Dawood v. Chicago Carriage Cab Corp. et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM Order: This memorandum order is issued sua sponte because of some problematic aspects of defendant Chicago Carriage Cab Corp.'s Answer. Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 9/17/2015:Mailed notice(clw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

HIROS DAWOOD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHICAGO CARRIAGE CAB CORP., an
Illinois Corporation; and ZHILONG ZHANG,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15 C 6160

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Chicago Carriage Cab Corp. ("Carriage") has filed its Answer to the personal injury
Complaint brought against it and cab driver Zhilong Zhang ("Zhang") by Hiros Dawood
("Dawood"), who seeks to invoke the diversity-of-citizenship branch of federal jurisprudence.
This memorandum order is issued sua sponte because of some problematic aspects of that
Answer.
Carriage's counsel are not members of the regrettably large group of defense counsel who
mistakenly seek to "improve" on the terms of the Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule") 8(b)(5) disclaimer by
departing from the crystal-clear roadmap it provides for a defendant who or that cannot in good
conscience comply with the directive of Rule 8(b)(1)(B) as to a plaintiff's allegation without
colliding with counsel's obligation to exercise the good faith, both objective and subjective,
mandated by Rule 11(b). Instead Carriage's counsel regularly parrot the language prescribed by

Rule 8(b)(5) throughout the Answer -- though it must be said that the Answer's use of that
locution appears ostrichlike in all too many places. 1
There are, however, at least of couple of instances that clearly seem out of bounds. Thus
Answer ¶¶ 12 through 14 stake out the position that Dawood's allegations there "contain[s] a
legal conclusion to which no answer is required" -- see App'x ¶ 2 to State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276,278 (N.D. Ill. 2001). And having done that, Carriage's counsel
disclaim "knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief" about the Complaint's
specifically cited provisions of Chicago's Municipal Code. Come now!
Those paragraphs of the Answer are accordingly stricken, but with leave granted to
replead in proper fashion on or before September 28, 2015. And while defense counsel are at it,
they ought to take a fresh look at Answer ¶ 34 as well.
Lastly, no charge may be made to Carriage by its counsel for the added work and expense
incurred in correcting counsel's errors. Defense counsel are ordered to apprise their client to that
effect by letter, with a copy to be transmitted to this Court's chambers as an informational matter
(not for filing).

__________________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date: September 17, 2015
1

This Court is not of course in a position either to confirm or to dispel that suspicion at
this threshold stage of the litigation. All the same, the Answer's overwhelmingly pervasive
invocation of Rule 8(b)(5) creates the strong impression that Carriage's counsel have not
properly served the cause of notice pleading that should operate on both sides of the "v." sign in
federal court litigation.
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