Coffey-Sears v. Lyons Township High School District 204

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 3/31/2017:Mailed notice(rth, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARIBETH COFFEY-SEARS,
Plaintiff,
v.
LYONS TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL
DISTRICT 204,
Defendant.

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No. 15-cv-08642
Judge Andrea R. Wood

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Maribeth Coffey-Sears brought this lawsuit against her employer, Lyons
Township High School District 204 (“District”), alleging that the District violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 120101 et seq., by discriminating against her and
subjecting her to a hostile work environment because of her disabilities: diabetes and
fibromyalgia. The District has moved for summary judgment on all of Coffey-Sears’s claims.
The Court grants that motion for the reasons that follow.
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed or have been deemed
admitted. Plaintiff Coffey-Sears is an art teacher for Lyons Township High School District 204,
a public high school in the western suburbs of Chicago. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Stmt. Undisputed
Facts (“PRDSUF”) ¶¶ 1, 2, Dkt. No. 29.) The District operates two campuses, the North Campus
located in LaGrange and the South Campus located in Western Springs. (Id. ¶ 1.) Coffey-Sears
started at the District in 1991 and eventually earned tenure. (Id. ¶ 2.) At issue in this lawsuit is
the school’s accommodation of and response to Coffey-Sears’s disabilities.

Born with diabetes, Coffey-Sears did not present any metabolic or diabetic symptoms
from this disease until her fourth pregnancy in 2005. (App. of Exs. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.
(“AESDMS”) Ex. 2, Dkt. No. 27-2 at 4 of 110.) Her diabetic symptoms include hypoglycemic
episodes, which Coffey-Sears can avoid by eating at specific times. Coffey-Sears also suffers
from fibromyalgia, which causes her to experience chronic pain and balances issues. (Id.) As a
result of these symptoms, Coffey-Sears has trouble walking and standing for more than an hour.
She uses a wheelchair for activities that require travelling long distances on foot. (Id.)
I.

Facts Regarding Coffey-Sears’s Accommodation Requests
A.

Early Lunch

The conduct at issue in this complaint began in 2013. The earliest incident alleged in the
lawsuit occurred on May 6, 2013, when the Chair of the Fine Arts Division, Nicholas Gehl,
emailed the draft master schedule to the school’s art teachers. (PRDSUF ¶ 7.) The original 20132014 schedule had Coffey-Sears taking lunch at eighth period. (AESDMS Ex. 10, Dkt. No. 27-4
at 5 of 77.) Coffey-Sears immediately emailed Gehl back and told him that the eighth period
lunch would not work because her medication did not allow her to go for long periods of time
between meals. (Id.) Gehl responded the next day and told Coffey-Sears the school could
accommodate an earlier lunch for her but would require a note from her doctor prescribing this
accommodation. (Id. at 4 of 77.) Coffey-Sears complained that this was unnecessary since she
had already provided a note from her doctor regarding this request several years ago. (PRDSUF
¶ 10.) As such, Coffey-Sears told Gehl that she was not obligated to provide the district with this
material again. (AESDMS Ex. 10, Dkt. No. 27-4 at 4 of 77.) The issue was escalated to Edward
Piotrowski, the District’s Director of Human Resources, who had an in-person meeting with
Coffey-Sears. (PRDSUF ¶ 12.)

