Bietsch et al v. Sergeant's Pet Care Products, Inc.

Filing 149

OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 9/19/2018: For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification 91 , denies Sergeant's motion to exclude Dr. Kelly Swanson's expert opinions and testimony 101 , and grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Dr. Jrg Steiner's expert opinion and testimony 127 . Status hearing set for 9/26/2018 to stand. Mailed notice (mw, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RYAN BIETSCH, MICHAEL
PFORTMILLER, JUSTIN MANNER, and
SELIM FREIHA, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,

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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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SERGEANT’S PET CARE PRODUCTS, INC., )
a Michigan corporation,
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Defendant.
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No. 15 C 5432
Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER
After their dogs ate Pur Luv pet treats (the “Pur Luv Treats”) and became ill, Plaintiffs
Ryan Bietsch, Selim Freiha, Justin Manner, and Michael Pfortmiller filed this putative class
action against the Pur Luv Treats’ manufacturer, Defendant Sergeant’s Pet Care Products, Inc.
(“Sergeant’s”). Plaintiffs bring claims for breach of implied and express warranties under state
law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (the “MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., and for
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”), 815 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 505/1 et seq., and 10 other states’ consumer fraud laws. Plaintiffs have filed a
motion to certify a national class of all purchasers of the Pur Luv Treats based on their warranty
claims, a multi-state class based on their consumer fraud claims, and, alternatively, state classes
based on their consumer fraud claims. Plaintiffs move to certify these classes under both Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) seeking a mandatory injunction requiring Sergeant’s to recall
and reformulate the Pur Luv Treats, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), seeking
damages in the form of a full refund of the Pur Luv Treat’s purchase price [91]. Plaintiffs also

move to strike portions of Sergeant’s expert Dr. Jörg Steiner’s testimony [127]. Sergeant’s
moves to strike Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Kelly Swanson’s testimony in its entirety [101].
Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot show irreparable harm or likelihood of
future harm, they do not properly present a claim for Rule 23(b)(2) class certification. And
because Plaintiffs are not able to prove that the Pur Luv Treats are unsafe through evidence
common to the entire class, the Court finds that they have not carried their burden with respect to
Rule 23(b)(3) certification either. Thus, the Court denies the motion for class certification.
The Court also denies the motion to strike Dr. Swanson’s testimony because his
testimony satisfies the requirements under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 702. The Court denies in part and grants in part the motion to
strike the testimony of Dr. Steiner. The Court strikes Dr. Steiner’s testimony regarding what
products are properly part of this suit because that is a legal opinion Dr. Steiner is not qualified
to make and strikes Dr. Steiner’s opinion on the statistical rate of adverse events. The Court
denies the motion with regard to Dr. Steiner’s remaining opinions, but Plaintiffs may re-raise, at
a later date, their objection to Dr. Steiner’s opinions on the causation of illnesses experienced by
dogs identified in the Adverse Event Database.
BACKGROUND
I.

Product Background and Adverse Events
Sergeant’s manufactures, sells, and markets Pur Luv Grande Bones and Pur Luv Mini

Bones (the “Pur Luv Treats”) as semi-soft chew treats for dogs. Sergeant’s began selling the Pur
Luv Treats in 2010. Sergeant’s packaging and labeling of the Pur Luv Treats uniformly proclaim
the treats’ “nutritious ingredients” and state that the treats’ “essential nutrients” are recognized
by AAFCO Dog Food Nutrient Profiles. The packaging and labeling also states that there is a

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“guaranteed analysis” of each nutrient in the Pur Luv Treats. Doc. 75 ¶¶ 41–47. In general,
Sergeant’s represents the treats as nutritious, safe and wholesome.
Between the initial release of the Pur Luv Treats to the market and the end of 2016,
Sergeant’s reported selling approximately 6.6 million packages of the Grande Bones and 4.2
million packages of the Mini Bones. According to Sergeant’s own “Adverse Events Database,”
since February 2011, hundreds of consumers have complained about the Pur Luv Treats.
Between their market introduction and the beginning of 2017, Sergeant’s received and recorded
376 consumer complaints from 278 customers. Of these complaints, 210 involved the dog
vomiting the treat with no other reported complications. Thirty-six complaints involved an
obstruction and seven other complaints reported severe complications that led to hospitalization,
surgery, or pet death. For many of the dogs that received treatment from a veterinarian,
Sergeant’s received documentation of the treatment. The documentation ranged from the
veterinarian ascribing 100% certainty to the Pur Luv Treat as the cause of the ailment to
veterinarians who did not believe it likely that the treat caused the dog’s issue. Several dogs in
these records are reported as having eaten the Pur Luv Treats over several months with no issue
at all before they experienced the reported adverse event. In some of these cases, Sergeant’s
resolved the complaints by providing compensation to customers who provided proper
documentation from their veterinarian regarding their adverse event. Sergeant’s required these
individuals to sign a release waiving their rights to sue Sergeant’s over the Pur Luv Treats and
agreeing to keep the settlement confidential.
Customers also complained about the Pur Luv Treats on the customer review section of
the products’ Amazon.com pages. One customer also organized a petition on Change.org asking
Sergeant’s to recall the Pur Luv Treats. Many people commented on the petition sharing stories

