Kweicien et al v. Medina-Maltes et al
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 10/20/2016: The Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment 24 . Civil case terminated. [For further details see memorandum opinion and order.] Mailed notice(is, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CELESTINA KWEICIEN, and
GEDIMINAS JUKNA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARTHA MEDINA-MALTES, et al.
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 15-cv-5692
Judge Ronald A. Guzmán
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
The Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [24]. Civil case terminated.
STATEMENT
This case concerns plaintiff Celestina Kweicien’s challenge to the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Service’s (“USCIS”) denial of her petition to have her husband,
Gediminas Jukna (“Jukna”), admitted as a lawful permanent resident by virtue of their marriage.1
I.
Statutory and Regulatory Framework
A United States citizen who seeks lawful permanent resident status for a spouse/foreign
national must file a petition (Form I-130) with USCIS. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. §
204.1(a)(1). Form I-130 provides USCIS with an opportunity to investigate the claimed
marriage, and, if granted, establishes a “formal relationship” between the petitioner and the
beneficiary. Akram v. Holder, 721 F.3d 853, 83 (7th Cir. 2013). That relationship, in turn,
qualifies the beneficiary as eligible for certain immigration visas as an “immediate relative” of a
1
Because Ms. Kweicien originally filed the petition on her husband’s behalf, and they both bring
the same challenge to USCIS’s decision, the Court will use the singular term “Plaintiff” for
narrative ease.
United States citizen. Id. USCIS may not, however, consider the alien’s (separate) application to
“adjust status” until it first recognizes the validity of the underlying marriage. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1125,
1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154.
In that respect, USCIS is categorically barred from recognizing a marriage under certain
circumstances, such as marriage fraud:
[N]o petition shall be approved if (1) the alien has previously been accorded, or
has sought to be accorded, an immediate relative or preference status as the
spouse of a citizen of the United States or the spouse of an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney
General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration
laws, or (2) the Attorney General has determined that the alien has attempted or
conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration
laws.
8 U.S.C. § 1154(c). The authority to decide issues of marriage fraud in this context has been
delegated to USCIS for initial review, see 8.C.F.R. § 100.1, and to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”), which generally issues the final agency decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7).
II.
Background2
(A)
Jukna and His Marriages
Jukna is a Lithuanian native and citizen. (Defs.’ Facts [Dkt. # 36] ¶¶ 1-2.) He entered the
United States in 2001 on a B1/B2 visitor visa and married Samantha Crawford (“Ms. Crawford”)
on February 1, 2005. (Id.) This would be the first of his three marriages in the United States.
Three weeks after they married, Ms. Crawford filed an I-130 petition with USCIS,
seeking to classify Jukna as an immediate relative of a U.S. citizen. (Id. ¶ 4.) But Jukna and Ms.
Crawford failed to appear for the scheduled hearing/interview with USCIS (set for September 28,
2005), and they divorced within the next year, on July 28, 2006. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) Accordingly, on
October 25, 2010, USCIS denied Ms. Crawford’s I-130 petition, finding that the marriage had
2
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
2
dissolved on July 28, 2006 and that there was insufficient evidence to support her claim of a
bona fide relationship between her and Jukna. (Id. ¶ 7.)3
Jukna met his second wife, Andrea Jimenez (“Ms. Jimenez”), two months later at a New
Year’s party, in December 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) They married on May 15, 2011, and were divorced
by April 19, 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.) The judgment of dissolution of marriage indicates that Jukna
and Ms. Jimenez began living separately in June 2011, just one month after they became
husband and wife. (Id.) Ten days prior to divorcing Ms. Jimenez, however, Jukna was placed
into removal proceedings. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Jukna married his third wife (Plaintiff) on July 18, 2012, shortly after the removal
proceedings were initiated. (Id. ¶ 12.) Like Ms. Crawford, Plaintiff filed an I-130 petition on
Jukna’s behalf. (Id. ¶ 13.) In support of the petition, she filed a number of Jukna’s tax returns,
medical bills, and a copy of a lease. (Id. ¶ 14.) With the exception of the tax returns from 20052012, the documents provided evidence of Jukna’s relationship with Plaintiff, but they did not
establish his relationship with his prior wives (beyond marriage certificates and divorce
judgments). (Id.)
