Marzillo v. United Auto Workers Local 551 et al

Filing 63

Enter MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 10/6/2015. Mailed notice (jdh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Michael Marzillo,
Plaintiff,

v.

United Auto Workers Local 551; Ford
Motor Company; Grant Morton; Alan
“Coby” Millender; Greg Poet; and
International
Union,
United
Automobile,
Aerospace
and
Agricultural Implement Workers of
America,
Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this action, plaintiff Michael Marzillo, an employee of
defendant

Ford

United

Auto

Local

Union;

Motor

Workers
its

Company
Local

past

551
and

and
(the

a

Union
“Local

present

Representative
Union”),

Chairmen,

sues

Morton

at
the
and

Millender; the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and

Agricultural

Implement

Workers

employee, Greg Poet; and Ford.

of

America

(“UAW”);

UAW

He asserts a “hybrid action”

against the Local Union (for breach of the implied duty of fair
representation) and Ford (for breach of contract) (Counts I and

II,

respectively) 1;

seeks

injunctive

relief

(Count

III);

and

complains of tortious conduct including civil conspiracy (Count
IV); tortious interference with contract (Count V); and unfair
labor practices (Count VI) by all defendants.
moved to dismiss some or all of these counts.

Defendants have
For the following

reasons, the motions are granted.
I.
Plaintiff has been an elected representative of the Local
Union at Ford’s Torrence Avenue facility in Chicago, Illinois
since

August

of

2004,

and

he

has

been

reelected

with

the

substantial support of the Local Union’s Skilled Trades Group
since then. 2

At a meeting held in October of 2011, officers of

UAW presented the Local Union with a proposed contract between
UAW and Ford.

Defendant Morton, who at that time was Chairman

of the Local Union, had promised defendant Poet, an officer of
UAW,

that

he--Morton--would

deliver

a

favorable

vote

proposed contract from the Torrence Avenue facility.

on

the

Plaintiff,

however, believed that the proposed contract was unfavorable to
his

membership,

and

he

spoke

out

1

against

it

at

the

October

See Nemsky v. ConocoPhillips Co., 574 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir.
2009) (in a “hybrid 301” action, plaintiff asserts claims under
Section 301 of the LMRA against the union for breaching its duty
of fair representation and against the employer for breaching
collective bargaining agreement).
2
As is appropriate at the motion to dismiss stage, I accept all
well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true.
See Jones v.
General Elec. Co., 87 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1996).
2

meeting.
Ford

Ultimately, the contract was approved by a majority of

workers,

but

it

was

voted

down

at

the

Torrence

Avenue

facility.
Sometime shortly thereafter, Morton confronted plaintiff in
his

office

and

complained

representatives
“embarrassed”
forward,

who

Morton

plaintiff

that

had
at

plaintiff

criticized

the

October

alleges,

and

the

meeting.

Morton

and

other

union

contract

had

From

day

other

that

Local

Union

officials devised and carried out a scheme to punish plaintiff
for being “out of line” at the meeting by reducing plaintiff’s
overtime

hours.

Plaintiff

claims

that

the

reduction

in

his

overtime violates provisions of both the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (the “CBA”) and a 1995 Letter of Understanding (the
“1995 Letter”) between UAW and Ford relating to the allocation
of

overtime

work

by

full-time

union

representatives.

In

addition, plaintiff claims, Morton reduced plaintiff’s area of
responsibilities and cut his representative group in half by
forming two separate Skilled Trades groups and assigning one of
them to another Local Union representative.
Plaintiff

began

filing

grievances

challenging

allocation of overtime in or around April of 2012.
Resources

Representative

allegedly

the

unfair

Ford’s Human

participated

in

these

grievance proceedings and “took the position that such matters
were

within

the

exclusive

discretion”
3

of

the

Local

Union’s

Chairman.

For their part, Chairmen Morton and Millender (the

latter became the Local Union Chairman in June of 2013) have
refused, in bad faith, to equalize plaintiff’s overtime hours
“because

of

[plaintiff’s]

political

affiliation

and

because

[plaintiff] had criticized the proposed International contract.”
Accordingly, plaintiff’s grievances were either denied or never
adjudicated, and his attempts to appeal have been fruitless.
Indeed,

plaintiff

complains

that

the

grievance

procedure

is

“circular” because it requires that appeals be “made to the very
same Chairman of whom the complaint is being made.”
To

“get

past

the

logjam”

in

his

grievance

process,

plaintiff wrote a letter to UAW’s president in November of 2013.
In that letter, plaintiff invoked the 1995 Letter and stated
that he wished to “appeal and complain of the denial or deemed
denial of” his grievances regarding overtime allocation.
Exh. 1.

