Taylor v. Chicago Transit Authority
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Ruben Castillo on 8/25/2015. Mailed notice. (jl)
?L
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHN TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
No. 15 C 1479
v.
Chief Judge Rub6n Castillo
CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff John Taylor filed this action in the Circuit Court of Cook County against the
Chicago Transit Authority ("CTA") alleging four claims: (1) gender discrimination in violation
of the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"),775I11. Comp. Stat. 512-102; (2) failure to rehire due
to gender discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. $ 1983; (3) retaliatory discharge; and (4)
retaliatory refusal to rehire or retain. (R. 1-1, Ex. A, Compl.
atll25-57.) CTA removed this
action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.l 1R. 1, Notice of Removal.)
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff s motion to remand the case to state court. (R. 7, Pl.'s
Mot. Remand.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff is a resident of Chicago, Illinois. (R. l-1, Ex. A, Compl. fl
l.)
CTA is an Illinois
municipal corporation with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. (Id.
n2.) Plaintiff
' CTA technically removed this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1441(b), which permits removal
jurisdiction. However, the allegations contained in the complaint do
jurisdiction. Further, CTA alleges in its notice of removal that removal is
not implicate diversity
proper based upon federal question jurisdiction. (R. l, Notice of Removal fl 4.) Therefore, this
Court assumes, based on the complaint and CTA's pleadings, that it intended to remove this suit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ laa1(c), which permits removal based on claims "arising under the
based on federal diversity
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
began working for CTA as a bus operator in September 2008. (ld.
Plaintiff was injured while working when
a
n3.)
On January 6,2009,
coworker drove over Plaintiff s right foot. (Id.
I4.)
Plaintiff was unable to work from January 26,2009, to May 5,2009, because he needed medical
treatment for his injury.
(ld
n 5.) In May 2009, Plaintiff returned to work but was unable to
continue working as a bus operator due to recurring medical issues with his right foot.
(Id
n 6.)
In October 2012, Plaintiff was notified that his temporary medical disability benefits were
expired and that he would need to return to his duties as a bus driver by December 31, 2012 or
else he would have to resign.
(Id n9.)
On December 31, 20t2, Plaintiff was discharged for a
failure to return to work. (Id. n 11.) Following his discharge, Plaintiff filed a grievance with his
union and a complaint with the Illinois Department of Human Rights ("IDHR"). (Id nn D-13.)
On April 23,2013, Plaintiff was cleared for work, at which time he requested to be reinstated to
his position as a bus driver. (Id. n 15.) Plaintiff alleges that a CTA representative verbally asked
him to drop his recent charge with the IDHR against CTA in order to be rehired to his previous
position. (Id n 16.) Plaintiff dropped his IDHR claim, but CTA did not re-hire Plaintiff and
denied that the conversation ever took place.
(Id nn 17-18.) On December 26,2013, Plaintiff
was denied re-employment in writing by CTA. (ld. n 19.) Plaintiff continued to apply to CTA,
and was denied re-employment again in writing on January
20,2014. (Id. n2l.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to filing this action, Plaintiff filed a substantially similar suit ("Taylor
l')
in this
Court on June 30,2}l4,alleging four claims: (1) retaliatory discharge under state common law;
(2) rctaliatory refusal to rehire or retain in violation of 775Ill. Comp. Stat. 512-102; (3) gender
discrimination in violation of 775Ill. Comp. Stat.512-102; and (4) gender discrimination in
violation of 42 U.S.C. $ 1983. (R. 8-1, Ex.
l,
Taylor
/Compl.) The underlying facts and claims
in support of Plaintiff
s June
30,2014 complaint filed in federal court are nearly identical to that
of the present case. On August 8,2014, this Court found that Plaintiff had failed to establish
federal jurisdiction for his state law claims, and that no effort had been made to serve CTA. (R.
8-
l, Ex. 2, Taylor 1Min. Entry.)
without prejudice to the filing of
For those reasons, this Court dismissed the Taylor
a proper amended
1
complaint
complaint that would have established
federal jurisdiction or to filing the complaint in state court. (Id.)
On January 6,2015, Plaintiff filed the instant action in state court ("Taylor
II').
(R. 1-1,
Ex. A, Taylor //Compl.) In Count I, Plaintiff alleges gender discrimination in violation of the
Illinois Human Rights Act,775Ill. Comp. Stat. 512-102. (1d.fln25-32.) In Count II, he alleges a
failure to rehire due to gender discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. $ 1983. (Id.fln 33-40.) In
Count III, he alleges retaliatory discharge in violation of Illinois law. (Id.
tTfl
41-50.) In Count
IV, he alleges aretaliatory refusal to rehire or retain in violation of Illinois law. (Id. 'l|fl 5l-57.)
