Vroman et al v. Board of Education of Round Lake Community Unit School District #116 et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 16 is granted and therefore, Counts III, IV, and VI of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint are dismissed without prejudice. See Order for further details. Ruling set for 1/7/16 is converted to a status hearing set to begin at 9:15 a.m. rather than at 9:30 a.m. Signed by the Honorable James B. Zagel on 11/18/2015. Mailed notice(ep, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CLAUDIA VROMAN, PATRICIA FICASPENCER, and ZORAYA TORRES,
Plaintiffs,
No. 15 C 2013
Judge James B. Zagel

v.
ROUND LAKE AREA SCHOOLS –
DISTRICT #116 (a/k/a Board of Education of
Round Lake Community Unit School District
#116, Lake County Illinois), CONSTANCE
COLLINS, KEELY ROBERTS, LEE
PALMER, PHILIP GEORGIA, AMY
GANNON, NICK HECKEL, JERI RYAN,
and PATRICIA STANKO,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Claudia Vroman, Patricia Fica-Spencer, and Zoraya Torres bring this action
against Defendant Round Lake Area Schools – District #116 (the “District” or “Defendant”) and
its current and former employees, Defendants Constance Collins, Keely Roberts, Lee Palmer,
Philip Georgia, Amy Gannon, Nick Heckel, Jeri Ryan, and Patricia Stanko. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants discriminated against them in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS
5/2 (the “IHRA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
This matter is currently before me on Defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings as to Plaintiff Vroman’s IHRA claims—Counts III, IV, and VI of the amended
complaint—under Rule 12(c) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. For the following
reasons, I am granting Defendant’s motion in its entirety.

1

BACKGROUND
Vroman was employed by the District between 2012 and 2014. To support her IHRA
claims, Vroman alleges that she filed four discrimination charges against the District with the
Illinois Department of Human Rights (the “IDHR”): (1) Charge No. 2014CF1029 on October 23,
2013, alleging national origin discrimination; (2) Charge No. 2014CF1740 on January 30, 2014,
alleging retaliation discrimination; (3) Charge No. 2014CF2249 on March 25, 2014, alleging
retaliation discrimination; and (4) Charge No. 2014CF2447 on March 25, 2014, alleging ancestry
discrimination.
All four charges were simultaneously cross-filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). In the amended complaint, Vroman alleges that these
charges were then “transferred” to the EEOC for investigation. Vroman also alleges that she
requested a “notice of right to sue” letter from the EEOC and received this letter on December
10, 2014. Vroman does not mention, however, that she submitted a written request to the IDHR
to withdraw her charges. On August 11, 2014, the IDHR issued corrected Orders of Closure
approving Vroman’s request to withdraw her charges and closing the charges. The IDHR neither
issued a final determination nor notified Vroman of any right to pursue civil claims.
Although Plaintiff was given the opportunity, she did not file a response to Defendant’s
motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. Massey v.
Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000). “[T]he proper vehicle for dismissal based on an
affirmative defense is a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Scott v. City of

2

Kewanee, 2014 WL 1302025, at *5 (C.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 912–13
(7th Cir. 2010) and McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 892 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006)).
The court evaluates a Rule 12(c) motion under “the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.” McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 757 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). A complaint must provide the grounds of the claimant’s
entitlement to relief, contain more than formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action,
and allege enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
In addition to the allegations in the complaint, “documents attached to a motion to
dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and
are central to [her] claim.” 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Wright v. Assoc. Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994)). Further, a court “may
also take judicial notice of matters of public record.” Henson v. CSC Credit Services, 29 F.3d
280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, this Court may consider Plaintiff’s IDHR and EEOC
charges attached to the complaint as well as IDHR records submitted by the parties. Anderson v.
Ctrs. for New Horizons, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 2d 956, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (court “may consider
plaintiff’s IDHR and EEOC charges attached to defendants’ motion as well as IDHR records
submitted by the parties.”) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims under the IHRA should be dismissed because
she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Act. “Under Illinois law, the

3

comprehensive scheme of remedies and administrative procedures of the IHRA is the exclusive
source of redress for alleged violations of the act.” Jimenez v. Thompson Steel Co., Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 2d 693, 695 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The IHRA “is enforceable only in administrative proceedings
and not by an original suit in court, whether state or federal.” Shah v. Inter-Continental Hotel
Chicago Operating Corp., 314 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
It is well-established that a complainant who voluntarily withdraws a charge before the
IDHR issues a final order addressing whether there is substantial evidence supporting the alleged
civil rights violation has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Anderson, 891 F. Supp.
2d at 960; see also Slaughter v. Fred Weber, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1057-58 (N.D. Ill.
2008) (dismissing the plaintiff's IHRA claims where she had withdrawn her IDHR charge).
Plaintiff cannot relieve herself from the administrative requirements of the IHRA by
characterizing her withdrawal as a transfer. See Ocampo v. Remedial Environmental Manpower,
Inc., No. 13-cv-06283, 2014 WL 2893190, *2 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2014) (dismissing an IHRA
claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where the plaintiff claimed that she
“transferred” her IDHR charges to the EEOC, but the IDHR Order of Closure stated that her
request to withdraw was approved). Although Plaintiff claims that she transferred her IDHR
charges to the EEOC, it is clear that Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew her charges because the
IDHR’s August 11, 2014 Orders of Closure, which Defendant attached to its motion, clearly
states that Plaintiff’s request to withdraw her charges was approved.
Because Plaintiff did not receive a final order from the IDHR as required under the
IHRA, I am dismissing Plaintiff’s IHRA claims without prejudice for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. See Teal v. Potter, 559 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Greene v.
Meese, 875 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir.1989) (determining that the “proper resolution for failing to

4

exhaust administrative remedies is dismissal without prejudice”).
CONCLUSION
Vroman has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for her claims under the
Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/2 and 5/6-101. Accordingly, I am dismissing Counts III,
IV, and VI of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint without prejudice.
ENTER:

James B. Zagel
United States District Judge
DATE: November 18, 2015

5