rise to the complaints” and
“[t]here was no ratcheting up of the harassment”); see also
Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 2001)
(no evidence of causation for purposes of retaliation claim
where it was undisputed that plaintiff’s superior treated her
“as poorly before her filing of the EEOC charges as he did

25

afterwards”). Carter points to no evidence that his harassment
became more pronounced after he complained.
Because Carter has failed to adduce evidence of a causal
link between his protected activity and the harassment he
experienced, his retaliation claim fails.
D.

Monell Claim
Count III of Carter’s complaint asserts a § 1983 claim

against the Sheriff under Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). To establish municipal liability
under Monell, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he suffered a
deprivation of a federal right; (2) as a result of either an
express municipal policy, widespread custom, or deliberate act
of a decision-maker with final policy-making authority for the
City; which (3) was the proximate cause of his injury.” Ovadal
v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 416 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 2005)
(alteration and quotation marks omitted).
Carter contends that the Sheriff’s failure to establish
procedures for addressing employee complaints “was so pervasive
that acquiescence on the part of the policymakers was apparent
and amounted to a policy decision.” Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 18
(quotation marks omitted). Aside from the facts of his own case,
however, Carter points to no evidence to support a finding of
such a pervasive practice in the Sheriff’s Office. In his brief,
Carter states that the “U.S. Department of Justice has

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continually since 2007 inspected the Cook County Department of
Corrections every six months looking for various criteria to be
met.” Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 18. In support of this claim, he cites
the deposition testimony of Commander William Thomas (“Thomas”),
Lieutenant Hurd’s superior. But nothing in Thomas’s testimony
suggests that the inspections in question have any relevance to
Carter’s claims. Thomas mentioned the inspections in the course
of explaining why he had been demoted from Superintendent to
Commander. Specifically, Thomas stated that the demotion came
after an inspection found that a division of the correctional
facility previously under his supervision had failed to meet
sanitation standards during a Justice Department inspection. See
Deposition of Commander William Thomas at 30:3-16. Thomas’s
testimony contains no hint that the inspections had anything to
do with the way the Sheriff dealt with employee complaints, or
indeed that the inspections were anything other than routine.
Accordingly, I grant the Sheriff summary judgment as to
Carter’s Monell claim.9
Conclusion

9

The County argues that it should be dismissed from the suit
because it cannot be liable for indemnification where there has
been no finding of liability on the Sheriff’s part. However,
because Carter’s hostile work environment claim survives summary
judgment, the Sheriff is potentially liable. As a result, the
County must remain in the suit as an indemnitor.

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For the reasons discussed above, I grant the Sheriff’s
motion for summary judgment as to Count I of the complaint
insofar as it is based on Carter’s failure-to-promote and
failure-to-train theories. I also grant the Sheriff summary
judgment as to Count II’s retaliation claim and Count III’s
Monell claim. The motion is denied only as to Carter’s hostile
workplace claim.

ENTER ORDER:

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: February 15, 2017

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