Jefferson v. Guerrero et al
Filing
79
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order; As to Jefferson's motions in limine as numbered in Dkt. No. 76-1: 1. Motions Nos. 1, 3 and 6 through 15 are granted without objection. 2. Motions Nos. 2, 4 and 5 are granted for the reasons stated in this opini on. As for Guerrero's motions in limine as designated in Dkt. No. 75: 1. Motions Nos. 2 through 4, 8 and 9 are granted without objection. 2. Motions Nos. 1 and 6 are denied for the reasons stated in this opinion. 3. Motion No. 5 is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated in this opinion, with the particularized rulings in that respect to be made at trial. 4. Any ruling on Motion No. 7 is deferred until trial, again for the reasons stated in this opinion. Next, a status hearing is set for 9:30 a.m. April 6, 2017 for the purpose of setting a trial date later this month. Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 4/3/2017:Mailed notice(clw, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NATHANIEL JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER PABLO GUERRERO,
Defendant.
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Case No. 15 C 2117
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
After this Court's September 1, 2016 memorandum opinion and order ("Opinion") that
denied the motion of Officer Pablo Guerrero ("Guerrero") for summary judgment against
Nathaniel Jefferson ("Jefferson"), a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Department of
Corrections ("County Jail"), an opinion that left Guerrero as the sole defendant in the case, the
parties developed and this Court entered a Final Pretrial Order ("FPTO") that teed up the case for
trial. As directed by this Court during the conference with the parties that resulted in the
approval of the FPTO, each side has tendered motions in limine to which the other side has
responded. This memorandum opinion and order will speak to those motions, beginning with
Jefferson's and concluding with Guerrero's.
Jefferson's Motions in Limine
There is no need to discuss the bulk of Jefferson's motions in limine, for Guerrero's
counsel has treated only three of them as subject to dispute. Although some confusion has been
created by the fact that Jefferson's Memorandum in Support of His Contested Motions in Limine
(Dkt. No. 76) has numbered those disputed motions differently from the numbers assigned in the
motions in limine themselves (Dkt. No. 76-1), this opinion will refer to the disputed matters by
using the same altered identification numbers that the parties' dueling memoranda have
employed. That means that Jefferson's Motions Nos. 1, 3 and 6 through 15 as originally
numbered in Dkt. No. 76-1 are granted, and Guerrero's counsel are ordered to comply with those
motions at trial.
As for Jefferson's Motion No. 2, which seeks "to bar reference to any other inadmissible
criminal history or arrest record of Plaintiff Nathaniel Jefferson," Guerrero's counsel disclaims
any intention of referring to any prior arrests but does seek to introduce Jefferson's prior felony
convictions (that same contention as to felony convictions forms the gravamen of Guerrero's
Motion No. 6). Jefferson has the better of that dispute by a wide margin, for his prior
convictions all relate to controlled substance offenses, which have no direct correlation to his
credibility, 1 and the Evid. R. 403 balancing test plainly teaches that any arguable probative value
is substantially outweighed by its highly prejudicial effect (see such directly relevant cases as
United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 261-62 (7th Cir. 2000) and United States v. Neely, 980
F.2d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 1992)) and cases that address Evid. R. 403 balancing generally, such as
United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2010) and Thompson v. City of Chicago,
472 F.3d 444, 456-67 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Even putting to one side the numerous deficiencies in Guerrero's response displaying his
counsel's periodic misuse of the English language, that response comes down to a thinly
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1
See Fed. R. Evid. ("Evid. R.") 609(a)(2), which allows limited impeachment -- by
"attacking a witness's character for truthfulness" (emphasis added) -- by evidence of a criminal
conviction for any crime regardless of the punishment. But that provision's limited scope applies
only "if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required
proving -- or the witness's admitting -- a dishonest act or false statement." If that is not the case,
as is true here, Evid. R. 609(a)(1)(A) looks to the Evid. R. 403 balancing test dealt with in the
rest of this paragraph and the following paragraph of the text.
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disguised appeal to the prejudice that Evid. R. 403 is designed to avoid. Nothing more need be
said. Hence Jefferson's Motion No. 2 is also granted.
Next, Motion No. 4 in the Dkt. No. 76-1 compendium asks "to bar any reference to
Division IX of Cook County Jail as a 'maximum security' Division." In response, in an example
of the numerous English language problems referred to earlier, defense counsel states:
Defendant should be able to illicit (sic) that Division IX is a maximum security
division.
