Hutchison v. Fitzgerald Equipment Co., Inc.
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen on 3/8/2016: Defendant's motion to dismiss or transfer to the Western Division 8 is denied.Mailed notice(mad, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
STANLEY HUTCHINSON,
)
)
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Plaintiff,
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v.
FITZGERALD EQUIPMENT CO., INC.,
AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION,
Defendant.
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)
)
)
)
)
Case No.: 1:15-cv-06521
Judge Marvin E. Aspen
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MARVIN E. ASPEN, District Judge:
Stanley Hutchinson (“Plaintiff”) filed this civil action in diversity against Fitzgerald
Equipment Co., Inc. (“Defendant”) for personal injuries he suffered in a forklift accident at his
employer’s Metamora, Illinois facility. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached its duty to
provide preventative maintenance and repairs to the forklift. Defendant moves to dismiss for
improper venue, or in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Western Division of the Northern
District. For the reasons explained below, Defendant’s motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by Borkholder Corporation LLC as a truck driver. (Compl. ¶ 5.)
On August 19, 2013, Plaintiff made a delivery to Borkholder’s Metamora facility. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Another Borkholder employee backed a forklift into the Plaintiff, causing him to suffer severe
injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8, 13.) At the time of the accident, the forklift’s beeper did not sound to warn
individuals that the forklift was moving in reverse. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.)
According to the complaint, Defendant was responsible for repairs and preventative
maintenance to the forklifts operated at the Metamora facility, including maintenance of the
beeper function. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to properly service and
maintain the forklift, warn Borkholder employees, and fulfill Occupational Safety and Health
Administration regulations requiring an operational beeper. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff claims that these
negligent acts and/or omissions resulted in the failure of the beeper to sound on August 19, 2013,
resulting in Plaintiff’s severe and permanent injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.)
As relevant here, the parties agree that Defendant is an Illinois corporation, incorporated
in Illinois, with its principal place of business in Illinois. (Id. ¶ 2; Mot. ¶¶ 2–3, 8.)
ANALYSIS
Defendant moves to dismiss or transfer Plaintiff’s case for improper venue under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). Defendant contends that the Eastern Division is an
improper venue for this action due to Defendant’s residency in Rockford, Illinois (which lies in
the Western Division) and its insufficient business contacts in the Eastern Division.
Accordingly, we begin our analysis by evaluating whether this venue, the Eastern Division, is a
proper venue for Plaintiff’s lawsuit.
Facing Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(3) challenge, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
that venue is proper. Hanyuan Dong v. Garcia, 553 F. Supp. 2d 962, 964 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Rotec
Indus., Inc. v. Aecon Grp., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 931, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Interlease Aviation
Investors II (Aloha) LLC v. Vanguard Airlines, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 898, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for improper venue, we may take all of the allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. Kubiak v. City of
Chi., 810 F.3d 476, 480–481 (7th Cir. 2016); Hanyuan Dong, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 964; Interlease
Aviation Investors, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
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A.
Standards for Proper Venue of a Corporation under 28 U.S.C. § 1391
To determine whether venue is proper in a civil action, we look first to the governing
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Under Section 1391(b), venue is proper in “a judicial district in which
any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.”
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). In short, the propriety of venue hinges on a defendant’s residency.
Section 1391(b) thus guides us to Section 1391(c), which addresses the residency of various
types of defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
We turn then to Section 1391(c)(2), which provides that “[f]or all venue purposes,” an
entity such as Defendant is “deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which it is subject to
the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c)(2); see KM Enters., Inc. v. Glob. Traffic Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d 718, 732 (7th
Cir. 2013); Hayward v. Taylor Truck Line, Inc., 15 C 866, 2015 WL 5444787, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 14, 2015); Imperial Crane Servs., Inc. v. Cloverdale Equip. Co., 13 C 4750,
2013 WL 5904527, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2013); see also Hill v. White Jacob & Assocs., Inc.,
15 C 9, 2015 WL 1717431, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 15, 2015); MacDermid Printing Solutions,
LLC v. Clear Stamp, Inc., 12 C 259, 2013 WL 3176887, at *5 (N.D. Ind. June 21, 2013). In
other words, if Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Illinois,
then it “resides” here and venue is proper. 1 KM Enters, Inc., 725 F.3d at 732.
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In its motion, Defendant seeks dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). Section 1391(d) addresses
the residency of corporations in states that have more than one judicial district. Relying on this
section, Defendant argues that jurisdiction (and thus venue) is not proper in the Eastern Division
of this district because of its business activity and principal place of business in the Western
Division. (Mot. ¶ 3–4, 6; Reply ¶¶ 4–7.) While Illinois has more than one judicial district,
Section 1391(d) does not apply to Defendant’s motion. Defendant is not requesting transfer to
another district within Illinois, (i.e, the Central or Southern districts), but to another division
within the same district. Section 1391(d) is not relevant when assessing competing divisions.
