VanDenburgh v. Ogden et al

Filing 44

OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 2/3/2016. Mailed notice(rj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LINDA S. VANDENBURGH,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
BANNOCKBURN POLICE OFFICER
)
ROBERT OGDEN; HIGHLAND PARK
)
POLICE OFFICER GERALD CAMERON;
)
HIGHLAND PARK POLICE OFFICER
)
PHILIP DELAURENTIS; HIGHLAND PARK )
POLICE OFFICER AMY HYNDMAN;
)
DEERFIELD POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE )
#1; HIGHLAND PARK POLICE OFFICER
)
JOHN DOE #2; RAVINIA FESTIVAL
)
ASSOCIATION, an Illinois not-for-profit
)
organization; THE CITY OF HIGHLAND
)
PARK, a Municipal Corporation; THE
)
VILLAGE OF BANNOCKBURN, a Municipal )
Corporation; and THE VILLAGE OF
)
DEERFIELD, a Municipal Corporation,
)
)
Defendants.
)

No. 15 C 6191
Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER
After an incident at the Ravinia Music Festival (“Ravinia”) resulted in Plaintiff Linda
VanDenburgh being charged with interference with a police officer and criminal trespass to
property, VanDenburgh filed this suit against Defendants: Bannockburn Police Officer Robert
Ogden; Highland Park Police Officers Gerald Cameron, Philip DeLaurentis, Amy Hyndman, and
John Doe #2; Deerfield Police Officer John Doe #1 (collectively, the “Defendant Officers”);
Ravinia Festival Association; the City of Highland Park (“Highland Park”); the Village of
Bannockburn (“Bannockburn”); and the Village of Deerfield (“Deerfield”). VanDenburgh
alleges false arrest and excessive force claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in addition to state

law assault and battery and malicious prosecution claims against the Defendant Officers. 1
VanDenburgh also alleges that all Defendants acted negligently. Finally, she asserts an
indemnification claim against Bannockburn, Deerfield, and Highland Park for any tort judgment
entered against the Defendant Officers. Bannockburn and Ogden, as well as Deerfield (on behalf
of itself and its Officer John Doe #1), filed motions to dismiss the claims against them [20, 23],
which are granted in part and denied in part. Ravinia Festival Association also filed a motion to
strike VanDenburgh’s request for attorneys’ fees, injunctive relief, and prejudgment interest [28],
which is granted.
Specifically, because the statute of limitations has run on VanDenburgh’s state law
claims and VanDenburgh cannot take advantage of relation back to name John Doe #1 as a
Defendant with respect to these claims, the state law claims against John Doe #1 are dismissed.
But because VanDenburgh may maintain a respondeat superior claim against Deerfield for John
Doe #1’s alleged negligence, the negligence claim may proceed against Deerfield. Although
VanDenburgh engages in group pleading, this does not require dismissal of her claims against
Ogden and John Doe #1, as the complaint provides them with sufficient notice of the claims
asserted against them. VanDenburgh’s false arrest claim is dismissed because her conviction on
the interference with a police officer charge provides probable cause for her arrest on both
charges. This conviction does not preclude her from pursuing her malicious prosecution claim,
although that claim is limited to the criminal trespass charge on which she was found not guilty.
Finally, because VanDenburgh does not oppose the motions to strike the punitive damages
requests against Deerfield, Bannockburn, Ogden, or John Doe #1 and attorneys’ fees, injunctive

1

The excessive force and assault and battery claims are not asserted against Officer John Doe #2.