But once again that type of argument runs afoul of Evid. R. 403, for it is highly likely (and
indeed it may well be intended) to deflect jurors' attention from the actual issues in the case, not
the viability or lack of viability in Jefferson's substantive case.
Indeed, in response to Jefferson's allegation that Guerrero "was aware of a threat of
serious harm at the hands of other detainees, Thaddeus Thompson and Martice Smith,"
Guerrero's counsel asserts at her responsive Mem. 2-3:
Therefore, Officer Guerrero should be able to assert protocol for the handling of
more dangerous detainees who are classified in a manner that cause them to be
placed in maximum security.
That of course misses the whole point that awareness of an inmate's dangerous proclivities ought
to heighten a correctional officer's alertness to the possibility of harm -- a fact-intensive matter as
to which both sides are free to offer their competing versions for jury consideration. And that
has nothing to do with the label attached to a particular custodial facility and to the potential
prejudice that such a pejorative label can foster. Again Jefferson's motion is granted.
Lastly, Jefferson's Motion No. 5 in Dkt. No. 76-1 seeks "to preclude reference to any
ticket, proceedings or discipline received by Plaintiff Nathaniel Jefferson as a result of this
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incident and any argument that such discipline absolves Defendant Guerrero of any
wrongdoing." There Guerrero's opposition essentially seeks to have someone else's judgment
influence the jury's own judgment, a particularly inappropriate prospect when jurors necessarily
have no familiarity with the nature of the administrative proceedings in effect at the Cook
County Jail (in this instance "tickets" were given to Jefferson, his cellmate and, importantly, the
two inmates that Jefferson claims were enabled by Guerrero's misconduct to harm him).
This Court makes no factual findings, of course, either for or against Jefferson's claim or
Guerrero's defense. But it is plainly inappropriate to create the prospect that the jury's own
determination after it hears firsthand about the parties' respective positions might be influenced
by the rulings made in an administrative proceeding that lacked the structure and controls
provided in a court-run trial. Hence Jefferson prevails on that motion as well.
Guerrero's Motions in Limine
Just as was the case with Guerrero's limited response to Jefferson's motions, Jefferson
offers no objection to a substantial number of Guerrero's motions in limine. In this instance
Guerrero's motions designated as Nos. 2 through 4, 8 and 9 in Dkt. No. 75 have met no
opposition. As has been ordered on the other side of the coin, Jefferson's counsel is ordered to
comply with those non-objected-to motions.
As for Guerrero's Motion No. 1, it asks "to bar any testimony or evidence concerning or
related to plaintiff's treatment, diagnosis or his medical records." That motion attempts to
preclude Jefferson himself from testifying as a lay witness about the claimed effects of injuries
that he says he sustained in the attack for which he blames Guerrero. Like too many of the
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positions marked out by defense counsel and dealt with in this opinion, that position is at war
with common sense as well as with both the literal language and the purpose of Evid. R. 701. 2
Indeed, the position advanced by Jefferson's counsel is so obviously correct that our own
Court of Appeals has never been called upon to deal with it 3 -- but it is noteworthy that the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit did have the occasion to treat with the same subject on a case
much like this one, and it ruled in favor of permitting a prisoner's testimony in essentially
identical circumstances (In re Bayside Prison Litig., 341 Fed. App'x 790, 793 (3rd Cir. 2009)) -and in doing so it quoted directly from one of the opinions cited by Jefferson here, Townsend v.
Benya, 287 F. Supp. 2d 868, 875 (N.D. Ill. 2003), an opinion authored by now-retired Magistrate
Judge Morton Denlow of this District Court on a like motion in limine. This Court sees no
arguable reason for doing otherwise, and Guerrero's Motion No. 1 is denied.
Next, Guerrero's Motion No. 5 asks this Court "to bar all questioning or argument
regarding defendant's prior disciplinary history or lawsuits in which they [sic] were named."
Although prior lawsuits against Guerrero would normally be out of bounds under Evid. R. 404(b)
(the mere fact of being sued by someone else cannot of course be viewed as probative as to the
legitimacy of the current lawsuit), the special circumstances as to Guerrero's past make the
testimony of County Jail inmate Marcus Mannie ("Mannie") admissible and may perhaps
provide the occasion for Mannie to refer to his lawsuit against Guerrero.
