Mcnally v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/19/2016:Mailed notice(kef, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY MCNALLY,

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Plaintiff,
v.
ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE
COMPANY, d/b/a AT&T Illinois,
Defendant.

Case No. 15 C 2802

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
On September 8, 2015, Plaintiff Timothy McNally filed the present Second Amended
Complaint alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
(“FLSA”), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1, et seq. (“IMWL”), and the Illinois
Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS §115, et. seq. (“IWPCA”). McNally bases his
claims on Defendant Illinois Bell Telephone Company’s (“Illinois Bell”) alleged failure to pay
overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. Before the Court is
Illinois Bell’s partial motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the
Court grants in part and denies in part Illinois Bell’s motion.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the

viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). Under
Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule
8(a)(2) must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)
(citation omitted). Under the federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff’s “factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Put differently, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Also,
“although a plaintiff need not anticipate or overcome affirmative defenses such as those based on
the statute of limitations, if a plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to establish a statute of limitations
defense, the district court may dismiss the complaint on that ground.” O’Gorman v. City of
Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2015). Last, the Court “may take judicial notice of
publicly available records of court proceedings.” Spaine v. Cmty. Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542,
545 (7th Cir. 2014).
II.

Rule 15(c)(1)(B) Relation Back Doctrine
“Under Illinois law as under federal law, an amendment relates back when it arises out of

the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading.” Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc.,
656 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). More specifically, an amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading when “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out – or attempted to be set out – in the

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original pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B); see also Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722
F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013). “[T]he purpose of relation back” is “to balance the interests of
the defendant protected by the statute of limitations with the preference expressed in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes on their
merits.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 549-50, 130 S.Ct. 2485, 177 L.Ed.2d
48 (2010).
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In his Second Amended Complaint, McNally alleges that he is a cable splicer and worked
as an hourly non-exempt employee for Illinois Bell and that Illinois Bell did not pay him
overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 a week in violation of the FLSA,
IMWL, and IWPCA. (R. 16, Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3.) McNally’s allegations include (1) a
claim based on his reviewing assignments and meeting with his manager and co-workers before
his shift started, (2) a claim based on working through lunch break, and (3) a claim based on
completing tasks after his shift had ended. (Id. ¶¶ 32-41.)
I.

Blakes Action
To give context to McNally’s allegations, the Court turns to the procedural history of this

lawsuit because McNally was an opt-in plaintiff in the FLSA collective action in Blakes v. Ill.
Bell Tel. Co., Case No. 11 C 0336 (“Blakes Action”) pending before Magistrate Judge Kim.
After the parties consented to Judge Kim’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), on June 15,
2011, Judge Kim conditionally certified a proposed class of similarly situated cable splicers.
Specifically, Judge Kim determined that the named plaintiffs had made the “modest showing”
for pre-conditional certification of the following overtime claims: (1) Illinois Bell’s policy that

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required cable splicers to maintain the security of their job sites routinely interfered with their
lunch breaks; (2) cable splicers missed their lunch breaks because of traveling from job site to
job site; and (3) Illinois Bell’s policies forced cable splicers to work past the end of their shifts in
order to complete their time sheets. (11 C 0336, R. 56, 6/15/11, Mem. Op, & Order, at 5-8.)
After Judge Kim’s conditional certification, the named plaintiffs issued notice of the Blakes
Action to approximately 2,000 potential opt-in plaintiffs. McNally alleges that he filed a written
consent and became part of the collective conditional class on August 1, 2011. (15 C 2802,
Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 12.)
After discovery, Illinois Bell filed a motion to decertify the collective action. On
December 17, 2013, Judge Kim granted the motion in part. (11 C 0336, R. 233, 12/17/13, Mem.
Op. & Order.) More specifically, Judge Kim decertified the class except for the claims based on
Illinois Bell’s policies forcing cable splicers to work past the end of their shifts in order to
complete their time sheets. (Id. at 54-57.) Once Judge Kim decertified the majority of the
collective action, Illinois Bell moved for summary judgment. In ruling on that motion, Judge
Kim addressed the named plaintiffs’ attempt to amend their pleadings to include broader preshift and post-shift claims. Specifically, on December 10, 2014, Judge Kim concluded that the
named plaintiffs had waived those broader claims by failing to discuss them in their response
briefs and motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and that allowing constructive
amendment at summary judgment would prejudice Illinois Bell given that the parties had not
completed discovery on these issues. (R. 355, 12/10/14, Mem. Op. & Order, at 19-20.) The
Court presumes familiarity with Judge Kim’s December 2013 and December 2014 rulings.
II.

