Local 743 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Rush University Medical Center
Filing
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Enter MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, Defendants motion to dismiss 14 is denied. Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/19/2015.Mailed notice(tsa, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
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Local 743 International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,
v.
Rush University Medical Center.
No. 15 C 2457
Judge Virginia M. Kendall
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185),
Plaintiff Local 743 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“Union”) filed this complaint
against Rush University Medical Center seeking to compel arbitration of issues arising between
the Union and Rush regarding the negotiation of wages, hours, and coalition of employment for
patient care technicians. Rush seeks to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the following reasons, Rush’s motion to
dismiss [14] is denied on both grounds.
BACKGROUND 1
The Union is a labor organization that represents employees regarding grievances, wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. (Dkt. No. 19, ¶ 4). Rush is an academic
medical center that provides medical care, treatment, and education for students of medical
sciences. (Id. at ¶ 5). Both parties have principal offices in Chicago, Illinois. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5). In
1967, the Union and Rush’s predecessor, St. Luke’s Hospital, entered into an Election
Agreement (“Agreement”), establishing an ongoing collective bargaining relationship that is still
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The Court takes the following allegations from Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and treats them as true
in evaluating this motion. See Vinson v. Vermillion County, Ill., 776 F.3d 924, 925 (7th Cir. 2015).
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in existence. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 12). The unit of Rush employees originally eligible for Union
representation was:
All housemen, maids, dietary workers, laundry workers, messengers, elevator
operators, maintenance employees, central service technical assistants, nurses
aides, orderlies, aides, helpers, attendants and unit clerks at Presbyterian-St.
Luke’s Hospital. The unit specifically excludes supervisors and all other
employees of the hospital. (Id., Ex. A, § I).
If a majority of the members in this unit voted to be represented by the Union, the Union agreed
not to:
…in any way attempt to interfere with the Hospital’s flexibility in the use of its
personnel when patient needs reasonably require such flexibility and that it will
not restrict the Hospital in the development of new classifications, the use and
development of new methods, procedures, or equipment, and the training of
personnel. (Id., Ex. A, § VIII).
To try and prohibit work stoppages, strikes, or slowdowns of any kind during negotiation or for
any other reason, the Agreement further provides:
The Union agrees that, should it win the election, there will be no work stoppages,
strikes or slowdowns of any kind for any reason at the Hospital during the course
of any future contract negotiations, but that, should any matters remain
unresolved at any such negotiations after a reasonable period of good faith
collective bargaining and an impasse has been reached such matters must be
submitted by either party to an impartial arbitrator to whom all of the facts will be
presented and whose decision with respect to such matters will be final and
binding upon both parties.” (Id., Ex. A, § IX).
The Hospital agreed to the same terms, stating in a later paragraph that: “any unresolved issues
shall be submitted to binding arbitration as provided in paragraph IX hereof.” (Id., Ex. A. §§ X,
XII).
The original Union vote, which was affirmed by an arbitrator according to the
Agreement, resulted in the majority of the unit wishing to be represented by the Union. (Dkt.
No. 14, ¶ 10). Upon the Union’s successful election, the parties—in accordance with the
Agreement—proceeded to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). (Id. at ¶ 11).
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Since the formation of the Agreement, the parties have continuously negotiated and updated their
CBA every three years, adding and modifying the job classifications included in the appropriate
bargaining unit. (Id. at ¶ 12). The unit currently includes:
...all environmental aides, environmental specialists, environmental technicians,
dietary workers, laundry workers, transport specialists, elevator operators,
maintenance employees, central service technical assistants, nursing attendants,
psychiatric aides, community health aides, lab helpers, operating room attendants,
mail room clerks, unit clerks, geriatric technicians, patient services associates
(PSAs), physical therapy aides, rehabilitation aides, pediatric assistants, pediatric
nursing assistants, certified nursing assistants (CNAs), truck drivers (laundry &
SPD), food service assistant I lead, food service assistant II lead, environmental
specialist lead, transport specialist lead, unit clerk lead, and journeymen lead. The
unit specifically excludes supervisors, temporary and casual employees, regular
part-time employees normally working less than seventeen (17) hours per week,
and all other employees of the Hospital. (Dkt No. 19, Ex. C., Section 2,
Recognition, at 1).