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of their dogs having issues with the treats. It is not clear if these customers are the same
customers who complained directly to Sergeant’s.
Plaintiffs assert that the Pur Luv Treats are defective and categorically unsafe for dogs to
consume because they do not break down completely in dogs’ stomachs and intestinal tracts.
Plaintiffs assert that this defect caused these adverse events described above. Plaintiffs retained
Dr. Kelly Swanson of the University of Illinois Department of Animal Sciences as an expert
witness on the issue of digestibility. Dr. Swanson performed an in vitro, that is lab based,
disappearance testing of the Pur Luv Grande Bones and concluded that they had relatively low
disappearance rates in simulations of canine stomach and small intestine conditions. Dr. Kelly
expressed concern about the safety of the treats related to choking and gastrointestinal blockage.
II.

Proposed Classes
Plaintiffs seek to certify two classes of consumers. The first class is a national class

defined as: “All persons in the United States who purchased Pur Luv Grande Bones and/or
Mini Bones Treats within the Class Period of June 19, 2010, through the present.” The second
class is a consumer fraud multistate class defined as: “All persons residing in California, Florida,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and
Washington who purchased Pur Luv Grande Bones and/or Mini Bones Treats within the Class
Period of June 19, 2010, through the present.” In the alternative to the multistate class, the
Plaintiffs seek to certify state consumer fraud classes in Illinois, California, and Ohio.
The class plaintiffs are Ryan Bietsch, Selim Freiha, Justin Manner, and Michael
Pfortmiller. Bietsch is a citizen of Illinois. His dog died from complications related to a bowel
obstruction following eating a Pur Luv Treat. Pfortmiller is a citizen of Illinois. His dog ate Pur
Luv Treats over two weeks without incident. His dog subsequently became ill, including

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vomiting, constipation, lack of appetite, and lethargy. Pfortmiller’s veterinarian diagnosed
intestinal irritation and treated the dog with IV fluids and anti-vomiting medication. The dog
improved and passed two small pieces of what appeared to be a Pur Luv Treat. Freiha is a
citizen of California. Her dog vomited red chunks of what appeared to parts of a Pur Luv Treat a
few days after consuming it. Her dog did not go to the veterinarian or have any other symptoms.
Manner is a citizen of Ohio. His dog ate Pur Luv Treats and a few weeks later had diarrhea,
lethargy, loss of appetite, and loss of thirst. The dog also vomited large chunks of the treats.
Manner’s veterinarian did not diagnose an obstruction, but found the dog suffered from acute
gastritis with no identifiable cause.
LEGAL STANDARD
I.

Expert Opinion Testimony
The admissibility of expert opinion testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence

702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.
Ed. 2d 469 (1993). See Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2011).
Rule 702 provides that a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of opinion or otherwise provided that “(a) the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. To admit expert
testimony under this rule, the Court must determine that (1) the witness is qualified, (2) the
expert’s methodology is reliable, and (3) the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Myers v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 629 F.3d 639, 644 (7th

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Cir. 2010). The Rule 702 inquiry “is a flexible one,” however. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
“Determinations on admissibility should not supplant the adversarial process; ‘shaky’ expert
testimony may be admissible, assailable by its opponents through cross-examination.” Gayton v.
McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 2010). The proponent of the testimony bears the burden of
proving that the proffered testimony meets these requirements, and the Seventh Circuit grants the
district court “wide latitude in performing its gate-keeping function.” Bielskis, 663 F.3d at 894.
II.

Class Certification
Class certification is appropriate where a plaintiff can meet the four requirements of Rule

23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a). Additionally, a plaintiff must also satisfy one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b); Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, Plaintiffs
seek certification under Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). Rule 23(b)(2) requires a finding that “the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class,
so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the
class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3) requires a finding that “questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Finally, although not an explicit
requirement of Rule 23, the party seeking certification must demonstrate that the class members
are identifiable. Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513.
The Court has broad discretion in determining whether a proposed class should be
certified. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1998). The party seeking certification
bears the burden of demonstrating that certification is proper by a preponderance of the evidence.