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On May 14, 2013, the same day Piotrowski met with Coffey-Sears, he received a letter
from her doctor stating that she required “[l]unch by noon or earlier.” (Id. ¶ 13.) A couple of
days later, Piotrowski received a letter from a different physician asking that Coffey-Sears be
permitted to eat lunch within four or five hours after breakfast due to her diabetes. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Piotrowski asked Coffey-Sears for further information about these accommodation requests.
Shortly thereafter, one of Coffey-Sears’s doctors sent a letter explaining the requested
accommodations. (Id. ¶ 15.)
With all medical documentation accounted for, the District made the requested change to
Coffey-Sears’s schedule. On May 29, 2013, Gehl sent Coffey-Sears an email confirming the
adjustment. (Id. ¶ 16.) Coffey-Sears responded, stating that the schedule looked good, except for
the fact that she only had a single-period for lunch first-semester. Coffey-Sears expressed
concern about getting from her classroom to the lunchroom and negotiating lines at the lunch
counter in one period. But she stated that they could “wait and see and make adjustments at that
time, or discuss being proactive and changing that now.” (Id.) On May 31, 2013, Piotrowski met
with Coffey-Sears to discuss a number of her accommodation requests, including the extended
lunch period. Piotrowski told Coffey-Sears that her doctors’ notes did not reference the need for
an extended lunch, and she would need to provide further documentation to that effect if she
required that accommodation. (Id. ¶ 17.)
After the schedule was changed to accommodate an earlier lunch for Coffey-Sears, other
art teachers started making comments blaming her for issues resulting from the schedule change.
One teacher, Carlene Kinzie, told Coffey-Sears, “Our schedules are changed, we don’t know
what rooms we are going to be in, what order, if we’re teaching this class or that class. Why do
they have to be changed for you?” (Id. ¶ 69.) Lorena Logis asked her, “Well, why is this

3

happening?” Coffey-Sears believed Logis was upset with her because Logis’s voice got louder.
Another teacher, Mary Rohlicek, expressed frustration with the changes and concern about
materials being delivered on time. Later, at the beginning of the 2013-2014 school year, Matt
Brod made statements to Coffey-Sears in relation to her changed lunch period such as,
“Everything centers around you. Why should it be that way?” (Id.) Notably, Kinzie continued to
make comments throughout the 2013-2014 school year, and beyond, about how Coffey-Sears’s
accommodation requests would affect other teachers and the department. (Id. ¶ 71.)
B.

Restroom Access

In addition to an earlier lunch, Coffey-Sears’s physician also requested she be able “to
use the restroom intermittently and at short notice throughout the day.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Piotrowski
was amenable to meeting this request, but noted “the need for continuous supervision of
students” and informed Coffey-Sears “that leaving the class at any time, and leaving students
unsupervised, is not something that we can allow.” (AESDMS Ex. 16, Dkt. No. 27-4.) CoffeySears agreed to provide coverage with the front desk should she need to use the restroom in the
middle of class. (PRDSUF ¶ 18.) During the 2013-2014 school year, Coffey-Sears had to leave
her classroom to use the restroom about once a month. On each of these occasions, she was able
to have another staff member supervise her classroom while she used the facilities. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Because Coffey-Sears never told Piotrowski that this arrangement was not working out, he
believed that she was satisfied with the District’s response. (Id. ¶ 20.)
As it turns out, however, Coffey-Sears was not satisfied with this arrangement.
Specifically, the location of the women’s restroom proved challenging for Coffey-Sears. Her
classroom was in the basement and whenever she needed to use the restroom, she had to go to
the first floor women’s room. (AESDMS Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 27-1 at p. 102.) In order to avoid

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navigating the stairs and distance required to get to the women’s restroom, Coffey-Sears asked
that the District allow her to use a restroom located in the foyer of the building. This restroom
had been shut down in 2010 due to maintenance costs and the fact that it was not wheelchair
accessible. (PRDSUF ¶ 21.) Alternatively, Coffey-Sears requested to use the men’s restroom
near her assigned classroom. (Id. ¶ 22.) Ultimately, Coffey-Sears did not end up using either of
these restrooms.
C.

Buildings and Grounds Team

Sometime over the summer of 2013, Coffey-Sears sent a note to the District’s Buildings
and Grounds team asking that they make some adjustments to her classroom. (AESDMS Ex. 17,
Dkt. No. 27-4.) The changes were primarily to allow her to use her wheelchair in the classroom
and to limit the amount of walking needed to reach critical areas of the classroom. (PRDSUF
¶ 28.) Piotrowski was contacted about this request and emailed Coffey-Sears to confirm that
Buildings and Grounds would accommodate any moves. (Id. ¶ 30.) On August 17, 2013, the
Saturday before the first day of school, Coffey-Sears went to her classroom and found that it had
not been changed per her request. (Id. ¶ 31.) When she discovered this, Coffey-Sears went to an
unidentified person, whom she believes was the lead building foreman, and asked for help
rearranging her room. The man told Coffey-Sears that the Buildings and Grounds staff were
busy with other jobs and would not be able to assist her at that time. Since school was going to
start that Monday, August, 19, 2013, Coffey-Sears got her husband and son to help her rearrange
the room. (Id.)
D.

