Squires-Cannon, v. The Forest Preserve District of Cook County

Filing 76

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 4/18/2016. Defendants Dwyer and Cooper's Motion to Dismiss all Claims against them with prejudice 40 is granted. Mailed notice(lk, )

15-6876IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MERYL SQUIRES-CANNON,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al.
Defendant.

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No. 15 C 6876
Judge Virginia M. Kendall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The claims asserted by Plaintiff Meryl Squires-Cannon arise from her arrest for trespass
on Horizon Farms. Defendants Dwyer and Cooper are police officers who were a part of her
arrest. Squires-Cannon’s four-count complaint asserts claims for violation of her constitutional
right to freedom of movement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil conspiracy, false arrest, and
malicious prosecution. Dwyer and Cooper move to dismiss all claims against them under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons given below, the Court
grants Dwyer and Cooper’s motion to dismiss all claims against them with prejudice. (Dkt. No.
40.)
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the facts as set forth in its order addressing the
motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Forest Preserve District of Cook County, Illinois, Dennis
White, Christopher Carmichael, and Holland & Knight LLP (“First Order”).

See Squires-

Cannon v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County, No. 15 C 6876, 2016 WL 561917 at *1 (N.D.Ill.
Feb. 12, 2016). In short, on May 5, 2014, the Circuit Court of Cook County issued an order in
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reference to Horizon Farms requiring the Sheriff of Cook County to “evict and dispossess, no
sooner than 30 days from the entry of this Order…Meryl Squires-Cannon…from the mortgaged
estate…without further Order of Court.”1 (Dkt. No. 185.) On August 13, 2014, Cooper and
Dwyer participated in the arrest of Squires-Cannon for trespass on Horizon Farms. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
A challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) asserts that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
A challenge under Rule 12(b)(6), on the other hand, asserts that the complaint fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” For a complaint to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, it must
allege “sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. When applying this standard, the Court “first accept[s]
all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and then ask[s] whether those facts state a
plausible claim for relief.” Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 2015). In
evaluating 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions, “[C]ourts must accept as true all material allegations
of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Silha v.
ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). Nonetheless, the Court is “not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, (2007).

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Squires-Cannon repeats the arguments she made in the briefing of the First Order about how the Court should not
take judicial notice of the state court order. (Dkt. No. 50 at 3.) The Court incorporates its analysis on this issue
from the First Order in finding that at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court may take judicial notice of state court
orders because they are matters of public record. See Squires-Cannon, 2016 WL 561917 at *3 (citing Henson v.
CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994)).

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DISCUSSION
I.

Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Claims against Dwyer and Cooper
Dwyer and Cooper argue that they were acting agents as the state when they arrested

Squires-Cannon because they were following a lawful state court order that they were required to
uphold. They opine that all claims against them should therefore be dismissed because the Court
lacks jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment to hear claims against agents of the state and
only the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to address these claims. Squires-Cannon in turn
contends that Dwyer and Cooper are not covered by sovereign immunity because they were
acting outside the scope of the state court order since it only mandated her eviction, not her arrest
or prosecution.
Although the Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits brought against states by citizens of
another state, it “has long been interpreted to also bar federal courts from exercising jurisdiction
over actions against a state brought by her own citizens.” Scott v. O’Grady, 975 F.2d 366, 369
(7th Cir. 1992). When claims are brought against agent state actors in their official capacities
they are considered claims against the entity of which they are agents and the Eleventh
Amendment can apply. See Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2001). But “[a]
suit against a state official in his personal capacity is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment[.]”
Scott, 975 F.2d at 369. When the plaintiff does not state in the complaint whether she is suing a
state actor in his or her individual or official capacity, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to
treat it as a lawsuit against the defendant “in his individual capacity because he sought punitive
damages—a remedy only available in an individual capacity suit—and because ‘the
unconstitutional conduct alleged involve[d] [the defendant's] individual actions and nowhere
allude[d] to an official policy or custom.’” Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2000)