Cmplt.

In response, plaintiff received a letter stating that

his appeal was “premature,” and advising him that he must first
exhaust

the

Constitution.

grievance

procedure

Plaintiff

attempted

set
to

forth
follow

in
the

the

UAW

designated

process, but no resolution of his grievances was forthcoming.
Sometime

between

April

and

July

of

2014,

plaintiff

requested a report on the status of his various grievances from
Regional International Servicing Representative, Tony Tallarita.
Tallarita determined that plaintiff had between twenty-three and
4

thirty-two unresolved grievances, and he advised plaintiff to
bring his complaints about unequal overtime allocation to the
UAW National Ford Department, pursuant to the 1995 Letter.

So

plaintiff wrote to the UAW National Ford Department for a second
time

on

August

1,

2014,

again

invoking

the

1995

Letter

and

complaining “that the representative overtime opportunities have
not

been

fairly

distributed.”

Cmplt.,

Exh.

6.

Plaintiff

attached the 1995 Letter to this letter and also quoted its
provision that complaints about overtime distribution “may be
brought to the attention of the UAW National Ford Department and
the

U.S.

Union

Affairs

Office,

Ford

Automotive

Operations,

Employee relations, for review and resolution as the national
parties deem appropriate.”
Defendant

Poet

Id.

responded

to

plaintiff’s

August

1,

2014,

letter, stating, “[a]fter further investigation, I found that
the Local 551 Plant Chairman has committed to equalizing you
with

the

other

district

committee.

The

spreads

are

within

twenty-five (25) hours as of week ending September 21, 2014.”
Cmplt., Exh. 7.

Plaintiff claims that this letter does not

resolve his outstanding grievances, however, and that payroll
records from the Torrence Avenue facility reveal an inequitable
allocation

of

overtime

hours.

He

now

seeks

unpaid

overtime

compensation, profit sharing, and other benefits in excess of
$300,000.
5

II.
With respect to the allocation of overtime hours, the CBA
provides:
Section
13.
Provisions
Applicable
Representatives
****

to

Full-time

(b) Hours on Company Time
****
(2) Monday through Friday, excluding holidays, all
other elected representatives shall be scheduled to
represent
employees
on
the
basis
of
their
representation functions and a proportionate amount of
the overtime worked by the employees in the Unit on
such days when less than all are scheduled to work.
Such overtime shall be determined and authorized
weekly by totaling the Monday through Friday overtime
worked in the Unit during the preceding week,
excluding holidays and periods when all employees were
scheduled to work, and multiplying that total by .01.
Appointed representatives will receive overtime hours
equivalent to the average hours authorized for elected
representatives. The Chairperson will be notified of
the Unit’s Monday through Friday overtime allocation
and will establish the daily work schedule for all
representatives and provide it to a designated Company
representative.
****
(3) . . . The Unit Chairperson will be notified of and
will establish the Unit’s Saturday, Sunday or holiday
work schedule for representatives and provide it to a
designated Company representative.
Ford’s Mem., Exh. A. 3

3

Ford states, and plaintiff does not dispute, that although two
CBAs were in force during the period encompassed by plaintiff’s
claims, they are identical in all relevant respects. Plaintiff
raises no objection to my consideration of the document Ford
6

The 1995 Letter explains that Article VI, Section 13(b) of
the CBA, from which the foregoing is excerpted, “describes the
process for determining the weekly allocation of overtime hours
for union representatives.”

Cmplt., Exh. 9.

