Park Pet Shop, Inc. et al v. City of Chicago

Filing 59

ORDER. The Court grants plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint 50 on or before August 17, 2015 and strikes as moot defendants' motion to dismiss the first amended complaint 32 and plaintiffs' motion to file an excess-length response to the motion to dismiss 54 . Signed by the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso on 8/3/2015. [For further details see order.] Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
PARK PET SHOP, INC., POCKET
PUPPIES BOUTIQUE, INC., JIM
PARKS, SR., LANE BORON, SUSAN
REID, and CEDAR WOODS FARM,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE CITY OF CHICAGO through the
City Council of Chicago, SUSANA A.
MENDOZA, in her official capacity as
City Clerk of the City of Chicago, and
SANDRA ALFRED, in her official
capacity as Executive Director of the
City of Chicago Department of Animal
Control,
Defendants.

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15 C 1450

Judge Jorge L. Alonso

ORDER
In their first amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that a Chicago ordinance regulating the sale
of dogs, cats, and rabbits is unconstitutional. They seek to file a second amended complaint to: (1)
“make express in their jurisdictional paragraph that this Court has authority to enter the . . . relief
requested”; (2) allege new facts and assert new theories in support of their Commerce Clause claim;
and (3) assert an alternative takings claim. (Mot. Leave Amend Compl. at 1-2.) Leave to amend
should be “freely give[n],” see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), absent “undue delay, bad faith
or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
[or] futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Defendants argue that the motion should be denied because plaintiffs could have
incorporated the proposed amendments in their first amended complaint and allowing them to amend
now will prolong the case, and thus the stay of enforcement of the contested ordinance. (See Defs.’
Resp. Pls.’ Mot. Leave Am. Compl. at 2-4.) Neither of these arguments is persuasive. Assuming
arguendo that plaintiffs could have incorporated the proposed amendments earlier, their short delay
in seeking to do so given that this case is still in the pleading stage is not a reason for denying their
motion. See McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674, 687 (7th Cir.) (noting that “[t]he
issue of undue delay generally arises when a plaintiff seeks leave to amend deep into the litigation”),
reh’g denied, 769 F.3d 535 (2014); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 838 F.2d 904, 909 (7th
Cir. 1988) (“A number of cases say that delay by itself does not justify denying a motion to amend
a pleading in view of the statement in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) that ‘leave [to amend] shall be freely
given when justice so requires.’”). Moreover, defendants’ contention that the delay in the
proceedings, and concomitant delay in enforcing the ordinance, will prejudice them rings hollow
given their voluntary agreement not to enforce the ordinance until this case is resolved.
Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiffs’ motion to file an amended complaint [50] on or before
August 17, 2015 and strikes as moot defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint [32]
and plaintiffs’ motion to file an excess-length response to the motion to dismiss [54].
SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: August 3, 2015

__________________________________
HON. JORGE ALONSO
United States District Judge

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