Lipford v. City of Chicago et al
Filing
106
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Robert Blakey on 3/5/2018. Mailed notice(gel, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL LIPFORD,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 15-cv-6988
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Judge John Robert Blakey
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michael Lipford sued the City of Chicago and numerous police
officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that the officers violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when they searched his home and arrested him in September
2013. See generally [45]. Plaintiff also asserts a state-law malicious-prosecution
claim against the officers and a state-law indemnity claim against the City. Id.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. [86]. For the reasons explained below,
this Court partially grants and partially denies Defendants’ motion.
I.
Background
The following facts come from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts
[87] and Plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of additional facts [93].
In September 2013, Plaintiff lived with Deandre Norfleet, a probationer. [87]
¶¶ 12–13. On September 18, 2013, Officers Dailey, Goff, and Veleta (the Defendant
Officers) accompanied Cook County probation officers (no longer parties to this case)
to Plaintiff and Norfleet’s apartment to conduct a probation check on Norfleet. Id. ¶
1
11. Defendants say that the probation officers had a search warrant related to
Norfleet that they showed Plaintiff, who then allowed all the officers to enter his
home. Id. ¶¶ 15–16. 1
Plaintiff denies that he let the officers into his apartment voluntarily. He
says that he let the officers in because they showed him a piece of paper that they
claimed was a search warrant for Norfleet.
[94] ¶ 31.
But, Plaintiff says,
Defendants never produced a warrant during discovery, no Defendant mentioned a
warrant during their depositions, and Plaintiff’s official arrest report says—without
mentioning a warrant—that officers were “let into the location by Michael Lipford.”
Id.; [93-2] at 3. In other words, Plaintiff says that the officers lied to him about
having a warrant to gain entry to his apartment. [94] ¶ 31.
The parties agree that, once inside, Dailey walked through the apartment
toward the open door to Plaintiff’s bedroom. [87] ¶ 20. When Dailey looked through
the door, he saw a shotgun sitting on a shelf above the bed. Id. ¶ 21. Dailey then
entered Plaintiff’s bedroom and saw another shotgun in the corner of the room. Id.
¶ 22. At this point, Goff, Veleta, the probation officers, and Plaintiff came into the
room. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff admitted that he owned both guns, and Veleta asked him
for his Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card. Id. ¶ 25.
Plaintiff searched his bedroom and a safe for his FOID card. Id. ¶ 26. When
Plaintiff opened the safe, the Defendant Officers saw boxes of ammunition. Id. ¶
29. Despite his search, Plaintiff could not produce a FOID card, so the Defendant
Officers arrested him for failure to possess a FOID card. Id. ¶ 31. After arresting
1
It appears that Norfleet was not there, although neither side explicitly says so.
2
Plaintiff, the Defendant Officers transported him to the police station, where he was
charged with failure to possess a FOID card while in possession of firearms and
ammunition. Id. ¶ 40. At his subsequent criminal trial, Plaintiff stipulated that his
last FOID card expired in 2009. Id. ¶ 46. Plaintiff was ultimately found not guilty
of all charges. Id. ¶ 49.
II.
Legal Standard
Courts should grant summary judgment when the moving party shows that
no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and the evidence weighs so heavily
in the moving party’s favor that the moving party “must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists when, based upon the evidence, a
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To
show a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the non-moving party must point to
“particular materials in the record,” and cannot rely upon the pleadings or
speculation. Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2014).
At summary judgment, courts must evaluate evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and must refrain from making credibility
determinations or weighing evidence. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir.
2017) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The moving party bears the burden of
establishing the lack of genuine disputes as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
3
III.
Analysis
A.
Unreasonable Search
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
lying about having a search warrant to enter his apartment. [92] at 7. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Rasho, 856 F.3d at 477, triable
issues of fact exist regarding whether the Defendant Officers lawfully entered
Plaintiff’s home.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Warrantless searches presumptively violate the Fourth Amendment. See Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). That said, an occupant’s voluntary consent to
a search of his home generally makes a warrantless search reasonable. See Georgia
v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006). An occupant does not consent to a search,
however, when he allows officers to enter his home based upon their claim of a
search warrant. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549–50 (1968) (“When a
law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he
announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search.”).