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Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court must
engage in a “rigorous analysis,” resolving material factual disputes where necessary. Wal–Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011); Szabo v.
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001). But “[i]n conducting [the Rule 23]
analysis, the court should not turn the class certification proceedings into a dress rehearsal for the
trial on the merits.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 811; Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds,
568 U.S. 455, 465–66, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 185 L. Ed. 2d 308 (2013) (merits questions are to be
considered only to the extent relevant to determining if Rule 23’s prerequisites are met).
ANALYSIS
I.

Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Expert Dr. Kelly Swanson
Sergeant’s moves to exclude Dr. Swanson’s expert opinions. Sergeant’s argues that Dr.

Swanson is unqualified, that his opinions will not be helpful to the jury, that his opinions are
based on unreliable methodology, and that his opinions are based on insufficient facts and data.
Plaintiffs seek to have Dr. Swanson testify that “(1) the Pur Luv pet treats exhibit low
digestibility characteristics; (2) Sergeant’s failed to perform adequate testing to determine
whether treats were sufficiently safe or digestible prior to marketing and selling the treats to
consumers; and (3) due to the risk of dogs experiencing difficulty digesting treats, it would be
prudent for Sergeant’s to reformulate the treats.” Doc. 115 at 5.
A.

Dr. Swanson’s Qualifications

For his testimony to be admissible, Dr. Swanson must be qualified as an expert to opine
on the subject matter of his testimony. See Gayton, 593 F.3d at 616 (“Whether a witness is
qualified as an expert can only be determined by comparing the area in which the witness has
superior knowledge, skill, experience, or education with the subject matter of the witness’s

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testimony.”). Dr. Swanson is a professor in the Department of Animal Sciences, Division of
Nutritional Sciences and Department of Veterinary Clinical Medicine at the University of
Illinois. He has published over 140 peer-reviewed papers, six book chapters, and over 220
abstracts presented at scientific meetings. He oversees a lab that is active in comparative
nutrition and nutrigenomics. He provides consulting services to companies in the pet food
industry relating to food nutrition and safety. Dr. Swanson is not a veterinarian but teaches a
course in veterinarian medicine.
Dr. Swanson’s expert opinion is related to the rate of digestion of the Pur Luv treats and
how that relates to potential hazards to dogs that consume the treats. This opinion falls squarely
within his professional experience. Therefore, Dr. Swanson is adequately qualified to opine on
the digestibility and testing methods of dog treats.
B.

Reliability of Dr. Swanson’s Methodology

Sergeant’s argues that Dr. Swanson’s method for testing digestibility is not reliable. To
evaluate reliability, Daubert provides a non-exhaustive list of criteria to consider: “(1) whether
the scientific theory can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer
review and publication; and (3) whether the theory has been generally accepted in the scientific
community. Gayton, 593 F.3d at 616 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94). The Court may also
consider the expert’s experience and training in the subject area. Id.
Dr. Swanson states in his Expert Report that the in vitro disappearance test he performed
on the Pur Luv Grande Bone is a modified version of a commonly used method that was
originally published in the Nutritional Research Review in 1991. The modification was done to
make the method usable with large samples such as the Grande Bone. His laboratory has used
this modified method to test the disappearance of treat products over the past decade for

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numerous pet food companies. Exhibit A to the report includes the composition of the in vitro
solution used in the test as well as the procedures followed in the test. Additionally, it includes
when and how data were recorded during the test and what those data were.
Dr. Swanson testified that he has published two articles on pet treat disappearance rates
and a few other articles using the in vitro test for digestion that were not pet treat specific. Dr.
Swanson testified that these articles were subject to peer review. Dr. Swanson also testified that
leading pet food companies use this modified version of the Nutritional Research Review
method in their product testing.
Sergeant’s asserts that Dr. Swanson’s method is not reliable because he tested the treats
without breaking them into smaller pieces to simulate chewing, and he did not account for gastric
contractions. These critiques go to the weight of the opinion, not the reliability of the method.
As Dr. Swanson himself testified, no in vitro test can perfectly simulate what occurs during
digestion of a treat, but that does not render in vitro tests per se invalid. This method is both
based on a long-accepted peer reviewed methodology and has been subjected to peer review
itself. The method is capable of being replicated and tested itself. It is used widely in the
industry to evaluate digestibility of dog treats. Therefore, despite the potential shortcomings
Sergeant’s identified, the method is a scientifically valid one and Sergeant’s can address its
potential blind spots on cross-examination.
C.