(B)
USCIS’s Interview and Investigation
Jukna’s interview was held on July 23, 2013. (Id. ¶ 15.) There, Jukna provided details
about his arrival into the United States in 2001, his employment history, and places he had lived.
(Id. ¶ 16.) He was unable to remember the exact date of his marriage to his first wife (Ms.
Crawford), but claimed they married in 2004. (Id. ¶ 17.) (They actually married in 2005, id.) He
did, however, recall that she worked at a hospital in some capacity, although he was unable to
describe her duties. (Id. ¶ 18.) When asked about Ms. Crawford’s family, Jukna asserted that her
3
The parties’ briefing is silent about why the application took so long to adjudicate, but this gap
is irrelevant to the foregoing analysis.
3
parents’ names were Michelle and John. (Id. ¶ 19.) (Ms. Crawford’s father’s actual name is
Tony, id. ¶ 20.)
In terms of his life with Ms. Crawford, Jukna was unable to recall what bills the two
shared during their marriage. (Id. ¶ 21.) He also stated that Ms. Crawford had only one child
from a previous relationship. (Id. ¶ 22.) Yet, when he was confronted with information that she
had a second child in February 2006 — conceived during the duration of their marriage — Jukna
stated that Ms. Crawford had drinking problems and that they were not sleeping together at the
time. (Id. ¶ 23.)
Regarding his first I-130 petition and the missed USCIS interview, Jukna explained that
he and Ms. Crawford did not appear because they were already separated. (Id. ¶ 26.) That I-130
petition, moreover, stated that Jukna and Ms. Crawford lived together in Lemont, Illinois for
about 4-5 months after marrying (from February 2005 through June or July 2005), whereas on
April 1, 2005, Ms. Crawford filed a police report (for an unrelated incident) that listed her
address as 1616 N. Poplar Avenue, Round Lake, Illinois (Id. ¶¶ 36-39.) This latter address was
also reported as the residence of Douglass Whitt, Jr. (“Mr. Whitt”), who is listed as the father of
Ms. Crawford’s second child on the birth certificate. (Id.)
Turning to questions about his own family, Jukna stated that they were non-immigrant
visa “overstays” and that his mother and sister were placed in removal proceedings because they
did not pass the interview. (Id. ¶ 27-28.) He further noted that his mother had married another
United States citizen, John Garcia (“Mr. Garcia”). (Id. ¶ 29.) Mr. Garcia, however, previously
informed USCIS of some significant details: he stated in 2005 that his marriage to Jukna’s
mother was fraudulent and that they married only to “help her stay in America” and because she
4
paid him. (Id. ¶ 40.) He further claimed that Ms. Crawford’s marriage to Jukna was similarly
fraudulent. (Id.)
Lastly, concerning Jukna’s second wife, Ms. Jimenez, Jukna wavered on when exactly
they were married, initially stating that he married her on May 5, 2010 but later claiming that
they married in 2011. (Id. ¶ 30.) Jukna further noted that Ms. Jimenez did not move in with him;
she was instead a “long term guest” who kept her own apartment. (Id. ¶ 32.)
(C)
USCIS’s Notice of Intent to Deny the I-130 Petition
On July 24, 2013, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Petition for Alien Relative
(“NOID”). (Id. ¶ 41.) In the six-page NOID, USCIS summarized the above evidence and
concluded that Jukna’s marriage to Ms. Crawford was fraudulent, largely because of (1) the
inconsistencies of Jukna’s testimony with the record, (2) Jukna’s inability to recall pertinent
details of the relationship, (3) Ms. Crawford’s likely relationship with her actual partner, Mr.