On or about July 2, 2014, the Union filed an NLRB petition seeking to represent patient care
technicians (“PCTs”) employed at Rush in July of 2014. (Dkt No. 24 at 3). Rush opposed the
petition. (Id.) The Acting Regional Director for National Labor Relations Board Region 13
ordered an election despite the opposition and the Board denied Rush’s request for review of the
decision in a 3-2 vote. (Id.) On August 27 and 28, 2014, the majority of PCTs voted to join the
Union in a self-determination election, and the Regional Director for NLRB Region 13 issued an
amended certification of representation on October 8, 2014 certifying the Union as the collective
bargaining representative for “all full-time and regular part-time Patient Care (PCT) employees,”
but not “Nurse Assistant II (NA II), all other employees, office clerical employees, guards, and
professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.” (Dkt. No. 14, ¶ 18).
Rush refused to bargain with the Union over PCTs, arguing that the self-determination
election was improper. (Dkt. No. 24 at 4). In response, the Union filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB on October 17, 2014. (Id.) On February 27, 2015, the NLRB issued a
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decision and order requiring Rush “to bargain on request with the Union and, if an understanding
is reached, to embody the understanding in a signed agreement.” (Dkt. No. 24-2 at 3). Rush
appealed the Board’s decision to the District of Columbia Circuit Court on March 9, 2015. (Dkt.
No. 24 at 5). The appeal is pending and the NLRB has since filed a cross-application for
enforcement of its decision and order, in which the Union has intervened. (Id.) On March 23,
2015, the Union filed this suit to compel arbitration regarding the negotiation of wages, hours,
and coalition of employment for PCTs pursuant to the parties’ Agreement and CBA. (Id. at 4).
Rush now seeks to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction due to the pending appeal in the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals or, alternatively, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The motion is denied on both grounds.
DISCUSSION
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Rush first challenges this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). The party seeking to bring suit in a federal forum bears the burden of
establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Farnik v. F.D.I.C, 707 F.3d 717, 721 (7th
Cir. 2013). When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all
reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of the plaintiff. See Storm v. Storm, 328
F.3d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 2003). In accepting allegations as true, the Court “may look beyond the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the
issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists” in a motion based on these
grounds. Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing proper jurisdiction and jurisdictional issues cannot be
waived.
The Union brings this suit under Section 301 of the LMRA, seeking to compel arbitration
of a bargaining dispute with Rush pursuant to the terms of the parties’ Agreement. Section 301
grants this Court subject matter jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce…”
29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Section 301 grant of jurisdiction, however, is “extremely limited” to
only allegations of a violation of a labor agreement. See Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine
Div., AVCO Corp. v. UAW, 523 U.S. 653, 661-62 (1998). Rush argues that this dispute is beyond
the scope of this Court’s Section 301 jurisdiction because it is primarily representational and
therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB and the D.C. Circuit Court where the
parties’ current appeal is pending. See, e.g., J.F. Edwards Const. Co. v. Int’l Union, No. 03 C
6058, 2004 WL 1444874, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2004) (“Where a labor dispute is arguably
representational, a district court should not exercise jurisdiction”) (citing Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 83 (1982) (“As a general rule, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over
activity which is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA, and they must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board.” (internal quotations and citations
omitted)); Loewen Group Int’l, Inc. v. Haberichter, 65 F.3d 1417, 1425 (7th Cir. 1995)
(indicating that when an activity is arguably prohibited under the National Labor Relations Act,
state and federal courts must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB).
The issue before this Court is contractual and fits squarely within its jurisdiction under
Section 301. Yes, there is a collateral representation issue percolating: namely, whether the PCTs
are part of the appropriate bargaining unit. That issue, however, has already been resolved by the
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Board. On August 27 and 28, 2014, the majority of PCTs voted to join the Union in a selfdetermination election and the Regional Director for NLRB Region 13 issued an amended
certification of representation on October 8, 2014 certifying the Union as the collective
bargaining representative for “all full-time and regular part-time Patient Care (PCT) employees,”
but not “Nurse Assistant II (NA II), all other employees, office clerical employees, guards, and
professional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.” (Dkt. No. 14, ¶ 18).
Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e-f), Rush is currently seeking review of the Board’s order in
the D.C. Circuit Court and the Board and Union are seeking enforcement of the order in that
same Court. The pendency of those proceedings, however, “shall not, unless specifically ordered
by the court, operate as a stay of the Board’s order.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(g). This Court sees no
evidence in the record before it that a stay has been entered or even entertained by the D.C.