Helpfulness of Dr. Swanson’s Opinion to Trier of Fact

Sergeant’s argues that Dr. Swanson’s opinion will not assist the jury because his
contention that the risks of choking or blockage are increased when a dog swallows a whole
Grande Bone are within the understanding of an average lay person. Rule 702 “requires that the
evidence or testimony ‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

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issue,’” which “goes primarily to relevance.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (citation omitted).
Expert testimony is relevant if it helps the jury determine any fact at issue in the case.
Stuhlmacher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 774 F.3d 405, 409 (7th Cir. 2014).
Sergeant’s characterization of Dr. Swanson’s opinion too narrowly construes the
conclusions of his Expert Report. Dr. Swanson states, “The low gastric disappearance and only
moderate small intestinal disappearance calls into question the safety of the product tested, with
the potential for choking or gastrointestinal blockage especially if large pieces are consumed.”
Doc. 102 Ex. 3 at 2. Lay jurors do not have personal experience understanding the risks
associated with various rates of intestinal disappearance or factors that may contribute to
disappearance rates. Dr. Swanson’s testing and his opinion of those test results will aid the jury
in determining whether the Pur Luv treats are safe for dogs to consume, which is central to
Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. As discussed below in the class certification section, Dr.
Swanson’s opinions are not sufficient to make a prima facie case on the safety issue, but this
does not render them unhelpful.
D.

Sufficiency of Dr. Swanson’s Facts and Data

Sergeant’s argues that the facts Dr. Swanson relied upon in formulating his Expert Report
are not sufficient to support his conclusions. Specifically, he argues that Dr. Swanson did not
collect data regarding digestion rates when the Grande Bones are consumed in two or more parts.
Also, Dr. Swanson did not conduct any testing in live dogs. Moreover, Dr. Swanson also did not
talk to pet owners, consumers, or Plaintiffs, and he did not evaluate the alleged injuries in this
case. However, this argument fails for two reasons. First, although an expert’s testimony must
be based on “sufficient facts or data,” Fed. R. Evid. 702, it is the jury’s role to determine the
“soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert’s analysis and the correctness of the

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expert’s conclusions based on that analysis,” Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th
Cir. 2000). Sergeant’s will be able to direct the jury to the relevant issues that Dr. Swanson’s
analysis failed to consider or inappropriately or inaccurately considered. The jury may then
weigh Dr. Swanson’s opinion according to all the evidence. Second, Sergeant’s once again
misconstrues Dr. Swanson’s opinion. He opines on the digestibility of the Pur Luv Treats and
how that digestibility might impact the safety of the treat. He does not need to speak to lay pet
owners or Plaintiffs about their specific experiences to render this opinion. He will likely be
called to explain why his opinion should be given much weight when he did not account for dogs
chewing the treats before swallowing, but this goes to the weight of the testimony, not its
admissibility. Thus, the facts and data sufficiently support his opinion for admissibility
purposes, and the Court denies Sergeant’s motion to exclude Dr. Swanson.
II.

Motion to Exclude Dr. Jörg Steiner’s Expert Opinion and Testimony
Plaintiffs move to exclude portions of Dr. Steiner’s expert opinion and testimony, arguing

that (1) Dr. Steiner’s proposed testimony regarding the pre-market palatability testing Sergeant’s
conducted is improperly based on testimony from Mark Levin, Sergeant’s former Vice President
of Technical Affairs, (2) Dr. Steiner relies upon incomplete data for his opinions regarding
Sergeant’s Adverse Events Database, (3) Dr. Steiner lacks sufficient data to opine on the cause
of illness in one of the Plaintiffs’ dogs, and (4) Dr. Steiner offers an improper legal opinion.
A.

Dr. Steiner’s Qualifications

Plaintiffs seek to exclude Dr. Steiner from offering a variety of opinions related to
adverse medical events experienced by dogs that ate Pur Luv treats, including Plaintiffs’ dogs.
Additionally, Plaintiffs seek to bar Dr. Steiner from opining on what specific dog treats should
be part of this law suit. For his testimony to be admissible, Dr. Steiner must be qualified as an

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expert to opine on the subject matter of his testimony. See Gayton, 593 F.3d at 616 (“Whether a
witness is qualified as an expert can only be determined by comparing the area in which the
witness has superior knowledge, skill, experience, or education with the subject matter of the
witness’s testimony.”).
Dr. Steiner has a degree in veterinary medicine, completed an internship in small animal
medicine and surgery, completed a residency in small animal internal medicine, and was boardcertified as a small animal internist in 1996. Dr. Steiner also holds a PhD for work on canine
digestive lipases and their use in diagnosing gastrointestinal disorders in dogs. Since 2000, he
has held various positions at Texas A&M, including Professor of Small Animal Internal
Medicine, Director of the Gastrointestinal Laboratory, and Chair in Small Animal
Gastroenterology and Nutrition. He has conducted research on small animal gastroenterology
and has authored and co-authored over 250 peer-reviewed articles, 80 book chapters, and 370
research abstracts. Dr. Steiner’s education and professional experience more than adequately
qualify him to opine on topics related to digestion of dog treats and potential complications
associated with dog gastrointestinal tracts.
B.

