Manley et al v. Law et al

Filing 51

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. For the reasons stated in the Opinion, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 23 is denied as to the Section 1983 claims; Defendants' motion for summary judgment 34 is granted as to the Section 1983 claims; and supplemental jurisdiction is relinquished over the state-law claims. The case is remanded to the Circuit Court of DuPage County. A separate AO-450 judgment will be entered. The status hearing of 09/20/2016 is vacated. Civil case terminated. (pjg, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CLAUDIA MANLEY and NOEL MANLEY, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
BRUCE LAW and HINSDALE TOWNSHIP )
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 86,
)
)
Defendants.
)

No. 15 C 07499
Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Claudia and Noel Manley believe that Hinsdale Township High School
District 86 and Bruce Law, the District’s Superintendent, subjected Claudia to a
“vigilante” campaign when they investigated complaints that Claudia—a member of
the District’s School Board—inappropriately confronted two individuals on school
property. (For convenience, the Opinion will refer to the Defendants collectively as
“the District.”) After launching a grievance procedure to address the complaints, the
Manleys filed a state-court suit, unsuccessfully seeking a temporary restraining
order against the investigation. The District eventually concluded that Claudia was
“mean spirited and rude” during the confrontation, but took no other formal action
against her. After the Manleys amended the state-court complaint to refer to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the District removed the case to federal court. The Manleys allege
that the grievance procedure violated their procedural due process rights, and also
assert two state-law declaratory judgment claims asking the Court to interpret two

School Board policies.1 Both parties then moved for summary judgment. For the
reasons explained below, the Manleys’ motion is denied as to the § 1983 claims, and
the District’s cross-motion is granted on those claims. With the federal claims out of
the case, the Court relinquishes jurisdiction over the state-law claims and remands
the case to the DuPage County Circuit Court.
I. Background
Both parties have moved for summary judgment, so in evaluating the
Manleys’ motion the Court must draw reasonable inferences in the District’s favor,
and vice versa on the District’s motion. But the relevant facts are largely
undisputed. Claudia and Noel Manley are a married couple residing in Darien,
Illinois. PSOF ¶ 3; R. 8, Defs.’ Answer ¶¶ 1-2.2 At all relevant times, Claudia was
(and still is) a member of the Hinsdale Township High School District 86 Board of
Education, which is an elected office; she also served as chairperson of the Board’s
policy committee until May 4, 2015. PSOF ¶¶ 2, 6; Defs.’ Answer ¶¶ 1, 5. On the
evening of March 12, 2015, two individuals—one high school student and one
1The

Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal civil-rights claims under
28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law declaratory
judgment claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), because they form part of the same case or
controversy as the federal claim.
2Citations to the record are noted as “R.” followed by the docket number and the
page or paragraph number.
Citations to the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact are “PSOF” (for the
Manleys’ Statement of Facts) [R. 24]; “Defs.’ Resp. PSOF” (for the District’s Response to the
Manleys’ Statement of Facts) [R. 36]; “DSOAF” (for the District’s Statement of Additional
Facts) [R. 36 at 23]; “Pls.’ Resp. DSOAF” (for the Manleys’ Response to the District’s
Statement of Additional Facts”) [R. 37 at 6]; “Pls.’ Reply PSOF” (for the Manleys’ Reply to
the District’s Response to their Statement of Facts) [R. 37 at 2]; “PSOAF” (for the Manleys’
Statement of Additional Facts) [R. 37 at 10]; “Defs.’ Resp. PSOAF’ (for the District’s
Response to the Manleys’ Statement of Additional Facts) [R. 39].
Where a fact is admitted, only the asserting party’s statement of facts is cited; where
an assertion is otherwise challenged, it is so noted.

