Krupa v. Columbus McKinnon Corporation
Filing
38
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 6/27/2016:Civil case terminated.Mailed notice(wp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RICHARD KRUPA,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 15 c 6460
v.
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
COLUMBUS McKINNON CORP.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Richard Krupa brought this product liability action
against Defendant Columbus McKinnon Corporation (“CMCO”) on June 26,
2015, seeking damages for an injury sustained while using a Lodestar
hoist at his workplace, Hearthside Food Solutions, LLC, on June 28,
2013.
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[ECF No. 27].
For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
At the time the Lodestar hoist was designed and manufactured by
CMCO, it was a state of the art product; it conformed with the
American National Standard Institute standards for Overhead Hoists,
the National Electric Code and the Occupational Safety and Health
Act.
Def.’s Mem. Ex. E, F, ECF No. 29.
The hoist in question was
manufactured by CMCO on December 8, 1986 and shipped to Hearthside
to fulfil a customer order.
Id. at Ex. E.
Prior to shipment, CMCO
employed a three-step quality control process to inspect the hoist —
as it did with each of its products — consisting of electrical and
mechanical
testing.
Hearthside.
Id.
complaints
about
properly.
Id.
CMCO
did
not
install
the
hoist
at
According to CMCO’s records, it never received any
the
hoist
being
defective
or
not
operating
Id.
Plaintiff’s injury occurred while he was using the hoist to
suspend a 1,500 pound bag of sugar.
Id. at Ex. B, D, G. Plaintiff
had the bag suspended six feet in the air when he reached under it
to remove some excess plastic lining and pull on a rope to release
the sugar from the bag.
Id. at Ex. D.
on his right arm.
The Plant Manager was able to use the hoist
Id.
As he did this, the bag fell
to lift the bag off Plaintiff immediately, but Plaintiff sustained
severe injuries to his arm as a result of the incident.
Ex. B, D.
Id. at
Plaintiff took several photographs of the hoist shortly
after the accident, but the hoist was never inspected for defects.
Id. at Ex. G. Hearthside has since discarded the hoist.
Id. at
Ex. I.
II.
Summary
dispute
as
judgment
to
any
is
LEGAL STANDARD
appropriate
material
judgment as a matter of law.”
fact
and
when
the
“there
movant
is
is
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
are those that affect the outcome of the lawsuit.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
no
genuine
entitled
to
Material facts
Anderson v.
A genuine dispute
exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
- 2 -
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
In determining whether a
genuine
the
issue
of
material
fact
exists,
Court
construes
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
all
See,
Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2000).
The moving party may meet its burden by showing “there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
If the moving party
satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate
“that a triable issue of fact remains on issues for which [it] bears
the burden of proof.”
Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463–64 (7th
Cir. 2009).
III.
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s argument
that summary judgment would be premature and prejudicial at this
stage
in
the
proceedings
because
Plaintiff
opportunity to conduct discovery.”
has
“not
had
a
full
Pl.’s Resp. 5, ECF No. 30.
The
Court is unsympathetic to Plaintiff’s position because he failed to
conduct any discovery during the allotted discovery period or after
the Court granted him two extensions to the discovery cutoff date.
Despite CMCO pursuing discovery in various forms, Plaintiff did not
serve CMCO with any document requests, interrogatories or deposition
notices. Plaintiff provides no explanation for why he failed to make
his requests before the close of discovery, nor has he explained
precisely how additional discovery would generate a genuine issue of
- 3 -
material fact and help him avoid summary judgment.
See, FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(d) (authorizing further discovery prior to summary judgment if
the
non-movant
submits
an
affidavit
or
declaration
demonstrating
“that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
justify its opposition”). Plaintiff has been given ample opportunity
to conduct discovery relevant to his claims; he cannot now avoid
summary judgment due to his own lack of diligence.
A.
Count I - Strict Product Liability
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s product liability claim based
on
a
strict
liability
theory
is
barred
repose and therefore must be dismissed.
this point.
by
Illinois’
statute
of
Plaintiff does not contest
Under the Illinois statute of repose, such actions must
be commenced within twelve years from the date the seller first
sells, leases or delivers possession of the product in question.
