Weaver v. Butler

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 1/19/2016. Mailed notice (jc, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JIMMY WEAVER,

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Petitioner,
v.
KIMBERLY BUTLER, Warden,
Respondent.

No. 15 C 3284

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Petitioner Jimmy Weaver’s (Weaver) pro se
petition for writ of habeas corpus (Petition) brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
For the reasons stated below, the Petition is denied.

BACKGROUND
In December 2010, in Illinois state court, Weaver pled guilty to attempted
first-degree murder for severely beating a man and causing severe brain injuries to
him. Weaver was sentenced to 30 years of incarceration. Weaver filed an appeal
and on January 13, 2014, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction and
sentence. Weaver then filed a petition for leave to appeal (PLA) with the Illinois
Supreme Court, and the PLA was denied on May 28, 2014. The record does not

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reflect that Weaver ever filed a post-conviction petition or sought any collateral
relief. On April 13, 2015, Weaver filed the instant Petition.

LEGAL STANDARD
An individual in custody pursuant to state court judgment may seek a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides the following:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim--(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The decision made by a state court is deemed to be contrary to
clearly established federal law “‘if the state court applies a rule different from the
governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently
than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’”
Emerson v. Shaw, 575 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2009)(quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 694 (2002)). The decision by a state court is deemed to involve an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law “‘if the state court correctly identifies
the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably
applies it to the facts of the particular case.’” Emerson, 575 F.3d at 684 (quoting
Bell, 535 U.S. at 694).

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DISCUSSION
This court has liberally construed Weaver’s pro se filings. See Perruquet v.
Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 2004)(stating that “[a]s [the plaintiff] was without
counsel in the district court, his habeas petition [wa]s entitled to a liberal
construction”); Greer v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, Ill., 267 F.3d 723, 727
(7th Cir. 2001)(indicating that a court should “liberally construe the pleadings of
individuals who proceed pro se”). Weaver asserts in the Petition that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel allegedly advised him to plead
guilty without requesting a behavioral clinical examination to determine his mental
health at the time of the offense, and because his counsel allegedly failed to
investigate Weaver’s mental health history or explore the possibility of pursuing an
insanity defense.

I. Petition
Respondent argues that Weaver’s claim lacks any merit. To show ineffective
assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish that: “(1) his attorney’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a
result.” Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d 455, 457-58 (7th Cir. 2009)(citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). The Illinois Appellate
Court expressly rejected the claim that Weaver now presents in the Petition. Weaver
has not shown that the Illinois Appellate Court’s ruling was legally or factually
unreasonable or that his claim has any merit. Weaver contends that he suffers from a
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severe fear of the dark, which he contends is a recognized mental illness. At trial,
Weaver’s mother testified that Weaver had suffered from a fear of the dark since he
was a child. People v. Weaver, 2014 IL App (3d) 120171-U, ¶ 19. The Illinois
Appellate Court correctly concluded that although Weaver may have informed
certain persons that his violence stemmed from being afraid of the dark, “there is
nothing in the record to indicate that he was insane at the time” he committed the
offense. People v. Weaver, 2014 IL App (3d) 120171-U, ¶ 41. The court further
correctly concluded that “[t]his is particularly true when [Weaver] was never
diagnosed or treated for this condition, which he and his parents claim he suffered
from since childhood.” Id. This court agrees with the Illinois Appellate Court that
Weaver’s counsel acted within the scope of effective assistance of counsel.
The Illinois Appellate Court correctly noted that although Weaver claimed to
have stated that he “killed a demon” in his basement and did not remember
everything that happened on the night in question, Weaver also admitted to telling
his “counsel that he was drunk on the night of the incident, that he was a recent
steroid user, and that he took various nonprescribed medications.” Id. at ¶ 35, 40.
Thus, Weaver’s counsel had every reason to conclude that Weaver’s claimed
disorientation was the result of his voluntary ingestion of alcohol and drugs.
Weaver’s counsel did not have a reasonable basis to suspect that Weaver was
mentally ill or a reasonable basis to conclude that a mental health examination was
warranted. In certain instances when there is evidence in the record that shows that
“counsel had reason to know, from an objective standpoint, that a possible defense,
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such as insanity, was available, failure to investigate fully can constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Brown v. Sternes, 304 F.3d 677, 692 (7th Cir. 2002).
However, in the instant action, Weaver has not pointed to evidence to show that his
counsel had reason to know that he might be mentally ill.
The Illinois Appellate Court also properly concluded that based upon
Weaver’s history of convictions for violent offenses and such lack of evidence to
support an insanity defense, it was entirely reasonable for his counsel not to pursue
an insanity defense. People v. Weaver, 2014 IL App (3d) 120171-U, ¶ 41; see also
McElvaney v. Pollard, 735 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2013)(stating that “[i]n evaluating
an attorney’s performance, courts must defer to any strategic decision the lawyer
made that falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, even if
that strategy was ultimately unsuccessful”)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); Wyatt, 574 F.3d at 457-58 (stating that a “movant must
overcome the ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance’” and “[h]e must establish the specific acts or
omissions of counsel that he believes constituted ineffective assistance”).
Not only has Weaver failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel, he has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the absence of such a
defense or mental health examination. The Illinois Appellate Court properly
concluded that “[c]onsidering [Weaver’s] past convictions for violent offenses, it is
not objectively unreasonable to believe that trial counsel’s decision not to pursue an
insanity defense was sound trial strategy” and that Weaver’s “proclivities toward
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substance abuse and battering his lady friends makes an insanity defense in this
instance a hard, perhaps impossible, sell to a jury.” Id.; see also People v. Free, 447
N.E.2d 218, 232 (Ill. 1983)(stating that “voluntary intoxication on drugs, alcohol or
both is not a mental disease or mental defect which amounts to legal insanity”). The
record also reflects that Weaver’s own mother, who testified as a mitigating witness,
indicated that he did not know what he was doing because he was under the
influence of alcohol, stating that Weaver “had two personalities, one when sober and
one when drunk.” People v. Weaver, 2014 IL App (3d) 120171-U, ¶ 19. This court
agrees with the Illinois Appellate Court that “[i]t was a reasonable choice to forego
this option in favor of a reduced sentencing range.” Id. at ¶ 41. Even if Weaver’s
counsel had ordered a mental health examination and pursued an insanity defense,
the record does not indicate that such an examination would have revealed any
relevant mental health issues or that the defense would have succeeded. Weaver
chose to plead guilty and the fact that he may now be dissatisfied with that decision
or his sentence is not a sufficient basis to vacate his plea and present new defenses.
Based on the above, the Petition is denied.

II. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the court must
issue or deny a certificate of appealability “when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.” Id. A district court should only issue a certificate of appealability “if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
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U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The petitioner must also show that “reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved
in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000)(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)). In the instant action,
Weaver has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as
to any claims presented in his Petition. Nor has Weaver shown that reasonable
jurists could debate whether the Petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented in the Petition deserve encouragement to proceed
further. Therefore, should Weaver decide to appeal this court’s ruling, this court
finds that a certificate of appealability would not be warranted, and is denied.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Petition is denied.

___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: January 19, 2016

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