2

relief, and prejudgment interest against Ravinia Festival Association, those forms of relief are
stricken.
BACKGROUND 2
On July 19, 2014, VanDenburgh attended a concert at Ravinia, located in Highland Park,
with her husband, Mark. Before the concert started, the VanDenburghs bought food and found a
place to sit near the entrance to Ravinia’s food pavilion. Mark left to use the restroom, while
VanDenburgh remained behind to eat. Four or five men approached VanDenburgh and began to
harass her, attempting to solicit sexual favors from her and suggesting she was a prostitute.
VanDenburgh yelled to them to stop and get away from her, and eventually the men left. When
Mark returned, the VanDenburghs approached a Ravinia security member to provide a
description of the incident and inquire about filing a complaint. The security member referred
them to Officer DeLaurentis, who dismissed them, indicating he was busy and that
VanDenburgh needed to “go away.” Compl. ¶ 22. VanDenburgh insisted on making a report,
and DeLaurentis provided her with a Ravinia comment card. But VanDenburgh was not
satisfied, and she continued to approach other Ravinia security guards but they also refused to
help her. The VanDenburghs ultimately made their way to their seats in the pavilion for the
concert.
During the intermission, the VanDenburghs left their seats to use the restroom, where
VanDenburgh discussed the earlier incident with other women waiting in line. Officer
DeLaurentis was standing nearby and approached the VanDenburghs after they finished with the
restroom. Officer DeLaurentis placed a hand on Mark’s shoulder, telling the VanDenburghs to

2

The facts in the background section are taken from VanDenburgh’s complaint and are presumed true for
the purpose of resolving Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th
Cir. 2011); Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Exelon Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir.
2007).

3

“go back to [their] seats or leave.” Id. ¶ 32. The VanDenburghs complied, returning to their
seats. But as they were sitting down, Officer DeLaurentis and some combination of Officers
Ogden, Cameron, Hyndman, and John Doe #1, in addition to Ravinia security guards, gathered
around the end of the VanDenburghs’ row, staring at the VanDenburghs with their hands on their
gun belts. VanDenburgh began to cry, believing that they wanted to arrest her. The
VanDenburghs then tried to exit the row, at which point one or more of the Defendant Officers
shoved VanDenburgh into a wheelchair, causing bruising to her arms and legs. VanDenburgh
was then wheeled out a side door to the Iris Gate, where buses drop off and pick up concertgoers.
At the Iris Gate, one or more of the Defendant Officers forcibly lifted VanDenbergh out
of the wheelchair and she fell to the ground. VanDenburgh told the Defendant Officers she was
in pain, that she had broken her back in the past, and that they were hurting her shoulder and
back. The Defendant Officers called the paramedics, who asked if VanDenburgh wanted to go
to the hospital. VanDenburgh declined and the paramedics left. One or more of the Defendant
Officers then pulled VanDenburgh up off the ground by her arm, at which point VanDenburgh
felt her shoulder tear. The Defendant Officers then handcuffed VanDenburgh and put her in the
back of a police car, leaving bruises on her arms and legs. Mark pleaded with the Defendant
Officers to stop hurting VanDenburgh. Either Ogden or Cameron, with his hand on his taser,
told Mark, “if you move, I’m going to light you up.” Id. ¶ 49. Some of the Defendant Officers
then forced Mark into a cab. DeLaurentis, Ogden, Hyndman, and Cameron took VanDenburgh
out of the squad car and put her on the ground, at which point they uncuffed her and allowed the
paramedics to examine her.
The paramedics saw to it that VanDenburgh was transported to the NorthShore Highland
Park Hospital emergency room, where John Doe #2 and another Highland Park officer were

4

waiting. A doctor examined her, recommended she see an orthopedic surgeon, and stated she
was not inebriated. The unnamed Highland Park officer took pictures of her arms and legs,
remarking that her bruises seemed to be “old injuries.” Id. ¶ 53. John Doe #2 wrote
VanDenburgh up for interfering with a police officer and criminal trespass to property. He
threatened that if VanDenburgh did not sign the citations, she would be taken to the Highland
Park jail. Ultimately, the VanDenburghs were allowed to leave the hospital and return to their
Chicago home. VanDenburgh needed surgery for a five-centimeter rotator cuff tear to her right
shoulder. On October 8, 2014, a judge found VanDenburgh guilty of interference with an officer
but not guilty of criminal trespass to property. 3
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not
its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.
1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all wellpleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in
the plaintiff’s favor. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a
claim’s basis but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