Dr. Steiner’s Testimony Regarding Pre-Market Testing

Plaintiffs seeks to bar Dr. Steiner from testifying regarding pre-market palatability trials
and informal product testing by Sergeant’s employees. Plaintiffs argue that this testimony is
nothing more than hearsay testimony under the guise of expert testimony and it would not be
helpful to the jury. Sergeant’s argues that this testimony is admissible because it is part of the
foundation of Dr. Steiner’s opinion that there are no widespread and common safety concerns
with the Pur Luv Treats.

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An expert may base an opinion on any facts that “experts in the particular field would
reasonably rely on . . . in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the
opinion to be admitted.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. Dr. Steiner’s opinion only relied upon the premarket testing as one data point in support of his conclusion that there was no evidence of a
widespread safety concern with the treats. It was not the only information he consulted to reach
this conclusion and he did not simply parrot the results of the study back as his expert opinion.
His opinion was, essentially, that in reviewing the pre-market testing Mark Levin conducted in
conjunction with trials Summit Ridge Farms conducted, palatability testing, and experiential
reports from Sergeant’s own employees who fed the treat to their pets, there was no evidence of
a widespread safety issue. Plaintiffs are free to cross-examine him on why these data may not be
sufficient to support his conclusion or what gaps his analysis may have, but it is not unreasonable
for an expert to review this data as part of his analysis on the safety of the product.
C.

Testimony on the Adverse Events Database

Plaintiffs seek to bar Dr. Steiner’s opinions based on his review of the Adverse Events
Database, arguing that his opinions lack sufficient basis and he lacks the requisite qualifications
to conduct this review. Dr. Steiner derived three groups of opinions from the database. He
opines on the rate of adverse event reports, classifies the events in the database as mild,
moderate, or severe, and opines on the causes behind some of the adverse events.
Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Steiner is not qualified to provide statistical evidence about the
adverse event rates. Sergeant’s does not respond to this argument. In the report he states that the
percentage of adverse event reports is “very small.” Doc. 128 Ex. 1 at 14. While he does present
his methods of calculation, nowhere does he explain why he is qualified to opine on adverse
event report rates. He does not explain how adverse event report rates correlate to actual

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incidence rates of adverse events in the field. He does not explain what the threshold for high or
low rates is or how that is calculated. It is Sergeant’s burden to show that Dr. Steiner is
qualified. Bielskis, 663 F.3d at 894. It has not attempted to carry the burden on this issue;
therefore, the Court finds Dr. Steiner is not qualified as an expert to opine on adverse event
report rates.
With regard to the classification of the adverse event reports, Dr. Steiner is qualified. Dr.
Steiner is a veterinarian, and thus qualified to opine on the relative severity of various symptoms
experienced by dogs. Based on the symptoms reported in the database, Dr. Steiner grouped the
adverse event reports into three categories: mild, moderate, and severe. Dr. Steiner stated his
criteria for each group in his report; thus, his method is subject to evaluation and reproduction.
Plaintiffs certainly could quibble with where he has drawn the line, but that is a question of
weight of the evidence, not admissibility.
The fact that there is no extant paper or accepted method for grouping adverse events by
severity also does not doom his opinion on this matter. Daubert does not require expert opinions
to be based on accepted theories—they may be admissible if other indicia of reliability are
satisfied. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. In this case, Dr. Steiner’s method of classification can
be replicated and tested and his qualifications to opine on the relative severity of canine illness
are well established. See Gayton, 593 F.3d at 616 (courts may consider the expert’s expertise
and training the subject area when determining reliability). As noted above, Plaintiffs may raise
their issues with his data and method on cross-examination, but this does not render his opinion
on the matter inadmissible.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Steiner’s opinions on the cause of some of the events
reported in the database are not supported by sufficient data to be reliable. With the exception of

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the named Plaintiffs’ dogs, Dr. Steiner based his opinions on the causation of other dogs’
illnesses only on information contained in the Adverse Event Database. The database includes
only reports customers made to Sergeant’s about the adverse events and does not include
complete veterinary records beyond brief summaries and excerpts. In cases where Sergeant’s
received the complete veterinary records from customers, those records are stored outside of the
database.
The quality and substance of the entries Dr. Steiner reviewed and opined upon varies
considerably. Concluding whether Dr. Steiner’s opinions on the cause each dog’s illness
requires an individualized assessment of these opinions, and neither party has provided such
analysis in their brief. However, the Court need not rule on this portion of Plaintiff’s motion at
this time because the Court does not rely on it for its decision on class certification. See Am.
Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2010) (District court is only required
to rule on admission of expert testimony prior to class certification where that testimony is
critical to class certification decision). Therefore, the Court denies the motion to exclude Dr.
Steiner’s testimony with regard to his causation opinions, without prejudice to Plaintiffs refiling
it at a later date.
E.