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(citing Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir. 1991)). In contrast, “[w]here the
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from official policies or customs, the defendant has been sued in
her official capacity.” Id.
In the Complaint, Squires-Cannon does not specify whether she is suing Dwyer and
Cooper in their individual or official capacities. The Complaint additionally contains no factual
allegations about a policy or custom that caused her arrest and prosecution. Instead, SquiresCannon alleges that Dwyer and Cooper acted as individuals. She also seeks punitive damages in
her claims against Dwyer and Cooper and does not refer to their official titles except when
identifying them as police officers in the section of the Complaint listing the parties. Therefore,
the Court construes the Complaint as bringing claims against Dwyer and Cooper in their
individual capacity. See Miller, 220 F.3d at 494; Hill, 924 F.2d at 1373-74; contra, Greer v.
County of Cook, Ill., 54 F.App’x 232, 236 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding complaint brought against
defendants in their official capacities because it used “their official titles in his complaint and
requested injunctive relief from their allegedly illegal actions, so we treat the defendants as being
sued in their official capacity.”). Because the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to lawsuits
brought against state actors in their individual capacity, the Court denies Dwyer and Cooper’s
motion to dismiss all claims against them based on lack of jurisdiction under the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e.g., Falk v. Perez, 973 F.Supp.2d 850, 856 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (concluding
Eleventh Amendment did not bar lawsuit because claims were brought against defendant in his
individual capacity).
II.

Dwyer and Cooper are Entitled to Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Dwyer and Cooper next claim that they are protected from Squires-Cannon’s claims by

absolute quasi-judicial immunity because their conduct was ordered by a judge. Specifically,

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they point to the May 5, 2014 state court order mandating the eviction and dispossession of
Squires-Cannon if she enters Horizon Farms and argue that they are entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity because they were enforcing it. Squires-Cannon responds that quasi-judicial immunity
does not apply because the state court order does not direct them to arrest or prosecute her.
It is well-settled that “judges are entitled to absolute immunity from damages for their
judicial conduct.” Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 286 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). This
immunity has been “extended to apply to quasi-judicial conduct of [n]on-judicial officials whose
official duties have an integral relationship with the judicial process.” Richman, 270 F.3d at 435
(quotation omitted). Law enforcement officers are entitled to absolute immunity “when the
challenged conduct…was specifically ordered by the judge[.]” Id. at 436. In determining
whether absolute immunity applies to a law enforcement officer, “the law enforcement officer's
fidelity to the specific orders of the judge marks the boundary for labeling the act ‘quasijudicial.’” Id. For instance, the Seventh Circuit found the sheriffs were protected by absolute
immunity in Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1986) for the act of
enforcing a foreclosure judgment.
Dwyer and Cooper are entitled to absolute immunity for their quasi-judicial act of
evicting Squires-Cannon from Horizon Farms. Squires-Cannon does not challenge the manner
in which she was evicted and Dwyer and Cooper did not exercise a discretionary function when
they evicted Squires-Cannon, either of which would make absolute immunity inappropriate. See
Richman, 270 at 436-37. Instead, Squires-Cannon seeks to hold them liable for the fact that she
was evicted and the eviction was carried out pursuant to a court order; this constitutes a direct
assault on the state court’s eviction order and therefore absolute immunity applies. See Henry,
808 F.2d at 1238-39; Whitney v. Sheahan, 53 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding sheriff and his

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deputies immune from suit seeking damages for eviction by state court order); see, e.g., Logan v.
Wilkins, No. 1:09-cv-0282, 2009 WL 2351718 at *5 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 2009) (holding sheriff
and deputy entitled to absolute immunity to the extent that they were following a court order to
evict the plaintiff). The Court accordingly grants Dwyer and Cooper’s motion to dismiss all
claims against them with prejudice because they are protected by absolute quasi-judicial
immunity.
III.

Section 1983 Count States a Claim for Relief
Dwyer and Cooper adopt the Forest Preserve and White’s reasoning in their motion to

dismiss the Section 1983 claim in arguing that it does not state a claim upon which relief can
granted. The Court reiterates in analysis of this argument in Section I of the First Order. See
Squires-Cannon, 2016 WL 561917 at *2. In short, the Complaint plausibly alleges that SquiresCannon’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the Defendants arrested for trespass. Id.
For the reasons stated in Section I of the First Order, the Court denies Dwyer and Cooper’s
motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim. Id.
IV.