On February 18,2015, CTA removed the action from state court to federal court. (R. 1, Notice
of Removal.) On March 19,2015, Plaintiff filed
a
motion to remand this action to state court,
(R. 7, Mot. to Remand), and supporting memorandum, (R. 8, Pl.'s Mem.). CTA responded to
Plaintiff
s
motion on April 10,2015. (R. 11, Def.'s Resp.) Plaintiff replied on April 17, 2015.
(R. 13, Pl.'s Reply.)
LEGAL STANDARI)
"[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. $ laal(a). A defendant may remove a case to
federal court under Section l44l(c) whenever a claim conferring federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. $ 1331 is joined with an otherwise non-removable claim. 28 U.S.C. g
l
al(c).
"The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, and federal courts
should interpret the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubt in favor of the plaintiff
s
choice of forum in state court." Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d752,758 (7th
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Remand is the appropriate course of action under the following
circumstances:
(l)
the court "discovers that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction for the initial
removal"; (2) the court "concludes that state law predominates in
a removed
claim that is
separate and independent from the removed federal question claim"; or (3) the court o'determines
that it should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim." Adkins v.
Ill.
Cent.
R.R. Co.,326F.3d828,847-48 (7th Cir. 2003). "In considering amotion forremand, the court
must examine the plaintiff['s] complaint at the time of the defendant's removal and assume the
truth of all factual allegations contained within the original complaint.o' Scouten v. MNL-FTS,
L.L.C., 708 F. Supp. 2d729,731 O{.D. I1l. 2010) (citation omitted); see also Gossmeyer
v.
McDonald,128 F.3d 481,487 (7th Cir. 1,996) ("[W]hether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a
question answered by looking at the complaint as it existed at the time the petitionfor removal
was
.filed." (citation omitted)).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that CTA improperly removed this suit to federal court, and asks that the
Court remand this suit to state court. (R. 8, Pl.'s Mem. at 3.) Plaintiff sets forth a number
of
reasons for why he believes removal was improper. First, Plaintiff argues that the complaint
does not contain a claim created by federal law or one that requires the resolution of a substantial
question of federal law. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also argues that his Section 1983 claim is an
insufficient basis for federal question jurisdiction because it is not "separate and independent"
from his state law claims.2 (Id. at4.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that removal was improper
because this Court previously dismissed the Taylor
l
complaint containing nearly identical
claims for lack ofjurisdiction. (Id. at3.)
Three of the four counts in Plaintiff s complaint are indisputably state law claims. (See
R. 1-1, Ex. A, Taylor 11Compl.) However, Count II is styled as a discrimination claim for
"Failure/Refusal to Rehire" in violation of Section 1983. (Id. flfl 33-40.) Plaintiff first argues
that despite bringing the claim under a federal statute, it is not a claim that arises under federal
law and thus does not confer federal jurisdiction. (R. 8, Pl.'s Mem. at 5; R. 13, Pl.'s Reply at 1-
2.) CTA counters that removal is proper
because
Plaintiff
s Section 1983 claim confers the
Court with proper jurisdiction. (R. 11, Def.'s Resp. at3-4.)
In determining the propriety of removal under Section l44l(c), the Court must first
decide whether there is a claim that confers federal question jurisdiction under Section 1331. Ne.
Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, lnc.,707 F.3d 883, 890 (7th Cir.
2013). The existence of federal question jurisdiction is "governed by the 'well-pleaded
complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of the
plaintiff
s
properly pleaded complaint. The rule makes the plaintiff
the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state
law." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,482 U.S. 386,392 (1987);
State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,463 U.S.
see also Franchise Tax Bd.
of
l, l0 n.9 (1983) ("The well-pleaded
2 The Court notes that the previous version of 28
U.S.C . A4l(c) provided that: "Whenever a
separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by [28 U.S.C.
$ 1331] is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the
entire case may be removed[.]" Congress amended 28 U.S.C. 1441(c) effective January 6,2012
and expressly removed the "separate and independent" requirement from the statute, and
therefore this standard is no longer operative in removal cases. See Fore Invs., L.L.C. v.
