Samuels v. Schneider National Carriers Inc. et al
Filing
65
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 9/25/2018. Mailed notice. (mgh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Ruperto Samuels,
Plaintiff,
v.
Schneider National Carriers,
Defendant.
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)
)
)
)
) Case No. 15 C 8468
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Memorandum Opinion and Order
Plaintiff Ruperto Samuels was hired in July of 2012 as a
Regional Safety and Training Manager for defendant trucking company
Schneider National Carriers. His job duties included facilitating
periodic safety meetings and driver training programs for newly hired
drivers who flew to Chicago to attend programs at Schneider’s
training academy. In March of 2014, while plaintiff was off work due
to a work-related injury, one of his subordinates voiced a suspicion
that plaintiff had been misusing the company’s “fuel card” for
personal purposes. (The fuel card was normally used to purchase gas
for a corporate van that shuttled drivers to and from the training
academy.) After plaintiff’s supervisor, Dan Drella, investigated the
suspicion, defendant engaged an outside investigator to question
plaintiff about his use of the fuel card, as well as about a balance
Drella discovered plaintiff was carrying for personal expenses on
his corporate American Express card. At the close of the interview,
the investigator offered plaintiff two options: either he could sign
a pre-printed resignation letter, in which case defendant would
forget the suspect fuel purchases and pay off the American Express
balance; or he could choose not to resign, in which case defendant
would pursue criminal charges against him for theft. Plaintiff signed
the letter, then filed this lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil
Rights
Act
and
Illinois
state
law.
He
claims
that
he
was
discriminated against based on his race, and that he was forced to
resign in retaliation for complaining about race-based harassment
and for filing a workers’ compensation claim for his work injury.
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on each of these
claims. For the reasons explained below, I grant the motion.
I.
The facts recounted here are undisputed except where noted.1
Plaintiff is an African-American man of Cuban origin. His first yearend performance review as Schneider’s Regional Safety and Training
1
Some of the facts are drawn from my own review of the record, since
many of the parties’ L.R. 56.1 submissions—which incorporate legal
argument, evidentiary objections, and lengthy non-responsive
remarks—veer far afield of the letter and spirit of the Local Rule.
As I have observed on several occasions, L.R. 56.1 is intended to
facilitate the ascertainment of factual disputes. See, e.g.,
Grabianski v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 169 F. Supp. 3d
785, 788-89 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing cases). When parties populate
their submissions with objections and arguments rather than with
“concise” factual statements and clear citations to competent
evidence, they subvert the rule’s essential purpose.
2
Manager, which was completed by his then-supervisor Kris Maczollek,
was positive. In August of 2013, plaintiff began reporting to Dan
Drella, who met with plaintiff on several occasions in late 2013 and
early 2014 to discuss the high number of crashes in the Chicago
region and strategies for improving defendant’s safety results.
On one such occasion in November of 2013, Drella directed
plaintiff “to take specific steps to help reduce the number of
crashes.” Samuels Dep., Exh. 1 to Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., 137:24138:7. At another meeting the following month, Drella gave plaintiff
“a list of items that [he] needed to do or make sure were done,”
including catching up on training and keeping training current;
conducting post-incident reviews within 48 hours; improving “the
depth
of
analysis”
plaintiff
provided
to
Chicago’s
operations
manager; and “delegat[ing] better.” Id. at 140:12-25, 141:11-142:2.
And at a meeting in February of 2014, Drella identified additional
steps he wanted to see plaintiff take to reduce crashes, including
a “strongly increased field visibility.” Id. at 148:6-9. Drella
reinforced the visibility point in an email he sent plaintiff on
February 19, 2014, telling him “that instead of working at home he
wanted [plaintiff] to come into the operations center to be visible
and to talk to drivers” because he “believed [plaintiff’s] presence
in the Chicago operations center was important.” Id. at 151:20152:4.
3
Drella
states
that
plaintiff
“struggled
with
his
job
responsibilities,” and that he instructed plaintiff “to be more
proactive...to get out into the yard, go out on the rail ramp, watch
the drivers and see where they were having crashes” and “to stay on
top of training.” Drella Decl., Exh. D. to Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Smt.,
¶¶ 4, 5. Plaintiff agrees that the number of crashes in the Chicago
region was too high and that Drella instructed him to take certain
steps to improve the region’s safety results, but he disputes that
the poor safety results reflected any shortcomings in his own
performance. In plaintiff’s view, “there were certain things that
[Drella] wasn’t really aware of,” id. at 148:23-24, and he believed
that Drella “was giving [him] directives for things that [he] had
already completed,” id. at 150:14-17.