3

VanDenburgh indicates in her complaint that one of the two proceedings was resolved in her favor. The
Court takes judicial notice of the specific details of the proceedings, which are publicly available and
have also been attached to Bannockburn and Ogden’s motion to dismiss. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556
F.3d 575, 582–83 (7th Cir. 2009) (court may consider documents attached to motion to dismiss that are
reference in complaint and central to plaintiff’s claims); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution
Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080–81 (7th Cir. 1997) (court may take judicial notice of matters of public
record).

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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
ANALYSIS
I.

State Law Claims against John Doe #1
Deerfield seeks dismissal of VanDenburgh’s state law claims against John Doe #1,

arguing that those claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense that need not be anticipated in the complaint in order to survive a motion to
dismiss. United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005). But that is not the case
where “the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the
affirmative defense, such as when a complaint reveals that an action is untimely under the
governing statute of limitations.” Id.; see also Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009)
(considering statute of limitations defense on motion to dismiss where relevant dates were set
forth in the complaint).
The Illinois Tort Immunity Act (“ITIA”) governs civil tort claims filed against local
government employees such as the ones asserted here against John Doe #1. Under the ITIA,
claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101(a); Shelton
v. Wright, No. 09 C 6413, 2011 WL 856811, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2011). VanDenburgh’s
negligence and assault and battery claims accrued on the date of the incident, July 19, 2014.
Grzanecki v. Cook County Sheriffs Police Dep’t, No. 10 C 07345, 2011 WL 3610087, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2011) (assault and battery); Fetzer v. Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1242, 211 Ill.
App. 3d 70, 155 Ill. Dec. 626 (1991) (negligence). For malicious prosecution claims, the oneyear period begins “on the date the case was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Shelton, 2011
WL 856811, at *3. The incident occurred on July 19, 2014. VanDenburgh was found guilty on

6

the charge of interference with a police officer and not guilty as to criminal trespass to property
on October 8, 2014.
VanDenburgh’s complaint was filed on July 15, 2015. Although seemingly timely as to
all claims, the complaint does not name the Deerfield police officer involved in this case,
referring to him only by the pseudonym John Doe #1. Any amendment to name John Doe #1
would be timely only if that amendment relates back to the original complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). Rule 15(c)(1)(C) allows for relation back where “there
has been an error made concerning the identity of the proper party and where that party is
chargeable with knowledge of the mistake.” King v. One Unknown Fed. Corr. Officer, 201 F.3d
910, 914 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, 138 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir.
1998)). But a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the proper defendant does not allow for relation
back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s mistake requirement. Id. (complaint did not relate back where
plaintiff failed to identify the proper party within the limitations period). And where a plaintiff
lacks knowledge of the proper defendant, “it is irrelevant . . . whether or not the purported
substitute party knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against
him.” Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1980). This appears to be the case even
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Krupski v. Costa Cruciere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 130 S. Ct.
2485, 177 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2010), which focused the relation back inquiry on the defendant’s
knowledge of whether he or she knew or should have known that the plaintiff, if not for a
mistake, would have sued the defendant. 4 Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Techs. Racing Corp., 638
F.3d 555, 559–60 (7th Cir. 2011) (addressing inquiry under Krupski). After Krupski, courts have
continued not to allow relation back where the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the defendant’s
4

VanDenburgh does not argue that Krupski affected the relation back inquiry, but the Court addresses the
issue regardless.