735
ILCS
5/13-213(B).
Here,
delivery
of
the
hoist
occurred
in
December 1986; Plaintiff did not initiate this suit until nearly 29
years later.
Therefore, the Court enters summary judgment in favor
of CMCO on Count I.
B.
Count II – Breach of Warranty
Next, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s breach of warranty
claim is barred by Illinois’ four-year statute of limitations.
ILCS 5/2-725(1).
810
Plaintiff counters that the hoist was subject to a
lifetime warranty, and therefore the cause of action did not occur
until the warranty was breached — when the hoist failed.
- 4 -
Under Illinois law, a cause of action for a breach of warranty
claim
accrues
when
the
breach
occurs.
810
ILCS
5/2-725(2).
Generally, this occurs “when tender of delivery is made. . . .”
Id.
An exception to this rule applies where the “warranty explicitly
extends to future performance of the goods,” making discovery of the
breach
unlikely
until
such
performance
occurs.
Id.
In
these
limited circumstances, the cause of action for breach of warranty
“accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.”
The
term
merely,
“explicit[]”
or
conveyed
in
by
Section
2-725(2)
implication;
means
distinctly
“[n]ot
stated;
language; clear; not ambiguous; express; unequivocal.”
Id.
implied
plain
in
Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 454 (Ill. 1982) (alteration
in original); see also, Singer v. Sunbeam Prods., Inc., 2016 WL
1697777, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2016) (same); Cosman v. Ford
Motor Co., 674 N.E.2d 61, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“We require that
the extension of a warranty to ‘future performance’ be explicit.”).
Moreover,
to
qualify
for
the
exception
under
Section
2-725(2),
Illinois courts require:
[A]n explicit statement that the goods, not the warrantor,
will perform in a certain way in the future. A promise to
repair parts . . . for six years is a promise that the
manufacturer will behave in a certain way, not a warranty
that the [product] will behave in a certain way.
Cosman, 674 N.E.2d at 66.
Plaintiff’s contention that the hoist was subject to a lifetime
warranty
and
therefore
falls
- 5 -
within
the
exception
under
Section 2-725(2) is flawed for two reasons.
First, it is unclear
whether
a
the
Plaintiff’s
hoist
was
breach
of
actually
warranty
subject
claim
to
in
the
lifetime
Complaint
warranty.
makes
no
reference whatsoever to a lifetime warranty, much less a claim that
such a warranty was breached.
The only support Plaintiff offers for
this allegation — made for the first time in his opposition to the
motion for summary judgment — is an advertisement on CMCO’s website
stating that the hoist is “Made in the USA and comes with a lifetime
warranty.”
Pl.’s Resp. 3, ECF No. 30.
While this website may be
evidence of the warranty on a hoist sold today, it does not speak to
the warranty attached to a product manufactured and sold in 1986.
For the hoist in question, CMCO points to the users’ manual, which
states the product was subject to a 1-year limited warranty. Def.’s
Mem. Ex. F, ECF No. 29.
Even if the Court were to take Plaintiff’s evidence as true and
ignore CMCO’s proof to the contrary, a second problem arises.
A
statement that the hoist “comes with a lifetime warranty” is not an
explicit extension of a warranty to future performance of the goods.
Such a statement does not create a clear promise that the hoist will
behave in a certain way.
See, Cosman, 674 N.E.2d at 66.
It could
reasonably be a read as promise by the warrantor to repair the hoist
during its lifetime, which does not qualify for the exception under
Section 2-725(2).
The
statement
on
the
website
is
vague;
even
viewing it in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this evidence
- 6 -
does
not
prove
that
the
warranty
performance of the goods.”
“explicitly
extends
to
future
Therefore, Section 2-725(2) does not
apply to toll the four-year statute of limitations.
Because the hoist was delivered in December 1986 and Plaintiff
did not commence this action until June 26, 2015, Plaintiff’s breach
of warranty claim is barred.
Summary judgment in favor of CMCO is
entered on Count II.
C.
