Stevens v. Illinois Dept of Juvenile Justice et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 12/1/2016. Mailed notice(ef, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES E. STEVENS, as trustee of the
bankruptcy estate of Kye E. Gaffey,
Plaintiff,
v.
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 15-cv-06904
Judge Andrea R. Wood
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff James E. Stevens, trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Kye Gaffey, claims that
Gaffey was summarily terminated from his position as superintendent of Illinois School District
428 (“District 428”) in violation of his due process rights and in breach of his employment
contract. Stevens accordingly asserts claims on behalf of Gaffey’s bankruptcy estate for the
alleged constitutional violation and breach of contract against District 428’s board (“Board”), the
Board’s current members and those who served at the time of his termination, and the Illinois
Department of Juvenile Justice (“IDJJ”), which is the state agency alleged to control District 428.
Now before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. Nos. 8, 23) With their motions, Defendants contend that the IDJJ and
the Board are both immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution and also that Illinois law did not give Gaffey the expectation of continued
employment necessary to support his claim of a due process right. Defendants ask that the
constitutional claims be dismissed and that the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over the
state contract law claims. For the reasons explained below, the motions are granted in part and
denied in part—the claims against IDJJ are dismissed but the other claims survive.
BACKGROUND
As alleged in the complaint, on August 21, 2011, Gaffey was offered and accepted a oneyear contract for employment as superintendent of District 428, which administers Illinois’s
education programs for wards of the state and incarcerated juveniles. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 13, 14, 35–
39, Dkt. No. 1.) Gaffey’s employment was governed by the following provision of the Illinois
School Code applicable to superintendent contracts:
Notice of intent not to renew a contract must be given in writing stating the reason
therefor by April 1 of the contract year unless the contract specifically provides
otherwise. Failure to do so will automatically extend the contract for an additional
year.
105 ILCS 5/10-21.4. Yet Gaffey received no notice or opportunity to be heard before he was
terminated in August 2013. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-18, 20, 42, 44, Dkt. No. 1.)
Stevens alleges that the termination violated Gaffey’s due process rights. He seeks relief
for the alleged constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from the former president of
District 428’s Board, Defendant Arthur Bishop (Count I); the Board itself and its individual
members (Count II); and the IDJJ (Count III). He also asserts claims for breach of contract
against the Board for compensation owed Gaffey for the 2013–2014 (Count IV) and 2014–2015
(Count V) school years, alleging that the failure to give proper notice of termination triggered the
automatic statutory renewal of his contract for each year.
The IDJJ, the Board, and current District 428 Board members Candice Jones, Heather
Dalmage, Tresa Dunbar Garrett, David A. Green, John P. Griffin, Candice M. Smith, and
Jennifer Vidis now move for dismissal of Stevens’s § 1983 claims pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. They argue that the IDJJ and the Board are
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immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that Gaffey had no interest in future
employment that could have generated constitutional due process rights. They also assert that,
after dismissing the § 1983 claims, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law breach of contract claims. In a separate motion, former Board president Arthur
Bishop and former Board members Carl Ellis, Anthony Grady, James Gunnell, and Donald
Smoot adopt the arguments of their co-defendants.1
DISCUSSION
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). “[A] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Adams v. City of
Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). In deciding such a motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). While a
complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, there “must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 555.
I.
State Agency Immunity
Defendants first move to dismiss all claims against the IDJJ and the Board, claiming that
both are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment, with
exceptions not at issue here, grants states and their agencies immunity from private suits in
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For purposes of their common arguments, IDJJ, the Board, and the individual defendants are collectively
identified as “Defendants.”
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federal court without their consent. Nuñez v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 817 F.3d 1042, 1044 (7th
Cir. 2016). States and their agencies also have a distinct defense to § 1983 claims, since they are
not suable “persons” within the meaning of that statute. Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613
(7th Cir. 2012).
To determine whether an entity is an “arm of the state” entitled to immunity, courts
consider the entity’s financial autonomy from the state and the “general legal status” of the
entity. Burrus v. State Lottery Comm’n of Ind., 546 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Kashani
v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 845-47 (7th Cir. 1987)). The predominant factor in the inquiry is
the extent of the entity’s financial autonomy from the state. Id. In assessing the financial
independence of the entity, courts consider “the extent of state funding, the state’s oversight and
control of the entity's fiscal affairs, the entity’s ability to raise funds independently, whether the
state taxes the entity, and whether a judgment against the entity would result in the state
increasing its appropriations to the entity.” Id.; see also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994) (identifying the vulnerability of a state’s funds to any judgment as the
“most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment determinations”). In assessing the “general legal
status” of the entity, courts in the Seventh Circuit look to the state statute but value “substance
rather than form.” Peirick v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Ath. Dep’t, 510 F.3d 681, 696
(7th Cir. 2007). Courts consider whether the entity’s governing council or board of trustees are
independently selected, the entity’s ability to exercise powers independently (e.g., entering into
contracts without approval), and whether the entity serves the whole state or only a region of the
state. See, e.g., Kashani, 813 F.2d at 847; Peirick, 510 F.3d at 696; Parker v. Franklin Cty. Cmty.
Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910, 928 (7th Cir. 2012).
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The analysis differs somewhat when the state agency status of a local school district is at
issue. A local school district is not ordinarily an arm of the state and therefore generally may be
sued in federal court. Parker, 667 F.3d at 927 (citing Gary A. v. New Trier High Sch. Dist. No.
203, 796 F.2d 940, 945 (7th Cir. 1986)). Four factors are relevant in determining whether a local
school district is an arm of the state: (1) the characterization of the district under state law; (2)
the guidance and control exercised by the state over the local school board; (3) the degree of
state funding received by the district; and (4) the local board’s ability to issue bonds and levy
taxes on its own behalf.” Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 280 (1977)).