2

adult—were distributing fliers for a slate of candidates running for the upcoming
Board election. PSOF ¶ 8; Defs.’ Answer ¶ 7. The two stood outside the entrance of
Hinsdale South High School and gave fliers to people entering the building. Id. That
evening, the Manleys went to the high school to see the spring play; as they
approached the building, Claudia confronted the leafleters, challenging their right
to distribute campaign literature on District property. PSOF ¶¶ 9-11; Defs.’ Answer
¶¶ 8-10; R. 36-8, Defs.’ Exh. 8, 5/4/15 Circuit Court Op. at 2. In particular, Board
Policy 4:20 prohibits the on-campus distribution of “[a]dvertisements that promote
… political organizations” and “[c]ampaign materials from candidates and political
parties.” R. 36-10, Defs.’ Exh. 10, Board Policy 4:20 ¶ 2(f)-(g). The details of the
ensuing confrontation are disputed, but they are not relevant for the summary
judgment motions at hand. What is undisputed is that the encounter lasted around
six to seven minutes and was captured on the District’s security camera. PSOF ¶¶
11-12; R. 36-3, Defs.’ Exh. 3, Litman Report at 15. The video shows the student
moving in and out of the conversation; at one point, she faced Claudia and made a
gesture with her hands. PSOF ¶ 13. Claudia turned toward the student and
responded, and after a short exchange, the student walked away. Id. After the
student left, the adult leafleter spoke with the Manleys before leaving. Id. ¶ 15.
The March 12 incident quickly gained a lot of publicity; for example, a
petition demanding Claudia’s resignation from the School Board circulated online,
and several newspapers reported on the incident. PSOF ¶ 22; R. 24-1, Pls.’ Exh. A to
Davidson Aff., 4/6/15 Chicago Tribune Article; R. 24-1, Pls.’ Exh. B to Davidson Aff.,

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Online Posting; R. 24-1, Pls.’ Exh. D to Davidson Aff., 7/21/15 Chicago Tribune
Article; R. 24-2, Pls.’ Exh. A to C. Manley Aff., 3/15/15 Dupont Email; R. 24-2, Pls.’
Exh. A-1 to C. Manley Aff., 3/15/15 Gallo Email. A number of individuals also
complained to the District about the incident. PSOF ¶ 30; Defs.’ Answer ¶ 13. In
response, the District initiated the Uniform Grievance Procedure outlined in Board
Policy 2:260, which governs the process when “[s]tudents, parents/guardians,
employees, or community members … believe that the Board of Education, its
employees, or agents have violated their rights,” or if an aggrieved party otherwise
has a complaint about a list of enumerated issues. Id.; R. 36-9, Defs.’ Exh. 9, Board
Policy 2:260.
Bruce Law, the District Superintendent, appointed Jeffrey Litman as a
“complaint manager” or “independent reviewer” to supervise Claudia’s grievance
process; Litman had previously worked as a hearing officer for the District. PSOF
¶¶ 31-32; R. 36-12, Defs.’ Exh. 12, 3/17/15 Law Email. The School Board was
scheduled to discuss the investigation during a meeting on April 27, 2015, but the
Board could not take action because there was no quorum. PSOF ¶ 37; Defs.’
Answer ¶ 58. Three days later, the Manleys filed an action in the Circuit Court of
DuPage County, seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent the Board from
continuing the grievance procedures against Claudia. PSOF ¶ 38; R. 1-2, Compl.;
5/4/15 Circuit Court Op. The Manleys argued that Board Policy 2:260 was
inapplicable to Claudia, and that subjecting her to the grievance process would
violate her rights and cause immediate and irreparable harm to the Manleys’

4

reputation, mental health, and personal well-being. 5/4/15 Circuit Court Op. at 2.
The Circuit Court denied the TRO, explaining that the Manleys did not establish a
certain and clearly ascertainable right (state-law terminology for the TRO standard)
and also “fail[ed] to establish how being subjected to the District’s uniform
grievance