Oddly, although Defendants’ fact statement says (twice) that probation
officers showed Plaintiff a search warrant when they arrived with Dailey, Goff, and
Veleta, [87] ¶¶ 15–16, Defendants now argue that they rely only upon Plaintiff’s
consent for their authority to enter his apartment, see [99] at 5 (“Defendants’ motion
explicitly disclaimed reliance on a warrant.”).
Clearly, if the officers lied about
having a search warrant—as Plaintiff’s evidence suggests—then Plaintiff did not
4
truly consent to them entering his home. See Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 749
(7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that when police lie about having a warrant or have an
invalid warrant, “consent is vitiated”). Plaintiff repeatedly testified at his criminal
trial and during his deposition that he allowed the officers in because they showed
him a “piece of paper” and told him it was a search warrant for Norfleet. [93] ¶ 31.
Based upon Plaintiff’s testimony and Defendants’ current position regarding the
existence of a search warrant (which they had asserted existed in their fact
statement, but failed to mention in the Defendant Officers’ depositions and the
arrest report), as well as Defendants’ failure to produce any warrant during
discovery, the record contains genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
Plaintiff consented to the search.
Specifically, it remains unclear whether the
officers had a warrant and whether Plaintiff voluntarily consented to the search.
Defendants hint, but do not fully argue, that Norfleet’s status as a
probationer reduced Plaintiff’s expectation of privacy such that he has limited
grounds to challenge the search. [88] at 11; [99] at 5. Undeveloped arguments are
considered waived. See Crespo v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2016).
Even if Defendants made this argument properly, it fails to help them here.
True, probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy. See Samson v. California,
547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006). But the law has not yet explicitly reduced the expectation
of privacy for people who live with probationers, absent, at the very least, some
showing of knowledge regarding that status. Compare Thornton v. Lund, 538 F.
Supp. 2d 1053, 1058 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (concluding that “the reasoning underlying
5
the Supreme Court’s view that parolees and probationers have a diminished privacy
interest appears not to apply to individuals with whom they live”), and Barajas v.
City of Rohnert Park, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (explaining that
when a probationer’s co-resident “has no knowledge of the [probation] search
condition applicable to their home,” the co-resident has the right to refuse a search),
with Taylor v. Brontoli, No. 1:04-cv-0487, 2007 WL 1359713, at *1 n.4 (N.D.N.Y.
May 8, 2007) (finding that a co-resident’s refusal of a search did not control when
the co-resident “knew that Malloy was on probation and that her trailer was subject
to searches” under a probation agreement). Neither side provided evidence of the
conditions of Norfleet’s probation—such as whether probation officers could search
his home at any time without reasonable suspicion—and neither side offered
evidence about Plaintiff’s knowledge of Norfleet’s specific probation conditions.
Defendants also fail to raise qualified immunity as a defense to this claim.
See [99] at 11 (arguing qualified immunity only on the issue of probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff). Even if they had raised qualified immunity, the disputed material
facts (whether officers lied about having a search warrant and whether Plaintiff
actually consented to officers entering his home) would prevent this Court from
finding that Defendants merit qualified immunity. See Hill v. Coppleson, 627 F.3d
601, 606 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, this Court denies Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim of an unreasonable search.
B.
False Arrest
Plaintiff claims that the Defendant Officers falsely arrested him because they
6
lacked probable cause to ask for his FOID card in the first place, and still lacked
probable cause after asking because he “gave every indication of believing that he
had a FOID card.” [92] at 9–10. Defendants argue that they did not need probable
cause to ask for the FOID card and that Plaintiff’s failure to produce the card gave
them probable cause to arrest him. [99] at 7–9. This Court agrees.
Probable cause provides an absolute defense to a false arrest claim. Gonzalez
v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 2009). Probable cause for an arrest
exists when the facts and circumstances at the time of the arrest—viewed from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the officer’s shoes—warrant a prudent person
believing that the suspect committed, is committing, or will commit a crime. Id. If
reasonable minds could differ over the facts or resulting inferences, the probable
cause determination belongs to the jury. Id.