Defendants argue that IDJJ’s status as a state agency is established by its inclusion in the
“Departments of State Government” section of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois, 20
ILCS 5/5-15. And indeed, courts of this District have found an agency’s listing in this provision
to be a basis both for determining immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and amenability to
suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Ill. Dep’t of Healthcare & Family Servs., No. 13 C
8227, 2014 WL 7190877, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2014), aff'd sub nom. Muhammad v. Jesse,
608 F. App’x 429 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing statute to determine that the Illinois Department of
Healthcare and Family Services is not suable under § 1983); Rasche v. Lane, 150 F. Supp. 3d
934, 939-40 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing statute in determining the Illinois Department of the Lottery
to be an “arm of the state,” for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity and stating that “the
analysis need not go further” than the statute). Meanwhile, Stevens has offered no response to
Defendants’ contentions regarding IDJJ’s state agency status.
The Seventh Circuit has directed that a state agency’s statutory defense to a § 1983 claim
must be addressed before any Eleventh Amendment immunity determination to avoid
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“unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking.” Thomas, 697 F.3d at 613. Considering the
agency’s inclusion in the “Departments of State Government” section of the Code—and with
Stevens offering no meaningful response to this argument—the Court thus concludes that IDJJ is
an arm of the State of Illinois for § 1983 purposes. Since Count III, the sole claim asserted
against IDJJ, is a § 1983 claim, it is dismissed because IDJJ cannot be sued under that statute.
No Illinois statutory provision offers a similarly definitive conclusion as to the status of
District 428’s Board. The determination of an agency’s status as a state actor for immunity
purposes has been characterized as a “fact-intensive question” that “requires careful appraisal.”
Benning v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Universities, 928 F.2d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 1991). Although
Defendants offer argument supporting their view of the proper appraisal, the Court must draw all
factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party at the pleading stage. In the absence of clear
statutory authority or any factual record, the Court cannot conclude that the Board must be
characterized as a state agency not properly subject to a § 1983 suit or to any other litigation in
this Court.
II.
Gaffey’s Due Process Property Interest
Defendants next argue that Gaffey possessed no property interest in his continued
employment that was entitled to due process protections. Alternatively, they argue that any
employment expectation he may have had ended after his first year as District 428
superintendent. Neither argument is persuasive.
Defendants assert that the School Code provisions that form the basis for any claim that
Gaffey had an interest in continued employment do not apply to him. The School Code provides
that superintendents must be hired pursuant to a contract of no more than one year or a
performance-based contract of no more than five years. See 105 ILCS 5/10-23.8. As noted
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above, Stevens asserts that Gaffey’s contract was for a one-year term. Stevens claims that
Gaffey’s contract was breached by the Board’s termination of his employment without providing
him notice by April 1 of its intent to do so as required by the School Code, 105 ILCS 5/10-21.4.
The School Code provision creating District 428 includes a statement that certain of the
School Code’s terms “shall not apply to the Department of Juvenile Justice School District” and
then proceeds to enumerate several “Articles and Sections” that are inapplicable in their entirety.
105 ILCS 5/13-45. However, Article 10, the School Code section containing the superintendent
contract requirements on which the claims here are based, is made inapplicable only for those
sections that are “in conflict” with any of the provisions specifically directed to District 428. Id.
The District 428-specific provision that Defendants claim conflicts with the School
Code’s directives for superintendent contracts imposes upon District 428 the following
obligation:
To employ a superintendent who shall have charge of the administration of the
schools under the direction of the Board of Education. In addition to the
administrative duties, the superintendent shall make recommendations to the
Board concerning the budget, building plans, the location of sites, the selection of
textbooks, instructional material and courses of study. The superintendent shall
keep or cause to be kept the records and accounts as directed and required of the
Board, aid in making reports required by the Board, and perform such other duties
as the Board may delegate to him.
105 ILCS 5/13-43.6. The provision does not limit District 428’s relationship with its
superintendent to that described, does not prohibit the District from entering into contracts with
superintendents, and does not dictate that the District’s terms with its superintendent differ from
those mandated for other superintendents. Defendants offer no authority for their presumption
that the District 428-specific provisions and other sections of the School Code are properly
construed to be “in conflict” where one section is silent and the other speaks. No other provision
relating to District 428 appears to conflict with the Code’s guidelines for superintendent
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contracts. Thus, the Court rejects Defendants’ contention that the statutory mandates for
superintendent contracts can be determined on the pleadings to be inapplicable because of their
conflict with the School Code sections directed to District 428.
Defendants also argue that even if Gaffey was given a one-year contract pursuant to the
School Code’s provisions, any expectation of continued employment was extinguished in August
2012, after his first year of employment ended. This argument ignores the basis for the claim of
contractual breach: that the School Code automatically extended his contract for an additional
year if he did not receive written notice of the District’s intent not to renew his employment and
the specific reason for that decision on April 1. Stevens claimed that Gaffey did not receive the
required notice. This claim, taken as true, plausibly alleges a legal right to continued
employment sufficient to create a due process property right.
Defendants’ motions are thus denied as to the § 1983 claims against the Board and the
Individual Defendants.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss by Defendants IDJJ, the
Board, Jones, Garrett, Green, Griffin, Smith, and Vidis (Dkt. No. 8) is granted as to the claims
against IDJJ in Count III and otherwise denied. The companion motion by Defendants Ellis,
Grady, Gunnell, Smoot, and Bishop (Dkt. No. 23) is denied in its entirety.
ENTERED:
Dated: December 1, 2016
__________________________
Andrea R. Wood
United States District Judge
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