Raimondi v. Central DuPage Hospital

Filing 57

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 3/30/2017: For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court denies CDH's motion for summary judgment [dkt. no. 36] on the FLSA claim ( count 1) and the IMWL claim (count 2). The Court denies CDH's motion for summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim (count 5) to the extent that it seeks compensation for hours worked between 20 and 40 hours per week, and otherwise grants summary judgment in favor of CDH on this claim. The Court also grants CDH's motion for summary judgment on the IWPCA claim (count 3) and the breach of contract claim (count 4). The case is set for a status hearing on April 5, 2017 at 9:30 a.m. for the purpose of setting a trial date. (mk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ANNA RAIMONDI,

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)
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Plaintiff,
vs.
CENTRAL DUPAGE HOSPITAL as
successor to DELNOR HOSPITAL,
Defendant.

Case No. 15 C 7780

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Anna Raimondi has sued her former employer, Central DuPage Hospital (CDH),
alleging that the hospital failed to compensate her for all of the hours that she worked in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law
(IMWL), the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), and Illinois common
law. CDH has moved for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons stated
below, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of CDH on Raimondi's IWPCA and
breach of contract claims and on part of her unjust enrichment claim but otherwise
denies CDH's motion for summary judgment.
Background 1
Raimondi is a registered nurse who lives in Sugar Grove, Illinois. She earned a
bachelor's degree in nursing in 2010 and a master's degree in nursing in 2014. In 2005,
1

The facts are taken from the complaint and the parties' motions on summary
judgment. Where facts are in dispute, all reasonable inferences are made in favor of
Raimondi.

she began working at Delnor Hospital—which later merged with Central DuPage
Hospital—as a full-time staff nurse in the ICU. Raimondi was paid on an hourly basis.
In 2010, CDH began the process of seeking certification of its stroke program
from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (Joint
Commission). The Joint Commission requires certified hospitals to employ a stroke
navigator who is responsible for ensuring that stroke patients receive high-quality
treatment. The navigator is also responsible for ensuring that the hospital is in
compliance with the Joint Commission's standards for accreditation. CDH began the
process of hiring a navigator and wrote a job description for the position. The
description listed the job responsibilities, which included:
•

developing and maintaining clinical protocols and care paths;

•

monitoring adherence to clinical protocols and reporting outcome data to the
hospital's stroke team;

•

implementing and coordinating stroke response procedures with the stroke team;

•

demonstrating advanced knowledge in the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment
of stroke patients; and

•

conducting clinical rounds on stroke patients.

The job description indicated that the applicant must, at a minimum, be an Illinois
licensed registered professional nurse. CDH defined the navigator position as ".5 FTE,"
meaning that the position was limited to 20 hours of work per week. The hospital also
classified the navigator as a salaried position and exempt from wage and hours laws.
Raimondi applied and was selected for the navigator position. She also
continued to work in the ICU. Raimondi would spend 30 hours per week working at the
hospital, 20 hours per week working as the navigator, and 10 hours per week working in
the ICU. She continued to clock in and out for each position and received the same
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hourly rate for both the navigator and ICU positions.
Raimondi had numerous responsibilities as navigator. Her top priority was to
review patient charts and enter demographic and other data into a computer system.
She would also review patient charts to determine whether treating doctors and nurses
were following established protocols. Raimondi was also responsible for "rounding" on
patients, which involved meeting with patients to determine whether they were receiving
proper care and to answer any questions about treatment.
Despite the fact that the hospital budgeted 20 hours per week for the navigator
position, Raimondi regularly worked 40 hours or more per week performing her
responsibilities for that position. Despite this, CDH typically paid Raimondi for only 20
hours of work. In a few instances, Raimondi received additional pay for some of her
extra hours, but the amount was insufficient to cover all of the hours she had worked.
Raimondi notified other CDH employees that she repeatedly worked more than
20 hours per week in the navigator position. She spoke on multiple occasions with Ann
Pinkawa, the director of rehabilitation services and Raimondi's supervisor until March
2012. See Def.'s Statement of Material Facts (SOMF), Ex. C (Pinkawa Dep.) at 30:18–
31:6. Pinkawa instructed her to clock in for all hours that she worked—including those
in excess of 20 hours per week—in order to keep track of the number of hours actually
required for the position. Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts (SUDF), Ex. C (Raimondi
Dep.) at 134:13–136:15. Pinkawa then spoke with others at CDH in order to ask the
hospital to increase the navigator time allotment by .5 FTE, but the human resources
committee denied her request. Pinkawa Dep. at 31:7–14. Raimondi says that Pinkawa
made two more identical requests, both of which were denied. Raimondi Dep. at