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2
As chance would have it, this Court chaired the subcommittee of the Judicial
Conference's Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence that was responsible for drafting the
year 2000 revisions to Evid. R. 701, 702 and 703 and the Advisory Committee's Notes on those
revised rules.
3
Trial judges, by contrast, are regularly presented with such testimony by an injured
plaintiff and just as regularly admit it for jury consideration.
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There is no need to repeat the detailed exposition as to the Guerrero-Mannie episode set
out at pages 3 through 8 of Jefferson's Response (Dkt. No. 77). If Mannie's testimony is credited
by the jury, the jury may appropriately determine that it evidences one or more of the "plan,"
"absence of mistake" and "lack of accident" that are expressly listed as grounds for admissibility
under Evid. R. 404(b)(2). That then supports a partial denial of Guerrero's Motion No. 5 as an
exception to its generally being granted, with the specific particulars of the matter to be dealt
with in the course of trial.
Next, as stated earlier, Guerrero's Motion No. 6 -- which asks that evidence of Jefferson's
prior convictions be admitted -- is the direct counterpart of Jefferson's Motion No. 1 asking that
such evidence be barred. For the same reason that called for granting Jefferson's motion,
Guerrero's is denied.
Finally, Guerrero's Motion No. 7 asks "to bar reference to alleged failures to comply with
jail procedures as evidence of unconstitutional conduct." Guerrero's counsel is dead right in
contending that violations of that type do not automatically correlate one-to-one with conduct
actionable under Section 1983. But even though more than ample authority for that proposition
is provided by the caselaw cited and quoted in Guerrero's Dkt. No. 75 memorandum, Jefferson's
Dkt. No. 77 responsive memorandum cites caselaw from our Court of Appeals on the other side
of the coin, allowing such evidence as bearing on related constitutional issues. Because no
specifics have been provided to this Court as to which side of the coin better portrays the as-yetunidentified County Jail procedures that Jefferson would seek to bring into evidence, Guerrero's
Motion No. 7 cannot be ruled on to this point -- but if it were to find its way into the case, this
Court would certainly provide the jury with the cautionary instruction embodied in Instruction
7.04 of the Federal Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit.
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Conclusion
To avoid what would necessarily be an oversimplification of this opinion's extended
discussion of the parties' respective motions in limine, what follows is an encapsulated listing of
the rulings earlier set out in full. Here it is.
As to Jefferson's motions in limine as numbered in Dkt. No. 76-1:
1.
Motions Nos. 1, 3 and 6 through 15 are granted without objection.
2.
Motions Nos. 2, 4 and 5 are granted for the reasons stated in this opinion.
As for Guerrero's motions in limine as designated in Dkt. No. 75:
1.
Motions Nos. 2 through 4, 8 and 9 are granted without objection.
2.
Motions Nos. 1 and 6 are denied for the reasons stated in this opinion.
3.
Motion No. 5 is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated in
this opinion, with the particularized rulings in that respect to be made at
trial.
4.
Any ruling on Motion No. 7 is deferred until trial, again for the reasons
stated in this opinion.
Next, a status hearing is set for 9:30 a.m. April 6, 2017 for the purpose of setting a trial
date later this month. In anticipation of the trial, counsel for the parties are ordered to begin to
confer promptly -- even without awaiting that status hearing date -- to facilitate their pretrial
submission of proposed jury instructions, comprising (1) a single jointly-tendered set of
instructions of a generally standard nature, drawn from the most recent work product of the
Committee on Pattern Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, supplemented by (2) each
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side's particularized proposed instructions in any unagreed areas. 4 Each side's counsel should
also prepare and timely submit (see n.4) proposed voir dire questions for purposes of jury
selection (in that respect there is no need to spend time in trying to arrive at joint proposals). All
other pretrial preparatory matters will be dealt with at a date to be established when the timetable
for trial has been set.
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Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date: April 3, 2017
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4
Counsel are reminded that this Court's November 4, 2016 minute entry, entered in
conjunction with its conference with counsel as to their jointly submitted FPTO, specified that
both the proposed jury instructions and the proposed voir dire questions would be due for
delivery to this Court 14 days before the trial date.
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