English v. Williams et al
Filing
148
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Robert Blakey on 7/11/2018. Mailed notice(gel, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARIO ENGLISH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 15-cv-3950
v.
TARRY WILLIAMS, et al.,
Judge John Robert Blakey
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Mario English sued numerous correctional officers under 28 U.S.C. §
1983 for allegedly using excessive force against him, subjecting him to an
unconstitutional strip search, and exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious
medical condition.
Defendants Tarry Williams and Samuel Johnson moved for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim.
For the reasons
explained below, this Court grants Defendants’ motion.
I.
Background
The facts come from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts [131] and
Plaintiff’s statement of additional facts [138].
On November 2, 2014, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Stateville Correctional
Center. [138] ¶ 2. Stateville had Plaintiff under suicide watch—which Defendants
call “crisis watch”—meaning that guards checked on Plaintiff in his cell every ten
minutes and recorded their observations in a log. [131] ¶ 9; see generally [130-6].
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Around 11:00 a.m. that morning, a guard doing a scheduled check on Plaintiff saw
him wearing a string made from a bedsheet around his neck. [131] ¶¶ 11–12. Ten
minutes later, the same guard again observed Plaintiff with a string around his
neck. [130-6] at 4. Shortly after, multiple guards came to Plaintiff’s cell to remove
the string; Plaintiff attempted to use the string to end his life before guards took it
away from him. [131] ¶¶ 13–15.
According to Plaintiff, the guards then assaulted him. [138] ¶ 2. Plaintiff
testified that the guards punched and kicked him at least 20 times (including
strikes to his head) and pulled his hair out. Id. ¶ 7. Despite the fact that Plaintiff
had already submitted to a strip search before the guards started beating him, [131]
¶¶ 17–18, they forced him into the fetal position on the ground, grabbed his right
butt cheek, and pulled it aside to examine his anus, [138] ¶ 7.
Plaintiff maintains that Johnson stood outside his cell before and during the
attack and had a clear view of the attack, but did nothing to stop the other guards
from hurting Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 3–6. Johnson disputes Plaintiff’s testimony and says
that he did not arrive at Plaintiff’s cell until 12:40 p.m., when he took over the
regular checks for crisis watch. [131] ¶¶ 34–35. Under Plaintiff’s version of events,
Johnson and the other guards stood within earshot of Plaintiff’s cell after the attack
and ignored Plaintiff’s cries for help. [138] ¶ 8. Plaintiff says that, while the guards
remained outside his cell, he stomped on his bed to make noise and alert anyone
who could possibly help him. [130-2] at 31 (“I was basically calling for help, like,
anybody besides them. If anybody could hear me.”).
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Neither side explains who brought Plaintiff to get medical attention, but
Plaintiff saw a nurse by 12:15 p.m. the same day—about an hour after the assault.
See [131] ¶ 33; [138] ¶ 10. Plaintiff told the nurse that his body hurt “all over.”
[138] ¶ 10. The nurse noted some “mild erythema,” or redness, on Plaintiff’s leg, but
documented that Plaintiff had no other visible injuries. [130-3] at 2.
The
parties
agree
that
Williams,
Stateville’s
then-warden,
neither
participated in nor witnessed the attack. [131] ¶ 40. Plaintiff says that he later
wrote to Williams about the assault and “requested an investigation.” 1 [138] ¶ 12.
Plaintiff received a “non-substantive, form letter response” in early December. Id. ¶
14. According to Williams, his designee “jal” responded to Plaintiff’s letter. [131] ¶
43. Williams does not remember receiving a letter from Plaintiff or responding to
Plaintiff, and Williams says that he did not sign the form letter. Id. ¶¶ 42, 44. An
investigator from Stateville’s Internal Affairs Unit testified, however, that Williams
would have gotten notice of Plaintiff’s alleged assault by staff members through a
written “reportable” that traveled up the chain of command. [138] ¶¶ 15–17; see
also [138-4] at 14–16.
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In a declaration, Plaintiff also said that he told Williams about the assault in person and verbally
requested an investigation. [138-1] ¶ 9. That assertion contradicts Plaintiff’s earlier deposition
testimony. In response to a direct question asking when Plaintiff told Williams about the assault,
Plaintiff responded: “I wrote him a letter in November of 2014.” [130-2] at 41. Plaintiff said nothing
about speaking to Williams personally. Id. Declarations like Plaintiff’s, though signed under oath,
typically represent a lawyer’s work product; thus, when offered to contradict the declarant’s prior
sworn testimony, they lack credibility and deserve “zero weight in summary judgment proceedings
unless the affiant gives a plausible explanation for the discrepancy.” Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs.,
Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, Plaintiff offers no such explanation for the discrepancy,
and the declaration appears designed to manufacture an issue of fact about Williams’ knowledge.
Thus, this Court disregards paragraph 9 of Plaintiff’s declaration. See id.
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II.
Legal Standard
Courts should grant summary judgment when the moving party shows that
no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and the evidence weighs so heavily
in the moving party’s favor that the moving party “must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists when, based upon the evidence, a
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To
show a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the non-moving party must point to
“particular materials in the record,” and cannot rely upon the pleadings or
speculation. Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2014).
