DAWSON v. The City of Chicago et al
Filing
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OPINION and Order Signed by the Honorable Sheila M. Finnegan on 8/5/2016.Mailed notice(sxw, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NEHRU DAWSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Chicago Police Officer W. CARTER,
Star #18489, Chicago Police Officer
J. COUCH, Star #12716, Chicago
Police Officer R. COLLINS, Star
#13010, Chicago Police Officer J.
CASCONE, Star #1488, Chicago
Police Officer L. WILLIAMS, Star
#18542, Chicago Police Officer J.
ALI, Star # 8411, Chicago Police
Officer S. VANTHOF, Star #1433,
Chicago Police Officer R. HERRERA,
Star # 9994, Chicago Police Officer
S. ESTES, Star #7316, and THE CITY
OF CHICAGO, a Municipal
Corporation,
Defendants.
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No. 15 C 4321
Magistrate Judge Finnegan
ORDER
Plaintiff Nehru Dawson has filed suit against the City of Chicago and nine
Chicago police officers alleging that they violated his constitutional rights during the
course of a traffic stop. The City of Chicago has answered the amended complaint, as
have the two officers who pulled Plaintiff over and arrested him, Raymundo Herrera and
Samantha Estes. (Doc. 24). The remaining seven officers, W. Carter, J. Couch, R.
Collins, J. Cascone, L. Williams, J. Ali, and S. Vanthof (the “Moving Officers”), all seek
dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to allege that they were personally
involved in the events giving rise to this lawsuit. For the reasons set forth here, the
motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). In reviewing the Moving Officers’ motion to
dismiss, this Court accepts the Amended Complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations
as true and “construe[s] all inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Gessert v. United States,
703 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 2013).
A.
Plaintiff’s Arrest, Detention, and Release
On May 17, 2014, Plaintiff was driving his motor vehicle near 114th Place and
Indiana Avenue in Chicago when Officers Herrera and Estes pulled him over for a traffic
stop.
(Doc. 18 ¶¶ 8-9).
According to the amended complaint, Herrera and Estes
“blocked Plaintiff’s car with their squad cars, drew their weapons, and drew Plaintiff out
of his vehicle.” (Id. ¶ 9). At that point, the officers searched both Plaintiff and the
vehicle and found he was “carrying a licensed handgun properly secured in a locked
box.” (Id. ¶ 10). With their weapons still drawn, Herrera and Estes allegedly used force
to seize Plaintiff and his handgun, and then transported him to the City of Chicago’s 5th
District Police Station. (Id. ¶¶ 11-14, 16). There, Plaintiff was arrested and charged
with unlawful possession of a handgun and unlawful use of a weapon. (Id. ¶ 16).
Plaintiff alleges that after he was processed in the 5th District, “the Chicago
Police Department caused [him] to be transferred to Cook County Jail where he was
imprisoned by the Cook County Sheriff’s Police for five days.” (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff says
that during that period, he informed unidentified “Defendants” that he suffered from a
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heart condition and needed to take aspirin every day, but “Defendants” ignored his
multiple requests and “refused” to provide the medication. (Id. ¶ 19). On May 23, 2014,
the Cook County Circuit Court dismissed the charges against Plaintiff in what he
describes as “a manner indicating there was no probable cause.” (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21).
B.
Plaintiff’s Lawsuit
On May 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit claiming that he “sustained injuries to
his person as well as humiliation and indignities,” and “suffered great mental and
emotional pain and suffering” as a result of Defendants’ actions. (Id. ¶ 22). Count I
charges all Defendants with unlawful search, unlawful seizure, excessive force, false
arrest, false imprisonment and failure to intervene in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth, Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count II asserts a state law
claim for malicious prosecution against Officers Herrera and Estes, Count III charges all
Defendants with a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
Count IV seeks indemnification by the City.1
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must
“construe it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept well-pleaded facts
as true, and draw all inferences in [the nonmoving party’s] favor.” Reynolds v. CB
Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). “To survive a motion to dismiss,
the plaintiff must do more in the complaint than simply recite elements of a claim; the
‘complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
1
Plaintiff initially sued Cook County, the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Department, and
Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, but he voluntarily dismissed these defendants without
prejudice on November 6, 2015. (Doc. 11).
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relief that is plausible on its face.’” Zellner v. Herrick, 639 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. See also Bausch v. Stryker
Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must also provide “enough detail
to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests, and, through his allegations, show that it is plausible, rather than merely
speculative, that he is entitled to relief.” Reger Development, LLC v. National City Bank,
592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083
(7th Cir. 2008)).
B.
Analysis
1.
Section 1983 Claims
The Moving Officers argue that the Section 1983 claims against them must be
dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged that they were personally involved in the
constitutional violations at issue in this lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit has made it clear
that “§ 1983 liability is premised on the wrongdoer’s personal responsibility.” Kuhn v.
Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2012). To state a claim under the statute, a
plaintiff must allege that a defendant “caused or participated in an alleged constitutional
deprivation.” Id. (quoting Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983)).
See also Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[P]ersonal
involvement is a prerequisite for individual liability in a § 1983 action.”).