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identity prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d
859, 864 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (once statute of limitations expired, plaintiff could not amend
complaint to substitute new party in place of “John Doe” defendant); Dandridge v. Cook County,
No. 12-cv-5458, 2013 WL 3421834, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2013) (distinguishing Krupski and
finding that relation back was improper where “the only reason that Plaintiff did not name the
individual officers in the original complaint was Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge about their names,
not a mistake concerning their identity”); Fleece v. Volvo Constr. Equip. Korea, Ltd., No. 10 CV
4496, 2012 WL 171329, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2012) (“Following Krupski, numerous lower
courts have held that Krupski precludes relation back when a plaintiff made an affirmative choice
not to discover the identity of the new defendant or to sue the new defendant before the
limitations period expired.”).
Here, VanDenburgh did not make a mistake when naming John Doe #1 as a Defendant.
Instead, she simply did not know his actual identity at the time of filing. At this point, the statute
of limitations has run on all her state law claims. Therefore, when she learns John Doe #1’s
identity, she may not take advantage of Rule 15(c) to amend her complaint to name him. See
Henry v. City of Des Plaines, No. 15 C 5617, 2015 WL 6407812, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2015).
VanDenburgh urges the Court not to take such a technical approach to the statute of
limitations and the relation back rules and instead to adopt a more equitable approach allowing
her to pursue discovery into John Doe #1’s identity and then amend her complaint to pursue the
claims against him. But this exact argument was recently rejected in another case brought by
VanDenburgh’s counsel. See id. at *3. The Court agrees with the Henry court that the statute of
limitations is not a technicality but instead serves “important social purposes.” Id. The Court is
not inclined to set aside the statute of limitations in the face of Seventh Circuit precedent

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concerning this very issue, particularly where VanDenburgh, who is represented by counsel,
could have discovered the identity of John Doe #1 in a timely fashion. See id. (finding that the
fault in not identifying the unknown officers “lays squarely on [plaintiff’s] shoulders” so that
“there is no unfairness in enforcing the statute of limitations in this instance”). Consequently,
VanDenburgh’s state law claims against John Doe #1 are dismissed with prejudice.
Deerfield also argues that because all state law claims against John Doe #1 are dismissed,
the indemnification claim against Deerfield should also be dismissed with respect to those
claims. Id. (dismissing indemnity claims against city where there were no claims remaining
against unknown officers). But because § 1983 claims remain pending against John Doe #1, the
indemnification claim remains pending against Deerfield, although only for any claims on which
VanDenburgh obtains a judgment against John Doe #1.
II.

Negligence Claim against Deerfield
Deerfield argues that because VanDenburgh’s negligence claim against John Doe #1, the

only Deerfield police officer, has been dismissed, her negligence claim against Deerfield must
also be dismissed. Deerfield contends that VanDenburgh only includes allegations concerning
the Defendant Officers’ breach of a duty of care and no allegations concerning a separate duty of
care that Deerfield owed to VanDenburgh. But VanDenburgh has alleged that John Doe #1
owed VanDenburgh a duty, that Deerfield was John Doe #1’s employer, and that John Doe #1
was acting in the scope of his employment. With these allegations, VanDenburgh has made it
clear that she seeks to hold Deerfield responsible on a respondeat superior theory for any
negligent acts undertaken by John Doe #1. “Although a person injured by the tortious action of
another must generally seek his or her remedy from the person who caused the injury, the
principal-agent relationship is an exception to this rule.” McHale v. W.D. Trucking, Inc., 39

9

N.E.3d 595, 615, 2015 IL App (1st) 132625, 396 Ill. Dec. 46 (2015) (jury verdict that principal
was liable for agent’s negligent acts under respondeat superior theory was not against manifest
weight of the evidence). VanDenburgh’s allegations are sufficient to place Deerfield on notice
of the negligence claim against it based on respondeat superior liability. See Estate of Crandall
v. Godinez, No. 14-cv-1401, 2015 WL 1539017, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2015) (although
plaintiff did not explicitly allege respondeat superior liability, plaintiff had pleaded the factual
predicates required to hold defendant liable on that basis).
III.