Under Illinois’ FOID Card Act, residents who possess firearms or
ammunition must also have a FOID card in their possession. 430 ILCS 65/2(a); see
also People v. Mourecek, 566 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (“A person commits
the offense of failing to possess a State FOID card when he possesses a firearm or
firearm ammunition without having a FOID card in his immediate possession.”)
(emphasis added). Contrary to Plaintiff’s interpretation, [92] at 5, the FOID Card
Act has no knowledge or intent requirements. See People v. Schweihs, 43 N.E.3d
979, 982 (Ill. 2015) (contrasting the FOID Card Act with the offense of aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon, which requires that someone “knowingly” carried a
firearm outside the home “without having been issued a valid FOID card”).
7
No case supports Plaintiff’s position that officers needed probable cause to
believe that he violated the FOID Card Act before they could ask for his FOID card.
Logically, such a requirement would make it nearly impossible to develop probable
cause for a violation of the FOID Card Act, unless gun owners regularly announce
that they lack FOID cards.
And the cases that Plaintiff cites for his dubious
argument do not apply here because they address whether officers had the
reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop of a moving vehicle, not whether
officers already conversing with someone may ask to see a FOID card. See, e.g.,
People v. Granados, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
Here, the Defendant Officers unquestionably possessed probable cause to
believe that Plaintiff violated the FOID Card Act when he admitted to possessing
the firearms and ammunition in his bedroom, but could not produce a FOID card
upon request. See Mourecek, 566 N.E.2d at 845. Although the Defendant Officers
might have illegally entered and searched Plaintiff’s home (an issue for a jury to
decide), the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil suits under § 1983. See Vaughn
v. Chapman, 662 F. App’x 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). Thus, this
Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s false-arrest claim.
C.
Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff claims that the Defendant Officers maliciously prosecuted him
because they initially acted without probable cause and never “explained what
actually happened to the prosecutors.”
[92] at 12.
To succeed on a malicious-
prosecution claim under Illinois law, Plaintiff must show, among other things, that:
8
(1) Defendants commenced or continued a criminal or civil proceeding against him;
and (2) Defendants lacked probable cause for that proceeding. Holland v. City of
Chicago, 643 F.3d 248, 254 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Swick v. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d
1238, 1242 (Ill. 1996)).
This claim fails for the same reason that Plaintiff’s false-arrest claim failed:
the Defendant Officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for violating the FOID
Card Act when he failed to produce a FOID card while in possession of firearms and
ammunition. See Mourecek, 566 N.E.2d at 845. Even if the Defendant Officers
searched Plaintiff’s home illegally, the exclusionary rule does not apply to
malicious-prosecution suits under Illinois law. See Vaughn, 662 F. App’x at 467.
Thus, this Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s maliciousprosecution claim.
D.
Indemnity
The City cannot face liability when its officers have no liability for the
underlying claims. See Fleming v. Livingston Cnty., Ill., 674 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir.
2012) (citing 745 ILCS 10/2-109). Thus, this Court grants summary judgment to
the City on all claims except Plaintiff’s claim of an unreasonable search.
E.
Motion to Dismiss Certain Officer Defendants
Within their motion for summary judgment, Defendants moved to dismiss
certain officers whom Plaintiff originally sued, but that the parties now agree never
participated in any of the relevant events. [88] at 14. Plaintiff moved to voluntarily
dismiss all the officers in question with prejudice in October 2017, [89], and this
9
Court granted that motion, [90].
Thus, this Court denies as moot Defendants’
motion to dismiss these officers.
IV.
Conclusion
This Court partially grants and partially denies Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment [86]. This Court grants the motion as to Plaintiff’s false-arrest
and malicious-prosecution claims and the corresponding indemnity claims against
the City. This Court denies the motion as to Plaintiff’s unreasonable-search claim
and the corresponding indemnity claim against the City. This Court denies as moot
Defendants’ request to dismiss certain officers that Plaintiff already voluntarily
dismissed with prejudice. The motion hearing set for March 6, 2018, at 9:45 a.m. in
Courtroom 1203 stands, but is converted to a status hearing. The parties shall
come prepared to set a trial date.
Dated: March 5, 2018
Entered:
____________________________________
John Robert Blakey
United States District Judge
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?