Whitt, and (4) the allegations of fraud by Mr. Garcia. (Id. ¶¶ 42-51.)4 The NOID further
expressed doubt about the validity of Jukna’s marriage to Ms. Jiminez, noting that it “appears to
also have been fraudulent,” in part because Jukna was put into removal proceedings in April 9,
2012, only to divorce Ms. Jiminez a few days later and marry Plaintiff shortly after. (Id. ¶ 52.)
Accordingly, USCIS concluded that Jukna had entered into multiple sham marriages, at least one
of which (with Ms. Crawford) was entered into solely for the purpose of evading immigration
laws. (Id. ¶ 53.)
4
Plaintiff disputes paragraph 45 but offers no record support for the denial, so this fact is
accordingly deemed admitted, as it is supported by the record. See L.R. 56.1 (requiring that a
party who disputes a fact must make “specific reference” to exhibits supporting the denial).
5
(D)
USCIS’s Decision Denying the Petition
Despite its findings, USCIS gave Plaintiff an opportunity to provide evidence to the
contrary. (Id ¶ 54.) Plaintiff thus submitted a brief through counsel, arguing that USCIS’s
conclusion was based on mere speculation and unsupported allegations. (Id. ¶ 56.) Particularly,
she claimed that USCIS erred by focusing on Jukna’s inability to answer “trivial” questions and
that it was “completely unjust” to credit Mr. Garcia’s allegations of fraud. (Id.). In USCIS’s
view, however, Plaintiff failed to provide any additional evidence that Jukna’s marriage to Ms.
Crawford was not fraudulent. (Id. ¶ 57.)
As such, on September 5, 2013, USCIS issued a four-page letter denying Plaintiff’s I-130
petition, addressing the issues she raised in her brief as follows:
USCIS notes that the beneficiary’s marriage occurred on February 1, 2005.
During the interview on July 24, 2013, USCIS questioned the beneficiary
regarding the events that occurred in his life dating back to when he first entered
the U.S. in 2001. The beneficiary was able to correctly answer how he entered the
U.S., when he entered the U.S. and where he lived in the U.S. prior to February 1,
2005. Furthermore, the beneficiary was able to provide the specific names of
companies he had worked for and the specific address for each residence he had
lived at prior to February 1, 2005. USCIS finds your attorneys [sic] claims of the
beneficiary being unable to remember information about his ex-wife
unconvincing.
(Id. ¶¶ 57-58.) The denial letter further noted that Plaintiff had not provided any additional
evidence to support the claim that Jukna’s marriage to Ms. Crawford was in good faith. (Id. ¶
59.)
(E)
The Board of Immigration Appeals’ Denial
Unhappy with USCIS’s decision, Plaintiff filed an appeal with the BIA. (Id. ¶ 60.) She
argued that USCIS’s ruling was erroneous because the record lacked “substantial and probative
evidence” that Jukna’s prior marriage was not bona fide. (Id.) The BIA, upon de novo review,
rejected her argument, dismissed the appeal, and affirmed USCIS’s decision, concluding that the
6
record contained evidence that the marriage to Ms. Crawford was fraudulently entered into
because Ms. Crawford needed money and Jukna needed permanent residency. (Id. ¶ 62.)
Moreover, the BIA found that based on Mr. Garcia’s statements and the other reason in USCIS’s
denial letter, Plaintiff had “failed to establish that the marriage was valid from its inception.” (Id.
¶ 63.) Plaintiff’s appeal to this Court soon followed.
LEGAL STANDARD
I.
Administrative Review
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) governs this Court’s review of a final
decision by the BIA. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. Under the APA, review is limited to the
administrative record, and courts must uphold the BIA’s findings of fact so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 706. A decision is supported by “substantial
evidence” if a reasonable mind could find adequate support for the given conclusion based on the
record as a whole. Kepple v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 2001). Under this
deferential standard, “the scope of review . . . is narrow, and a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
II.