procedure

would

certainly

and

clearly

constitute

intimidation,

harassment, bullying, or defamation.” Id. at 2. There was no irreparable harm
because the procedures had not yet started and no findings had been made; further,
the Manleys failed to explain why Claudia should not be subjected to Board Policy
2:260, which “appears well suited to address community concerns regarding Board
members.” Id. at 3-4. The Circuit Court closed by “not[ing] its concern” with two
issues; one was Claudia’s “attempt[s] to enforce Board policy [4:20] without
authority” on the evening of March 12. Id. at 4. The second concern was the
legitimacy of Board Policy 4:20, which “may constitute prior restraint of free speech”
in its prohibition of political and campaign materials on campus. Id. at 5. But the
Circuit Court “reserve[d] any further comment” on these issues pending additional
briefing. Id.
A few days after the Circuit Court denied the TRO, Litman’s investigation
continued. PSOF ¶ 39; Defs.’ Answer ¶¶ 22-23. On May 12, 2015, Litman completed
a 16-page report, concluding that “there was not enough time [during the March 12
encounter] for Mrs. Manley’s remarks to rise to the level that would establish a
pattern of harassment or bullying” against the student leafleter, but that Claudia’s
comments were nonetheless “mean-spirited and rude.” PSOF ¶ 46; Litman Report

5

at 15-16. Litman also concluded that Claudia had violated District Policy 8:30,
which requires “mutual respect, civility and orderly conduct among all individuals
on school property or at a school event.” Litman Report at 16 (quotation marks
omitted); R. 36-11, Defs.’ Exh. 11, Board Policy 8:30 at 1.
On May 18, 2015, the Board held an open meeting to appoint a “[Uniform
Grievance Procedure] Investigative Committee,” which consisted of the full Board
except for Claudia, and then held a closed session to approve the Litman Report.
PSOF ¶¶ 49-50; Defs.’ Answer ¶ 35. Later that evening, the full Board—including
Claudia—reconvened in an open session and voted 4-2 to adopt the Litman Report
with minor changes. R. 36-4, Defs.’ Exh. 4, 5/18/15 Committee Recommendation; R.
36-2, Defs.’ Exh. 2, Law Aff. ¶ 3; Defs.’ Answer ¶¶ 37-38. A little less than a month
later, on June 9, 2015, the Board sent Claudia a letter formalizing its conclusions—
namely, that on March 12, Claudia had “over-stepped [her] authority” by
confronting the leafleters about a perceived Board Policy violation, because
individual board members “do not have the authority to police behaviors on
campus,” but “have authority only at a publically-noticed open meeting during a
vote.” PSOF ¶ 58; R. 36-5, Defs.’ Exh. 5, 6/9/15 Board Letter. The Board explained
that although Claudia did not bully or harass the leafleters, her comments were
“mean-spirited and rude,” so she had violated District Policy 8:30 requiring respect
and civility on school property. 6/9/15 Board Letter. After issuing the letter, the
Board closed its investigation of the March 12 incident. Law Aff. ¶¶ 4-5.

6

On July 27, 2015, the Manleys filed an amended complaint in the state-court
action. R. 1-2, Am. Compl. The amended complaint contained two counts for
declaratory relief; the first requested the state court to hold “that Board Policy
2:260 is invalid and unenforceable as applied” to Claudia, allegedly because it does
not cover complaints against Board members. Id. ¶¶ 51-60. In the second count, the
Manleys also sought a declaration that “Board Policy 4:20 clearly prohibits
distribution of political campaign materials on district property.” Id. ¶¶ 60-66. The
Manleys also alleged, without listing a separate count, that Board Policy 2:260 did
not safeguard Claudia’s procedural rights because she did not have full hearing
rights, including the ability to object to evidence, present and confront witnesses,
and have an impartial arbiter, among other rights, id. ¶ 55, and requested damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, id. at 21.
On August 26, 2015, the District removed the action to this Court. R. 1,
Notice of Removal. After failed settlement negotiations, and after the Court ensured
that the parties had conducted all the discovery they wanted, the Manleys moved
for summary judgment, R. 23, against which the District cross-moved, R. 34.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating

7

summary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 378 (2007). As noted above, both parties moved for summary judgment in
this case, so in evaluating the Manleys’ motion the Court must draw reasonable
inferences in the District’s favor, and vice-versa on the District’s motion. The Court
may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, Omnicare,
Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011), and must consider
only evidence that can “be presented in a form that would be admissible in
evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party seeking summary judgment has the
initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute and that she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460
(7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Wheeler v.
Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the adverse party
must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
III. Analysis
A. Federal Due Process Claim
1. Claudia Manley
The Court will first address the § 1983 claim as to Claudia Manley, who
asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation.3 The Fourteenth

3The

Manleys’ amended complaint explicitly references § 1983 only once, alleging
that “[d]amages might, for example, be awarded pursuant to the remedies provided by 42
U.S.C. § 1983 … .” Am. Compl. at 21. But the Manleys consistently highlight the lack of
appropriate procedures during the grievance process. See Am. Compl. ¶ 55 (“Policy 2:260 is

8

Amendment prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. “The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citations
and quotation marks omitted). Evaluating procedural due process claims entails “a
two-step process: [t]he first step requires us to determine whether the plaintiff has
been deprived of a protected interest; the second requires a determination of what
process is due.” Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
Claudia immediately runs into a problem at step one of the inquiry. She has
not alleged or explained, much less offered evidence at this summary judgment
stage, that she has been deprived of any constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest. It is undisputed that at the end of the District’s investigation, the
only tangible consequence Claudia suffered was the receipt of a letter stating that
she had “over-stepped [her] authority” by confronting the leafleters about a
perceived Board Policy violation, because individual board members “do not have
the authority to police behaviors on campus,” but “have authority only at a
publically-noticed open meeting during a vote.” 6/9/15 Board Letter. The Board also

devoid of safeguards of a party’s procedural rights, such as (but not limited to): (i) right to
an impartial arbiter … ,(ii) right to be advised of the nature of the complaint, or even the
identity of the complainant; (iii) right to respond to the complaint, (iv) right to discover the
evidence being introduced or considered, (v) right to object to evidence, (vi) right to confront
witnesses, (vii) right to appeal, etc.”); R. 25, Pls.’ Br. at 6 (arguing that “Defendants …
denied plaintiffs[] due process rights in its application” of District Policy 2:260); id. at 9-11
(making procedural due process arguments). And the defense does not dispute that the
Manleys are asserting a procedural due process violation under § 1983.

9

concluded that Claudia had violated Board Policy 8:30, which requires “mutual
respect, civility and orderly conduct among all individuals on school property or at a
school event,” because she “did not demonstrate respect or civility in [her]
interactions with [the two leafleters].” Id. (citing Policy 8:30 at 1). But no legal
interest of Claudia’s was harmed as a result of this reprimand; she did not lose her
seat on the Board, was not suspended, and did not lose any privileges of her office.
Claudia fails to explain why the receipt of this letter implicated any
constitutionally-protected interest, whether liberty or property.
Claudia does allege, however, that the District participated in “a campaign of
character assassination” that was “injurious to [her] reputation and well-being.”
Am. Compl. ¶ 17. As proof, Claudia submits articles and online postings about the
March 12 incident, as well as emails from the community calling for her resignation
from the Board. See 4/6/15 Chicago Tribune Article; Online Posting; 7/21/15 Chicago
Tribune Article; 3/15/15 Dupont Email; 3/15/15 Gallo Email. But that is not enough
to transmogrify the situation into a federal constitutional due process claim. No
protected liberty interest is at stake; the Supreme Court has held that “interest in
reputation alone” is not cognizable under the Due Process Clause. Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976). This is true “even when [defamation by the
government] causes serious impairment of one’s future employment,” Hinkle v.
White, 793 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted),
which did not even happen in Claudia’s case. To assert a liberty interest based on
reputational loss, a plaintiff must show “stigma plus,” or “the alteration of legal