Group Pleading
Deerfield, Bannockburn, and Ogden argue that VanDenburgh’s claims against Ogden and

John Doe #1 must be dismissed because VanDenburgh does not attribute to each Defendant
Officer the conduct for which he is responsible, instead referring to the Defendant Officers
collectively or contending that “one or more Defendant Officers” engaged in the acts that form
the basis of her claims. Such pleading, according to Deerfield, Bannockburn, and Ogden, does
not provide Ogden and the other Defendant Officers with sufficient notice of their allegedly
wrongful conduct. Connected to this argument, Deerfield contends that the § 1983 claims
against John Doe #1 fail because they do not adequately plead his personal involvement.
Rule 8(a), however, “is not so rigid that it requires a plaintiff, without the benefit of
discovery, to connect every single alleged instance of misconduct in the complaint to every
single specific officer.” Hyung Seok Koh v. Graf, No. 11-cv-02605, 2013 WL 5348326, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2013). Instead, a plaintiff may generally name those responsible for the
alleged violations, as VanDenburgh has done here, placing Ogden, John Doe #1, and the other
Defendant Officers on notice of the claims against them. Sanders v. City of Chicago Heights,
No. 13 C 0221, 2014 WL 5801181, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2014) (allowing group pleading for

10

constitutional claims). Here, Deerfield contends that the acts of each individual Defendant
Officer should be specified for each count so as to meet the requirement of personal involvement
for § 1983 claims because VanDenburgh’s allegations suggest that some of the Defendant
Officers may not have engaged in excessive force or false arrest. See Atkins v. Hasan, No. 15
CV 203, 2015 WL 3862724, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2015) (dismissing claims premised on
“group pleading” that “provides no clues as to whether, for the particular conduct described,
plaintiffs assert that each and every one of the defendant engaged in that conduct . . . or whether
plaintiffs instead contend that only some of the defendants, or possibly even none of them,
performed a given act”). While VanDenburgh will ultimately have to demonstrate that each
individual Defendant Officer was personally responsible for her injuries, she is not required to do
so at the pleading stage without discovery. See Kuri v. City of Chicago, No. 13 C 1653, 2014
WL 114283, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2014) (plaintiff allowed to direct allegation at multiple
defendants at pleading stage where plaintiff may not be aware of “which individual committed
which parts of the alleged misconduct before the benefit of discovery”); Hyung Seok Koh, 2013
WL 5348326, at *5 (noting that plaintiffs “must eventually tie particular officers to particular
injuries to survive summary judgment”). Because VanDenburgh’s complaint provides Ogden
and John Doe #1 with sufficient notice of the claims against them, the Court will not dismiss
those claims because VanDenburgh has engaged in group pleading.
IV.

False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims
Deerfield, Bannockburn, and Ogden also argue that VanDenburgh’s false arrest and

malicious prosecution claims are barred by VanDenburgh’s conviction for interfering with a
police officer. They contend that this conviction establishes probable cause for her arrest,
precluding VanDenburgh from pursuing both claims. In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court

11

established that a criminal defendant may not use § 1983 to claim damages for an allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, “or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” unless that conviction or sentence
had been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. 477, 486–87, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383
(1994). This is because criminal defendants cannot use § 1983 to collaterally attack an otherwise
valid criminal conviction. Id. at 486. Heck’s bar applies not only to malicious prosecution
claims but also to false arrest claims. See id. at 486.
Heck requires the Court to consider whether a judgment in VanDenburgh’s favor would
necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction or sentence. Id. at 487. If it would, her
malicious prosecution and false arrest claims cannot proceed. Id. VanDenburgh was charged
with interference with a police officer and criminal trespass to property. She was found guilty of
interference with a police officer, although she was found not guilty of criminal trespass to
property. Court records indicate that she was fined and placed on supervision for twelve months.
VanDenburgh’s conviction of an ordinance violation qualifies as a conviction for Heck purposes.
See Stone v. Vill. of Broadview, No. 13-cv-09316, 2014 WL 3397222, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 11,
2014) (Heck applies to claims that would imply the invalidity of municipal ordinance
convictions).
VanDenburgh does not argue that there was no probable cause for her arrest for
interference with a police officer, instead she only contends that her conviction for that offense
does not bar a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution with respect to the underlying
criminal trespass charge. See Doc. 35 at 3 (citing Hornung v. Vill. of Park Forest, 634 F. Supp.