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Aside from the case caption, the only place the Moving Officers are mentioned by
name in the amended complaint is paragraph 5, which simply states that they are
employed by the Chicago Police Department and are being sued in their individual
capacities.
(Doc. 18 ¶ 5).
Plaintiff does not allege that the Moving Officers were
present at the scene of the traffic stop, or that they engaged in any specific conduct that
deprived him of his constitutional rights. Instead, Plaintiff pleads in conclusory fashion
that all “Defendants” are responsible for the unlawful search, seizure, use of excessive
force, false arrest, false imprisonment and failure to intervene. (Id. ¶ 26; Doc. 29, at 45).2 Such generic allegations of personal involvement are insufficient to state Section
1983 claims against the Moving Officers. See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois Dep’t of Public Aid,
318 F. Supp. 2d 696, 700 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (dismissing Section 1983 claim where the
plaintiff’s allegations were “made generally against all defendants, failing to allege the
‘element of personal involvement necessary to individual liability under § 1983.’”).
Plaintiff stresses that he merely needs to provide the Moving Officers with “fair
notice” of the claims against them, and insists that he must have done so since the City,
Officer Herrera and Officer Estes were able to answer the amended complaint. (Doc.
29, at 5) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)) (noting that “Defendant feels it has a basis to
defend the claim for at least some of the named Defendants.”). The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff alleged that Officers Herrera and Estes personally engaged in very specific
conduct, including pulling his vehicle over for a traffic stop, drawing their weapons,
searching him, seizing his property, and using force to arrest him. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 8-14).
There are no similar allegations against the Moving Officers, who are left with no idea
2
For ease of reference, unless otherwise specified, page numbers for all briefs and
exhibits are drawn from the CM/ECF docket entries at the top of the filed document.
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as to what they purportedly did wrong in this case. See Marshall v. Buckley, 644 F.
Supp. 2d 1075, 1080 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (a plaintiff “must plead personal involvement of
each Defendant to properly state a claim under Section 1983.”) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff next relies on two documents attached to his response to the motion to
dismiss as evidence that his pleadings are adequate. The first is the Rule 26(a)(1)
disclosures submitted by the City, Officer Herrera and Officer Estes, which names 6 of
the 7 Moving Officers as participants in his “arrest, booking, fingerprinting, transport to
holding facilities, and supervising officers at each facility.” (Doc. 29, at 4; Doc. 29-1, at
2) (stating that Officers Couch, Collins, Cascone, Williams, Ali and Carter may have
information about Plaintiff’s “arrest and lock-up, any and all interactions with the parties,
and matters relating to the incident and alleged injuries that are the subject of this
lawsuit.”). The second is Plaintiff’s arrest report identifying all of the Moving Officers as
persons who assisted in “processing” his arrest. (Id.) (citing Doc. 29-2, at 5).
Since these documents are not attached to or referred to in the amended
complaint, they are not properly considered on a motion to dismiss. See McCready v.
eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 891 (7th Cir. 2006).
To the extent Plaintiff believes the
Moving Officers personally violated his constitutional rights in the course of processing
his arrest, he must specifically allege so in his complaint and describe how it occurred.
Simply stating that “there are multiple parties causing multiple infractions against
Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights” is insufficient to show that the Moving Officers were
personally involved in the violations. (Doc. 29, at 4).
Plaintiff must also do more than allege generally that the Moving Officers are
responsible for any misconduct committed by Officers Herrera and Estes. (Doc. 29, at
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5) (stating that some of the Moving Officers may be liable because they “are responsible
for the training and supervision of” Officers Herrera and Estes).
The doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply to Section 1983 actions, and mere negligence in
“failing to detect and prevent subordinate misconduct” does not suffice for personal
involvement in a constitutional violation. Ames v. Stigler, No. 07 C 0430, 2009 WL
9097015, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2009) (citing Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d
612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). Rather, the official must “know about, facilitate, approve,
condone, or deliberately turn a blind eye to the unconstitutional conduct.” Burris v.
Cullinan, No. 09-3116, 2011 WL 3207205, at *5 (C.D. Ill. July 27, 2011) (citing Gentry v.
Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)). The amended complaint contains no
such allegations relating to any of the Moving Officers.
For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state Section 1983
claims against the Moving Officers, and their motion to dismiss is granted.
2.
State Law Claims
None of the parties addresses the remaining state law claims against the Moving
Officers for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Absent any viable Section 1983
claims against the Moving Officers, however, the Court declines to assert supplemental
jurisdiction over them. Lofton v. Eberle, No. 14 C 898, 2015 WL 507472, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 5, 2015) (quoting Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999)) (“[I]t is
the well-established law of this circuit that the usual practice is to dismiss without
prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed
prior to trial.”).
The claims against the Moving Officers for intentional infliction of
emotional distress are dismissed.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss Officers Carter, Couch,
Collins, Cascone, Williams, Ali and Vanthof (Doc. 23) is granted without prejudice.
Plaintiff has until August 26, 2016 to file a second amended complaint consistent with
this opinion.
ENTER:
Dated: August 5, 2016
_____________________________
SHEILA FINNEGAN
United States Magistrate Judge
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