As such, we reject the Section 1391(d) argument.
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B.
Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
The venue question thus turns on whether Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in
the Northern District. We therefore review some basic personal jurisdiction principles and assess
whether we have jurisdiction over Defendant.
1.
General Principles
“As the Seventh Circuit has succinctly described it, federal personal jurisdiction is proper
whenever the [defendant] would be amenable to suit under the laws of the state in which the
federal court sits (typically under a state long-arm statute), subject always to the constitutional
due process limitations encapsulated in the familiar ‘minimum contacts’ test.” Tamburo v.
Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Where no federal statute authorizes nationwide
service of process, personal jurisdiction is governed by the law of the forum state.”); KM Enters.,
Inc., 725 F.3d at 723; Citadel Group Ltd. v. Washington Reg’l Med. Ctr., 536 F.3d 757, 760
(7th Cir. 2008) (“A federal court . . . has personal jurisdiction only where a court of the state in
which it sits would have such jurisdiction.”). We therefore rely on Illinois law for this analysis.
“To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over [a defendant] in Illinois, we
consider the Illinois long-arm statute, the Illinois constitution, and the federal constitution.”
Citadel Group Ltd., 536 F.3d at 760–61; Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 700. Under its long-arm statute,
735 ILCS 5/2–209(c), Illinois allows for personal jurisdiction to the extent authorized by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, thus merging the federal constitutional and state
statutory inquiries. Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 700; see Citadel Group Ltd., 536 F.3d at 760–761.
Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. KM Enters., Inc., 725 F.3d at 732; uBid, Inc. v.
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GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). As discussed below, it is clear that
Defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in the Northern District of Illinois. 2
2.
General Jurisdiction over Defendant
General personal jurisdiction extends for all purposes, even if the lawsuit is unrelated to
the defendant’s connections to the state. Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761
(2014); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9,
104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 n.9 (1984); North Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 492
(7th Cir. 2014); Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 701. General jurisdiction arises where the defendant’s
“affiliations with the [s]tate are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home
in the forum [s]tate.” Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 761; KM Enters., Inc., 725 F.3d at 733. This
standard is stringent “because the consequences can be severe: if a defendant is subject to
general jurisdiction in a state, then it may be called into court there to answer for any alleged
wrong committed in any place, no matter how unrelated the alleged wrong was to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.” uBid, Inc., 623 F.3d at 426; Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 701
(“The threshold for general jurisdiction is high.”); see E-Telequote Ins., Inc. v. TRG Holdings,
LLC, 14 C 4269, 2015 WL 5950659, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2015). A corporation is typically
subject to general jurisdiction “in a forum where it is incorporated or has a principal place of
business,” but may also be subject to other jurisdictions where it is “essentially at home.”
Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 760–61; KM Enters., Inc., 725 F.3d at 733.
Here, it is undisputed that Defendant is a citizen of Illinois, is incorporated here, and
maintains its principal place of business in Illinois. (Compl. ¶ 2; Mot. ¶ 3.) Illinois is
unequivocally Defendant’s “home” state. As a result, the Illinois courts, and therefore this court,
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As a result, we need not address whether we have specific jurisdiction over Defendant as well.
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plainly have general jurisdiction over Defendant. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 761; KM Enters,
Inc., 725 F.3d at 733. Because we have personal jurisdiction over Defendant, venue throughout
the Northern District of Illinois is proper. 3 Accordingly, we deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss
based on improper venue.
We next evaluate Defendant’s alternative request to transfer to the Western Division.
Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, 4 this question falls under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, which authorizes
us to transfer venue under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Graham v. United Parcel Serv., 519
F. Supp. 2d 801, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Howell v. Joffe, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1021 (N.D. Ill.
2006); Kingsley v. Dixon, 96 C 2464, 1996 WL 417548, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 1996).
C.
Transfer Based on Convenience and Interests of Justice
Under Section 1404, we may transfer an action to another district or division “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). To
succeed on a motion to transfer venue under Section 1404, Defendant, as the moving party, bears
the burden of showing that: (1) venue is proper in the district where the action was originally
filed; (2) venue would be proper in the transferee court; and (3) the transfer will serve the
convenience of the parties and witnesses as well as the interests of justice. Morton Grove
Pharm., Inc. v. Nat’l Pediculosis Ass’n, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2007); see also
Graham, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 809. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, deciding whether to
transfer a case requires “flexible and individualized analysis” based on the circumstances of a
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Defendant, moreover, does not contest that “plaintiff correctly filed this matter in the Northern
District of Illinois.” (Mot. ¶ 5.)
4
Defendant contends that its request for transfer is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1406. That section
would indeed apply if venue was improper here. Because, as we have found, venue is proper in
the entirety of the Northern District, Section 1406 is irrelevant. In re LimitNone, LLC,
551 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Transfer under § 1406(a) is appropriate only when venue is
improperly laid.”).