The Marriage Fraud Bar
To find a marriage fraudulent, the government must identify “substantial and probative
evidence” that the marriage was a sham from its inception. Surganova v. Holder, 612 F.3d 901,
904 (7th Cir. 2010); Matter of Tawfik, 20 I&N Dec. 166, 170 (BIA 1990); Cassell v. Napolitano,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42766, at *36-38 (N.D. Ill. 2014). There must be affirmative evidence
that creates more than a “reasonable inference” of fraud. Tawfik, 20 I&N Dec. at 167-68; 8
C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii). The burden rests initially on the government, and a finding of fraud
requires more than a finding that a couple failed to prove that their marriage is bona fide. Id. If
7
the government identifies substantial and probative evidence that a marriage is fraudulent, the
burden then shifts to the petitioner to show otherwise. Matter of Kahy, 19 I&N Dec. 803, 80607 (BIA 1988); see also Cassell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42766 at *36-38 (citing Brown v.
Napolitano, 391 Fed. App’x. 346, 349-51 (5th Cir. 2010)).
ANALYSIS
Since the BIA is under a statutory obligation to deny an I-130 petition if it determines
that the alien previously entered into a fraudulent marriage in order to receive immigration
benefits, the determinative issue here is whether there was substantial evidence that Jukna’s
marriage to Ms. Crawford was a sham designed to circumvent immigration laws.
I.
The Record Supports the BIA’s Finding of Marriage Fraud
The thrust of Plaintiff’s argument on appeal is that the BIA erred in finding “substantial
and probative evidence” of marriage fraud, and she devotes much of her time to offering
alternative explanations of the primary bases of the BIA’s conclusion; namely, Mr. Garcia’s
statements, Jukna’s inability to recall pertinent details about his relationship with Ms. Crawford,
and the multiple inconsistencies in his story, such as Ms. Crawford’s relationship with Mr. Whitt
and their second child. The Court will address each category in turn.
(A)
Mr. Garcia’s Statements
Plaintiff first argues that the BIA committed reversible error by relying heavily on Mr.
Garcia’s sworn statements because, on her account, they were mere speculation, which
establishes only “an inference” of fraud. (Pl.’s Br. [Dkt. # 33] at 13-16.) But this argument
misses the mark, and by a lot.
First, the agency’s decision was based on consideration of multiple factors, not just Mr.
Garcia’s statements, as evidenced by the NOID and the BIA’s explanation of its final decision.
8
Mr. Garcia’s statements, moreover, are highly probative. They were given under oath and
provided details about Jukna’s and his mother’s fraudulent marriages. (Defs.’ Facts [Dkt. # 36]
¶¶ 86-88.) Particularly, Mr. Garcia noted that he met Ms. Crawford once when they all gathered
to take photographs at various locations, which is when she told him that she entered into an
arranged marriage with Jukna because she needed the money and had a child with another man.
(Id.) These statements were further corroborated by other record evidence, such as (1) Ms.
Crawford’s second child with Mr. Whitt, which was conceived during Jukna’s marriage to Ms.
Crawford, and (2) the police report filed by Ms. Crawford, which suggested she did not live with
Jukna at the time they claimed to be married. Although Plaintiff attempts to explain these points
by (a) noting that Mr. Garcia could be lying and (b) pointing to Ms. Crawford’s alleged drinking
problem and the “issues” she and Jukna were having at the time, such arguments are, at best, a
plea to reweigh the evidence considered by the BIA and arrive at a different conclusion, which
the Court cannot do. See Schneider v. Nat’l, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 948 F.2d 338,
343 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that under the APA, a reviewing court may not substitute its
decision for that of the agency; its review is limited to assessing whether the record reasonably
supports the agency’s conclusion).