The 1995 Letter

goes on to:
confirm
the
parties’
understanding
that
these
provisions contemplate that insofar as practical such
overtime
opportunities
would
be
rotated
by
the
chairperson among the representatives, depending upon
their
specific
representation
functions
and
the
representation requirements in the unit, with the
objective of equalization within reasonable limits
over a period of time (e.g., quarterly or semiannually).
In
this
regard,
complaints
that
representative
overtime
opportunities
are
not
being
fairly
distributed may be brought to the attention of the UAW
National Ford Department and the U.S. Union Affairs
Office,
Ford
Automotive
Operations,
Employee
Relations, for review and resolution as the national
parties deem appropriate.
Id.
In

Count

I

of

the

complaint,

plaintiff

claims

that

the

Local Union, Morton, and Millender breached their duty of fair
representation

under

Section

301

of

the

LMRA

by

failing

to

equalize his overtime allocations pursuant to the CBA and the
1995 Letter, and by failing to represent him in the grievance
procedures. 4 In Count II, plaintiff claims that Ford was aware

represents as the earlier of the two CBAs and attaches as
Exhibit A to its memorandum.
4
In his combined response to defendants’ motions to dismiss,
plaintiff concedes that Morton and Millender cannot be held
7

that plaintiff was not receiving an equalized share of overtime,
yet “failed to manage or require its employee, the Chairman of
UAW Local 551, to comply with the CBA,” and failed to take
disciplinary action against the Chairman.
Count III is captioned “Injunctive Relief” and seeks an
order directing Ford to “exercise its management authority to
order that overtime hours...be equalized,” and to “enforce the
CBA and honor the rights of Union Representatives to equalized
overtime

pay.”

Plaintiff

further

requests,

“should

Ford

or

Millender” fail to equalize his overtime, “that an independent
third party be appointed to assign and equalize overtime hours
among the Union Representatives.”
Counts IV-VI assert various torts against all defendants.
In

Count

IV,

plaintiff

claims

defendants

were

aware

that

plaintiff was not receiving equalized overtime, and that they
conspired

to

deny

plaintiff

“and

other

dissident

Union

Representatives their right to receive equalized overtime” under
the CBA and the 1995 Letter, including by developing “a maze of
conflicting

routes

of

appeal,

complaining

representatives

giv[ing]

about

their

false
appeal

information
rights,

to

[and]

fail[ing] to enforce the terms and conditions of the CBA and the

individually liable for any breach of the duty of fair
representation.
Accordingly, Count I is dismissed as to them,
but it remains pending against the Local Union, whose motion
does not challenge its adequacy.
8

1995

Letter

defendants’

Agreement.”
conduct

In

amounts

Count
to

V,

plaintiff

tortious

asserts

interference

that
with

plaintiffs’ rights under the CBA and the 1995 Letter Agreement.
Finally, in Count VI, he claims that the conduct described in
the complaint amounts to an unfair labor practice.
Ford seeks dismissal of all counts against it, which is to
say, every count but Count I.

Ford argues that Count II must be

dismissed because the CBA expressly delegates to the Local Union
Chairperson

exclusive

representatives.

authority

to

assign

overtime

to

union

Accordingly, Ford had no authority to compel

Morton, Millender, or the Local Union to equalize plaintiff’s
share

of

overtime.

Additionally,

Ford

argues

that

I

lack

jurisdiction to order the injunctive relief plaintiff seeks in
Count

III,

and

that

his

state

law

claims

must

be

dismissed

because they are preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA or the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. ' 151, et seq.
Because all of these arguments, except the first, are echoed by
other defendants (some of whom also assert additional bases for
dismissal), I begin with Ford’s motion.
Ford

begins

with

the

premise

that

the

scope

of

authority is defined and cabined by the terms of the CBA.

its
Ford

then points to provisions in the CBA delegating the duty to
“establish the daily work schedule for all representatives,” and
to

“establish

the

Unit’s

Saturday,
9

Sunday

or

holiday

work

schedule for the representatives” to “[t]he Chairperson [of the
Local Union].”
(b)(3).

Ford

Ford’s Mem., Exh. A, CBA Art. VI, '' 13(b)(2) and
asserts

that

these

provisions

expressly

vest

authority for work scheduling exclusively in the Local Union’s
Chairman.

Moreover,

Ford

notes,

the

1995

Letter

likewise

provides that “the chairperson [will] establish the daily work
schedule

for

the

unit

committee,”

and

that

overtime

opportunities “would be rotated by the chairperson among the
representatives.”

Cmplt., Exh. 9 (emphasis added).