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143:7–22. Afterwards, Pinkawa told Raimondi that she expected Raimondi to perform
the job within the .5 FTE limitation and that Raimondi should not clock in for more than
20 hours per week. Id. at 134:2–17. Pinkawa never expressly told Raimondi to work
without being punched in. Id. at 311:13–15. But Raimondi continued to work more than
20 hours per week in order to meet her supervisor's demands and complete all of the
navigator responsibilities. She did not clock in for the extra hours that she worked, and
she was not paid for these hours.
In the spring of 2011, Delnor Community Health System merged into Central
DuPage Health, doing business as Central DuPage Hospital. Raimondi remained on
the Delnor payroll system until December 2011 when the two systems merged. At that
time, CDH informed Raimondi that she could no longer work in two positions and that
she could choose which position to keep. Raimondi chose to stay on as stroke
navigator. CDH says that, beginning February 2012, it paid Raimondi a bi-weekly
salary of $1,516.40. Raimondi says that her income varied from week to week.
After the merger, Pinkawa left CDH, and Jennifer Biede, the neurosciences
director, took over the stroke program. Before leaving, Pinkawa told Biede that CDH
had denied her request to increase the navigator position to 1.0 FTE, and she asked
Biede to look into the issue again. Pl.'s SUDF, Ex. B (Pinkawa Dep. II) at 53:10–20.
Raimondi also told Biede on numerous occasions that she was having difficulty
accomplishing the navigator responsibilities during the allotted time, see Def.'s SOMF,
Ex. A (Biede Dep.) at 23:6–14; Raimondi Dep. at 119:17–120:9, and that she was
working more than 20 hours per week, see Raimondi Dep. at 415:15–417:10. In
response, Biede looked for other employees who could provide support and instructed

4

Raimondi on how to prioritize her work flow. Biede Dep. at 27:24–28:3. According to
Biede, Raimondi's priorities as navigator were to ensure that the hospital was up-to-date
with its data entry and to have daily face time with the stroke team. Id. at 28:20–29:1.
In August 2013, CDH eliminated the stroke navigator program. The hospital
terminated Raimondi's employment on September 3, 2013.
Raimondi filed suit against CDH on September 3, 2015. She alleges in count 1
of her complaint that CDH refused to pay her for hours that she worked beyond the
required 20 hours per week in violation of the FLSA and that CDH failed to pay her at an
overtime rate for any hours worked over 40 hours per week also in violation of the
FLSA. Compl. ¶¶ 42–44. Raimondi further alleges that CDH acted willfully. She also
alleges that the same conduct violates the IMWL (count 2) and the IWPCA (count 3).
Raimondi alleges in count 4 that, by creating a situation in which she was required to
work more than 20 hours per week, CDH breached the employment contract it had with
her. Id. ¶¶ 54–57. Finally, Raimondi alleges in count 5 that because CDH did not
compensate her for all of the hours she worked as navigator, CDH was unjustly
enriched by her work. Id. ¶¶ 59–62.
Discussion
CDH has moved for summary judgment on all five of Raimondi's claims. The
hospital first argues that Raimondi's FLSA claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
The hospital also argues that even if the claims are not barred, the navigator position is
exempt from the FLSA under either the learned professional or administrative
exemptions. CDH argues that the IMWL claim fails for the same reason and that the
IWPCA claim fails because Raimondi cannot demonstrate the existence of a contract.