Ultimately, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to rebut Mr. Garcia’s sworn statements
with evidence, but instead she articulated the same conclusory argument to the BIA that she
raises now — that Mr. Garcia’s statements are mere conjecture or unreliable. Accordingly, given
the paucity of evidence to rebut Mr. Garcia’s statements, as well as their consistency with other
record evidence, the Court finds that the agency was well within its discretion to credit those
statements as part of its finding. See Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir.
2009) (upholding USCIS’s reliance on unsworn statements from the petitioner’s sister, which
9
suggested marriage fraud, and noting that the petitioner had offered nothing to undermine the
reliability of those statements besides generalized, unsupported allegations that the witness was
lying out of spite).
(B)
Jukna’s Recollection of His Marriage with Ms. Crawford
Plaintiff next contends that the BIA erred by considering Jukna’s inability to recall
pertinent details of his marriage with Ms. Crawford to be “substantial and probative evidence” of
marriage fraud. On Plaintiff’s account, it was unreasonable to expect Jukna to recall “trivial”
details of a marriage eight years gone. Moreover, Plaintiff insists, the agency should have
realized that Jukna had a bad memory, since he was also unable to recall other “big” details
about his life, such as what he studied in college and for how long. But even if true, these points
do not undermine the agency’s decision.
For starters, it bears emphasizing (again) that the BIA did not rely solely on Jukna’s
inability to recall or provide evidence of the typical “bona fides”5 of his marriage with Ms.
Crawford. If the BIA had done that, then its decision would not stand, since a petitioner’s failure
to establish the validity of a marriage does not satisfy the agency’s initial burden of finding
substantial evidence of marriage fraud. Tawfik, 20 I&N Dec. at 167-68. But Jukna’s failure to
recall pertinent details of the marriage was just one piece of the puzzle, and a considerable one.
Jukna was unable to recall what year he married Ms. Crawford, when they separated, or
what bills they shared during their marriage. (Defs.’ Facts [Dkt. # 36] ¶¶ 21-26.) Nor was he able
to recall what Ms. Crawford did for a living (although he knew she worked at a hospital in some
5
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 204.2 (listing examples of documentary evidence of a bona fide marriage,
such joint expenses or jointly owned property); see also Agymen v INS, 296 F.3d 871, 882-83
(9th Cir. 2002) (“Evidence of a marriage’s bona fides include: jointly-filed tax returns; shared
bank accounts or credit cards . . . documents reflecting joint ownership of [property], . . . and
testimony or other evidence of the couple’s courtship.”).
10
capacity) or what her father’s name was.6 (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) Perhaps these shortcomings were a
product of Jukna’s poor memory, but an equally fair inference to be drawn is that Jukna did not
know much about Ms. Crawford or their “shared life.” Thus, as Plaintiff has cited no principle of
law suggesting that Jukna’s allegedly faulty memory somehow undermines the BIA’s inference
in this regard, the Court simply has no basis to overturn it. See Freeman United Coal Mining Co.
v. Stone, 957 F.2d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[A] reviewing body [under the APA] may not set
aside an [agency’s] inference merely because it finds the opposite conclusion more
reasonable.”).
(C)
Inconsistencies in Jukna’s Statements
Lastly, Plaintiff makes much of the BIA’s emphasis on two glaring inconsistencies
between Jukna’s testimony and the record: (1) his statements regarding Ms. Crawford’s second
child; and (2) his statement that he lived with Ms. Crawford in Lemont, Illinois, whereas the
police report she filed suggested she lived in Round Lake, Illinois with Mr. Whitt.
In terms of the second child, Plaintiff insists that Jukna’s statements were actually
consistent with the record. But this argument is difficult to swallow. The hearing transcript says
it all:
Q: Did you and Samantha have any children together?
A: She had a kid from her previous relationship.
Q: She just had one child?
A: Yes.
Q: Was Samantha pregnant at any time before you separated from her?
A: No.