At summary judgment, courts must evaluate evidence in the light most
favorable
to
the
non-moving
party
and
refrain
from
making
credibility
determinations or weighing evidence. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir.
2017) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The moving party bears the burden of
establishing the lack of genuine disputes as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
III.
Analysis
A.
Objectively Serious Medical Condition
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim fails
because he did not have a serious medical condition, given his lack of any objective
symptoms. [130-1] at 3–4. Plaintiff contends that the pain he felt demonstrated a
serious medical condition. [137] at 3–5.
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To succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference to a medical condition,
Plaintiff must show: (1) an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) an official’s
subjectively deliberate indifference to that condition. Gonzales v. Feinerman, 663
F.3d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 2011).
A “serious” medical condition means one that a
physician has diagnosed as requiring treatment, or a condition “so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize” the need for a doctor’s attention. Knight
v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d
579, 583 (7th Cir. 2006)). That said, the law does not require “objective symptoms”
as evidence of an objectively serious medical condition; pain “and other subjective,
nonverifiable complaints are in some cases the only symptoms of a serious medical
condition.” Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996).
Although Plaintiff did not show many visible effects from the alleged attack,
he told a nurse that his body hurt “all over.” [138] ¶ 10. If a jury believed Plaintiff’s
subjective complaint, the jury could reasonably find that he had an objectively
serious medical condition. See id. (Requiring “a threshold showing of an ‘objective’
injury” would “confer immunity from claims of deliberate indifference on sadistic
guards,” since they might “inflict substantial and prolonged pain without leaving
any ‘objective’ traces on the body of the victim.”).
B.
Johnson
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s claim against Johnson fails because
“the only objective and credible evidence in the record”—the crisis watch log—
undermines Plaintiff’s claim that Johnson saw the attack. [144] at 3 (citing Scott v.
5
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
Defendants misread Scott.
Scott involved
uncontested video evidence of a car chase that contradicted the fleeing driver’s
version of events. 550 U.S. at 378–80. In contrast, the crisis watch log consists of
multiple pieces of paper full of handwritten entries signed by Stateville guards. See
[130-6]. Plainly, this Court cannot rely on those handwritten notes to discredit
Plaintiff’s testimony.
Aside from Scott and a few other limited exceptions, this
Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence at summary
judgment. Rasho, 856 F.3d at 477. For purposes of Defendants’ summary judgment
motion, this Court must credit Plaintiff’s testimony that Johnson saw the attack
and did nothing when Plaintiff called for help. See id.
Plaintiff’s claim against Johnson, however, still fails based upon the record.
A guard’s delay in treating “non-life-threatening” conditions might constitute
deliberate indifference if the plaintiff has a “sufficiently serious or painful” medical
condition. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir. 2008). But a plaintiff
who claims deliberate indifference in the form of a delay must produce “verifying
medical evidence” that “his condition worsened because of the delay.” Knight, 590
F.3d at 466 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff provided no medical
evidence that his condition worsened because of the (at most) hour-long delay
between the attack and when he saw a nurse. Rule 56 mandates granting summary
judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Thus, this Court grants
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summary judgment to Johnson.
C.
Williams
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim against Williams fails because
Williams never saw the letter that Plaintiff sent him. [144] at 4. Even assuming
Williams did see the letter, Plaintiff’s claim cannot proceed.
Plaintiff testified that he wrote Williams a letter informing him of the attack
and “requested an investigation.” [138] ¶ 12. So, in Plaintiff’s own words, his letter
(which neither side produced to this Court) said nothing about his need for medical
attention, but rather asked Williams to investigate the guards’ alleged wrongdoing,
ostensibly for disciplinary purposes. Prison administrators must act if they know
that medical professionals are mistreating or ignoring inmates, “but this was not
the concern” that Plaintiff presented to Williams. See Burse v. Komorowski, 521 F.
App’x 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir.
2010)). Plaintiff saw a nurse within an hour of the attack, and Plaintiff does not
explain what further medical care he wanted Williams to procure for him—notably,
he never sued the nurse for deliberate indifference.
Besides, the Seventh Circuit has held that, in the context of prison
bureaucracies, an inmate cannot hold a public official liable for deliberate
indifference simply by writing a letter to that official about a medical issue. See
Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). Because bureaucracies divide
tasks for the sake of efficiency, non-medical officials may properly “relegate to the
prison’s medical staff the provision of good medical care.” Id. Indeed, Plaintiff’s
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view that Williams should face § 1983 liability under these circumstances would
lead to the untenable result that Plaintiff could write letters to 1,000 public
officials, “demand that every one of those 1,000 officials drop everything” to
investigate his claims, “and then collect damages from 1,000 recipients if the letterwriting campaign does not lead to better medical care.” Id. Because Plaintiff failed
to produce any evidence beyond the single letter to suggest that Williams exhibited
deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition, this Court grants summary
judgment to Williams. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
IV.
Conclusion
This Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [130].
The
Clerk shall enter judgment for Tarry Williams and Samuel Johnson against
Plaintiff. The motion hearing set for August 7, 2018 at 9:45 a.m. in Courtroom 1203
stands, but as a status hearing. All other dates and deadlines stand.
Dated: July 11, 2018
Entered:
________________________________
John Robert Blakey
United States District Judge
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