Together,

Ford contends, the CBA and the 1995 Letter make clear that Ford
has no power to direct or control the distribution of overtime
hours among full-time Union Representatives, as UAW expressly
retained authority over overtime allocation.
Plaintiff
delegate

acknowledges

responsibility

for

that

the

scheduling

CBA
to

and
the

1995
Local

Letter
Union’s

Chairman, see Pl.’s Opp. at 11, but in his view, the terms of
the

1995

Letter

distribution

“may

providing
be

that

brought

to

complaints
the

about

attention

of

overtime
the

UAW

National Ford Department and the U.S. Union Affairs Office, Ford
Automotive

Operations,

Employee

relations,

for

review

and

resolution as the national parties deem appropriate” establishes
a substantive duty on Ford’s part to “enforce equalization.” Id.
at 7.
Letter’s

This construction is at odds, however, with the 1995
immediately

preceding
10

provisions,

which

expressly

convey authority for establishing work schedules and rotating
overtime opportunities to the local union chairperson.

At best,

the provision plaintiff points to establishes a procedure for
alerting

Ford

and

UAW

to

local

disputes

about

overtime

allocation, which the “national parties” may review and resolve
as they “deem appropriate.”
invoked that procedure here.

Cmplt., Exh. 9.

Indeed, plaintiff

It is true that he claims his

initial effort to follow the procedure was mishandled (by UAW;
not by Ford), and that its substantive outcome--Poet’s letter
stating

that

equalizing

“the
you

unsatisfactory.

Local
with

551
the

Plant

Chairman

other

has

district

committed

to

committee”--was

But the essence of plaintiff’s claim against

Ford is not that Ford failed to follow the procedure established
in the 1995 Letter, but instead that Ford should have “enforced”
a different substantive allocation of overtime.

Because it is

clear from the face of the CBA and 1995 Letter that Ford had no
authority to do so, plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract
against Ford fails as a matter of law. 5

5

Curiously, plaintiff attaches to his complaint a decision of
the American Arbitration Association in another case involving
Ford, in which the panel rejected the very claim plaintiff
asserts against Ford here: that it breached the CBA by failing
“to properly supervise [the local Chairman] and correct his
errors in the assignment, rotation and equalization of Union
overtime” pursuant to the same 1995 Letter of Understanding at
issue here. The panel examined the language of the 1995 Letter
and concluded that “[a]ny fair reading of the CBA in this case
reveals that the parties clearly shifted the exclusive right to
11

Ford’s next argument, echoed by several other defendants,
is

that

Count

plaintiff’s

III,

which

overtime,

must

seeks
be

to

enjoin

dismissed

Ford

because

to

equalize

the

Norris-

LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. ' 101, et seq., divests federal courts
of jurisdiction to enter an injunction of the sort plaintiff
requests.

The

anti-injunction

provisions

of

the

Norris-

LaGuardia Act state:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute
(as these terms are herein defined) from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts:
* * * *
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any
person participating or interested in such labor
dispute . . . moneys or things of value.

The parties agree that “the critical element in determining
whether

the

provisions

of

the

Norris-LaGuardia

Act

apply

is

whether the employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of
the

controversy.”

International

Jacksonville

Longshoremen’s

Bulk

Association,

Terminals,
457

U.S.

Inc.
702,

v.
712

assign, rotate and equalize Union overtime hours to the Union,
and specifically the Unit Chairperson. The Employer retained no
control over the assignment, rotation and equalization of Union
overtime hours and opportunities.” Cmplt., Exh. 8. Obviously,
I am not bound by that decision, but my independent review of
the letter leads me to the same conclusion.
12

(1982) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (original
alteration).

That is the case here, Ford argues, because the

employer-employee relationship is the only relationship it has
with plaintiff.
that

defendants

falls

squarely

Moreover, Ford points out, plaintiff’s claim
breached
within

the

the

overtime

statutory

provisions
definition

of
of

the
a

CBA

“labor

dispute,” which broadly encompasses “any controversy concerning
the terms or conditions of employment...regardless of whether or
not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee.”

29 U.S.C. ' 113(c).

Indeed, the Supreme Court

“has consistently given the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia

Act

exceptions

in

only

a

broad

limited

interpretation,

situations

where

recognizing
necessary

to

accommodate the Act to specific federal legislation or paramount
congressional policy.” Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, 457 U.S. at
708.
Plaintiff does not claim that either federal legislation or
paramount congressional policy exempts his claims from the broad
scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s anti-injunction provisions.
Instead, he argues that, “[w]hen an action involves a dispute
over

work

assignments,

the

Norris

LaGuardia

Act

is

inapplicable.”

