Young v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Defendant's motion to dismiss 9 is granted in part and denied in part. Status hearing held on 11/12/2015. Status hearing set for 2/11/2016 at 09:00 AM. Counsel is to directed to submit on or before 11/17/15 a proposed discovery schedule. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 11/12/2015:Mailed notice(srn, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
BYRON YOUN G,

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PLAINTIFF,
v.
ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE
COMPANY D/B/A AT&T ILLINOIS,
DEFENDANT.

No. 12 C 2771
Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Byron Young brings claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., alleging that his employer, Illinois Bell Telephone
Company, did not pay him overtime compensation for the time he worked before his
shift started each day, over what should have been his lunch breaks, and after his
shift ended. R. 2. Specifically, Mr. Young alleges that he (1) participated in
meetings, met with supervisors, reviewed job assignments and paperwork, stocked
his truck, and performed other work-related tasks before the start of his shift, id. at
¶¶ 21-22, 45, 50; (2) routinely worked on the jobsite performing various activities
required of him through lunchbreaks (a) in order to avoid being subject to discipline,
and (b) to meet company efficiency standards, id. at ¶¶ 23-28 47, 50; and (3) cleaned

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out and restocked his truck, completed timesheets, 1 and updated a daily status
report after his work shift ended, id. at ¶¶ 30, 46, 50.
Mr. Young originally filed this action on February 28, 2014. Tinoco v. Ill. Bell
Tel. Co., No. 14 CV 1456, R. 2 (N.D. Ill.) The FLSA provides a two-year statute of
limitations for ordinary claims and a three-year limitations period for willful
violations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Mr. Young argues that the earlier-filed collective
action Blakes v. Illinois Bell Co., No. 11-cv-336 (N.D. Ill.) tolled the statute of
limitations on his claims from the date he filed his opt-in consent, August 12, 2011.
Id. ¶ 3. Alternatively, he argues that his claims relate back to that date under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). R. 15 at 3. Illinois Bell moves to dismiss all
claims before February 28, 2011 on the basis that they exceed the scope of the
claims conditionally certified in Blakes. R. 10, 20.
Judge Chang recently considered a similar motion in Wiggins v. Illinois Bell
Telephone Company, No. 15 CV 02769, R. 19 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2015). This Court
adopts Judge Chang’s well-reasoned opinion in Wiggins to deny Illinois Bell’s
motion in part and grant it in part. For the reasons set forth in Judge Chang’s
Order:
The statute of limitations is tolled for Mr. Young’s unpaid lunch-hour claims,
with the exception noted below. These claims extend back two years from the
commencement of the Blakes action to August 12, 2009 for non-willful FLSA
violations, or back three years to August 12, 2008 for willful FSLA violations.

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To the extent Mr. Young’s post-shift claims include damages arising from electronic time
entry, those claims remain live in the Blakes collective action and are not properly before this
Court.
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The statute of limitations is not tolled as to Mr. Young’s unpaid lunch-hour
claims to the extent Mr. Young alleges he worked through lunch to meet
company efficiency standards. These claims extend back two years from the
filing of Tinoco to February 28, 2012 for non-willful FLSA violations, or back
three years to February 28, 2011 for willful FSLA violations.
The statute of limitations is not tolled for Mr. Young’s pre-shift or post-shift
work claims. These claims extend back two years from the filing of Tinoco to
February 28, 2012 for non-willful FLSA violations, or back three years to
February 28, 2011 for willful FSLA violations.
ENTERED:

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: November 12, 2015

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