Bright v. Western Express, Inc.

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM Order: Both the Complaint and this action are dismissed sua sponte. And because the reason for such dismissal is predicated on the absence of in personam general jurisdiction (as well, of course, as the absence of specific jurisdiction) o ver defendant Western Express, Inc., the dismissal is without prejudice to plaintiff Bright's refiling of her suit in a forum that does not pose like problems. (For further details see Memorandum Order) Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 8/24/2015:Mailed notice(clw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TRACY A. BRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v.
WESTERN EXPRESS, INC.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 15 C 7110

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Initially counsel for plaintiff Tracy Bright ("Bright") violated this District Court's
LR 5.2(f) by failing to comply with its requirement that promptly after suit was filed a paper
copy of Bright's Complaint had to have been delivered to the chambers of the District Judge to
whom the case had been randomly assigned. After this Court had waited over a week for such
compliance with LR 5.2(f), it issued a short memorandum order that required the delivery of the
missing copy of the Complaint forthwith and imposed a $100 fine for the LR violation.
Now Bright's counsel has cured that procedural delinquency and paid the fine, but the
delivery of the Complaint has disclosed far more vital flaws -- one of which is noncurable -- that
call for dismissal of the action. This second memorandum order will address those flaws.
To begin with, counsel's effort to invoke the diversity-of-citizenship branch of federal
jurisdiction runs afoul of our Court of Appeals' directive, repeated in such cases as Adams v.
Catrambone, 359 F.3d 858, 861 n.3 (7th Cir. 2004) that "[w]hen the parties allege residence but
not citizenship, the District Court must dismiss the suit." That is just what Bright's counsel has
alleged as to the plaintiff herself in Complaint ¶ 11. This Court ordinarily views that dismissal

mandate as Draconian in nature, so that it normally works out an alternative that permits a
curative amendment so that the lawsuit may remain in the federal judicial system (after all, for
most people their states of residence coincide with their states of citizenship).
Here, however, Bright's attempt to hale defendant Western Express, Inc. ("Western") into
this District Court to defend against Bright's lawsuit poses a far more fundamental problem.
This is a personal injury action arising out of an August 29, 2013 motor vehicle accident on
interstate highway I-81 in Roanoke County, Virginia, where the driver of a Western-owned
motor vehicle assertedly "made an abrupt lane change" that forced the motorcycle being operated
by Bright off of the roadway. Yet all that the Complaint asserts as to Western is this (Complaint
¶ 10):
Defendant, WESTERN EXPRESS, INC., is a Tennessee corporation, but does
substantial business in Cook County, Illinois.
Just a bit over 1-1/2 years ago the United States Supreme Court scotched any notion that
the principles of "general jurisdiction" over corporations under state long-arm statutes stretch to
encompass lawsuits such as this one (Daimler AG v. Bauman, 131 S. Ct. 746, 754-58 (2014)).
And that definitive ruling clearly calls for dismissal of this action in this Illinois forum.
Accordingly both the Complaint and this action are dismissed sua sponte. And because
the reason for such dismissal is predicated on the absence of in personam general jurisdiction (as
well, of course, as the absence of specific jurisdiction) over Western, the dismissal is without
prejudice to Bright's refiling of her suit in a forum that does not pose like problems.
This Court has not undertaken to look at the statute of limitations applicable to this type
of action in the relevant jurisdiction for limitations purposes (presumably Virginia, the place of

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the alleged wrong, although that is for Bright's counsel to determine). 1 Because of the possibility
that such jurisdiction has a limitations statute akin to that established by Illinois statute -- two
years -- this opinion is being issued immediately after this Court's receipt of the Complaint, to
give Bright's counsel the opportunity to bring a timely lawsuit if that is the case.

__________________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date: August 24, 2015

1

That determination is not, of course, the same determination called for in the preceding
paragraph: the choice of forum.
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