McNally’s Claims

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After the decertification decision took effect in the Blakes Action, counsel for the opt-in
Blakes plaintiffs, including McNally’s counsel, filed a lawsuit on February 28, 2014 (the “2014
Action”). The amended complaint in the 2014 Action alleged that the plaintiffs were “seeking to
assert those claims that were not certified to go forward on a collective basis in” the Blakes
Action. (14 C 1456, R. 8, Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) In that lawsuit, Adkins v. Ill. Bell. Tel., Co., Case
No. 14 C 1456, Chief Judge Castillo granted Illinois Bell’s motion to dismiss for misjoinder and
severed the individual opt-in plaintiffs’ claims on March 24, 2015. (14 C 1456, R. 146, 147.)
Chief Judge Castillo gave the opt-in plaintiffs until July 30, 2015 to file separate complaints
containing their individual claims. (Id.) McNally filed the present action after Chief Judge
Castillo’s March 2015 ruling. The Court presumes familiarity with Chief Judge Castillo’s March
2015 order.
ANALYSIS
I.

FLSA and IMWL Claims
In the present motion to dismiss, Illinois Bell argues that the FLSA’s and IMWL’s

limitations periods bar McNally from bringing his pre-shift, lunch break, and post-shift claims
that are broader than the claims initially certified in the Blakes Action. The FLSA has a twoyear limitations period (three years where the violation is willful), see 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), and
the IMWL has a three-year limitations period. See 820 ILCS 105/12. In the case of a collective
action, 29 U.S.C. § 256(b) provides that an action for opt-ins commences when the individual
files his written consent in the court in which the action is brought.
A.

Tolling of the Statute of Limitations

Illinois Bell argues that absent tolling, McNally’s broader pre-February 28, 2011 claims

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are barred by the limitations periods based on the assumption that the filing date of the lawsuit
before Chief Judge Castillo, namely, February 28, 2014, is the relevant date for limitations
purposes. In the Court’s earlier rulings in the related cases Ballard v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No.
15 C 2687, 2015 WL 6407574 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2015), and Hodges v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 15
C 2711, 2015 WL 6407757 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2015), the Court concluded that these severed
lawsuits were not separate lawsuits, but stem from the Blakes Action based on the premise that
“[t]he statute of limitations for a plaintiff in a collective action is tolled after the plaintiff has
filed a consent to opt in to the collective action, and begins to run again if the court later
decertifies the collective action.” Butler v. DirectSAT USA, LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 793, 801 (D.
Md. 2014); see also Wright, McNally, & Kane, 7B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1807 (3d ed.) (“the
statute of limitations for opt-in plaintiffs will begin to run again if the court later decertifies the
collective action.”). To clarify, it is reasonable to infer that if the limitations periods of
collective and individual actions are intertwined as such, then the cases are related and not
separate. The Court further reasoned that these lawsuits were not separate from the Blakes
Action for Rule 15(c) purposes based on equitable considerations. See Luevano, 722 F.3d at
1022 (the relation back doctrine that “has its roots in the equitable notion that dispositive
decisions should be based on the merits rather than technicalities.”) (citation omitted). Thus, the
Court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B)’s relation back doctrine instead of the
tolling doctrine under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756,
38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), and Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 103 S.Ct.
2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). See, e.g., Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008).
The day after the Court ruled on Ballard and Hodges, another district judge decided