Handicap Parking

The following week, on August 20, 2013, Coffey-Sears sent an email to Piotrowski
regarding handicap parking at the school. (Id. ¶ 23.) According to that email, Coffey-Sears spoke

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to an unnamed secretary about her handicap parking sticker, which she was in the process of
obtaining. The secretary informed Coffey-Sears that the school had more people in need of
handicap parking spots than spots available. The secretary did, however, assign Coffey-Sears a
parking space. She also warned Coffey-Sears that the assigned spot was “too far from the
building,” and said if Coffey-Sears wanted a closer option she would have to “simply arrive
earlier.” (Id.) Coffey-Sears stated that she wanted to bring this to Piotrowski’s attention in hopes
that “perhaps data could be collected to re-evaluate the increased need[]” for handicap parking.
(AESDMS Ex. 18, Dkt. No. 27-4.) Coffey-Sears specifically told Piotrowski not to “interpret this
email as a necessity to meet,” but just as an informative message. (Id.) During the rest of the
2013-2014 school year, Coffey-Sears never advised Piotrowski that the she was having difficulty
finding parking close enough to the building. (PRDSUF ¶ 25.)
E.

Classroom Observation

Several months later, then-Interim Fine Arts Division Chair Sam Robinson conducted a
classroom observation of Coffey-Sears. (Id. ¶ 34.) On October 18, 2013, Robinson sent CoffeySears his feedback from the unannounced observation. (AESDMS Ex. 21, Dkt. No. 27-4 at 37 of
77.) The report includes a brief summary of Robinson’s observations, followed by positive
observations and suggestions for improvement. (Id. at 38–39 of 77.) In the suggestions for
improvement section, Robinson states:
You remained at your computer for approximately 20 minutes. As a result, you were
unable to observe several groups of students who were in many different areas of the
room. Please monitor students by varying your position in the classroom as much as
possible.
(Id. at 39 of 77.) Coffey-Sears objected to this criticism, alleging that her mobility issues
prevented her from moving about the classroom. (PRDSUF ¶ 37.) In response to this objection,
the District revised the assessment by replacing the sentence “Please monitor students by varying
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your position in the classroom as much as possible” with “Please think of effective strategies to
monitor students.” (Id.)
F.

Sick Bank

Health issues seem to have plagued Coffey-Sears throughout the first-half of the 20132014 school year. Indeed, by December 31, 2014, Coffey-Sears had exhausted all of her
available sick days, as well as 3.9 days beyond her available balance. (Id. ¶ 41.) Accordingly, on
January 27, 2015, the District notified Coffey-Sears that it would deduct 3.9 days from her salary
over four payroll periods. (Id.) Coffey-Sears replied to this email, stating that she assumed the
3.9 extra days would be covered by the Sick Bank or some other accommodation. (Id.) The Sick
Bank is a contractually-provided benefit, which allows participating teachers to draw from the
Bank once they have depleted their own sick days and been on unpaid status for five school days
due to a “catastrophic illness.” (Id. ¶ 39.) Piotrowski explained to Coffey-Sears, via email, that
she was not eligible to use the Sick Bank because she had neither met the qualifications nor
submitted the proper paperwork. (Id. ¶ 42.) Although not eligible to use the Sick Bank, CoffeySears nonetheless asked Piotrowski for additional paid sick days as a reasonable accommodation
for her medical condition. (Id. ¶ 43.) The District did not provide Coffey-Sears with any
additional paid sick days.
G.