On
February
defendant’s
Human
19,
2014,
Resources
plaintiff
Business
called
Partner
Angie
to
Sheedlo,
complain
about
Drella’s supervision. At his August 25, 2016, deposition, plaintiff
testified that he did not recall what was said during that call. He
stated, however, that an email he sent to Sheedlo the following day
accurately summarized their conversation. Id. at 153:4-5, 17-18. The
email states:
As I stated in our conversation yesterday I believe that
I am being set up to fail. In every conversation with my
leader [i.e. Drella] there has been the tone focusing on
our current safety results being negative as due to
something that I am not doing.
Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. I. The email continues,
4
my perception of my leader’s attitude towards me over the
past few months is that he is increasingly negative and I
feel that I am being harassed, and that I am possibly being
set up for termination. …. I do not feel that I am being
heard, and that the expectation is not consistent.
Id. Nowhere in the email did plaintiff express that he believed
Drella was harassing him because of his race. At his deposition,
however, plaintiff testified that he believed Drella’s harassment
was race-based, Samuels Dep. at 262:14-18, and in his June 11, 2018,
declaration, he states that he told Sheedlo as much during their
February 19, 2014, phone call. Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. 6 at ¶ 4.
Sheedlo denies that plaintiff ever complained of race-based
harassment. She testified that the concerns plaintiff expressed in
February
of
2014
related
to
Drella’s
leadership
and
poor
communication of his expectations. Sheedlo Dep., Pl.’s L.R. 56.1
Stmt., Exh. 7 at 44:11-46:8. Accordingly, while Sheedlo discussed
plaintiff’s concerns with Drella, she did not tell Drella that
plaintiff had complained about being harassed because of his race.
Id. at 46:10-13. See also Drella Dep. 69:1-3 (denying that Sheedlo
told him plaintiff had complained about harassment).
On February 25, 2014, Drella talked to plaintiff about a
performance improvement plan (“PIP”). The following day, plaintiff
sent Drella an email stating,
[Y]ou have no grounds to put me on a PIP…. This is not a
performance issue on my part. I believe…that this is a
direct result of my discussion with Angie Sheedlo
expressing my concern about being harassed and expressing
my feelings and my perception that my job was in jeopardy.
5
If I am to be put on a PIP, my perception is that it would
be due to retaliation for those actions.
Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. J. Nothing in this email indicated that
plaintiff
had
reported
or
discussed
race-based
harassment
with
Sheedlo.
Days later, while conducting a safety seminar at a local hotel
the weekend of February 28-March 1, 2014, plaintiff injured his knee.
He reported the injury to Drella on Sunday, March 2. Plaintiff did
not return to work the following day, and he remained off work until
May
6,
2014.
During
his
absence,
he
submitted
paperwork
in
conjunction with a workers’ compensation claim. On March 7, 2014,
Sheedlo and Drella called plaintiff to discuss his PIP, a paper copy
of which he received in the mail a few days later.
While plaintiff was off work due to his knee injury, one of his
subordinates, Pauletta Wood, approached Drella and expressed her
concern that plaintiff had been keeping the company fuel card on his
person. At her deposition, Wood explained that the fuel card had
previously
been
accessible
to
employees
at
several
different
locations, but that at some point, plaintiff took control of the
card and gave it to other employees only when they needed it to fuel
the corporate van. Wood suspected that plaintiff was using the fuel
card to fuel his personal vehicles. Wood Dep., Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt.,
Exh. 9 at 120:3-9.
6
Drella investigated Wood’s concern by obtaining a report from
Schneider’s
travel
department
that
contained
information
about
purchases made with the fuel card. Drella also spoke with other
employees who used the card. Drella Dep. at 128:19-21. Drella
analyzed the fuel report and discovered a number of purchases he
found “unusual.” For example, he identified “a series of purchases
that seemed very unusual both in terms of the odometer reading, the
date, time, so somewhere on a Saturday or a Sunday where the van
shouldn’t have been operating necessarily.” Id. at 128:25-129:4. In
addition, Drella noticed that purchases were made at a gas station
located two miles from plaintiff’s home, which was far from where
the van normally operated. Id. at 129:11-20. Drella determined that
none of the other employees responsible for fueling the training
academy van lived near the location of these purchases. Id. at
129:21-130:8.
The fuel report also revealed an instance in which the fuel
card had been used twice in the same day, at two different locations.
According to Drella, because the combined fuel purchases on that day
exceeded the capacity of the van’s fuel tank, he concluded that
“there
was
something
-
something
that
couldn’t
logically
be
rationalized there.” Id. at 135:6-11. And on another occasion, the
fuel card was used for a gas purchase at the gas station near
plaintiff’s home within four minutes of another gas purchase at the
7
same gas station on plaintiff’s corporate American Express card. Id.
at 133:4-17.