Pl.’s Opp. at 9 (citing Burkholder v. Local 12,

International

Union

United

Automobile,

Aerospace

and

Agricultural Implement Works of America, Local No. 12, 444 F.
13

Supp.

2d

Pointers

817,
of

820

(N.D.

Greater

Ohio,

New

2006)

York,

and

Local

Drywall

1974

Tapers

v.

&

Operative

Plasterers’ & Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, 537 F.2d 669, 674 (2d
Cir. 1976)).

But plaintiff’s cited authorities do not support

his

proposition,

sweeping

nor

do

they

persuade

me

that

his

claims fall outside the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s broad scope.
In Burkholder, the plaintiffs were machine repairmen at an
auto plant who sued their local union, claiming the union had
breached

its

duty

disproportionate

of

fair

amount

of

representation
work

“by

previously

repairmen [to] electricians and millwrights.”

allocating

done

by

a

machine

Id. at 819.

The

court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not deprive it of
jurisdiction

to

enter

a

preliminary

injunction

(though

it

declined to issue the injunction on other grounds), concluding
that “the dispute at issue here does not involve the employeremployee

relationship,

but

rather

the

employees at the plant.” Id. at 820.
however,

the

plaintiffs

in

Burkholder

relationships

between

Unlike in this case,
did

not

sue

their

employer, DaimlerChrysler, 6 nor did their claims arise out of an
alleged breach of the CBA between the employer and the union.

6

DaimlerChrysler was subsequently joined as a defendant by the
union. The plaintiffs’ later-filed Third Amended Complaint named
DaimlerChrysler as a defendant, but they made no allegations
against DaimlerChrysler. See Burkholder v. International Union,
299 F. App’x 531, 532 (6th Cir. 2008).
14

The dispute in Drywall Tapers was even further removed from
the

Norris-LaGuardia

That

case

Act’s

involved

a

definition

turf

war

of

a

“labor

between

two

dispute.”
unions—the

“Plasterers” and the “Painters”—over whether a particular aspect
of construction work fell within the province of one or the
other.

537 F.2d at 671.

The plaintiffs claimed that pursuant

to a certain memorandum between the unions, the work in question
was within their jurisdiction, while the defendants contested
the

viability

of

Norris-LaGuardia

the
Act

memorandum.
did

not

The

bar

court

held

jurisdiction

to

that
enter

the
an

injunction, concluding that “the injunctive relief sought here
will not infringe upon the workers organizational or bargaining
rights

but

will

instead

enforce

a

negotiated by the unions themselves.”

work

assignment

agreement

Id. at 673-74.

The same

cannot be said here, where the union negotiated with Ford, the
employer,

for

representatives.

the

right

to

distribute

overtime

among

its

The injunction plaintiff seeks directing Ford

to reallocate his overtime hours would directly infringe upon
that right.
In

short,

while

plaintiff

is

correct

that

the

Norris-

LaGuardia Act’s anti-injunction provisions are not absolute, I
conclude that their broad scope encompasses the claims plaintiff
asserts here because they arise out of, and are inextricably
linked

to,

agreements

between
15

plaintiff’s

union

and

his

employer.

Accordingly, I have no jurisdiction to order Ford—the

only party whose actions Count III explicitly seeks to enjoin—to
“equalize”

plaintiff’s

overtime

allocation.

Moreover,

even

assuming Count III could be construed as seeking an injunction
against Millender (as plaintiff evidently intended, see Pl.’s
Mot.

for

Hearing

at

2

(DN

22)),

plaintiff’s

claims

against

Millender are equally grounded in rights flowing from the CBA
and

the

1995

relationship
Jacksonville

Letter.
remains

Bulk

Accordingly,
“the

Terminals,

matrix
457

U.S.

the
of
at

employer-employee
the

712.

controversy.”
See

also

29

U.S.C. ' 113(c) (“labor dispute” not limited to those in which
“the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee”). 7
This brings me to plaintiff’s claims in Counts IV-VI for
civil

conspiracy,

tortious

unfair labor practices.

interference

with

contract,

and

Ford and other defendants argue that

each of these claims is preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA,
citing Kimbro v. Pepsico, Inc., 215 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2000),