In
Count
negligently
III
of
designed,
inspected the hoist.
Count III - Negligence
the
Complaint,
manufactured,
Plaintiff
alleges
installed,
that
CMCO
maintained
and
CMCO contends that all proof establishes that
the hoist was reasonably safe for its intended purposes at the time
it left CMCO’s control in 1986, CMCO had no further involvement with
the hoist after that time, and therefore it could not have been
negligent
in
product.
In his response, Plaintiff appears to concede that the
hoist
was
the
not
installation,
negligently
inspection
designed,
or
maintenance
manufactured
or
of
the
installed;
instead, he focuses his argument on the negligent maintenance and
inspection of the product. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the
hoist was inspected and maintained by Uesco Industries (“Uesco”)
acting as an agent of CMCO, Uesco was negligent in inspecting and
maintaining the hoist, and CMCO is liable for this negligence as the
principal of Uesco.
- 7 -
“An agency is a fiduciary relationship in which the principal
has the right to control the agent’s conduct and the agent has the
power to act on the principal’s behalf.”
7 N.E.3d 675, 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
either
actual
or
apparent,
express or implied.
and
Powell v. Dean Foods Co.,
An agent’s authority may be
actual
authority
may
be
either
Saletech, LLC v. E. Balt, Inc., 20 N.E.3d 796,
803 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
Actual express authority exists where
“the principal explicitly grants the agent the authority to perform
a particular act.”
C.A.M. Affs., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.,
715 N.E.2d 778, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
Apparent authority, by
contrast, arises where a principal has created the appearance of
authority
in
detrimentally
an
agent,
relied
upon
and
the
another
party
agent’s
has
appearance
reasonably
of
and
authority.
Patrick Eng’g, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 976 N.E.2d 318, 329-30
(Ill. 2012). Although the question of whether an agency relationship
exists is a question of fact, a court may decide the issue as a
matter
of
law
if
undisputed facts.
only
one
conclusion
may
be
drawn
from
the
Buckholtz v. MacNeal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 162, 170
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
The burden of proving the existence of an
agency relationship is on the party seeking to charge the alleged
principal.
Id.
Plaintiff failed to mention Uesco in the Complaint, or plead
the existence of an agency relationship between Uesco and CMCO.
Nor
did he allege this theory of liability in any of his discovery
- 8 -
responses.
The only proof he provides in support of this theory is
that Uesco is listed on CMCO’s current website as a certified “CMCO
Hoist
Technician”
No. 30.
and
a
“Warranty
Center.”
Pl.’s
Resp.
4,
ECF
Plaintiff argues that by acquiring CMCO’s certification and
conducting
inspection
and
repairs
in
the
manner
required
by
the
certification program, Uesco was able to send claims to CMCO for
costs and parts.
Plaintiff further contends that this illustrates
CMCO’s significant level of control over the work performed by Uesco
and other certified technicians.
Plaintiff does not point to any evidentiary support for his
characterization of the relationship between CMCO and its certified
technicians.
conjecture.
Agency
cannot
arise
out
of
Plaintiff’s
pure
The fact that CMCO has a program by which it certifies
technicians and authorizes warranty centers, standing alone, does
not suggest that CMCO has the “right to control the manner in which”
the service technicians and warranty centers perform their work.
This evidence is insufficient to show that the service technicians
and warranty centers had “the ability to subject the principal to
liability.”
More
Powell, 7 N.E.3d at 696.
importantly,
even
if
Plaintiff
could
establish
the
existence of an agency relationship between CMCO and Uesco, he has
failed
to
present
any
evidence
showing
that:
(1)
Uesco
ever
inspected or serviced the hoist; (2) Uesco’s alleged inspection and
maintenance of the hoist was negligent; and (3) Uesco’s negligence
- 9 -
proximately caused his injuries.
On the record presented, neither
CMCO nor Uesco had any involvement with the hoist after it was
delivered to Hearthside.
negligence.
Summary
Therefore, there can be no finding of
judgment
is
entered
in
favor
of
CMCO
on
Count III.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 27], is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: June 27, 2016
- 10 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?