Antonacci et al v. City Of Chicago et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Both the Complaint and this action are dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to establish the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 5/5/2015:Mailed notice(clw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

LOUIS B. ANTONACCI, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal
corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15 C 3750

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Court has just received, via the computerized random assignment system in force in
this District Court, the prolix 1 Complaint filed pro se by attorney Louis Antonacci ("Antonacci").
This Court has waded through Antonacci's extensive allegations, and this memorandum order is
issued sua sponte because of some patently problematic aspects of the pleading.
Four of Antonacci's legal theories are nonfederal in nature: Count I is labeled "Common
Law Fraud," Count II is labeled "Breach of Fiduciary Duty," Count III is labeled "Full
Conspiracy" and Count VI is labeled "Legal Malpractice." Only two of the counts are
purportedly advanced in federal-question terms -- Counts IV and V seek to invoke civil RICO.
But quite apart from the obvious difficulty in squaring Antonacci's Complaint with the Fed. R.
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1
Prolix is used advisedly: Antonacci's Complaint comprises no fewer than 295
paragraphs that occupy 57 pages and that assert a half dozen theories of liability labeled as
separate counts (a locution that, although in common usage, follows the cause of action notion
that governs state court pleading rather than the federal concept of a claim for relief -- in that
respect, see the excellent discussions in NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F. 2d 287,
292 (7th Cir. 1992) and Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir.
1992)).

Civ. P. ("Rule") 8(a)(2) requirement of a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." 2 Antonacci's assertions that he has assertedly been the victim of a
massive global conspiracy on the part of what seems to be the entire world with which he comes
into contact plainly appears to fail -- flat-out -- the "plausibility" requirement established by the
Twombly-Iqbal canon that has taken the place of the long-standing and overly generous Conley
v. Gibson approach.
What this Court has therefore done is to view Antonacci's Complaint in terms of the
diversity-of-citizenship branch of federal jurisprudence, which he purports to call into play in
Complaint ¶ 16. And from that perspective, as the ensuing analysis demonstrates, Antonacci's
pleading gets a failing grade in every respect.
At the outset of that analysis, it is worth a moment's look to understand why it should
take place at all. On that score it has been nearly three decades since Wis. Knife Works v. Nat'l
Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986) set out a fundamental proposition that
remains as true today as when it was written:
The first thing a federal judge should do when a complaint is filed is check to see
that federal jurisdiction is properly alleged.
And such cases as Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 2005) have since made
clear that the sua sponte jurisdictional inquiry that follows is mandatory on any court such as this
one:
Jurisdiction is the power to declare law, and without it the federal courts cannot
proceed. Accordingly, not only may the federal courts police subject matter
jurisdiction sua sponte, they must.
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2
This Court of course recognizes that what has just been said in the text poses no
substantive problem when the nature of a complaint demands more.
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Now to the substantive analysis itself. Here every individual party -- Antonacci himself
and all of the individuals named as defendants -- are spoken of in terms of their residences rather
than their respective states of citizenship. In that regard such cases as Adams v. Catrambone,
359 F.3d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 2004) continue to repeat the command that "when the parties allege
residence but not citizenship, the district court must dismiss the suit."
That, however, is only the start. Three of Antonacci's targeted defendants are law firms
that the Complaint describes as limited liability companies: Seyfarth Shaw LLP ("Seyfarth
Shaw") (Complaint ¶ 3), Perkins Coie LLC ("Perkins Coie") (Complaint ¶ 7) and Neal & Leroy
LLC (Complaint ¶ 14). And as to each of those defendants Antonacci has alleged only
irrelevancies -- their respective states of organization and their respective principal places of
business. But in that respect such cases as Wise v. Wachovia Sec. LLC, 50 F.3d 265, 267 (7th
Cir. 2006) (citing a passel of earlier cases) have regularly reconfirmed (in this instance nearly a
decade ago) what facts to look to in determining whether diversity of citizenship exists:
The citizenship for diversity purposes of a limited liability company, however,
despite the resemblance of such a company to a corporation (the hallmark of both
being limited liability), is the citizenship of each of its members.
That last deficiency on Antonacci's part is particularly troublesome, for Seyfarth Shaw
and Perkins Coie are national law firms with multiple offices around the country. If either has
even a single member that (like Antonacci) is a citizen of the District of Columbia 3 the complete
diversity that has been required for more than two centuries (see Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 267 (1806)) would be destroyed, and with it Antonacci's access to this federal district
court.
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3
What is said in the text assumes, as is most often the case, that Antonacci's District of
Columbia's residence coincides with his citizenship there.
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In summary, this Court holds that Antonacci cannot use civil RICO as the springboard for
federal-question jurisdiction in the subjective and objective good faith required by Rule 11(b), so
that Antonacci's multiple failures in terms of diversity of citizenship mandate dismissal (again
see Adams v. Catrambone). But because this Court's view has always been that the "must
dismiss the suit" language of the latter decision may be viewed as Draconian in nature, its
consistent practice has been to comply with that case's mandate but, if a plaintiff were to cure
that deficiency within the 28-day time frame made available by Rule 59(e), to entertain a motion
that would avoid the plaintiff's having to file a new lawsuit -- on condition, however, that a
payment equivalent to another filing fee must be tendered by the plaintiff to avoid his, her or its
having to redraft a bulky complaint. This Court accordingly orders that both the Complaint and
this action be dismissed because of Antonacci's failure to establish the existence of federal
subject matter jurisdiction.

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Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date: May 5, 2015

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