7

To the extent Count III seeks the appointment of an independent
third party to determine the proper allocation of overtime in
the event plaintiff prevails on the substance of his claims,
that request is not properly characterized as an “injunction.”
See Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 668 F.3d 481, 491 (7th
Cir. 2012) (appointment of independent monitor did not amount to
an injunction because it did not “grant relief on the merits or
substantively alter the parties’ legal relationship,” nor did it
“require the parties to do or refrain from doing anything at
all.”) (Original emphasis).
16

and

that

Count

VI

(unfair

preempted by the NLRA.

labor

practices)

is

additionally

With respect to Section 301 preemption,

Kimbro made clear that when a worker is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement, he must litigate any legal dispute with
his employer as a breach of that contract under Section 301.
215 F.3d at 725.

The Kimbro court further held that a plaintiff

may not “recharacterize his claim as one of tort law in order to
circumvent the exclusive jurisdiction of federal law over claims
for

breach

of

a

collective

bargaining

agreement,”

noting

specifically that “[o]ne of the forbidden recharacterizations is
recasting

a

breach

of

contract

interference with contract.”

suit

as

a

Id. at 725-26.

suit

for

tortious

I agree that that

is what plaintiff has done here.
With

respect

to

his

civil

conspiracy

and

tortious

interference with contract claims, plaintiff insists that state
tort remedies remain available “as long as the state-law claim
can be resolved without interpreting the [collective bargaining]
agreement itself.”

Pl.’s Opp. at 13 (citing Lingle v. Norge

Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 (1988).

That may be

true, but the argument rings hollow in this case because the CBA
(and the 1995 Letter) is the very source of the rights plaintiff
claims

defendants

(defendants

“have

violated.
denied

See,

overtime,

e.g.,
denied

Count

IV

¶ 134

grievances,

given

false or incorrect advice regarding appeal rights and refused to
17

abide by the 1995 Letter Agreement relative to the assignment of
overtime among Union Representatives as a cudgel to suppress
dissident representation”); Count V ¶¶ 151, 153 (“the CBA and
the 1995 Letter Agreement created certain contractual rights and
benefits for MARZILLO to be assigned overtime hours and receive
overtime pay for such overtime hours worked” and that defendants
“tortiously

interfered

contractual benefit”).

with

Marzillo’s

receipt

of

such

Claims grounded in these and similar

allegations plainly cannot be adjudicated without reference to
the CBA and the 1995 Letter, and thus do not fall within the
Lingle exception to Section 301’s field preemption. 8
Plaintiff’s

response

to

defendants’

arguments

for

dismissing his claim for unfair labor practices only reinforces
that

that

assert

claim

that

practices

and

the

is

likewise

NLRA

further

preempted.

preempts
vests

his

claim

exclusive

for

defendants

unfair

jurisdiction

claim in the National Labor Relations Board.

8

Several

labor

over

the

Plaintiff concedes

Ford raises the additional argument that a party generally
cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract, citing
Douglas Theater Corp. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 681 N.E. 2d
564, 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
That principle likewise dooms
Count V as to both Ford and UAW. Swager v. Couri, 395 N.E. 921
(Ill. 1979), which plaintiff cites for the proposition that
claims alleging malice are excepted from this rule, is
inapposite, as it addressed when actions taken by corporate
officers, directors and shareholders can be deemed to have
interfered with the corporation’s contracts. In any event,
plaintiff’s allegations do not raise a plausible inference of
malice on Ford’s part.
18

that his allegations articulate “a violation of the National
Labor Relations Act,” but he argues that because they also state
“a breach of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement...the
NLRB

and

the

district

court

share

concurrent

jurisdiction.”

Pl.’s Opp. at 19 (citing Local Union No. 884, United Rubber,
Cork,

Linoleum,

&

Plastic

Workers

of

Am

v.

Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 61 F.3d 1347, 1356 (8th Cir. 1995).
Even if plaintiff’s jurisdictional argument is correct, however,
it merely emphasizes that his claim essentially arises out of
the CBA and is thus preempted by Section 301.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Count I is dismissed as to the
individual
Union.

defendants

but

remains

pending

against

the

All other counts are dismissed in their entirety.

ENTER ORDER:

_____________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: October 6, 2015

19

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