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Wiggins v. Illinois Bell, No. 15 C 02769, 2015 WL 6408122, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2015), in
which the court applied the American Pipe tolling doctrine without discussing Rule 15(c)
relation back doctrine – most likely because the plaintiff did not argue that Rule 15(c)’s relation
back doctrine applied under the circumstances.1 (15 C 2769, R. 15, Resp. Brief.) Thereafter, in
Alphonse v. Illinois Bell, No. 15 C 2692, 2015 WL 7251953 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2015), another
district judge reconciled Hodges, Ballard, and Wiggins, stating “[w]hether viewed through the
lens of Rule 15 relation-back doctrine or through the tolling principles governing Rule 23
actions, the inquiry is functionally the same: Was defendant sufficiently on notice of plaintiff’s
claim?” Alphonse, 2015 WL 7251953 at *1.
Because Wiggins and Alphonse were decided after Illinois Bell’s motion to dismiss in the
present matter, Illinois Bell did not address these decisions until its reply brief, at which time
Illinois Bell explained why the opt-in plaintiffs lawsuits that originated in the Blakes Action and
severed by Judge Castillo are separate, new lawsuits that are not related to Blakes. In doing so,
Illinois Bell relied upon non-controlling legal authority that once a court decertifies a collective
action, the opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice in order to file a new lawsuit. See,
e.g., Albitron v. Cagle’s, Inc., 508 F.3d 1012, 1019 (5th Cir. 2007); Proctor v. Allsups
Convenience Stores, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 278, 284 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Ulvin v. Northwestern Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., 141 F.R.D. 130, 131 (D. Minn. 1991). These cases, however, do not hold that optin plaintiffs’ lawsuits are separate actions from their underlying collective actions for purposes

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On December 1, 2015, another court adopted the Wiggins’ reasoning in deciding House
v. Illinois Bell, No. 15 C 2718, 2015 WL 7731866 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2015). The House court did
not discuss Rule 15(c)’s relation back doctrine probably because plaintiff stated in his response
brief that he was proceeding under the assumption that the American Pipe tolling doctrine
applied. (15 C 2718, R. 24, Resp. Brief, at 7 n.2.)
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of Rule 15(c) nor do these cases have the unique procedural posture of the present lawsuit. In
any event, because Illinois Bell addressed Wiggins and Alphonse for the first time in its reply, the
Court directed McNally to file a sur-reply addressing Illinois Bell’s arguments. McNally filed
his sur-reply on January 4, 2016.
In his sur-reply, McNally maintains that the legal continuity and relationship of his
claims to the Blakes Action establish that his lawsuit is not a separate lawsuit from the collective
action for Rule 15(c) purposes. McNally supports this argument by distinguishing legal
authority Illinois Bell relied upon, including Protich v. Will Ctny. Health Dept., No. 02 C 4796,
2002 WL 31875461, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 24, 2002). In Protich, the district court noted the
importance of legal continuity when rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that Rule 15(c) applied,
especially in light of the lack of legal relationship between the earlier state court lawsuit and the
federal lawsuit at issue. McNally also points to a Sixth Circuit case in which the appellate court
treated a collective action and the subsequent individual actions as the same lawsuit for purposes
of attorney’s fees. See O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enter., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2009).
McNally further asserts that there is an inherent unfairness in denying the opt-in Plaintiffs the
ability to amend their allegations after approximately four and a half years of continuous
litigation.
As the parties’ legal memoranda reveal, there little, if any, case law on this exact subject
matter. Due to equitable considerations, McNally’s arguments are the more persuasive under the
unique circumstances of this case. See Woods v. Indiana Univ. – Purdue Univ., 996 F.2d 880,
884 (7th Cir. 1993) (“fairness militates against allowing a limitations defense to an opposing
party who knows of the action within the required time frame”). Accordingly, the Court applies

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the relation-back doctrine to McNally’s claims.
B.