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particular case. Research Automation, Inc. v. Schrader–Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978
(7th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted); see also Graham, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 809. The
district court determines the weight given to each factor and has wide discretion in deciding
whether transfer is appropriate. N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 648
(7th Cir. 1998); Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 1988); Coffey v. Van Dorn
Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff’s choice of forum is usually
favored “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant.” In re Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc.,
347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003). With these standards in mind, we consider the pertinent
factors.
As discussed above, the first two elements are easily met. Venue is proper in either
division of the Northern District due to our general jurisdiction over the Defendant. 5
1.
Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses
Next, we will consider the convenience of the transferee forum, the Western Division in
Rockford. As the party seeking transfer, Defendant has the burden to show that “the transferee
forum is clearly more convenient” than the transferor forum. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey
Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Coffey,
796 F.2d at 219; Graham, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
In deciding whether transfer would promote convenience, courts consider such factors as:
“(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the situs of material events; (3) the relative ease of access
to sources of proof; (4) the convenience of the parties; and (5) the convenience of witnesses.”
Morton Grove Pharm., 525 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (citing Schwartz v. Nat’l Van Lines, Inc.,
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Relatedly, the Northern District of Illinois no longer has a divisional requirement that mandates
filing cases in certain divisions. Graham, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 809; Howell, 478 F. Supp. 2d
at 1021.
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317 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2004)); see also Graham, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 809–10. When
evaluating the convenience of a forum to the parties and witnesses, we may consider, for
example, the length and cost of travel, the number of witnesses to be called, the nature of
witnesses’ testimony, and witness travel time. Graham, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 809–10; Kingsley,
1996 WL 417548, at *1–2; Bjoraker v. Dakota, 12 C 7513 2013, WL 951155, at *2–6 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 12, 2013).
On the whole, however, Defendant neglects to address these factors in its motion.
Defendant, for example, does not assert that the Western Division is more convenient for any
likely witnesses. See, e.g., Preussag Int’l Steel Corp. v. Ideal Steel & Builders’ Supplies, Inc.,
No. 03 C 6643, 2004 WL 783102, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2004) (noting that the appearance of
witnesses is frequently considered the most important fact in this analysis). Defendant did not
discuss the cost and time associated with travel for the parties or witnesses, the number of
witnesses that the parties expect to testify, or the nature of that testimony. Plaintiff, on the other
hand, elected to bring this lawsuit in the Eastern Division as a result of our proximity to his
residence in Indiana, and this choice is entitled to substantial weight. Continental Cas. Co. v.
Staffing Concepts, Inc., No. 06 C 5473, 2009 WL 3055374, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009)
(explaining that the movant must show that “the original forum is inconvenient for the defendant
and that the alternative forum does not significantly inconvenience the plaintiff”); see also
Bjoraker, 2013 WL 951155, at *2; Rorah v. Peterson Health Care, 13 C 01827,
2013 WL 3389063, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2013); Graham, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 809; First Nat’l
Bank v. El Camino Res., Ltd., 447 F. Supp. 2d 902, 912–13 (N.D. Ill. 2006). In sum, we find that
the Defendant has not met its burden of proving the convenience of the transferee forum.
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2.
Interest of Justice
Lastly, we will consider whether transferring to the Western Division is in the best
interest of justice. To perform this analysis, we typically assess the efficiency of administration,
the court’s familiarity with relevant law, and the jurors’ potential stake in the outcome of
litigation in a particular venue. Rorah, 2013 WL 3389063, at *5 (citing Leuders v. 3M Co.,
08 C 02456, 2008 WL 2705444, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2008)); see Research Automation,
626 F.3d at 978. Defendant has not argued that these considerations favor transfer to Rockford.
Nor do we find that the interest of justice would be served by transfer. For example, each
division within the Northern District is equally capable of applying Illinois law and resolving this
case. Kramer v. Daimler Chrysler Motors Co., LLC of Del., 08 C 2611, 2008 WL 4542654,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2008); see Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., v. Rubloff Oakridge, LLC,
03 C 3063, 2003 WL 22382999, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2003) (“Although a motion to transfer
venue between divisions is subject to the same analysis as any other transfer motion, the public
interest factor is given less weight in the case of an intra-district transfer.”). And as to efficiency,
Defendant does not contend that the time to trial or disposition is shorter in the Western Division
than in the Eastern Division.
We conclude that, while the Western Division would be preferable to and more
convenient for Defendant, transfer is not warranted. Even in cases “[w]here the balance of
convenience is a close call, merely shifting inconvenience from one party to another is not a
sufficient basis for transfer.” Research Automation, Inc., 626 F.3d at 978–79; see also Rorah,
2013 WL 3389063, at *2. Defendant has failed to show that a transfer to the Western Division
would further the convenience of parties and witnesses or the ends of justice.
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CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer to the
Western Division. It is so ordered.
____________________________________
Marvin E. Aspen
United States District Judge
Dated: March 8, 2016
Chicago, Illinois
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