Cochran v. Madigan et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM Opinion: Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 1/28/2016. Mailed notice (mmy, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LARRY COCHRAN,

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Petitioner,
v.
LISA MADIGAN,
Respondent.

No. 15 C 1526

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Petitioner Larry Cochran’s (Cochran) pro se
petition for writ of habeas corpus (Petition) brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(Section 2254). For the reasons stated below, the Petition is dismissed.

BACKGROUND
In 1993, Cochran was convicted in Illinois state court of two counts of
residential burglary. In December 1998, Cochran was convicted in state court of one
count of retail theft and one count of writing a bad check. In January 2008, Cochran
was convicted in federal court of possessing five grams or more of cocaine base with
the intent to distribute was sentenced to 405 months of imprisonment, for which he
remains currently in custody. Cochran unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and

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then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Section
2255), which was also denied in 2009. In May 2013, Cochran filed a petition for
post-judgment relief relating to his 1993 state court convictions, arguing that his
guilty plea was void because he was not represented by counsel. In August 2013, the
trial court denied that petition, finding it untimely and the underlying claims to be
unsupported by the record. Cochran also filed similar unsuccessful challenges to his
other state court convictions. On February 17, 2015, Cochran filed the instant
Petition.

LEGAL STANDARD
An individual in custody pursuant to state court judgment may seek a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to Section 2254, which provides the following:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--(1) resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The decision made by a state court is deemed to be contrary to
clearly established federal law “‘if the state court applies a rule different from the
governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently
than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’”

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Emerson v. Shaw, 575 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2009)(quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 694 (2002)). The decision by a state court is deemed to involve an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law “‘if the state court correctly identifies
the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably
applies it to the facts of the particular case.’” Emerson, 575 F.3d at 684 (quoting
Bell, 535 U.S. at 694).

DISCUSSION
This court has liberally construed Cochran’s pro se filings. See Perruquet v.
Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 2004)(stating that “[a]s [the plaintiff] was without
counsel in the district court, his habeas petition [wa]s entitled to a liberal
construction”); Greer v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, Ill., 267 F.3d 723, 727
(7th Cir. 2001)(indicating that a court should “liberally construe the pleadings of
individuals who proceed pro se”). Cochran asserts in the Petition that he was
convicted and sentenced in the state court proceedings without the assistance of
counsel, and that such convictions should be held unconstitutional because they were
inappropriately used to enhance his federal sentence which he is currently serving.
(Pet. 4-8).

I. Petition
Respondent moves to dismiss the Petition, arguing that this court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over the current Petition since Cochran is not in custody
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on the challenged state court judgments. (MTD 2).

A. “In Custody” Requirement
Respondent argues that Cochran’s Petition is based on state court sentences
for which he has already served, and thus Cochran does not meet the “in custody”
requirement. (MTD 1). The phrase “in custody” in Section 2254 has been
interpreted to refer to when the petitioner is “‘in custody’ under the conviction or
sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S.
488, 490-91 (1989). Cochran’s Petition seeks to challenge his prior “expired or
discharged” state court convictions. (Pet. 3). The record does not reflect that
Cochran is being held in custody as part of a sentence for those convictions. The
record reflects, and Cochran concedes, that Cochran is currently serving his federal
sentence resulting from his January 2008 conviction. (Pet. 6). Thus, Cochran cannot
invoke Section 2254 to challenge his previous state court convictions since he is not
being detained based on those convictions.

Cochran argues that he falls under the exception outlined in Lackawanna
County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). In Lackawanna, the Supreme
Court has identified only one exception when a petitioner could challenge his prior
conviction in such a situation: “where there was a failure to appoint counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment. . . .” Id. at 404; see also Grigsby v. Cotton, 456
F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2006)(identifying the “single exception” recognized in
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Lackawanna). The exception is not applicable in this case since the record reflects
that Cochran has made similar arguments at state court and that his claims relating to
counsel were found to be unsupported by the record. Nor has Cochran pointed to
sufficient evidence in his Petition to show that he was not afforded the opportunity to
have counsel. The court also notes that to the extent that the holding in Lackawanna
identified a second potential exception, namely where “a habeas petition directed at
[an] enhanced sentence may effectively be the first and only forum available for
review of the prior conviction,” that exception is also inapplicable in this case. 532
U.S. at 406. The record reflects that Cochran was able to pursue a state remedy in
the state courts. Therefore, Cochran cannot contest his current federal sentence in
this habeas proceeding by attacking his state court convictions, and this court lacks
jurisdiction over the instant Petition.

B. Place of Filing
Even liberally construing the instant Petition and considering it as a petition
for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to Section 2255, the court notes that
Cochran filed the Petition in the Northern District of Illinois. Respondent contests,
and Cochran affirms, that he is currently in federal custody resulting from his
January 2008 conviction in the Northern District of Indiana. (MTD 5); (Pet. 6).
Since Cochran is not incarcerated in the Northern District of Illinois, this district is
not the proper forum and the Petition is dismissed for that reason as well. See United
States v. Mittelsteadt, 790 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1986)(holding that “the proper venue
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for the habeas corpus proceeding is the district where [the prisoner] is being held”).
Based on the above, Cochran’s Petition is dismissed.

II. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the court must
issue or deny a certificate of appealability “when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.” Id. A district court should only issue a certificate of appealability “if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The petitioner must also show that “reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved
in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDonnell, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)). In the instant action,
Cochran has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as
to any claims presented in his Petition. Nor has Cochran shown that reasonable
jurists could debate whether the Petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented in the Petition deserve encouragement to proceed
further. Therefore, should Cochran decide to appeal this court’s ruling, this court
finds that a certificate of appealability would not be warranted.

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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Petition is dismissed, and the court
declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: January 28, 2016

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