McNally’s Second Amended Complaint Relates Back to Blakes Action

The allegations in the Blakes Action, as discussed by Judge Kim in his thorough
December 2013 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part Illinois Bell’s motion to
decertify the conditional class, are as follows.
The named plaintiffs filed their amended complaint in February 2011,
claiming that Illinois Bell violates the FLSA by requiring cable splicers to include
a half-hour lunch break on their time sheets whether or not they actually take a
break, unless they receive a supervisor’s preapproval to work through lunch. (R.
11, Am. Compl.¶¶ 17-18.) They further alleged that management routinely
disciplines cable splicers for seeking overtime compensation for hours that were
not pre-approved, and as a result, cable splicers regularly underreport the hours
they work. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20.) In describing the policies that require them to work
through lunch, the named plaintiffs alleged that they are required to maintain the
security of job sites and travel between job sites even during their lunch hours.
(Id. ¶ 26.) They also alleged that because of restrictions governing when they can
return to their garage at the end of a shift, and because of an alleged shortage of
garage computers, they often have to work beyond their scheduled shift to enter
their time on Illinois Bell’s computer system. (Id. ¶¶ 27-30.) As relief for these
alleged overtime violations, the named plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
stating that Illinois Bell’s actions are unlawful, as well as damages on behalf of
all similarly situated people who opt into the action. (Id. ¶ 50.)
Blakes v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 11 CV 336, 2013 WL 6662831, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17,
2013).
The Court would be hard-pressed to conclude that McNally’s present FLSA claim does
not arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out – or attempted to be set out –
in the Blakes Action, or that Illinois Bell did not have notice of McNally’s claims. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B). McNally specifically alleges that he started and finished his workday
at the Morris garage, where he was required to perform discrete tasks, including discussing his
job assignments with his managers and co-workers. Also, McNally alleges that cable splicers

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are expected to work through their unpaid lunch breaks to complete the tasks of securing their
job sites, maintaining safety, and monitoring equipment. McNally further alleges that Illinois
Bell has a policy requiring cable splicers not to return to their garages more than 20 minutes
before the end of the shift, yet Illinois Bell expects cable splicers to complete these numerous
tasks without pay.
Illinois Bell’s attempt to parse out each of the allegations into pre-shift, lunch break, and
post-shift overtime is unavailing because Rule 15(c) does not require that a claim be based on an
identical theory of recovery, but instead it need only be based on the same conduct, transaction,
or occurrence. See Arreola, 546 F.3d at 796; Bularz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 372, 379
(7th Cir. 1996). In particular, Illinois Bell’s argument that Judge Kim’s December 2014
Memorandum Opinion and Order narrowed the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims regarding the broader
pre-shift, lunch break, and post-shift claims is of no moment because Judge Kim had decertified
the opt-in plaintiffs approximately a year before he ruled that the named plaintiffs in Blakes
could not amend their allegations at summary judgment. In short, the opt-in plaintiffs did not
waive these claims because they were no longer actively litigating their claims in the context of
the underlying collective action. To conclude otherwise would go against the nature of the
relation back doctrine that “has its roots in the equitable notion that dispositive decisions should
be based on the merits rather than technicalities.” Luevano, 722 F.3d at 1022 (citation omitted).
On a final note, Chief Judge Castillo discussed limitations periods in the context of
severed claims in his March 2015 ruling when his explained that the remedy for misjoinder is
severance and not dismissal because district courts are “duty bound” to prevent misjoinder from
“lead[ing] to a dismissal with statute of limitation consequences[.]” Adkins v. Illinois Bell Tel.

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Co., No. 14 C 1456, 2015 WL 1508496, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2015) (quoting Elmore v.
Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000)). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit teaches that “in
formulating a remedy for a misjoinder the judge is required to avoid gratuitous harm to the
parties, including the misjoined party.” Elmore, 227 F.3d at 1012.
Because McNally’s Second Amended Complaint relates back to the Blakes Action in
which McNally filed a written consent on August 1, 2011, McNally’s FLSA claims are timely.
The Court therefore denies Illinois Bell’s motion to dismiss.
II.

IWPCA Claim
Illinois Bell also moves to dismiss McNally’s IWPCA claim arguing that federal law

preempts this claim and that McNally has failed to state a claim under the circumstrances. The
IWPCA permits recovery of all unpaid wages, plus monthly statutory penalties. See 820 ILCS
115/14. Also, the IWPCA states that wages “shall be defined as any compensation owed an
employee by an employer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement between the two
parties, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, or any other basis of
calculation.” 820 ILCS 115/2. Thus, “[t]o prevail on his IWPCA claim, [McNally] must first
show that he had a valid contract or employment agreement.” Hess v. Kanoski & Assocs., 668
F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 2012). “Illinois courts have explained that an agreement under the
IWPCA is ‘broader than a contract’” and “requires only a manifestation of mutual assent on the
part of two or more persons.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, McNally bases his IWPCA claim on
three agreements, namely, Illinois Bell’s internal policy regarding the reporting of time worked,
Illinois Bell’s code of business conduct, and the relevant Collective Bargaining Agreements
(“CBAs”). The Court first turns to McNally’s arguments in relation to the CBAs.