Testimony Regarding Why Pet Owners Feed Treats to Dogs

Plaintiffs also ask the Court to bar Dr. Steiner from testifying that “the Pur Luv treats are
in fact designed to be chewed and broken down slowly during the chewing process, meaning
soaking them in fluid alone would not dissolve them as would be the case for [softer treats].
This is by design, and as requested by the pet owner.” Doc. 128 Ex. 1 at 7. The basis for this
opinion is that it says on the package of Pur Luv Grand Bones that they are “Long-Lasting
Chews.” Doc. 108-20. Furthermore, Dr. Swanson acknowledges that the Pur Luv Treats are

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designed to be long-lasting chews. See Doc. 133 Ex. D at 121–22 (“Q: Well, they’re intended to
be a long-lasting chew, right? A. Correct.”). Thus, there is ample evidence in the record to
conclude that the Pur Luv Treats are sold as long-lasting chews, and Dr. Steiner reasonably takes
that into account in his analysis.
E.

Testimony Regarding Treats Properly in this Case

Dr. Steiner is not qualified to opine on questions of law. United States v. Diekhoff, 535
F.3d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 2008) (experts cannot offer opinions that involve legal conclusions). His
expert report states, “Furthermore, I find it perplexing that a product, Pur Luv mini bones, is part
of this suit when not one of the dogs selected for class certification even received this treat.”
Doc. 128, Ex. 1 at 30. Whether these treats are properly part of the case is a question of law, and
Dr. Steiner may not opine on such topics. Furthermore, he does not appear to offer an opinion
on the issue, only stating that he is “perplexed.” So, to the extent this is an opinion, it is not a
helpful one. Therefore, he may not testify regarding what treats are appropriately part of this
case. He may, however, use the lack of any injuries associated with the Pur Luv Mini Bones in
support of any of his otherwise appropriately presented opinions.
III.

Class Certification
To certify a class, Plaintiffs must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they

have satisfied Rule 23(a)’s requirements. Messner, 669 F.3d at 811. Plaintiffs must also satisfy
one of the Rule 23(b) requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b); Oshana, 472 F.3d at 513. Plaintiffs
seek certification under Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). Certification is only proper if both the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) are met. Because the Court finds that common issues of fact
do not predominate over the questions affecting only individual members, the Court denies
certification of the Rule 23(b)(3) class. And because the Plaintiffs cannot show that an

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injunction remedy would provide appropriate or final relief for any of the individual class
members, or the class as a whole, the Court denies the motion to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class.
A.

Rule 23(b)(3) Class

Plaintiffs seek to certify a nationwide breach of warranty class and a multistate consumer
fraud class under Rule 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs argue that the Pur Luv Treats are defective because
they are unsafe for canine consumption and that no reasonable consumer would purchase the Pur
Luv Treats knowing this. As damages, Plaintiffs seek a full refund of the purchase price of all
Pur Luv Treats consumers have purchased since they came to market in 2010.
The Plaintiffs’ claims all rely upon one central allegation: that the Pur Luv Treats are not
safe for dogs to eat. Plaintiffs’ state law warranty claims, MMWA claims, and consumer fraud
claims all require proving that Sergeant’s made an actionable statement. The Court previously
ruled that Sergeant’s representations that the Pur Luv Treats are nutritious, safe, and wholesome
are actionable. Each of these claims also requires proving that the actionable statement is not
true. Plaintiffs argue that these statements are not true because the Pur Luv Treats were
“defective, unsafe, and unfit for canine consumption” when they left the Sergeant’s factory.
Doc. 92 at 17. Therefore, all of Plaintiffs’ claims rely upon Plaintiffs’ ability to prove that the
Pur Luv Treats are, in fact, “defective, unsafe, and unfit for canine consumption.”
To satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement, Plaintiffs must ultimately be able
to prove that the Treats are defective and unsafe through use of “evidence that is common to the
class rather than individual to its members.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 818 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). If each plaintiff will require individualized
evidence to make a prima facie showing, then predominance is not satisfied. Id. at 815. It
ultimately is Plaintiffs’ burden to show that the “products contain an inherent defect that is