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Finally, the hospital argues that Raimondi's common law claims are preempted and, in
the alternative, that she has not provided evidence sufficient to sustain those claims.
A court considering a motion for summary judgment takes all facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Schaefer-LaRose v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 679 F.3d 560, 572 (7th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is warranted when the
moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fat and he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., 735
F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2013).
I.

FLSA
Under the FLSA, an employer is required to pay an employee the minimum wage

for each hour that she is employed as well as "a premium wage (one and one-half times
the regular rate of pay)" for each hour that the employee works beyond forty hours per
week. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(a), 207(a). This standard applies unless the
employee falls within one of the exemptions set out in the FLSA. Schaefer, 679 F.3d at
572. The exemptions are narrowly construed, and the burden is on the employer to
demonstrate that the employee is covered by one of the exemptions. Id. CDH first
argues that Raimondi's FLSA claims are barred by the statute of limitations and,
alternatively, that the navigator position falls into an exemption under the FLSA.
Because the statute of limitations determination depends, initially, on whether there is a
genuine dispute regarding Raimondi's status as exempt, the Court considers the
exemption issue first.
A.

Exemption

CDH argues that the navigator position falls into any one of three exemptions

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under the FLSA: the learned professional exemption, the administrative exemption, and
the combination exemption. Therefore, the hospital argues, Raimondi cannot sustain
an FLSA claim based on hours worked in this position.
1.

Learned professional exemption

To qualify for the learned professional exemption, "an employee's primary duty
must be the performance of work requiring advanced knowledge in a field of science or
learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual
instruction." 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(a).
CDH argues that Raimondi's primary duties as navigator required advanced
knowledge in the field of nursing and therefore that the position qualifies for the learned
professional exemption. Def.'s Reply in Supp. of its Mot. for Summ. J. at 7–8. CDH first
cites the federal regulations interpreting the FLSA, which indicate that "[r]egistered
nurses who are registered by the appropriate State examining board generally meet the
duties requirements for the learned professional exemption." 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(e)(2).
CDH also points to the navigator job description, which indicates that an applicant must
be an Illinois registered professional nurse. See Def.'s SOMF, Ex. E (Petrella Decl.) at
Ex. 9. The hospital argues that because it required the navigator to be a registered
nurse—and because Raimondi herself is a registered nurse—any work she performed
in the navigator position falls under the learned professional exemption.
Under the regulations, however, the key question is whether Raimondi's primary
duties, as she actually performed them, required use of advanced knowledge acquired
through a course of specialized instruction. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(a)(1) ("The
employee must perform work requiring advanced knowledge." (emphasis added)).

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Therefore the fact that the hospital sought and hired a registered nurse does not carry
the day if Raimondi did not actually perform work that required use of her specialized
knowledge as a nurse.
CDH argues that Raimondi's primary duties as navigator did require her to apply
specialized knowledge acquired through her nursing education. CDH contends that her
primary duties included (1) interpreting medical records to determine whether stroke
patients received appropriate care; (2) performing patient rounds to assess the quality
of patient care and answer questions; and (3) improving the process for use of a
particular drug to treat stroke patients, among other things. Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of its
Mot. for Summ. J. at 11. Raimondi agrees that she was responsible for these tasks but
contends that most of her work did not actually require a nursing degree and could be
performed by someone with "far less skill and education." Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SOMF ¶
38. More importantly, Raimondi argues that her primary duty as navigator was data
entry and that this responsibility involved no advanced knowledge whatsoever.
"Determination of an employee's primary duty must be based on all the facts in a
particular case, with the major emphasis on the character of the employee's job as a
whole." 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). An employee's primary duty is "that which is of
principal importance to the employer, rather than collateral tasks which may take up
more than fifty percent of his or her time." Demos v. City of Indianapolis, 302 F.3d 698,
705 (7th Cir. 2002). As navigator, Raimondi was responsible for collecting specific
information about each stroke patient, tracking whether the hospital was meeting its
own guidelines, and entering the data into an Excel spreadsheet. Raimondi Dep. at
449:9–15. Raimondi has provided evidence from which a reasonable jury could find