12

540, 544 (N.D. Ill. 1986)). In doing so, she limits her claims to actions related to the criminal
trespass to property charge and the Court will do the same here. But this does not save her false
arrest claim.
The existence of probable cause bars a false arrest claim. Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the
City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2010). Although VanDenburgh was not convicted
of criminal trespass to property, she was convicted of interference with an officer. This is
sufficient to provide probable cause for the arrest, for a challenge to probable cause would
necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction for interference with a police officer. See Case
v. Milewski, 327 F.3d 564, 569 (7th Cir. 2003) (conviction for resisting arrest barred false arrest
claim because “under Illinois law, so long as there is physical resistance, an officer has probable
cause to arrest someone who resists an arrest attempt”); Highland Park Ordinance § 130.015
(“Interference with public officers: A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance
by one known to the person to be a peace officer of any authorized act within his official
capacity shall be guilty of resisting or obstructing a public officer.”). And for purposes of her
false arrest claim, VanDenburgh cannot divorce her arrest on this charge from that for criminal
trespass: “probable cause to believe that a person has committed any crime will preclude a false
arrest claim, even if the person was arrested on additional or different charges for which there
was no probable cause.” Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“An arrested individual is no more seized when he is arrested on three grounds rather than one;
and so long as there is a reasonable basis for the arrest, the seizure is justified on that basis even
if any other ground cited for the arrest was flawed.”). This is particularly the case here, where
the two charges arose out of the same incident and the Seventh Circuit has held that “even if
probable cause did not exist for the crime charged, proof of probable cause to arrest the plaintiff

13

on a closely related charge is also a defense.” Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 647–48 (7th Cir.
1998) (discussing related charges of criminal trespass and resisting law enforcement); see also
Hooks v. City of Batavia, No. 13 C 1857, 2014 WL 114152, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2014)
(probable cause for resisting arrest charge is sufficient to preclude false arrest claim for trespass
arrest). 5 VanDenburgh thus cannot pursue her false arrest claim, even if based solely on the
arrest for trespass, because there was probable cause for her arrest for interference with a police
officer. Hooks, 2014 WL 114152, at *3.
VanDenburgh may, however, pursue her malicious prosecution claim with respect to the
criminal trespass to property charge, on which she was found not guilty. “[P]robable cause to
believe an individual committed one crime—and even conviction of that crime—does not
foreclose a malicious prosecution claim for additionally prosecuting the individual on a separate
charge.” Holmes, 511 F.3d at 682. Such a claim-by-claim analysis applies to both federal and
state law malicious prosecution claims. Id. at 683 (citing March v. Cacioppo, 185 N.E.2d 397,
402, 37 Ill. App. 2d 235 (1962)); see also Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 759 (7th
Cir. 2013) (applying Illinois law, noting that “[m]alicious prosecution is offense-specific”).
Consequently, this claim may proceed against Ogden. 6 See Johnsen v. Vill. of Rosemont, No.
10-cv-07097, 2014 WL 4909080, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014) (“Unlike with Johnsen’s false
arrest claims, the existence of probable cause to prosecute Johnsen for one offense does not
defeat his claim for malicious prosecution of the other offenses.”).

5

The case VanDenburgh relies on Hornung, 634 F. Supp. at 544, was decided before Kelley and Holmes
and consequently cannot be considered to represent the law with respect to whether probable cause for
resisting arrest precludes a false arrest claim for the underlying charges.

