Dean v. Chicago, Schaumburg, Des Plaines, Illinois State Police Dept.

Filing 127

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 5/19/2017. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 100 , 102 , and 106 are granted and Plaintiff's Sixth Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Mailed notice(lk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

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Ronald Pritchard Dean, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Ashford, et al.
Defendant.

No. 15 C 3193
Judge Virginia M. Kendall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed his lawsuit on April 10, 2015 against several municipalities alleging
constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. (Dkt. 97 at 3.)1 The case
was assigned to a different district court judge and for the last two years, Plaintiff had six
opportunities to amend his complaint. Although the previous judge granted various motions to
dismiss throughout the course of the proceedings, he never granted one with prejudice. As such,
for two years the case has been pending and now six Complaints have been filed and there have
been three rounds of briefing on motions to dismiss. This Court received the case approximately
two months ago and has considered each of the previously filed pro se Complaints, even when
Plaintiff failed to request leave to amend. Although each Complaint pertained to a different set
of defendants and each alleged a different set of facts, the common thread among his Complaints
is the allegation that the various Defendant entities maintain incorrect information in their
records of Plaintiff’s criminal history. In the operative Sixth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
brings his claims against Defendants City of Des Plaines, City of Chicago, City of Schaumburg,

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His first pro se Complaint was received by the Court on April 10, 2015 (Dkt. 1), but with no copies. His complaint
was actually filed on June 17, 2015.

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Illinois State Police Bureau of Identification, F.O.I.A. of Des Plaines. (Dkt. 97 at 1-2.) He
merely alleges that Des Plaines and a non-existent legal entity, “Des Plaines FOIA,” refuse to
make the appropriate corrections to his criminal record. Defendant Des Plaines moves to dismiss
the Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and because Des Plaines FOIA is
a non-existent legal entity. (Dkt. 100.) The remaining Defendants move to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 102, 106.) Defendants’ motions are granted.
BACKGROUND
The Court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint and draws all
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009); Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank, 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007); Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc.,
722 F.3d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 2013). Additionally, Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings are liberally
construed. Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015); Edwards v. Cross, 801 F.3d 869,
873 (7th Cir. 2015). While only the Sixth Amended Complaint is operative2, the Court will
briefly summarize the past two years of litigation and the evolution of Plaintiff’s filings.
Plaintiff filed his first pro se form Complaint against Chicago, Schaumburg, Des Plaines,
and the Illinois State Police Department. In his Complaint, he alleges various arrests and claims
for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, but all of the events relating to those claims
predate 1999. (Dkt. 19 at 4, 9-10.) The Complaint also lacks facts regarding the context of these
arrests.
On January 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff brought his
claim only against the Schaumburg Police Department and alleged only that the “Schaumburg
case has caused numerous false arrest and unnecessary prison time by Chicago Police.” (Dkt. 48
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When a Plaintiff files a new complaint, that complaint supersedes all previous complaints and controls the case.
Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1999).

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at 5.) He provided no further information regarding when any alleged false arrests or prison time
occurred.

Schaumburg Police Department moved to dismiss the Complaint.

But without

responding to the motion and without seeking leave of the Court, on February 16, 2016, Plaintiff
filed his Second Amended Complaint. This time Plaintiff brought claims against Chicago,
Schaumburg, Des Plaines, and the “Illinois State Bureau of Identification,” and alleged that
“From March 4, 1998 until May 1999 Chicago police has [sic] locked me up a total of 4 times
for a crime I didn’t commit [and was found innocent of]. I was still being harassed for this same
charge later in the 2000’s until 2004[.]” (Dkt. 64.)
Ten days after filing his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff made a motion to amend
his complaint and his motion was granted on March 2, 2016. (Dkt. 69.) In his Third Amended
Complaint, brought against the Circuit Court of Cook County, Schaumburg, Chicago, and
DuPage County, he alleged that after filing a petition in 2015 of stolen identity theft in Chicago
and Schaumburg, those Defendants still had “the wrong offender on record.” (Dkt. 70.) He does
not allege how he has this information or what, if any, specific impact the inaccuracy in the
record had on him. (Id.) On May 3, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Fourth Amended Complaint, again
without leave, and sued Defendant Des Plaines for violations of Illinois F.O.I.A. Finally, on
May 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Fifth Amended Complaint, without leave, in which he sought an
injunction against “F.O.I.A. Center Des Plaines, IL” and “City of Des Plaines” for allegedly not
complying with the Illinois FOIA. (Dkt. 81.)