Drella shared his findings with his supervisor, Don Aiken, and
with Sheedlo on or around March 28, 2014. Drella testified that at
that time, he recommended confronting plaintiff with the evidence,
and if plaintiff admitted to wrongdoing, he would be offered the
opportunity to resign. If plaintiff denied misusing the fuel card,
he would be placed on leave while defendant conducted additional
investigations. Aiken and Sheedlo agreed with Drella’s recommended
approach. Drella Dep., 209:6-212:3.
Neither Drella nor Sheedlo told plaintiff during his work
absence about Drella’s investigation into his use of the fuel card,
although they communicated with him about other matters and sent a
PIP to his home. On April 28, 2014, plaintiff filed a charge of race
discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC. The charge states:
During my employment with Respondent I was subjected to a
hostile work environment based on my race. I complained to
respondent about the hostility toward me and immediately
after I was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan.
I believe that I have been discriminated against because
of my race, and retaliated against for engaging in
protected activity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. 22.
Plaintiff was medically cleared to return to work on May 6,
2014. Upon learning of plaintiff’s imminent return, Sheedlo and
Drella referred the fuel card investigation to defendant’s Corporate
8
Security Manager, Terry Wood, who engaged an outside investigator to
interview
plaintiff
about
the
matters
Drella
uncovered
in
his
investigation. Wood requested that the outside investigator be armed
during the interview and stated that the agent’s “primary mission”
was “to interview/integrate (sic) for a signed confession.” Pl.’s
L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. 16.
Upon
his
return
to
work,
plaintiff
was
questioned
by
investigator Michael Quiroz about his use of the fuel and American
Express cards. During the interview, which Sheedlo also attended,
plaintiff admitted that he had used the fuel card to fill up his own
vehicle; that he might have done so at the gas station two miles
from his home; and that no one had authorized him to do so. Sheedlo
Decl.,
Def.’s
L.R.
56.1
Stmt.,
Exh.
A
(including
exhibits).2
Plaintiff also admitted that he had a balance on the American Express
card that included charges for personal expenses, which he understood
were his responsibility. Samuels Dep., 121:16-19, 124:14-19.
Quiroz then offered plaintiff an opportunity to resign his
employment. In plaintiff’s words, Quiroz told him, “if I agreed to
2
In his L.R. 56.1(b)(3) responses, plaintiff “moves to strike”
Sheedlo’s declaration to the extent it relies on her handwritten and
typed notes that are attached as exhibits to her declaration. Setting
aside that L.R. 56.1 statements are not appropriate vehicles for
moving for relief, plaintiff’s hearsay objection is unpersuasive in
view of Sheedlo’s sworn statement that she: took the handwritten
notes contemporaneously with the interview; transcribed, signed and
dated them the same day pursuant to her usual practice; and retained
them in the regular course of her business duties for defendant. See
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
9
resigning…they would allow me to resign and they would have all this
taken care of, Schneider would pay for whatever I owed and that would
be it. If not, then they would press criminal charges on me.”
Id.
at 125:19-22. Plaintiff did not believe he was being terminated for
misuse of the corporate gas card; instead, he believed that if he
didn’t resign, he would be arrested and prosecuted. Id. at 126:2-5;
129:4-5. Plaintiff testified that he could have resolved any issues
surrounding his use of the fuel and American Express cards by
“talk[ing] to somebody,” but that Quiroz left him with “no choice”
but to sign the resignation agreement. Id. at 126:23-127:3. Plaintiff
signed the resignation letter, and this lawsuit followed.
II.
Summary
judgment
is
appropriate
if
the
moving
party
demonstrates that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material
fact” and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). To determine if that is the case, I must, wherever
reasonable, construe all factual disputes and draw all inferences in
the non-movant’s favor.
Cole v. Board of Trustees of Northern
Illinois University, 838 F.3d 888, 895 (7th Cir. 2016). If a fairminded jury reviewing the evidence could return a verdict for the
non-movant, summary judgment must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee on the
basis of race, among other characteristics, with respect to the
10
material terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a). In this case, plaintiff presses a disparate treatment
theory of discrimination, arguing that he was forced to resign, and
that he suffered other adverse employment actions, because of his
race.3 He articulates a laundry list of putative adverse actions: 1)
his placement on a PIP; 2) a diminution of his job responsibilities;
3) defendant’s efforts to obtain evidence from the hotel where he
injured his knee; 4) defendant’s dispute of his workers’ compensation
claim; 5) defendant’s denial of a portion of a claim he submitted
for reimbursement of certain business expenses; and 6) his forced
termination.