Matt Brod Dispute

During the 2014-2015 school year, Coffey-Sears shared a classroom with Matt Brod.
Sharing this space proved difficult, and tensions strained the two teachers’ working relationship.
Indeed, in February of 2015 Brod confronted Coffey-Sears and told her, “You know you’re the
problem, you’re always the problem with everyone in the department. They should see that you
are the problem with everyone.” (Id. ¶ 72.) Brod also asked Coffey-Sears, “How many times

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does a schedule have to be re-done for the same person for them not to see who is the problem. It
is always you.” (Id.)
Eventually this tension came to a head. On April 7, 2015, Brod sent Coffey-Sears an
email message asking her to keep students from her class from congregating near his desk while
waiting for the bell to ring. Coffey-Sears told Brod that she would “inform the students about
[his] feelings.” (Id. ¶ 64.) In keeping this promise, Coffey-Sears made a handwritten sign, which
she taped to the back of a chair with paper ribbons cordoning off the desk area. The sign read:
Off Limits to ALL Students
Do Not Stand Here
Or Near Door
Per./Mr. Brod Request
(Id. ¶ 65.) On April 13, 2015, Brod sent an email to Division Chair Paula Nardi complaining of
Coffey-Sears’s behavior, specifically noting that her “approach restricts my access to the desk,
makes my desk area look like a crime scene, and, in my opinion, puts kids in the middle of what
should be an adult conversation.” (Id. ¶ 66.) Eventually, both Brod and Coffey-Sears brought
their issues with one another to the attention of Piotrowski, the Director of Human Resources.
Piotrowski investigated their complaints and concluded that both teachers had acted
unprofessionally. (Id. ¶ 67.) Afterwards, Piotrowski met separately with Coffey-Sears and Brod,
and explained his determination. Piotrowski also told both Coffey-Sears and Brod that the
District expected they would maintain professionalism in all interactions with District staff
members. Piotrowski documented these meetings with memorandums to both Brod and CoffeySears. (Id. ¶ 68.)

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II.

Facts Regarding Alleged Retaliation Efforts
A.

Assessment Team

Around the same time Coffey-Sears was negotiating the above-mentioned Sick Bank
request, Assistant Principal Adam Davis met with Coffey-Sears to discuss her responsibilities on
the Assessment Team. (Id. ¶ 63.) The Assessment Team is a subgroup of the District’s
Curriculum Team tasked with creating assessments that are in line with established curriculum
requirements. (Id. ¶ 62.) Expressing concern about Coffey-Sears’s medical condition, Davis
asked her if she would like to step down from the Assessment Team and forego presenting at the
January institute day. (Id. ¶ 63.) Coffey-Sears declined the offer. According to Coffey-Sears,
after Davis heard she would remain on the team, he “looked as if he had a problem on his hands”
because he appeared “stern” and was thinking. (Id.) Coffey-Sears assumes that he asked her to
step down because of conversations he had with other teachers who did not want her on the team.
(Id.) Coffey-Sears has remained on the Assessment Team. (Id.)
B.

Rowdy Class

Throughout the 2013-2014 school year, Coffey-Sears was dealing with a particularly
“rowdy” class of students. The students in her class would flash gang signs, use inappropriate
language, and throw clay. (Id. ¶ 74.) In one instance, security was called to escort a female
student out of the classroom after the student threatened to punch Coffey-Sears. (AESDMS Ex.
2, Dkt. No. 27-2 at 14–15 of 110.) To Coffey-Sears’s chagrin, the student was allowed to return
to class for the next several days. (Id.) The student “remained very threatening” and CoffeySears eventually had security escort her out a second time. (Id.) Coffey-Sears believes the
District purposefully put her in an unsafe position with this student in order to retaliate against
her for filing a charge with the EEOC. (Id.; PRDSUF ¶ 74.)

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C.