10

status such as government deprivation of a right previously held, which, combined
with the injury resulting from the defamation, justif[ies] the invocation of
procedural safeguards.” Id. at 768. (citations and quotation marks omitted). For
example, in cases where the Department of Child and Family Services placed an
“indication” of child abuse and neglect in child care workers’ records, which were
located on a central registry, the state altered the workers’ legal status and affected
their liberty interest in pursuing their occupation. See Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d
493, 503 (7th Cir. 2005); Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603 (7th Cir.
2002). On the other hand, “[d]efamation alone, even if it renders it virtually
impossible for the [plaintiff] to find new employment in his chosen field … is not
enough to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hinkle,
793 F.3d at 770 (citation and quotations marks omitted) (no liberty interest
implicated when a state police investigator spread rumors that plaintiff was an
arsonist and a child molester, even when plaintiff was not able to get a job in law
enforcement afterward); see also, e.g., Doyle, 305 F.3d at 614 (“[W]hen a state actor
makes allegations that merely damage a person’s reputation, no federally protected
liberty interest has been implicated.” (citations omitted)). In this case, the District
did nothing to affect Claudia’s legal status, and no source of law “extends to
[Claudia] any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation … .” Paul, 424
U.S. at 711.
Nor has Claudia established the denial of any property interest, which exists
when there is “a legitimate claim of entitlement” to a benefit. Bd. of Regents v. Roth,

11

408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). This interest comes from an “independent source such as
state law,” or “rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. For example, state law could establish a
property interest in continued public employment. Id. Here again, Claudia has not
articulated or attempted to prove any property interest, although the District
agrees that Claudia has a legitimate claim of entitlement to her current term on the
School Board. R. 35, Defs.’ Br. at 5 (citing 105 ILCS 5/9-5, 10-10 (term of office); 105
ILCS 5/10-11 (identifying limited circumstances that disqualify sitting Board
member from office); E. St. Louis Fed’n of Teachers v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. No. 189
Fin. Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 417-18 (1997) (school board members had
protected property interests in seats on board)). But Claudia does not come close to
showing that she has been denied this property interest; as explained above, she
received only a letter of reprimand that carried no legal consequences against her
Board position. She was not removed or suspended, nor did she lose any privileges
of her position. And as the case with liberty interests, “[p]urely dignitary and nonpecuniary interests, such as professional satisfaction, personal relationships, and
reputation, do not constitute property” interests and are not actionable under the
Due Process Clause. Barrows v. Wiley, 478 F.3d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).
In sum, because the undisputed facts show that Claudia was not denied any
protected liberty or property interest, her § 1983 claim fails.

12

2. Noel Manley
Noel Manley, Claudia’s husband, asserts the same procedural due process
claim under § 1983. But for the same reasons explained above for Claudia, Noel’s
claims must be rejected as well, because there is even less of an argument that he
has been deprived of a protected interest. Like Claudia, Noel also claims “injury to
[his] reputation and well-being,” Am. Compl. ¶ 17, but nowhere in the record is
there any elaboration or proof of an injury to his, as opposed to Claudia’s,
reputation. But even had Noel shown reputational harm, he could not establish a
liberty interest. Noel was not subject to any community complaints or grievance
procedures, and he did not even come close to suffering an alteration of his legal
status. Nor has Noel established any property interest, much less the deprivation of
one, because he does not serve on the Board or claim entitlement to any other public
benefit. What’s more, even if Claudia had suffered any legally protected deprivation
(which she did not), Noel has cited no cases suggesting that he was entitled to
procedural due process during her grievance investigation solely because of his
status as her spouse. See Toronyi v. Barrington Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 220, 2005 WL
388568, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2005) (explaining that “[wife’s] retaliatory discharge
and due process claims must fail because she has no standing to challenge her
husband’s termination”). So again, no reasonable jury could find that Noel suffered
some stigma-plus to establish liberty interest, or the loss of a benefit to establish
property interest.4 5

4Another

deficiency with the Manleys’ § 1983 claims is that they fail to allege, much
less prove, municipal liability against the District. To establish municipal liability—that is,