Two of the items on this list—the diminution of plaintiff’s
responsibilities
and
defendant’s
challenge
of
his
workers’
compensation claim—do not require analysis because plaintiff cites
no competent evidence suggesting that defendant actually took either
action. Two others—plaintiff’s placement on a PIP and the denial of
3
Although plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleged “a hostile work
environment based on [plaintiff’s] race,” and both the complaint and
the record refer to race-based “harassment,” it is clear from
plaintiff’s argument that he is not relying on a hostile work
environment/harassment theory of Title VII liability. Indeed,
plaintiff does not identify the standard that applies to such claims
or argue that his evidence satisfies it. See Cole v. Board of
Trustees of Northern Illinois University, 838 F.3d 888, 895-96 (7th
Cir. 2016) (harassment claims require evidence that: 1) the employee
was subject to harassment; 2) the harassment was race-based; 3) the
harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of
the employee’s work environment; and 4) there is a basis for employer
liability). At all events, my review of the evidence confirms that
plaintiff is not entitled to a trial on this theory.
11
his claim for business expenses—do not support his discrimination
claim because the record does not reasonably suggest that either
action effectuated a material change in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of his employment. Langenback v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
761 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2014) (implementation of a PIP is not a
materially adverse action); Fyfe v. City of Fort Wayne, 241 F.3d
597, 603 (7th Cir. 2001) (refusal to reimburse business expenses
incurred to attend a seminar not an adverse employment action). As
for defendant’s efforts to obtain evidence relevant to his workers’
compensation
claim,
plaintiff
fails
to
explain
how
defendant’s
conduct was inappropriate.
This leaves only plaintiff’s coerced resignation. Although
defendant disputes that its resign-or-we-press-charges ultimatum
amounted
to
a
constructive
discharge,
a
jury
could
reasonably
conclude that defendant’s approach communicated to plaintiff that
his termination was imminent. See Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc.,
621 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2010) (constructive discharge occurs
when employer acts in a manner that would communicate to a reasonable
employee that he will be terminated). Where plaintiff’s claim loses
traction, however, is on the absence of any evidence that Drella—
the undisputed decisionmaker—coerced plaintiff’s resignation because
of plaintiff’s race. Plaintiff does not assert that Drella ever used
a racial epithet, expressed racial prejudice, or made any race-based
remark to him or to anyone else. Plaintiff makes passing reference
12
to racially offensive comments that he attributes to an employee
named
Bill
involvement
Bone,
in
but
the
he
fuel
does
card
not
suggest
investigation
that
or
Bone
in
his
had
any
forced
termination. Indeed, plaintiff suggests no link at all between Bone’s
comments and any adverse action he claims to have suffered.
And while plaintiff argues that similarly situated, non-African
American employees were treated better than he was, the record does
not support that contention. Plaintiff does not identify any other
employee investigated for misuse of corporate funds who remains
employed by defendant. Nor does he offer evidence that any other
employee used the fuel card in the manner he admitted to using it
himself, or who carried a balance on his corporate American Express
card after receiving reimbursement for the business expenses charged
to the card.4 Plaintiff’s comparator analysis rests on the vague
assertion the Caucasian employee who preceded him as the Chicago
safety manager was promoted, not forced to resign, even though he
4
Plaintiff urges me to strike the fuel reports and “all evidence
concerning [plaintiff’s] fuel purchases” as hearsay and as a sanction
for defendant’s failure to preserve receipts that would have provided
more specific information about the fuel purchases. These objections
lack merit, however, because my analysis does not turn on whether
the information contained in the fuel reports was either accurate or
sufficient to establish misconduct by plaintiff. Drella testified
that he interpreted the reports as suggesting possible misconduct,
and as discussed above, plaintiff offers no evidence to suggest that
Drella conducted his review in bad faith, i.e., as a pretext for
discrimination. See Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 415 (7th
Cir. 1997) (“Title VII does not prohibit unfairness or wrongheaded
decisions in the workplace.”) (citing cases).
13
“used his American Express card for personal matters and had issues
with safety in the same Chicago market.” But this cursory treatment
of the issue falls far short of establishing a triable claim of
disparate treatment. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th
Cir 2012) (“Similarly situated employees must be directly comparable
to the plaintiff in all material respects.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). At all events, the undisputed evidence
shows that plaintiff was not forced to resign because he used the
American Express card for personal expenses or failed to improve
defendant’s safety results, but because, in addition to using the
fuel card in an unauthorized manner, he failed to “pay for [his]
share” of the monthly American Express charges—which he acknowledges
he was expected to do. See Drella Dep. at 163:5-164:3; Samuels Dep.
at 47:25-48:13.