Class Assignments

In March of 2015, Division Chair Paula Nardi sent the Fine Arts Division a Staffing
Assignment Request form asking them to identify their preferred teaching assignments for the
2015-2016 school year. (PRDSUF ¶ 49.) The District assigns teachers to classes and sets
teaching schedules based upon a variety of factors, including but not limited to class enrollment,
available classroom space, availability of qualified teachers, and judgments about which
assignments will be in the best interests of the students. While a teacher’s preferences may be
considered, they are not dispositive, and it is not unusual for teachers not to receive their
preferred schedules or teaching assignments. (Id. ¶ 45.) In her Staffing Assignment Request form
for the 2015-2016 school year, Coffey-Sears asked to teach Advanced Ceramics, 3D AP Art, and
Advanced Drawing and Painting. (Id. ¶ 50.) In the section of the form asking teachers who teach
at only one campus to identify at least one course at the other campus that they would like to
teach, Coffey-Sears responded: “Due to my disability which is documented with supportive
doctor’s notes in Ed’s office, I can’t travel.” Coffey-Sears also stated that she would need a lunch
period beginning no later than 12:00 pm due to her medical condition. (Id.) Separately, CoffeySears informed Piotrowski that she needed a schedule that did not require her to move from one
campus to the other at mid-year. (Id. ¶ 51.)
When preparing the 2015-2016 schedule, Nardi prioritized Coffey-Sears’s
accommodation requests, focusing on providing Coffey-Sears with a schedule that addressed her
need for an earlier lunch, did not require her to travel between buildings during the day, and did
not force her to switch campuses mid-year. (Id. ¶ 54.) Nardi ultimately assigned Coffey-Sears to
teach five sections of Beginning Ceramics at the South Building each semester, a schedule that
not only allowed Coffey-Sears to remain at the South Campus for the entire year, but also to stay

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in the same classroom for the full school day. (Id.) While Coffey-Sears did not receive any
advanced courses in her 2015-2016 schedule, in the 2016-2017 school year she was scheduled to
teach Advanced Ceramics as well as AP 3D Studio Art. (Id. ¶ 61.)
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When presented
with a summary judgment motion, “[t]he court has one task and one task only: to decide, based
on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.”
Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24
F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994)). “In evaluating whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, all
evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986) and Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d
309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003)). “[A] court may not assess the credibility of witnesses, choose between
competing inferences or balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence; it must view all the
evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all factual
disputes in favor of the non-moving party.” Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th
Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against qualified individuals on the
basis of disability in job application procedures, the hiring of employees, and the advancement of
employees. See Majors v. General Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2013). Coffey-Sears
alleges that the District violated the ADA by denying her requests for reasonable
accommodations and discriminating against her because of her disability (Count I), and

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retaliating against her for bringing this lawsuit and subjecting her to a hostile work environment
(Count II). The District argues, however, that they are entitled to summary judgment for four
reasons: (1) a number of Coffey-Sears’s claims are time-barred; (2) her remaining
accommodation claims are baseless; (3) Coffey-Sears cannot establish unlawful retaliation; and
(4) Coffey-Sears cannot show a hostile work environment. The Court addresses each of these
arguments in turn below.
I.

Time-Barred Claims
As a threshold issue, the District seeks summary judgment on several of Coffey-Sears’s

ADA claims on the ground that they are untimely. 1 A plaintiff in Illinois who wishes to bring an
ADA claim in federal court must first file an administrative charge with the EEOC within 300
days of the alleged unlawful employment practice’s occurrence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a),
2000e-5(e)(1); Teague v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 492 F. App’x 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff
in Illinois, a ‘deferral state’ because it has a state agency with enforcement powers parallel to
those of the EEOC, must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of some
offending conduct.”). An unlawful employment practice begins to run on the date of the discrete
act of discrimination. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110–11
(2002). For example, refusal to accommodate is a discrete act for purposes of statute of
limitations. See Teague, 492 F. App’x at 684. Alleged discriminatory acts that do not fall within
the relevant 300-day period are generally untimely and cannot be considered by the Court. See
Fairchild v. Forma Scientific Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 574 (7th Cir. 1998).

1

In her response, Coffey-Sears does not discuss the District’s argument that several of her claims are
untimely. Such a failure to respond indicates that Coffey-Sears has waived whatever arguments she might
have raised. See Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Failure to respond to an
argument . . . results in waiver.”).