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that CDH prioritized this task over any other navigator responsibility. She testified
during her deposition that Biede made it clear that data entry was a priority. See
Raimondi Dep. at 218:18–21. And when Raimondi had limited time remaining in her
allotted hours, Biede indicated that she should prioritize data entry over other tasks
such as rounding on patients. Id. at 218:9–18. In an e-mail to Raimondi, Biede
indicated that she should be entering data from at least five charts every day. Id. at Ex.
HH. At one point, Biede instructed Raimondi that she wanted Raimondi to enter all the
data from charts created in May—approximately twenty-five—into the system within one
week. Id. at 505:6–9. Raimondi testified that each chart takes around ninety minutes to
complete, meaning that Biede was requesting at least 37.5 hours of data-entry work
over a one-week period. Id. at 505:12–19. Biede herself testified that, in terms of the
stroke program, the priority is "to be current with your data" and that "everything is
driven by [the hospital's] data." Pl.'s SUDF, Ex. A (Biede Dep. II) at 29:20–21, 38:23–
24. A reasonable factfinder could therefore conclude that Raimondi's primary duty as
navigator was data entry.
Further, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that this data entry did not
require use of specialized nursing knowledge. Although Biede testified that nursing
knowledge was necessary to abstract the data from patient charts, she also testified
that a lot of the data the navigator collected was demographic data such as the patient's
gender and date of birth, as well as procedural information such as what time the
patient arrived at the hospital and what time he or she received a CT scan. Id. at
31:17–20. Raimondi also testified that the data she gathered mainly concerned patient
demographics and whether hospital personnel were complying with established

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procedures set out by the Joint Commission. See Raimondi Dep. at 450:17–21.
Raimondi argues—and the Court agrees—that a reasonable factfinder could conclude
that this data collection and entry did not require advanced knowledge or a course of
specialized instruction. CDH is not entitled to summary judgment based on application
of the learned professional exemption.
2.

Administrative exemption

To qualify for the administrative exemption, an employee's primary duty must be
"the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management . . . of
the employer" and must include "the exercise of discretion and independent judgment
with respect to matters of significance." 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2)–(3). The exercise of
discretion typically involves "the comparison and evaluation of possible courses of
conduct, and acting or making a decision after the various possibilities have been
considered." 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a). Further, the exercise of discretion "must be more
than the use of skill in applying well-established techniques, procedures or specific
standards" and "does not include . . . recording or tabulating data, or performing other
mechanical, repetitive, recurrent or routine work." 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(e).
The Court finds that a genuine dispute exists regarding whether the navigator
position falls into this exemption, for reasons similar to those discussed in the previous
section. Raimondi has provided evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that her primary duty was to enter data from the charts of stroke patients and
that this does not qualify as an exercise of discretion and independent judgment. Thus
a reasonable factfinder could determine that Raimondi's job did fall within the
administrative exemption under the FLSA.

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3.

Combination exemption

CDH's last argument regarding Raimondi's FLSA claim is that the navigator
position falls under the combination exemption. This exemption indicates that an
employee whose primary duty involves a combination of tasks—each of which falls
under a different exemption—is still exempt under the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 541.708. "In
other words, work that is exempt under one section of this part will not defeat the
exemption under any other section." Id. But Raimondi has shown that a genuine
dispute exists regarding whether data entry—which a reasonable factfinder could
determine was her primary duty—qualifies for either the learned professional or
administrative exemption. Therefore a genuine dispute exists regarding whether
Raimondi's primary duties fall under either of the exemptions and thus whether the
navigator position is exempt under the combination exemption.
B.