6

The Court has already determined that VanDenburgh cannot proceed on this claim against John Doe #1
because it is barred by the statute of limitations.

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V.

Punitive Damages against Bannockburn, Deerfield, John Doe #1, and Ogden
In her complaint, VanDenburgh requests punitive damages against “all Defendants.”

Compl. ¶ 87(d). Deerfield and Bannockburn seek to dismiss the request for punitive damages
against them, arguing that such damages are not recoverable against public entities. See 745 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 10/2-102 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a local public entity is not
liable to pay punitive or exemplary damages in any action brought directly or indirectly against it
by the injured party or a third party.”). 7 Similarly, Ogden contends that the punitive damages
claim against him should be dismissed because VanDenburgh pleads that he was acting in his
official capacity and within the scope of employment, making the claims against him ones
against Bannockburn and also unrecoverable. 8 VanDenburgh agrees to strike her request for
punitive damages against Deerfield, Bannockburn, John Doe #1, and Ogden. 9 Thus, the Court
will strike that request.
VI.

Attorneys’ Fees, Injunctive Relief, and Prejudgment Interest against Ravinia
Festival Association
Finally, Ravinia Festival Association seeks to strike VanDenburgh’s request for

attorneys’ fees, injunctive relief, and prejudgment interest. VanDenburgh states that she does not
oppose Ravinia Festival Association’s motion to strike these components of the prayer for relief,
although she reserves the right to seek leave to reinstate them if discovery reveals an appropriate
7

Deerfield and Bannockburn do not cite § 2-102 but that is the relevant statutory provision prohibiting
the award of punitive damages against a municipality.

8

Ogden and Bannockburn do not set forth an argument that § 2-102 prohibits an award of punitive
damages. Although the Court will not address the issue further, it notes that other courts in this district
have found that § 2-102 applies regardless of whether the officer is sued in his official or individual
capacity. See Ohlrich v. Vill. of Wonder Lake, No. 13 C 50391, 2015 WL 4724822, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 10, 2015) (applying § 2-102 to strike punitive damages request against police officer); Golden v.
Vill. of Glenwood, No. 14 C 7247, 2015 WL 1058227, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2015) (police officer was
immune from punitive damages under § 2-102 despite having been sued in his individual capacity).

9

Although VanDenburgh indicates that she may seek leave to assert a claim for punitive damages in the
future, the Court suggests that VanDenburgh consult the authority cited in this section before doing so.

15

basis for such relief. The Court thus grants Ravinia Festival Association’s motion and strikes
VanDenburgh’s request for attorneys’ fees, injunctive relief, and prejudgment interest from
Ravinia Festival Association. 10
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Village of Bannockburn and Ogden’s motion to
dismiss [20] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendant Village of Deerfield’s motion to
dismiss [23] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendant Ravinia Festival Association’s
motion to strike [28] is granted. The state law claims against John Doe #1 (Counts III, IV, and
VI) are dismissed with prejudice. The false arrest claim (Count I) is dismissed without
prejudice. The malicious prosecution claim (Count IV) is limited to proceedings concerning the
criminal trespass to property charge. VanDenburgh may only seek indemnification (Count V)
from the Village of Deerfield for any claims on which she obtains a judgment against John Doe
#1. The request for punitive damages against the Village of Bannockburn, the Village of
Deerfield, Ogden, and John Doe #1 is stricken. The requests for attorneys’ fees, injunctive relief,
and prejudgment interest against Ravinia Festival Association are stricken. The Village of
Bannockburn, the Village of Deerfield, and Ogden are ordered to answer the remaining
allegations of the complaint by February 17, 2016.

Dated: February 3, 2016

______________________
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge

10

The Court advises VanDenburgh to consult the caselaw cited in Ravinia Festival Association’s motion
before seeking leave to reassert these forms of relief.

16