(AR [Dkt. # 17] at 74.) Since it is undisputed that Ms. Crawford was pregnant with a second
child during the duration of her marriage with Jukna, (Defs.’ Facts [Dkt. # 36] ¶ 33), Jukna’s
6
Plaintiff notes in her brief that Jukna preferred to call Ms. Crawford’s father by his nickname
“John,” but the portion of the record on which she relies (the hearing transcript) does not reflect
that. (See Pl.’s Br. [Dkt # 33] at 4) (citing Administrative Record (“AR”) [Dkt. # 17] at 71).
11
statements to USCIS can fairly be considered as evidence of his ignorance about significant
events in Ms. Crawford’s life, which suggests the two did not share one together.
With respect to Ms. Crawford’s purported residence and the police report, Plaintiff argues
that the BIA erred by finding an inconsistency because “there could be many reasons behind Ms.
Crawford’s decision to use Round Lake as her address . . . rather than the place she was residing
at the time.” (Pl.’s Br. [Dkt. # 33] at 24.) Yet this argument is as equally unavailing as the first.
Not only does it improperly invite the Court to speculate about different conclusions that could
be drawn from the record, see Schneider, 948 F.2d at 343, it also ignores the evidence that Mr.
Whitt, the father of the second child, was listed at the same Round Lake address that Ms.
Crawford gave in the report, (Defs.’ Facts [Dkt. # 36] ¶¶ 36-39). These are indeed glaring
inconsistencies in Jukna’s story, and the BIA did not err by weighing them heavily.
In the end, the Court is cognizant of Plaintiff’s repeated assertion that she and Jukna have
a bona fide marriage. But that marriage has no impact on the BIA’s determination on whether
Jukna’s prior marriage to Ms. Crawford was fraudulent. In that respect, the picture before the
BIA was this: Jukna was unable to recall significant details about his shared life with Ms.
Crawford, indeed even her pregnancy. The record suggests, moreover, that the two did not live
together during their marriage, and that Ms. Crawford was instead living with her actual partner
and father of her child, Mr. Whitt. Combined with the testimony from Mr. Garcia, which
Plaintiff has not rebutted, the BIA’s finding that Jukna’s marriage to Ms. Crawford was
fraudulent is certainly supported by substantial evidence.7 See Ghaly v. INS, 48 F.3d 1426, 1431
7
Plaintiff draws the Court’s attention to two cases, Sehgal v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir.
2016) and Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2009), as metrics for gauging
“substantial evidence.” In both cases, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the agency’s finding of
marriage fraud because the petitioning parties admitted that a prior marriage was fraudulent.
Thus, since there is no similar “smoking gun” here, Plaintiff insists that the Court cannot find
12
(7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that an agency decision must upheld so long as it is a rational
conclusion derived from the record); see also Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (noting
that where Congress has granted power to an agency over certain matters, [such as reviewing
immigration claims], that grant of power embodies congressional recognition of the agency’s
“special competence” to handle those matters, and compels deference from the reviewing court).
The Court therefore affirms the BIA’s decision and grants Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.
substantial evidence of marriage fraud, on this record, as a matter of law. But the Court does not
share this interpretation of the applicable precedent. The Sehgal panel, for example, explained
that “the agency had substantial evidence, in the form of [the admissions of fraud], as well as the
inconsistencies found in the original investigation of [the] marriage,” 813 F.3d at 1032
(emphasis added), which suggests that a finding of marriage fraud may be grounded upon record
inconsistencies alone. And here, as noted above, the BIA had a lot more than mere
inconsistencies to ground its conclusion. Moreover, while the Court is hesitant to assign a precise
evidentiary value to a party’s admission of marriage fraud, it likely falls closer to “conclusive
evidence” than “substantial evidence,” and imposing the former quantum of proof upon the BIA
would be inconsistent with the APA and well-established principles of administrative review.
See CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng'g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”) (citation omitted).
13
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment [24]. Civil case terminated.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 20, 2016
____________________________________
HON. RONALD A. GUZMÁN
United States District Judge
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?