Even assuming that plaintiff genuinely believed that his use of
the cards was appropriate, his subjective view of his own conduct
does
not,
without
more,
raise
an
inference
of
discrimination.
Pilditch v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago. 3 F.3d 1113, 1119
(7th Cir. 1993). Yet the record contains nothing but plaintiff’s own
speculation to suggest that racial animus motivated the challenged
actions. Asked why he believed Drella was harassing him based on his
race, plaintiff responded:
I just felt that there was a difference between me and my
peers.….[I]t just didn’t feel right. I felt like it had to
do with me, maybe the color of my skin, maybe it’s – it
14
had to have been something different. I just didn’t know
what else to point my finger to because he didn’t show me
anything else different that I could look at and say he
does that with everybody. It was more every time he spoke
to me it felt like he was uncomfortable with me. I don’t
know if I could say he just didn’t like me. I could tell
it was something to do with me, physically dealing with
me.”
Id. at 262:20-263:9. In essence, plaintiff surmises that Drella’s
ongoing criticism of his work—which plaintiff felt was unjustified—
must have been based on his race. But “[m]ere subjective beliefs by
the plaintiff—without the backing of hard evidence—cannot prove that
an action was inspired by improper motivations.” Pilditch 3 F.3d at
1119. Absent concrete “evidence of disparate treatment based on
race,” no reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff was subject
to race discrimination. Cole, 838 F.3d at 901.
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under Title VII fares no better.
Plaintiff’s central theory is that Drella retaliated against him
after he complained to Sheedlo on February 19 and 20, 2014. But this
theory falters at the gate because the record does not support the
inference
that
plaintiff’s
complaints
to
Sheedlo
amounted
to
protected activity. To be protected under Title VII, a complaint
“must indicate the discrimination occurred because of sex, race,
national origin, or some other protected class…. Merely complaining
in general terms of discrimination or harassment, without indicating
a connection to a protected class or providing facts sufficient to
create that inference, is insufficient.” Orton-Bell v. Indiana, 759
15
F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2014) (ellipses in original) (citations
omitted). At his 2016 deposition, plaintiff testified that he did
not recall what was said in his telephone conversation with Sheedlo,
but that his email to her the following day—which said nothing about
race-based
harassment—accurately
summarized
their
conversation.
While plaintiff reversed course in his 2018 declaration, stating
affirmatively that he did tell Sheedlo that Drella was harassing him
based on his race, that statement directly contradicts his earlier
testimony and cannot, standing alone, create a genuine factual
dispute. See Simmons v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 289 F.3d 488, 492 (7th
Cir. 2002) (a party “may attempt to clarify or augment (but not
contradict) prior deposition testimony through affidavits”). At all
events, even if I accept plaintiff’s later statement, there is no
evidence that Sheedlo told Drella—the undisputed author of the
alleged retaliation—that plaintiff had complained about race-based
harassment. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish the required
“causal link” between his complaints and the claimed retaliation.
Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 897 F.3d 835, 841
(7th
Cir.
2018)
(“[t]o
retaliate
against
a
complainant,
plaintiff’s
half-hearted
decisionmakers must be aware of the complaint.”).
The
same
deficiency
undermines
argument that defendant retaliated against him for filing a charge
of discrimination with the EEOC on April 28, 2014. While the filing
of that charge undeniably qualifies as protected activity, most of
16
the conduct plaintiff claims was retaliatory occurred before he filed
the charge. Indeed, only his resignation occurred later. Plaintiff
insists that because defendant “never produced its copy of the EEOC
charge,” a jury could conclude that defendant knew about the charge
“earlier”
than
May
5,
2014,
when
Sheedlo
referenced
it
in
a
communication with Quiroz. But it is hard to see what plaintiff gains
from that inference, since Drella had undisputedly decided by late
March—long before plaintiff filed the EEOC charge—that if plaintiff
admitted to misusing the fuel card, he would be forced either to
resign or face additional investigation. The sequence of events
simply does not add up to an inference of retaliation based on
plaintiff’s filing of the EEOC charge.
This leaves only plaintiff’s state law claim for retaliatory
discharge. Having determined that summary judgment of plaintiff’s
federal
claims
is
appropriate,
however,
I
decline
to
exercise
supplemental jurisdiction to decide this claim.
III.
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
defendant’s
motion
for
judgment is granted.
ENTER ORDER:
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: September 24, 2018
17
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