Circuit Court. Absent such a stay, Rush is not relieved of its obligations under the Board’s order
merely because the appeal or enforcement action are pending. See NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc., 361 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that employer not “relieved of its duty to obey
the order to bargain during the pendency of the proceedings to enforce the earlier order”), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 935, (1966), citing NLRB v. Am. Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74, 81 (5th Cir. 1965); Old
King Cole, Inc. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 1958) (filing petition for review of an order
of the Labor Board does not operate as a stay of the Board’s order, consistent with Section 10(g)
of the NLRA). 2
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The Court denies Rush’s cursory request to this Court for a stay of these proceedings pending resolution
of the appeal before the D.C. Circuit Court. This Court has substantial discretion to determine whether to stay
proceedings and manage its docket, see Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936), but such action is not
warranted in this case. The NLRB has already made its ruling with respect to Union representation of the PCTs in
accordance with the Act and the relief sought here is different than the relief at issue in the D.C. Circuit Court.
Should the ruling by the D.C. Circuit Court impact how the parties wish to proceed in this case, they are welcome to
make any motions they think appropriate at that time. Whatever risk of judicial inefficiency exists in denying the
stay is outweighed by the burden of staying this case pending resolution of the appeal that may or may not impact
this litigation. See, e.g., Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 134, AFL-CIO v. Chicago Zone of Marketing, 535
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Rush insists that until the Board’s order in enforced by the D.C. Circuit Court or until
Rush agrees to comply with it, this Court “lacks jurisdiction to compel Rush to comply with its
terms by bargaining.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 10). This argument, however, fatally mischaracterizes the
nature of this action. The Union is not seeking to compel enforcement of the Board’s order.
Instead, it is seeking to compel compliance with an arbitration provision in the parties’
underlying Agreement; a dispute over which this Court is authorized to preside under Section
301. Rush’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied.
II. Failure to State a Claim
Alternatively, Rush argues that the Union has failed to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When discussing the merits of a motion to dismiss, the
Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and facts alleged
must be accepted as true. See Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 619 (7th
Cir. 2007) (citing Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006)). While factual allegations
do not need to be detailed, the plaintiff must put forth facts that “when accepted as true…state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). If the
facts pled in the complaint permit the Court to reasonably infer the defendant is liable and relief
can be granted, it is facially plausible. Id. at 678.
A straightforward breach of contract suit brought under Section 301, as in this case,
“closely resembles an action for breach of contract cognizable at common law” and is governed
F. Supp. 16, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (refusing to stay proceedings until the Board ruled on the employer’s unit
clarification petition).
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by federal common law. See Olson v. Bemis Co., Inc., 2015 WL 5011951, at *6 (7th Cir. Aug.
25, 2015), citing DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983). Here, the
Court’s eventual inquiry will be “strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did
agree to arbitrate the grievance.” See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Golf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). Rush insists that the Union fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted because “even if PCTs are represented, they are not covered by the 1967
Agreement [and therefore not subject to arbitration] by virtue of the NLRB certification.” (See
Dkt. No. 24 at 12). This argument highlights the difficult position that the PCTs are currently in,
but it is insufficient to defeat the case at this early stage. PCTs are obviously not identified by
name in the Agreement and they are similarly not included in the updated list of classifications in
the parties’ most recent CBA. They have been included in the bargaining unit by the Board, but
negotiations have not yet resulted in their being added to the CBA. The PCTs are stuck in
purgatory.
The Court will not speculate at this early juncture whether the Agreement does in fact
warrant arbitral reprieve from this holding pattern. It is sufficient at this stage merely that such
relief is plausible on the face of the complaint. The PCTs are not named in the parties’
Agreement or CBA, but the Agreement does require that “[a]ll disputes concerning the
interpretation, application or violation of this Agreement shall be immediately submitted to
binding arbitration as provided in paragraph IX hereof.” (Dkt. No. 19-1, ¶ XIV). More than one
provision refers the parties to arbitration to resolve negotiation issues at any time for any reason
during any future negotiations. (See id. at ¶¶ IX-XII). Reading the facts in the light most
favorable to the Union, it is plausible that the Agreement contemplated that future job
classifications would join the Union and that negotiation disputes over the terms and conditions
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of employment for those job classifications would be submitted to arbitration. The Union alleges
in its First Amended Complaint that when new and modified job classifications have been added
thus far to the bargaining unit over the course of its relationship with Rush, “the parties
negotiated collective bargaining agreement provisions to apply to them and at all material times
herein any disputes arising from such negotiations were subject to resolution by interest
arbitration pursuant to the terms of ¶¶ II, X, XI and XII of the Agreement.” (Dkt. No. 19, ¶ 15).
Maybe the parties have routinely applied the arbitration or other terms of this Agreement to new
job classifications that sit in the same limbo where the PCTs now reside; maybe not. Suffice it to
say that at this early stage, the Union has strung together sufficient facts to state a cause of action
upon which relief can be granted. The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss [14] is denied.
Date: 10/19/2015
________________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Court Judge
Northern District of Illinois
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