The Court ruled it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint because Plaintiff only alleged a violation of Illinois state
law and dismissed the Complaint without prejudice. (Dkt. 95.)
In the operative Sixth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Des Plaines, Chicago,
Schaumburg, Illinois State Bureau of Identification, and F.O.I.A. of Des Plaines. Here, Plaintiff

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seeks only “to resolve a case in the city of Des Plaines,” and does not make any allegations of a
need to resolve a case against any of the other remaining Defendants. (Dkt. 97 at 3.) In the form
Complaint, he fills in “basis of claim,” as “defamation of character.” (Id.) He alleges that a
“name mix up due to ID theft[,]” occurred in Des Plaines and he filed a petition to correct the
conflicting information in Des Plaines’s records. (Dkt. 97 at 4.) He further states that Chicago
and Schaumburg “had no problem with complying” with his request to correct their records.
(Dkt. 97 at 4.)
Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Sixth Amended Complaint. On February 2,
2017, Plaintiff filed a Response to the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, arguing that they had
continually stalled and delayed his claim. Plaintiff asked that the Court rule on his case pursuant
to his purported right to a speedy trial. (Dkt. 112.) On February 6, 2017, the Court denied the
motion because the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to this
civil case. (Dkt. 113.)
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Des Plaines also moves to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Under
Federal Rule 12(h)(3), “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Defendant likely meant to bring their motion
under Rule 12(b)(1). Liberally construing the Complaint, the Court finds it has subject matter
jurisdiction because it is possible to state a claim for relief under Section 1983 when a
defamation claim infringes on a liberty interest. See, e.g., Bone v. City of Lafayette, 763 F.2d
295, 298 (7th Cir. 1985). Ultimately, Plaintiff does not state such a claim here. Nevertheless,
because Defendant moves to dismiss and prevails on Rule 12(b)(6), resulting in dismissal with

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prejudice, the Court need not address the “Rule 12(h)(3)” motion in any further detail. Defendant
Des Plaines also moves to dismiss the Complaint with respect to Defendant “F.O.I.A. of Des
Plaines” because this is a non-existent legal entity incapable of being sued. See Bowers by
Bowers v. Du Page Cnty. Regional Bd. of Trustees, 183 Ill. App. 3d 367, 373 (1989) (“Where a
suit is brought against an entity which has no legal existence, the proceedings are void ab
initio”). The motion to dismiss with respect to this non-existent entity is also granted on this
basis. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). In the complaint, a plaintiff must include “enough detail to give the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, and, through his allegations,
show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he is entitled to relief.” Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lang v. TCF Nat’l Bank, 249
F.App’x. 464, 466 (7th Cir. 2007)). The Court “must accept as true all material allegations of the
complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Silha v. ACT,
Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
To succeed on his Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must prove (1) the deprivation of a right
secured by the Constitution or federal law and (2) that defendants were acting under color of
state law. Wilson v. Warren Cty., Illinois, 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff does not allege that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution
or federal law. Plaintiff concedes that he only seeks relief from Des Plaines in his Complaint,
and that Des Plaines should be compliant with his petitions to correct his criminal records, as
Chicago and Schaumburg have been. Clearly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Chicago or