13

For similar reasons, the Court agrees with the District that Noel lacks
standing to bring his § 1983 claim. Standing requires that a plaintiff establish, for
each claim, “(1) injury in fact, meaning an invasion of a legally protected interest
that is concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, and not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of, such that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) that a
favorable decision is likely to redress the injury.” Tobin for Governor v. Ill. State Bd.
of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 527 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). But because Noel
fails at step one—the District did not deprive him of any legally protected interest—

a government policy or custom that violates a plaintiff’s rights—a plaintiff must show “an
express policy causing the loss, a widespread practice constituting custom or usage that
caused the loss, or causation of the loss by a person with final policymaking authority.”
Kujawski v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Bartholomew Cty., Ind., 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted). But the Manleys do not attempt to explain why one of those three
theories applies.
5Although the Manleys’ amended complaint did not expressly invoke a First
Amendment claim, their summary judgment briefing makes passing references to free
speech without explaining how the District violated their First Amendment rights. E.g., R.
25, Pls.’ Br. at 3 (“[Plaintiffs] were engaged in protected First Amendment speech on March
12th” and “it is the constitutional right of any citizen reasonably to confront a wrongdoer
with a truthful reference to governing authority”); R. 38, Pls.’ Reply at 3 (“[W]ell within the
bounds of permissible First Amendment principles, [the Manleys] challenged the
offenders.”); id. at 4 (“[T]he Board Majority’s actions in this matter is part of a systemic
effort to chill the [Manleys’] First Amendment rights of Speech and Association … .”); id. at
11 (“Claudia … was exercising her own First Amendment rights on March 12th[.]”). A
potential First Amendment theory—which the Manleys do not articulate or develop in the
faintest—is that Board Policy 8:30, which requires “mutual respect, civility and orderly
conduct among all individuals on school property or at a school event,” deters the Manleys
from speaking. Another theory—again undeveloped—might have been that the District
retaliated against the Manleys for exercising their speech rights. None of the First
Amendment theories were developed in any way.
Even if the Manleys had advanced a First Amendment claim, there would have
been, at the very least, a serious obstacle because they have not shown that the letter from
the Board, which had no particular legal consequence, deterred their speech or punished
them for it. Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 878 (7th Cir. 2011) (alleged conduct must be
“likely [to] deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected
activity”).

14

there is also no causation, nor can the Court redress any non-existent injury. See
supra. The lack of standing, therefore, is an independent reason to reject Noel’s
§ 1983 claim.6
B. State-Law Declaratory Judgment Claims
The Manleys assert two additional state-law declaratory judgment claims.
First, they ask the Court to declare that the District improperly subjected Claudia
to the Uniform Grievance Procedure in District Policy 2:260, which governs
complaints about “the Board of Education, its employees, or agents.” Board Policy
2:260; R. 25, Pls.’ Br. at 6-14. According to the Manleys, Claudia was not the Board,
its employee, or its agent, but rather a member of the community who was not
covered by the Policy. Id. Second, the Manleys ask for a declaration that
“distribution of political campaign materials on school property is a clear violation
of District Policy 4:20.” Pls.’ Br. at 2. In essence, the Manleys want the Court to say
that the leafleters violated district policy on the evening of March 12, which in turn
implies that Claudia had reason to confront the leafleters.
The Court, however, declines to address these issues and instead relinquishes
jurisdiction over the state-law declaratory judgment claims.7 When the federal
claims have dropped out of a litigation, courts have discretion to decide whether to
6Because

the Court has held that the Manleys were not deprived of any substantive
right, it need not address the District’s argument that Claudia received all of the process
that she was due during the grievance procedures, or that Defendant Law is entitled to
qualified immunity.
7The Manleys have not invoked the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, but
even if they had, the “[Act] is not an independent source of federal subject matter
jurisdiction,” so “the district court must possess an independent basis for jurisdiction.” GNB
Battery Techs., Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950)).