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Coffey-Sears filed her EEOC charge on November 17, 2014. Thus, counting 300 days
back from the date of Coffey-Sears’s charge, the alleged adverse employment action had to
occur on or after January 21, 2014 in order for her claim based on that action to be timely. Given
this timeframe, four of Coffey-Sears’s accommodation claims are fully time-barred:
•

The District’s request for medical documentation prior to granting Coffey-Sears an early
lunch, which occurred on May 7, 2013;

•

The Buildings and Grounds staff’s failure to provide Coffey-Sears with assistance in
rearranging her classroom, which occurred on August 17, 2013;

•

The District’s failure to designate a handicap parking spot for Coffey-Sears’s personal
use; 2 and

•

The Fine Arts Division Chair’s criticism of Coffey-Sears for not moving about the
classroom and monitoring students, which Coffey-Sears objected to on October 22, 2013.

Since Coffey-Sears missed the 300-day deadline for each of these claims, they are untimely. 3
Although Coffey-Sears may not recover for any pre-January 21, 2014 acts under the ADA, that
is not to say that such acts are irrelevant. Under the statute, Coffey-Sears may “us[e] the prior

2

Defendants point to the discussion between Coffey-Sears and Piotrowski regarding the parking spot,
which occurred in the summer of 2013, as the date when Coffey-Sears’s accommodation request accrued.
Since Coffey-Sears does not offer any alternative date for determining the limitations period, the Court
accepts this accrual date.
3

Even if these claims were not time-barred, the Court would have serious reservations as to their
viability. For example, it is not unreasonable for an employer to ask for medical documentation as part of
the interactive process. See Ekstrand v. Sch. Dist. of Somerset, 583 F.3d 972, 976 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[O]ur
cases have consistently held that disabled employees must make their employers aware of any
nonobvious, medically necessary accommodations with corroborating evidence such as a doctor's note or
at least orally relaying a statement from a doctor, before an employer may be required under the ADA's
reasonableness standard to provide a specific modest accommodation the employee requests.”). With
respect to her handicap parking and teacher-evaluation claims, Coffey-Sears does not allege that the
District failed reasonably to accommodate her, just that they did not provide her preferred resolution to
the issues, which is inadequate to prove an accommodation claim. See Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207
F.3d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000) (Employers are “obligated to provide a qualified individual with a
reasonable accommodation, not the accommodation he would prefer.”). Finally, the Buildings and
Grounds staff claim is likely not viable due to Coffey-Sears’s seeming failure to engage in the interactive
process. See Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998) (both employer and
employee must engage in the interactive process).

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acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.” National R.R. Passenger Corp., 536
U.S. at 113.
The District argues that Coffey-Sears’s claims regarding restroom access and the hostile
work environment are also time-barred. The Court disagrees. With regards to the restroom access
claim, Coffey-Sears claims that the District failed to accommodate her need to use the restroom
during class by not allowing her to use a male restroom or a de-commissioned bathroom, both of
which were closer to her classroom. Any claim related to the de-commissioned bathroom is timebarred. By her own admission, Coffey-Sears requested use of the closed bathroom in May or
June of 2013. (PRDSUF ¶ 21.) Coffey-Sears does not offer any alternative date for measuring
the statute of limitations related to this claim, and therefore the Court accepts May or June of
2013 as the accrual date. As mentioned above, Coffey-Sears filed her EEOC charge on
November 17, 2014 and thus any claim that occurred before January 21, 2014 is time-barred.
What is not clear from the record, however, is when exactly Coffey-Sears requested access to the
men’s restroom. Consequently, in resolving all factual disputes in Coffey-Sears’ favor, the Court
assumes this claim is not time-barred.
As to the hostile work environment allegations, the statute of limitations for this kind of
claim is more flexible than for accommodation claims. “An employee need only file an EEOC
charge within 300 days of the last hostile act in a continuous and ongoing hostile work
environment.” Moore v. Vital Prod., Inc., 641 F.3d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 2011). Hostile comments
by fellow art teachers Carlene Kinzie and Matt Brod in 2014 and 2015 fall within the 300-day
window. As such, Coffey-Sears’s hostile work environment claim is not time-barred.