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substantially certain to result in malfunction during the useful life of the product.” Cartwright v.
Viking Indus., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-02159FCDEFB, 2009 WL 2982887, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14,
2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). To succeed on any of Plaintiffs’
claims, they must prove that the treats are in fact defective, that is, substantially certain to harm
dogs that consume them. At this stage the Court must look at the proposed evidence and
determine whether the common evidence is sufficient for Plaintiffs to make out a prima facie
case. Id. at 826. The Court notes that its analysis on this issue overlaps in part with the merits of
Plaintiffs’ underlying claims. However, there is frequent overlap between the factual and legal
issues comprising a plaintiff’s cause of action and the rigorous analysis courts must undertake in
class certification, and the Court cannot avoid answering questions on class certification simply
because they touch on the ultimate merits of the case. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351.
Plaintiffs point to eight sources of proof they will use at trial to prove that the treats are
defective. These are:
(1) the named Plaintiffs’ testimony concerning their experiences
with the treats, including veterinarian testimony; (2) other putative
class members and their experiences with the treats, including
veterinarian testimony; (3) Defendant’s records detailing hundreds
of customer complaints about the safety of the treats; (4)
Defendant’s records showing Sergeant’s did no safety or efficacy
testing prior to marketing its treats; (5) Dr. Swanson’s testing of
the treats showing the treats had low dissolution rates; (6) the
Defendant’s subsequent testing of the treats following this lawsuit
that produced results similar to those of Dr. Swanson; (7) the
Defendant’s confidentially settling scores of claims made by
putative class members who claimed the treats were unsafe; and
(8) the Defendant’s reformulation of the product to conceal the
problem with the treats.
Doc. 111 at 8.
The proposed common evidence is not capable of proving Plaintiffs’ prima facie case.
First, and most importantly, Plaintiffs’ own expert, after reviewing much of the evidence above
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and conducting his own tests of the Pur Luv Treats, was unwilling to categorically say that the
Pur Luv Treats are unsafe. During his deposition, when asked about the safety of the treats, Dr.
Swanson stated, “I guess I wouldn’t – again I wouldn’t put a number on like – I guess I don’t
classify any of these as safe or unsafe. It’s kind of a – it’s not black or white. It’s a lot of gray
area there. I think the risk level is higher than other ones we’ve tested. To say safe or unsafe is
probably difficult to put them all in one or the other categories. Like, you know, all or nothing.”
Doc. 107, Ex. AA at 193:11–19. Earlier in the same deposition, Dr. Swanson engaged in the
following colloquy.
Q.
Would you agree with me that you would have to look at
each dog individually to determine whether or not that dog had
difficulty digesting any treat?
A.
Yeah . . . that’s why I don’t like to categorize things
because it depends on the dog and all the other factors that go
along with that.
Id. at 155:15–156:1. In his expert report, Dr. Swanson stated that in preparing his report he
reviewed “portions of the consumers’ experiences about the treats in question [from]
Sergeant’s . . . consumer affairs database, in a change.org petition, and Amazon product
reviews.” Doc. 92 Ex. 1 at 6. In discussing the various consumer reports, Dr. Swanson noted
that the reports may be unreliable for a variety of reasons and may not “provide a complete
picture of the true field experience.” Id. Dr. Swanson also does not offer any opinion regarding
any specific adverse events. After reviewing the consumer complaints, he simply concluded
that, “it would be prudent to test these treats for digestibility issues.” Id. at 6. Thus, Dr.
Swanson reviewed the bulk of Plaintiffs’ proposed evidence, and based on that evidence he did
not feel comfortable concluding that the treats are categorically unsafe. In fact, his expert report
recommends “further analysis of the treats” to identify any potential defect, id., and in his

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deposition, he clarified that whether a particular treat causes digestibility issues is heavily
dependent upon the dog that ate the treat.
Plaintiffs also do not provide the Court with any framework that it can use to determine
the point at which a treat is unsafe, merely pointing to anecdotal evidence from largely
unidentified consumers and an inconclusive expert report. Even accepting Plaintiffs’ assertion
that the rate of gastric and intestinal disappearance “calls into question the safety of the [Pur Luv
treats], with potential for choking or gastrointestinal blockage especially if large pieces are
consumed,” Doc. 92 Ex. 1 at 2, the Court has no basis upon which to conclude that the treats are
so unsafe that no reasonable consumer would purchase them. Dr. Swanson’s expert report is of
no help on this front as it at most states: “I would anticipate that some dogs would experience
difficulty digesting this dog treat.” Id. (emphasis added). The level of uncertainty in Dr.
Swanson’s report, combined with his opinion during the deposition that safety associated with
digestibility requires a dog-by-dog analysis, makes it clear that Plaintiffs cannot carry their
burden based on common evidence alone. Cf. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 353–55 (denying motion for
class certification where plaintiffs’ expert’s proposed method for proving a general policy of
discrimination could not provide any answer on how common “stereotyped thinking” influences
employment decisions).
Sergeant’s own testing corroborating Dr. Swanson’s testing on dissolution rates does not
alter the analysis. Dr. Steiner attempted to faithfully recreate Dr. Swanson’s testing method and
applied it to Pur Luv Treats as well as other pet treats and unprocessed animal meat. Dr.
Steiner’s testing shows comparable dissolution rates for the other pet treats and lower dissolution
rates for the animal meat products. This testing does not support the hypothesis that dissolution