Probable Cause Defeats False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims
Dwyer and Cooper move to dismiss the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims by

incorporating the arguments made in the motions to dismiss filed by the Forest Preserve and
White asserting that these claims fail under 12(b)(6) because there was probable cause to arrest
Squires-Cannon for trespass. The Court adopts in full its discussion of these arguments in
Section II of the First Order which explains that the state court order mandating the eviction of
Squires-Cannon provided probable cause for her arrest for trespass. See Squires-Cannon, 2016
WL 561917 at *3-4. The Court therefore grants Dwyer and Cooper’s motion to dismiss the

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claims against them for false arrest and malicious prosecution with prejudice for the alternative
reason that probable cause existed.
IV.

Civil Conspiracy Claim Fails
Next, Dwyer and Cooper contend that the civil conspiracy claim should be dismissed

because there was probable cause to arrest her and therefore no unlawful act was committed.
The Court addressed the same argument in the First Order and found that the Complaint fails to
plausibly allege a state law tort because the existence of probable cause defeats the claims of
false arrest and malicious prosecution.

See Squires-Cannon, 2016 WL 561917 at *5.

Furthermore, the Court noted that to properly plead a civil conspiracy claim in Illinois, a plaintiff
must adequately allege a tort. Id. (citing Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Ill.
1994)). Thus, because the Complaint fails to plausibly allege an underlying tort which is a
requirement for a civil conspiracy, the Court grants Dwyer and Cooper’s motion to dismiss the
civil conspiracy claim without prejudice. Id.
V.

Dwyer and Cooper are Protected by Qualified Immunity
Lastly, Dwyer and Cooper seek dismissal of the claims against them based on qualified

immunity. They assert that because Squires-Cannon’s constitutional rights were not violated
with respect to the false arrest, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy claims, they are
immune from suit. When a defendant claims that qualified immunity applies, the Court first
determines if the plaintiff asserted a violation of a constitutional right and “next consider[s]
whether the right was clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred.” Delaney v.
DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2001). The key inquiry in the second step “is whether a
reasonable person would have been on notice that her actions violated clearly established law. A
plaintiff can establish this either by showing that a closely analogous case has already established

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both the right at issue and its application to the factual situation at hand…or by showing that the
violation was so obvious that a reasonable person would necessarily have known about it.”
Erwin v. Daley, 92 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
As explained in Section III, the Complaint states a claim for a constitutional violation and
therefore Squires-Cannon carried her burden in the first step of the qualified immunity analysis.
See Squires-Cannon, 2016 WL 561917 at *6. Turning to the second step, Squires-Cannon fails
to prove that a reasonable person in Dwyer or Cooper’s position would have been on notice that
arresting her for trespass violated a constitutional right. She presented no factually analogous
case establishing that law enforcement officers violate a constitutional right by arresting
someone for trespass pursuant to a court order mandating the arrestee’s eviction. SquiresCannon claims that Dwyer and Cooper “knew of [her] routine presence on Horizon Farms for
months before [her] arrest; the District and its officers had communicated to her that she was
permitted on Horizon Farms; and the District’s officers regularly checked in with their superiors
to confirm [she] was permitted to be on the property.” (Dkt. No. 50 at 11.) This falls short of
establishing that Dwyer and Cooper obviously deprived Squires-Cannon of a constitutional right
when they arrested her in accordance with a court order. The allegations asserted by SquiresCannon fail to paint her arrest for trespass as unreasonable in the face of a court order mandating
her eviction. See Squires-Cannon, 2016 WL 561917 at *6. As a result, the Court grants Dwyer
and Cooper’s motion to dismiss all claims against them with prejudice for the additional reason
that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court grants Dwyer and Cooper’s motion to dismiss
all claims against them with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 40.)

________________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Court Judge
Northern District of Illinois
Date: 4/18/2016

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