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II.

Failure to Accommodate Claims
The ADA provides that a covered employer shall not “discriminate against a qualified

individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “Discrimination” under the
ADA includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee,” unless the employer “can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business.” § 12112(b)(5)(A). In sum, the ADA requires
that employers reasonably accommodate disabled employees.
To establish a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) she is a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of her disability; and (3) the
employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417
F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 2005).The third element outlined “requires that employer and employee
engage in an interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert, 149 F.3d at
633. Both employer and employee are responsible for engaging in the interactive process, and
each must make a good faith effort to determine what specific accommodations are necessary.
See Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 1996).
Coffey-Sears asserts that the District failed to provide her reasonable accommodations
when it did not allow her to use a men’s restroom closer to her classroom and did not give her
paid leave beyond what was provided for by the union contract.

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A.

Restroom Access

Coffey-Sears argues that the District failed to accommodate her need to use the restroom
during class by not allowing her to use a men’s restroom, which was closer to her classroom.
Instead, the District accommodated Coffey-Sears’s restroom request by providing coverage for
her class when she needed to use the bathroom during class time. During the 2013-2014 school
year, Coffey-Sears used the restroom during class about once per month. On each occasion she
was able to get another staff member to supervise her classroom while she used the bathroom.
(PRDSUF ¶ 19.) As conceded by both parties, allowing Coffey-Sears to use the men’s facility
would require getting a male staff member to come to the bathroom with her each time she
wanted to use the facilities. (Id. ¶ 22.) The male staff member would then have to check the
bathroom to ensure it was empty before Coffey-Sears could use it. (Id.) Coffey-Sears admits that
this would have been impractical as well as unnecessary given the availability of an accessible
female restroom. (Id.)
Despite these issues, Coffey-Sears insists she would have preferred to use the men’s
bathroom. However, an employer is only “obligated to provide a qualified individual with a
reasonable accommodation, not the accommodation he would prefer.” Rehling, 207 F.3d at 1014;
see also Jay v. Intermet Wagner Inc., 233 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000) (“It is the employer’s
prerogative to choose a reasonable accommodation; an employer is not required to provide the
particular accommodation that an employee requests.”). Although she was dissatisfied with the
accommodation the District offered, Coffey-Sears has not presented any evidence to explain why
this accommodation was unreasonable. Was she unable to get up the stairs to access the women’s
restroom? Did other staff members express resentment about having to cover her class? Did
going to the first floor cause her to miss too much class time? Ultimately, these questions are left

16

unanswered by Coffey-Sears. This failure to provide evidence of the unreasonableness of the
District’s accommodation sinks Coffey-Sears’s claim. See Beck, 75 F.3d at 1136 (7th Cir. 1996)
(affirming the district court’s summary judgment order in favor of the employer where plaintiff
“offer[ed] no evidence that the wrist rest, as compared to an adjustable keyboard, was an
unreasonable accommodation of her osteoarthritis”).
At most, Coffey-Sears’s evidence shows that there was another alternative—the men’s
restroom. But Coffey-Sears admits this alternative was both impractical and unnecessary due to
the availability of an accessible female restroom and staff members to cover her class. (PRDSUF
¶ 22.) Thus, overall, Coffey-Sears has failed to provide evidence sufficient to establish an
accommodation claim.
B.

Sick Bank

Coffey-Sears also asserts that the District’s refusal to allow her to use the Sick Bank or to
otherwise grant additional paid sick leave constitutes a failure to accommodate. The contract
between the District and its teachers’ union provides for a “Sick Leave Bank” to which
participating teachers may contribute sick leave. Teachers can then draw upon sick leave
contributed to the bank in the event of “catastrophic illness,” defined as an illness that is “life
threatening.” (PRDSUF ¶ 39.) Teachers are permitted to draw from the Sick Leave Bank only
once they have depleted their own sick days and been on unpaid status for five school days due
to disability or illness. Employees who wish to use the Sick Leave Bank must submit a doctor’s
statement supporting their eligibility for days from the Bank. The Sick Leave Bank is
administered by a joint committee appointed by the union and the administration. (Id.) Aside
from the Sick Leave Bank, the District does not have any contract provision, policy, or practice