Statute of limitations

CDH also argues that Raimondi's FLSA claims are time-barred because she
failed to file her complaint within the statute of limitations. "The FLSA presumes a twoyear statute of limitations unless an employee can show that an employer acted
willfully," in which case the statute of limitations is three years. Irwin v. Wisconsin, No.
92-2509, 1993 WL 134051, at *14 (7th Cir. Apr. 28, 1993); see also 29 U.S.C. § 255.
Raimondi filed her complaint on September 3, 2015. Under the typical statute of
limitations, Raimondi can assert FLSA claims based only on conduct that occurred on or
after September 3, 2013. But CDH terminated Raimondi's employment on September
3, 2013, and thus Raimondi did not perform any work for CDH during the two-year
limitations period. For this reason, even if Raimondi's position was not exempt under

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the FLSA, there is no conduct within the limitations period on which she can base an
FLSA claim, unless she can demonstrate willfulness. If there is a genuine dispute
regarding whether CDH acted willfully in failing to compensate her as required by the
FLSA, Raimondi can maintain an FLSA claim based on uncompensated hours worked
from September 2012 through her termination in September 2013.
"An employer acts willfully . . . where he knows or shows reckless disregard for
whether his actions are unlawful under the FLSA." Bankston v. Illinois, 60 F.3d 1249,
1253 (7th Cir. 1995). Raimondi alleges in her complaint that CDH knowingly
misclassified the navigator position as salaried—and therefore exempt from wage and
hour laws—in an attempt to avoid its FLSA obligations. Compl. ¶ 12. Thus to survive
summary judgment on the issue of willfulness, Raimondi must present evidence from
which a reasonable factfinder could infer (1) that CDH knew or recklessly disregarded
the fact that she was not receiving compensation for overtime hours; and (2) that CDH
knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that it failed to compensate her for these hours
because it misclassified her as exempt under the FLSA. See Young v. Cooper
Cameron Corp., 586 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2009); Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.,
551 F.3d 1233, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008).
Raimondi has provided evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that CDH knew she was working more than 20 hours per week and was not
receiving compensation for those hours. Raimondi told Pinkawa that she was working
more than 20 hours per week. Pinkawa told her to stop clocking in for those extra hours
because the hospital would not pay for them, but also knew that Raimondi could not
accomplish the navigator responsibilities in 20 hours per week. Similarly, Biede

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stressed the importance of completing data entry even when she already knew that
Raimondi had exceeded her allotted hours for the week. Thus a genuine dispute exists
regarding whether CDH recklessly disregarded the fact that Raimondi was not being
paid for hours worked over 20 hours per week.
A genuine dispute also exists regarding whether CDH knowingly misclassified
Raimondi as exempt under either the learned professional or administrative exemptions.
As discussed above, a genuine dispute exists regarding whether Raimondi's primary
duty as navigator was to collect and enter data. A reasonable juror could infer from
Raimondi's evidence that CDH recklessly disregarded this fact. Biede repeatedly told
Raimondi that data entry was her priority and should be completed before other tasks
such as patient rounding. See Raimondi Dep. at 218:9–21. Biede also stated during
her deposition that the navigator's priority is "to be current with your data" and that
"everything is driven by [the hospital's] data." Biede Dep. II at 29:20–21, 38:23–24.
Finally, another employee, Teresa Speranza, shadowed Raimondi during her time as
navigator and reported to Biede that Raimondi spent an estimated 17.3 hours per week
on data entry tasks. See Pl.'s SUDF, Raimondi Dep. at Ex. B. A reasonable juror could
infer that CDH based the exempt classification on other navigator responsibilities, while
disregarding the fact that data entry was Raimondi's primary duty.
A genuine dispute also exists regarding whether CDH knowingly or recklessly
disregarded the fact that this data entry did not fall under either FLSA exemption. First,
CDH does not argue that Raimondi's data entry required the use of discretion and
independent judgment, as required for the administrative exemption. CDH argues
instead that Raimondi's other duties required discretion and that these duties were in