Travelers Indem. Co. of Am.,No. l:12-CV-01702-SEB-DML,2013WL3467328,
Ind. July 9,2013).
at *9 (S.D.
complaint rule applies to the original jurisdiction of the district courts as well as to their removal
jurisdiction."). A well-pleaded complaint presents
a federal question where
it "establishes either
that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff s right to relief necessarily
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law." Franchise Tax,463 U.S. at27-
28.
Here, CTA bases its belief that Count II confers federal question jurisdiction over this
suit in part on its assumption that because Section 1983 is a federal statute, it must provide
federal question jurisdiction. (R. 11, Def.'s Resp. at 3.) However, courts have held that Section
1983 is not
Ill.
a
jurisdiction conferring statute.
1981) ("[42 U.S.C. $] 1983 is not
a
See Anderson v.
Luther,52l F. Supp. 91,96 (N.D.
jurisdictional statute; [rather] it is an enabling statute
allowing individuals to sue state officers who, under color of state law, have deprived the
plaintiff of constitutional rights.");
see also Polite v. Casella,901 F. Supp.
90,93 (N.D.N.Y.
1995) ("Section 1983 does not create federal court jurisdiction."); Curtis v. Taylor,625 F.2d 645,
649 (Sth
Cir. 1980) ("[42 U.S.C. $ 1983] is only remedial; it recognizes a cause of action but
does not of itself bestow jurisdiction of the action on federal courts."). Therefore, the fact that
this claim was brought pursuant to Section 1983 is not determinative of whether federal question
jurisdiction is present in this suit.
CTA also relies on Plaintiff s statement in Count II that "CTA violated TlyLoR's
constitutionally protected interest by failing and refusing to reemploy Tevlon based on his
gender" for its belief that Plaintiff seeks to assert a federal constitutional claim under Section
1983. (R. 11, Def.'s Resp. at3; see R. l-1, Ex. A, Taylor //Compl. fl 38.) When faced with
nearly identical claims in Taylor d the Court could not find a proper basis for federal jurisdiction,
(see R. 8-1, Ex. 2, Taylor
1Min. Entry), and nothing in the parties' pleadings has elucidated this
matter upon revisiting this case. It is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks to assert a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a violation of federal labor law statutes,
or a violation of state constitutional or statutory law. If Plaintiff was seeking to raise an Equal
Protection claim, he failed to allege any facts that would give rise to such a claim, such as
membership in a protected class or that he was irrationally singled out as a so-called "class
one." See Reget v. City of La Crosse,595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010). For Plaintiff
s
of
part, he
has not informed the Court of the source of law that supplies the basis of his Section 1983 claim,
other than his assertion that none of his claims are created by federal law. (R. 8, Pl.'s Mem. at
5.) As'omaster of his own complaint," Plaintiff is entitled to avoid
pleading only state law claims
.
Nelson v. Stewart, 422
F
federal jurisdiction by
.3d 463 , 466 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted;.3
Plaintiff has not put the basis for federal question jurisdiction on the face of his
complaint, and therefore the Taylor
11
complaint does not meet the requirements of the well-
pleaded complaint rule. See Williams,482 U.S. at392. Due to the styling of Count II and the
language used in the complaint, it is unclear whether the complaint presents a federal question
sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction over this suit. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude
that removal was proper in this case. See 28 U.S.C. $
laal(c). CTA has the burden of proving
that removal was proper, and it has failed to persuade the Court that federal question jurisdiction
is present in this case. See Schur, 577 F.3d at 758. In instances such as this one where the Court
3 The Court recognizes that a "plaintiff cannot frustrate a defendant's right
to remove by
pleading a case without reference to any federal law when the plaintifls claim is necessarily
federal." Wabash Valley,707 F.3d at 890 (quoting l48 Charles Alan Wright & Anhur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedvre $ 3722 (ath ed.)). Thus, the Court assumes that Plaintiff
has not engaged in "artful pleading" in an attempt to avoid federal jurisdiction, see id., and
therefore, will not attempt to raise an Equal Protection claim once this matter is remanded to
state court.
maintains doubt as to whether removal was proper, it should honor the plaintifls choice
of
forum in state court. See id. Accordingly, the Court remands this suit to the Circuit Court
of
Cook County.
As a result of the Court's conclusion, it need not reach Plaintifls additional arguments.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff s motion to remand (R. 7.) is GRANTED. The entire
case is remanded to the
Circuit Court of Cook County.
ENTERED:
hief Judge Rub6n Castillo
United States District Court
Dated:
August{)Lll
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