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The CBAs at issue – between Illinois Bell and the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local Union 21 – set forth detailed provisions regarding overtime pay. (R. 23-1, Exs.
A, B.) Based on these provisions, McNally asserts that he is seeking unpaid overtime wages at a
rate of time and one-half of his regular rate for hours worked over forty in a given week. Illinois
Bell argues that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”) preempts
McNally’s claim based on the CBAs. In determining whether § 301 preempts a state law claim,
courts look to the “legal character” of the claim to determine if the “question of state law, [is]
entirely independent of any understanding embodied in the collective bargaining agreement.”
Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2004). If the resolution of the claim “is
sufficiently dependent on an interpretation of the CBA,” § 301 preempts the state law claim. Id.
In short, “Section 301 preempts not only claims ‘founded directly’ on the collective bargaining
agreement, but also state law claims that indirectly implicate a collective bargaining agreement.”
Healy v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 804 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2015).
The sections of the CBAs upon which McNally relies reveal a complex analysis for
calculating overtime pay. Specifically, the CBAs have provisions relating to what absences are
credited toward time worked for purposes of the overtime calculation, the difference in treatment
between scheduled and unscheduled overtime, how wages and shift differentials are calculated,
how hours worked are calculated for various specific activities, and how other premium pay
provisions impact the overtime calculation. Under these circumstances, McNally’s IWPCA
claim is not “entirely independent of any understanding embodied in the collective bargaining
agreement.” See Baker, 387 F.3d at 657. Indeed, his IWPCA directly implicates the language
and interpretation of the CBAs. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Farmington Foods, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d

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912, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2003); see also House v. Illinois Bell, No. 15 C 2718, 2015 WL 7731866, at
*3-5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2015). Therefore, the Court grants Illinois Bell’s motion to dismiss
McNally’s IWPCA claim based on the relevant CBAs.
Next, McNally bases his IWPCA claim on Illinois Bell’s code of business conduct.
Illinois Bell’s code of business conduct, however, unequivocally states: “The Code of Business
Conduct is not a contract of employment and does not create contractual rights of any kind
between [Illinois Bell] and its employees.” (15 C 2801, R. 23-1, Ex. C.) Because written
disclaimers such as this belie any mutual assent, McNally’s IWPCA claim based on the
purported contract pursuant to Illinois Bell’s code of business conduct is misplaced. See Mooney
v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., No. 13 C 6592, 2014 WL 2959270, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
July 1, 2014) (“The majority view in this district is that such a written disclaimer dissolves a
claim under the IWPCA.”) (collecting cases); see also House, 2015 WL 7731866, at *5.
Therefore, the Court grants this aspect of Illinois Bell’s motion to dismiss.
Last, McNally asserts that Illinois Bell’s internal policy regarding the reporting of time
worked creates an employment agreement as a basis for his IWPCA claim. The reporting of
time-worked policy, however, does not create an agreement because it merely reiterates Illinois
Bell’s legal obligations under FLSA and state laws, such as the IMWL, to pay overtime for all
hours actually worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. (15 C 2801, R. 23-1, Ex. D.) In
short, this policy does not embody an employment agreement, but emphasizes Illinois Bell’s
commitment to follow federal, state, and local law regarding overtime pay. See Barlett v. City of
Chicago, No. 14 C 7225, 2015 WL 135286, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2015) (“to survive dismissal,
the plaintiff must point to an agreement supporting the IWPCA claim that is more than an

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allegation that the employer is bound by existing overtime laws.”). The Court thus grants
Illinois Bell’s motion to dismiss McNally’s IWPCA claim in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s partial motion
to dismiss [22].
Dated: January 19, 2016
ENTERED

______________________________
AMY J. ST. EVE
United States District Court Judge

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