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fact her primary responsibilities. But the Court has already concluded that a reasonable
juror could infer that CDH recklessly disregarded the fact that data entry was Raimondi's
primary duty. Thus a reasonable juror could find that CDH willfully misclassified the
navigator position as exempt under the administrative exemption.
A reasonable juror could also find that CDH willfully misclassified the navigator
position as exempt under the learned professional exemption. Both Biede and
Raimondi testified that a substantial portion of the data Raimondi collected was
demographic, which arguably does not require any advanced or specialized knowledge.
Although CDH contends that Raimondi's nursing expertise was required to abstract the
data from medical charts, it has not offered any evidence of data she collected in order
to demonstrate that expertise was necessary. Thus a genuine dispute exists as to
whether CDH recklessly disregarded the fact that the data entry did not fall under the
learned professional exemption.
The Court therefore concludes that a reasonable juror could infer that CDH
willfully misclassified Raimondi as exempt in order to avoid its obligations under the
FLSA. See Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1281 (affirming a jury's determination of willfulness
based on findings that the employer knew the employees spent most of their time
performing non-exempt duties). Were a jury to make this finding, Raimondi would be
able to maintain a claim under the FLSA for the period from September 3, 2012 through
September 3, 2013. For this reason, the Court denies CDH's motion for summary
judgment on count 1.
II.

IMWL
Courts evaluate claims under the IMWL using the same standard applied to

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claims under the FLSA. See Jae Ryong Ryou v. Jae Woong Yoon, 2016 IL App (1st)
151341-U ¶ 24; Kennedy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 F.3d 365, 376 (7th Cir.
2005). Therefore the Court denies CDH's motion for summary judgment on the IMWL
claim for the same reasons discussed in the previous section. Further, the statute of
limitations for IMWL claims is three years, 820 ILCS 105/12(a), meaning that Raimondi
is not required to demonstrate willfulness in order to pursue her IMWL claims that fall
within the three-year period before she filed suit.
III.

IWPCA
The IWPCA authorizes claims only for compensation due under a contract or

agreement. Hess v. Kanoski & Assocs., 668 F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus to
prevail on a claim under the IWPCA, the plaintiff "must first show that he had a valid
contract or employment agreement." Id. The plaintiff does not need to show the
existence of a formal written contract; an agreement can be a manifestation of mutual
assent between the parties. Zabinsky v. Gelber Grp., Inc., 347 Ill. App. 3d 243, 249,
807 N.E.2d 666, 671 (2004).
The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute regarding whether CDH agreed
to provide Raimondi with additional compensation for the hours she worked beyond her
allotted time. Raimondi admits that neither Pinkawa nor anyone else promised to
compensate Raimondi for the hours that she worked without clocking in. Pl.'s Resp. to
Def.'s SOMF ¶¶ 61–63. She also admits that after the merger, no one promised her
any compensation beyond the agreed salary for 20 hours of work per week. Id. at ¶¶
68–69. No reasonable factfinder could find that CDH agreed to provide Raimondi with
the compensation she is now requesting. The Court therefore grants summary

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judgment in favor of CDH on count 3.
IV.

Common law claims
Raimondi also brings two common law claims: breach of contract and unjust

enrichment. CDH argues that both of these claims are preempted by the FLSA. It also
argues in the alternative that there is no genuine dispute as to any fact material to these
causes of action.
A.

Preemption

The FLSA preempts any state law claims brought based on the same set of facts
that seek the same relief available under the FLSA. See Sorensen v. CHT Corp., Nos.
03 C 1609 & 03 C 7362, 2004 WL 442638, *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2004); Morgan v.
SpeakEasy, LLC, 625 F. Supp. 2d 632, 659–60 (N.D. Ill. 2007). Therefore if a state law
claim for breach of contract or unjust enrichment seeks only unpaid overtime
compensation or minimum wages guaranteed by the FLSA, the claim is preempted.
Nicholson v. UTi Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-722-JPG-DGW, 2010 WL 551551, *6
(S.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2010). But the FLSA does not preempt common law claims that seek
"something other than what the FLSA can provide." Id. Thus a common law claim for
"gap time—wages for fewer than 40 hours of work per week at a rate greater than the
minimum wage" is not preempted by the FLSA. Sanchez v. Haltz Constr., Inc., No. 09
C 7531, 2012 WL 13514, *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Nicholson, 2010 WL 551551, at *6.
Raimondi claims that CDH (1) failed to compensate her at her regular rate for
hours that she worked beyond 20 hours per week; and (2) failed to compensate her at
the overtime rate for hours that she worked beyond 40 hours per week. She does not