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rates alone are sufficient to establish the safety of a particular food item for the general
population of dogs.
The named plaintiffs’ experience is equally unhelpful to proving the safety of the dog
treats. Among the four named plaintiffs only three took their dogs to veterinarians while the
dogs were ill. Of these three, none of the veterinarians identified the Pur Luv Treats
conclusively as the cause of the dog’s illness. The dog that did not go to the veterinarian only
vomited chunks of a Pur Luv treat. Without further evidence it is impossible to say whether this
resulted because of a defect with the treat or some other unrelated issue. The four varied
experiences of the Plaintiffs’ dogs do not support the conclusion that all the Pur Luv Treats share
the same defect or that the treats are inherently unsafe for dogs to consume.
In the view of the Court as well as Plaintiffs’ own expert, the common evidence Plaintiffs
propose to show that the treats are unsafe is not sufficient to establish that claim.1 Therefore, the
Plaintiffs’ proposed classes do not satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) and
the Court denies the motion for certification of all the proposed classes under Rule 23(b)(3).2
B.

Rule 23(b)(2) Class

Plaintiffs also seek to certify their proposed classes under Rule 23(b)(2), seeking a
mandatory injunction requiring Sergeant’s to recall and reformulate the Pur Luv Treats. A court

1

Plaintiffs likely wonder what evidence would be sufficient to meet this burden. The Court does not have
an answer for that hypothetical question, but merely notes that on the facts of this case sufficient common
proof is likely hard to come by. As other courts have noted, “Proving a class-wide defect where the
majority of class members have not experienced any problems with the alleged defective product, if
possible at all, would be extremely difficult.” Mahtani v. Wyeth, No. CIV.A. 08-6255 KSH, 2011 WL
2609857, at *8 (D.N.J. June 30, 2011) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) In trying to
argue that a product is categorically unfit for dogs to eat, when very few dogs have experienced ill effects
eating it, Plaintiffs are attempting to cross a wide gap, and as such, need a strong bridge.
2

Because Plaintiffs must satisfy both Rules 23(a) and (b) certify their class, their failure to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3) is fatal and the Court need not address the Rule 23(a) factors. Messner, 669 F.3d at 811 (class
must satisfy both Rules 23(a) and (b)).

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may certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) where the “party opposing the class has acted or refused
to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). If the
contemplated relief is neither appropriate respecting the class as a whole nor final, class
certification is not appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2).
To be appropriate for the whole class, the remedy must first satisfy the test for all
equitable remedies. Plaintiffs must show that “(1) the plaintiffs have suffered irreparable harm;
(2) monetary damages are inadequate to remedy the injury; (3) an equitable remedy is warranted
based on the balance of hardships between the plaintiffs and defendant; and (4) the public
interest would be well served by the injunction.” Kartman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir. 2011)
It is clear from the complaint that Plaintiffs’ complained-of injury—purchasing a
worthless treat—is remediable through monetary damages. A refund of the product’s purchase
price would make the Plaintiffs whole. This alone defeats the request for equitable relief.
Additionally, the balance of hardships also disfavors an injunction here. Plaintiffs’
proposed injunctive relief not only seeks to force a recall of the Pur Luv Treats, but also a
reformulation of the treats to make them safe for all dogs to eat. A mandatory injunction such as
this imposes a significant burden on the defendant and considerable enforcement challenges for
the Court. Kartman, 634 F.3d at 892. The Court would have to determine some standard for
evaluating the safety of the reformulated treats. This would likely involve experts and require
the Court to engage in an ongoing review process of dog treat safety. Given that Plaintiffs’ own
expert cannot provide a standard of what constitutes a completely safe dog treat, the Court is not
confident that it can develop a standard that satisfies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)’s

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requirements that the injunction “state its terms specifically” and “describe in reasonable detail”
the “act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d); see also Kartman, 634 F.3d at 893.
Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy Rule 23(b)(2) for this reason as well.
Finally, the Plaintiffs make no real effort to address the issue of injury. Standing to
pursue prospective injunctive relief requires a threat of future harm that is not conjectural or
hypothetical. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351
(1992). “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy
regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse
effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974).
Plaintiffs do not explain how the mere presence of the Pur Luv Treats on the market will cause
them continuing adverse effects. Without such a showing, they have no standing to pursue an
injunction. Therefore, the Court finds this case unsuitable for certification under Rule 23(b)(2).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification
[91], denies Sergeant’s motion to exclude Dr. Kelly Swanson’s expert opinions and testimony
[101], and grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr. Jörg Steiner’s expert
opinion and testimony [127].

Dated: September 19, 2018

______________________
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge

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