15

relinquish the remaining state-law claims. E.g., RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP Prod. N. Am.,
Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2012); Al’s Serv. Ctr. v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., 599
F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2010). “When all federal claims in a suit in federal court are
dismissed before trial, the presumption is that the court will relinquish federal
jurisdiction over any supplemental state-law claims … , which the plaintiff can then
prosecute in state court.” Al’s Serv. Ctr., 599 F.3d at 727 (citations omitted). The
presumption in favor of relinquishing jurisdiction “is rebuttable, but it should not be
lightly abandoned, as it is based on a legitimate and substantial concern with
minimizing federal intrusion into areas of purely state law.” RWJ Mgmt. Co., 672
F.3d at 479 (quoting Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1366 (7th Cir. 1996);
Huffman v. Hains, 865 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1989)) (quotation marks omitted).
Three factors can “displace the presumption”: when “(1) the statute of limitations
has run on the [supplemental] claim, precluding the filing of a separate suit in state
court; (2) substantial judicial resources have already been committed, so that
sending the case to another court will cause a substantial duplication of effort; or (3)
[] it is absolutely clear how the [supplemental] claims can be decided.” Id. (quoting
Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505, 514-15 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Courts may also consider goals of “convenience, fairness, and comity.” See Wright v.
Associated Ins. Companies Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994).
Here, the District argues that the Court should retain jurisdiction for the
purposes of judicial economy, because “[t]his case has already consumed too many
judicial resources.” Defs.’ Br. at 14. But the Court has not committed substantial

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resources on this case to date. Indeed, the Court has not had a significant
opportunity to evaluate the case until now, after the summary judgment motions
were filed. After the District removed this case in August 2015, R. 1, the parties
scheduled a settlement conference for October, R. 16, but later canceled it, R. 19.
The District filed no dismissal motion, and the Manleys moved for summary
judgment in November, just one month after Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures were
due. R. 14-15, 23. So the parties exchanged little, if any discovery. As a result, the
Court “[is] not so enmeshed in substantive issues of state law that the presumption
in favor of remand should be set aside.” RWJ Mgmt. Co., 672 F.3d at 480
(relinquishment was proper even after district court had considered 70 motions and
issued 45 orders, because only one of the rulings were substantive); cf. Miller
Aviation v. Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors, 273 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2001)
(judicial efficiency warranted retaining jurisdiction when the district court already
invested 5 years in the litigation, after being involved in 22 motions, 9 hearings, 19
orders, and a substantive 71-page decision, and after significant effort developing a
“mastery” of the state-law issues).
The District also argues that the Court should retain jurisdiction because
“[t]he resolution of the state law claims is clear, and it would be pointless to burden
the state court with them.” Defs.’ Br. at 14. But the goals of comity and federalism
are better served by relinquishing jurisdiction, because the remaining claims are
pure issues of state law, and indeed require interpretation of local school board
policies that have the status of local administrative regulations. See 105 ILCS 5/10-

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20.5 (school boards have the authority “[t]o adopt and enforce all necessary rules for
the management and government of the public schools of their district. Rules
adopted by the school board shall be filed for public inspection in the administrative
office of the district.”); Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84,
133 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 1998) (“In Illinois, the School District’s Board of
Education has full power to manage the schools and to adopt all rules and
regulations needed for that broad purpose.”). The Circuit Court is especially wellpositioned to assess the declaratory-judgment claims because it is familiar with
local school board policies and the Manleys’ claims. Indeed, it has already
considered the challenged policies when it issued the May 2015 order denying the
Manleys’ TRO. See 5/4/15 Circuit Court Op. Thus, the presumption of relinquishing
jurisdiction is not rebutted in this case.
Finally, to be clear, although the Court previously held that Noel Manley has
no standing to bring his federal § 1983 claim, see supra Section III.A.2, the Court
makes no determination as to standing—for either party—with regards to the
declaratory judgment claims. Any procedural or substantive arguments regarding
those state-law claims will be decided by the state court.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons described above, the Manleys’ motion for summary judgment,
R. 23, is denied as to the § 1983 claims. The District’s cross motion for summary
judgment, R. 34, is granted as to the § 1983 claims. The Court makes no decision on

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the remaining state-law declaratory judgment claims, and relinquishes jurisdiction
over these claims.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: September 2, 2016

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