Evans v Brown et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 11/25/2015. Mailed notice. (etv, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
John Evans (#B-41234),
Plaintiff,
v.
Ms. Brown, et. al.,
Defendants.

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No. 15 C 2295
Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff John Evans brought this pro se civil right action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
seven nurses at Cermak Health Services ("Defendants"). Evans alleges that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. Defendans have moved to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below,
the motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Evans is a former inmate at the Cook County Jail.

(See Dkt No. 1, Comp. at 2.)

Defendants are nurses at Cermak Health Services, a healthcare provider for the jail. (Comp. at
2-3.) Evans alleges that, while incarcerated at Cook County Jail, he received dialysis three
times a week. (Comp. at 5.) The treatments caused Evans' temperature and blood pressure to
rise. (Id.) The treatments also caused Evans to experience nausea, blackouts, depression,
vomiting, loss of weight, and delirium. (Id.) The neurologist who administered Evans' dialysis
recommended that Evans eat ice chips to alleviate the side effects of the treatment.

(Id.)

According to Evans, each named Defendant denied him ice chips following dialysis. (Id.)
In its initial screening order dated April 15, 2015, the court explained that "while the facts
of this case ultimately may show that [Defendants'] failure to provide Plaintiff with ice chips
following his dialysis treatment is not constitutionally deficient, Plaintiff’s allegations state a
claim." The court noted decisions from other district courts that have concluded that the denial

of ice chips to alleviate the side effects of medical treatment are sufficient to support a
deliberate indifference claim at the pleading stage. (Dkt. No. 5, Apr. 15, 2015 Order at 2.)
LEGAL STANDARD
"A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the
viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). A claim survives a
challenge under Rule 12(b)(6) when it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This plausibility standard does not ask for detailed
factual allegations, but “plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to
present a story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir.
2010).
District courts are free to disregard "adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a
cause of action,” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009), but they nevertheless must
“construe pro se complaints liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). District courts also must view the complaint in the
light most favorable to the non-movant, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and
draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d
661, 664-65 (7th Cir. 2014).
ANALYSIS
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to the serious medical
needs of pretrial detainees. Burton v. Downey, __ F.3d __, No. 14-3591, 2015 WL 5894126, at
*5 (7th Cir. Oct. 8, 2015). To establish a claim of deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege

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facts showing that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition and that jail
personnel acted with deliberate indifference to that condition. Id.; see Townsend v. Cooper, 759
F.3d 678, 689 (7th Cir. 2014). "A medical condition is objectively serious if a physician has
diagnosed it as requiring treatment, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a layperson.”
Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014). Deliberate indifference also occurs when
medical personnel consciously disregard a risk to an inmate’s health, Townsend, 759 F.3d at
689, or the treatment is “so blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely
to seriously aggravate [an inmate’s] condition,” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendants first argue that the side effects Evans experienced as a result of dialysis
cannot be considered an objectively serious medical condition. (Defs. Mot. at 5-7.) In support,
Defendants rely on cases concluding that "aches, pains, and discomfort" are not serious
medical conditions, see Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1372 (7th Cir. 1997), and "breathing
problems, chest pains, dizziness, sinus problems, headaches, and a loss of energy" are not
objectively serious conditions, see Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999).
Evans has alleged that he suffered from more than mere aches and pains, however; dialysis
allegedly caused him to experience a rise in body temperature and blood pressure as well as
nausea, blackouts, vomiting, and delirium. The cases cited by Defendants do not address the
symptoms described by Evans, nor did Defendants address the cases relied on by this court in
its screening order. Evans is entitled to an inference at this stage of the litigation that his
medical condition was sufficiently serious to support a deliberate indifference claim.
Defendants next argue that the conduct alleged by Evans shows only that Defendants
disagreed with the neurologist's recommendation and thus does not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference. (Defs. Mot. at 7-8.) Evans' allegations show no such thing. The facts
pleaded by Evans show only that the neurologist administering the treatment recommended that
Evans eat ice chips to alleviate any side effects, and Defendants did not give Evans ice chips.

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Evans need not plead more to state a claim.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (explaining that a

pleading must contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim"). Whether the neurologist
communicated his or her recommendation to Defendants or whether Defendants believed ice
chips would have an impact on Evans' symptoms cannot be resolved solely by reference to
Evans' complaint. Thus, the court cannot determine at this juncture whether Defendants’ failure
or refusal to provide Evans with ice chips constitutes deliberately indifference to his medical
need.
Similarly, Evans' allegation that Defendants told him "that there no-ice machine in the
hospital" does not defeat his claim. Defendants suggest that "[i]f . . . the Defendant Nurses
cannot offer him ice chips because the hospital does not have an ice machine, . . . the
Defendant Nurses acted pursuant to a custom or practice of the hospital" and thus cannot be
held individually liable for the conduct alleged in the complaint. (Defs. Mot. at 9.) But Evans'
allegation concerning the ice machine is offered only as the reason allegedly proffered by
Defendants for their failure to provide ice chips. Ice chips may have been available through
some other means, and Defendants may have had other reasons for their failure to provide ice
chips.

The allegation concerning the reported lack of an ice machine, in short, does not

establish that the hospital has a custom, practice or policy of denying dialysis patients ice chips
or alternative palliative treatments. The court therefore declines to conclude, at this stage, that
Defendants acted pursuant to a hospital policy, either as a defense to individual liability or as
support for a Monell claim against Cook County.
Finally, Defendants allege that Evans pleaded insufficient allegations to confer liability on
each of them. (Defs. Mot. at 8-9.) Evans, however, explicitly stated: "each staff member who[]
I have named in my suit has[] denied me[] ice chips." Although he did not list the name of each
Defendant at this point in his complaint, Plaintiff's allegation that "each staff member . . . named
in my suit . . . denied me ice chips" is sufficient to put each Defendant on notice of Evans' claim
against them.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [20] is denied. Because
Plaintiff’s damages appear to be modest, the court encourages the parties to continue their
settlement efforts.
ENTER:

Dated: November 25, 2015

_________________________________________
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Judge

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