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Schaumburg as he holds them up as the example of how Des Plaines should proceed. He alleges
no wrong at all, let alone a constitutional wrong, committed by either of these Defendants.
With respect to Des Plaines, Plaintiff does not assert a constitutional right or liberty
interest that has been violated by the alleged inaccuracies in his records. Plaintiff alleges that the
basis of his Section 1983 claim is “defamation of character.” (Dkt. 97 at 3.) But to state a claim
for defamation under Section 1983, Plaintiff must not only allege that he was defamed and
injured by the defamation, but also that he was deprived of his property or liberty interests. “The
combination arises most frequently when an employee is discharged by a government employer;
should the government agency at the same time publicly defame the employee, he may be
deprived of a liberty interest: the interest in the possibility of future employment in his
profession.” Bone v. City of Lafayette, 763 F.2d 295, 298 (7th Cir.1985). Here, there are no
similar facts indicating that Des Plaines defamed Plaintiff resulting in a deprivation of a
protected liberty interest.
The Court held a status at which the Plaintiff was present and the Court asked Plaintiff to
state in his own words what happened to cause him the injury. Plaintiff was unable to articulate
any specific arrest or even any injury that resulted from the police allegedly having incorrect
information regarding his prior arrests. In fact, Plaintiff could not set forth what the incorrect
information was specifically except to allege that he was acquitted of a particular case and that it
still remains on his record as a charge. This could actually be true because the acquittal would
not remove the charge from his arrest history but would merely show that he was not convicted.
Again, even when given over ten minutes to describe any injury that resulted from the charge
remaining on his record, he could not articulate a specific arrest, a location for an arrest, a date
for an arrest, or even an arrest based on a mistake in his records. He could only describe one

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stop in 2013 and explained that the Chicago police stopped him, ran his name, and he was then
free to go. He could not describe any other stop or arrest at any other time in the two years prior
to filing his Complaint. Most troubling is that even when given the opportunity to tell the court
orally after having told the previous judge in writing six times, the only dates of arrests that
Plaintiff alleged were dates in 1998 and 1999 which clearly are past the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Des Plaines violated the Illinois Freedom of
Information Act. But as the Court stated in a previous order, Dkt. 95, on its own, that claim fails
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Illinois, 680 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2012) (dismissing Illinois FOIA claim for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction).

Finally, even in his previous Complaints, Plaintiff never alleges any

deprivations of his rights under the Constitution or federal law. For example, although he
vaguely and briefly discusses prior arrests, he does not state a claim for false arrest, false
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution because all of the events he bases his claims on predate
1999.3

(Dkt. 19.)

He never identifies any specific arrests made by any of the specific

Defendants resulting from the alleged inaccuracies in his records. Indeed, in his First Complaint
Plaintiff concedes that while Defendants Des Plaines and Schaumberg never “physically
arrested” him, “their records have caused [him] great discomfort.” (Dkt. 19 at 10.).

This

discomfort, however, does not rise to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Campbell v. Miller,
787 F.2d 217, 229 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986) (“Standing alone . . .
inconvenience do[es] not rise to the level of a constitutional deficiency.”); see also Bart v.
Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[I]n the field of constitutional torts [the law does not

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A federal court adopts the forum state's statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
276 (1985). In Illinois, the statute of limitations for § 1983 civil rights violations is two years. Booker v. Ward, 94
F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (7th Cir.1996). Plaintiff filed his first Complaint in 2015 making any of the events occurring in
the 1990’s clearly out of the range of the applicable limitations period.

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concern itself with trifles]. Section 1983 is a tort statute. A tort to be actionable requires
injury.”). No conceivable combination of these past two years of allegations states a plausible
claim.
It may be that Plaintiff has encountered red tape and that may have caused him some
difficulty. While he is not without the Court’s sympathies, it is clear based on his six attempts
that there has been no violation of his constitutional rights.

Therefore, the Complaint is

dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [100, 102, and 106] are
granted and Plaintiff’s Sixth Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

________________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Court Judge
Northern District of Illinois
Date: 5/19/2017

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