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claim that CDH failed to provide her with minimum wage. To the extent that Raimondi's
common law claims seek compensation for hours she worked over 40 hours per week,
they are preempted by the FLSA. But Raimondi's claims for compensation for the hours
she worked between 20 and 40 hours per week are not preempted by the FLSA. The
Court therefore grants summary judgment in favor of CDH on the common law claims to
the extent they are based on unpaid overtime, but otherwise denies the motion on the
basis of preemption.
B.

Merits

CDH argues that Raimondi's breach of contract claim fails because no
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the parties had a definite agreement to pay
Raimondi for the hours she worked over 20 hours per week. CDH also argues that the
unjust enrichment claim fails because, after the merger, Raimondi was a salaried
employee and therefore she cannot bring a claim of unjust enrichment based on
performing work that was within her job description.
In order to bring a claim for breach of contract, the plaintiff must show the
existence of a valid and enforceable contract whose essential terms are "definite and
certain." Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H. Donnelly Corp., 118 Ill. 2d 306, 314, 515
N.E.2d 61, 65 (1987); see also Miller v. MacMurray Coll., 2011 IL App (4th) 100988-U ¶
44. The Court agrees that Raimondi has not provided evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the parties had a definite agreement to
compensate Raimondi for the extra hours that she worked. Raimondi has conceded
that no one at CDH—either before or after the merger—promised any additional
compensation beyond the amount she was paid for 20 hours per week. Pl.'s Resp. to

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Def.'s SOMF ¶¶ 61–63. Further, Raimondi has not provided evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could infer that CDH promised to limit her hours to 20 per week.
In fact, Raimondi has conceded that no one made her any such promise. Pl.'s Resp. to
Def.'s SOMF ¶ 70. Raimondi has therefore failed to point to evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could determine that the parties had an agreement whose terms
were sufficiently definite to support a breach of contract claim.
But a reasonable factfinder could determine that CDH was unjustly enriched. A
plaintiff bringing an unjust enrichment claim must show "that defendant voluntarily
accepted a benefit which would be inequitable for him to retain without payment."
People ex rel. Hartigan v. E & E Hauling, Inc., 153 Ill. 2d 473, 497, 607 N.E.2d 165, 177
(1992). Both CDH and Raimondi agree that CDH classified the position as .5 FTE,
meaning that the company only planned to compensate the navigator for 20 hours of
work per week. Further, Raimondi testified that her understanding was that she would
only be required to work 20 hours per week to complete the job, and that she signed
employment paperwork to this effect. Raimondi Dep. at 82:3–5, 84:11–85:17, 112:10–
113:13. But it quickly became apparent, to both Raimondi and her supervisors, that she
could not complete the navigator responsibilities within the .5 FTE. Despite this fact,
Raimondi says that her supervisors still expected her to complete her job and instead
asked her not to clock in for hours she worked over her allotment. Taking the facts in
the light most favorable to Raimondi, the evidence shows that she put in well over the
anticipated 20 hours per week as navigator and yet CDH would not pay her for the extra
time. A reasonable factfinder could therefore conclude that CDH unjustly received the
benefit of Raimondi's work without compensating her for all of her efforts. The Court

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therefore denies CDH's motion for summary judgment on count 5.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies CDH's motion for summary judgment
[dkt. no. 36] on the FLSA claim (count 1) and the IMWL claim (count 2). The Court
denies CDH's motion for summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim (count 5) to
the extent that it seeks compensation for hours worked between 20 and 40 hours per
week, and otherwise grants summary judgment in favor of CDH on this claim. The
Court also grants CDH's motion for summary judgment on the IWPCA claim (count 3)
and the breach of contract claim (count 4). The case is set for a status hearing on April
5, 2017 at 9:30 a.m. for the purpose of setting a trial date.

________________________________
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge
Date: March 30, 2017

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