17

allowing for teachers to receive additional paid sick leave once they have exhausted their
entitlements under the contract. (Id. ¶ 43.)
Under the ADA, reasonable accommodations may include “[j]ob restructuring, part-time
or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position . . . and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). In analyzing
“reasonable accommodations,” courts generally agree that, in certain circumstances, providing
medical leave may constitute a reasonable accommodation. See Swanson v. Vill. of Flossmoor,
794 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[P]ermitting an employee to use paid leave can constitute a
reasonable accommodation.”); Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“Undoubtedly, a short, one-week medical leave constitutes a reasonable accommodation in
many circumstances.”); Basith v. Cook Cty., 241 F.3d 919, 932 (7th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with the
district court’s determination that medical leave of absence qualifies as a reasonable
accommodation); Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95 C 3834, 1997 WL
106257, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1997) (“The ADA’s legislative history, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's interpretive guidelines and case law addressing the issue make clear
that one type of reasonable accommodation may be a temporary leave of absence to obtain
necessary medical treatment.”).
Similarly, the EEOC interpretive guidelines 4 state that “[p]ermitting the use of accrued
paid leave, or unpaid leave, is a form of reasonable accommodation when necessitated by an
employee’s disability.” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Enforcement Guidance:
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,

4

While the EEOC guidelines are not controlling law, they do present an “important body of experience
and informed judgment entitled to some deference.” EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir.
2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

18

2002 WL 31994335, at *14 (Oct. 17, 2002) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1997)). However,
“[a]n employer does not have to provide paid leave beyond that which is provided to similarlysituated employees.” Id. The guidelines further state that employers should allow employees with
disabilities to exhaust accrued paid leave first and then provide unpaid leave. Id. The Department
of Labor has also weighed in on the issue, and in its regulations 5 state that a reasonable
accommodation may require an employer “to grant liberal time off or leave without pay when
paid sick leave is exhausted and when the disability is of a nature that it is likely to respond to
treatment of hospitalization.” 29 C.F.R. pt. 32, app. A(b) (specifically regarding programs
receiving federal financial assistance).
Here, the District allowed Coffey-Sears to use all of her paid leave. After she had used all
of her paid leave, Coffey-Sears took an additional 3.9 days off from work. Because Coffey-Sears
had neither been on unpaid status for five days nor submitted the proper paperwork, she was not
eligible to use the Sick Bank. Thus, the District gave her the 3.9 days as unpaid leave. The
District provided Coffey-Sears with the same accommodations it would to any similarly-situated
employee—i.e., an employee who suffered a “catastrophic illness.” While Coffey-Sears might
have preferred to receive paid leave, she has not shown that the District’s provision of 3.9 days
of unpaid leave could be viewed as an unreasonable accommodation. See Siegel v. Shell Oil Co.,
612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Summary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a
lawsuit.”). Accordingly, the District is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
III.

Retaliation Claims
In addition to the accommodation claims, Coffey-Sears also argues that the District

retaliated against her for asserting her rights under the ADA. The ADA prohibits employers from
5

An administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute commands a significant
amount of deference. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).

19

retaliating against employees who assert their right under the Act to be free from discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). “A plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim may present either direct evidence
of discrimination or indirect evidence under the burden-shifting method . . . .” Kersting v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1117 (7th Cir. 2001). To establish retaliation under the direct
method of proof a plaintiff must show a causal connection between her engagement in a
statutorily protected activity and an adverse action she suffered. See Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of
Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff can use either direct or
circumstantial evidence to meet her burden under the direct method. See Harper v. C.R. England,
Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 307 (7th Cir. 2012). Using the indirect method of proof, a plaintiff must
establish “a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) he is disabled under the ADA;
(2) he was meeting his employer’s legitimate employment expectations; (3) he suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees without a disability were
treated more favorably.” Dickerson, 657 F.3d at 601. Once a plaintiff establishes this prima facie
case, the burden shifts to defendant “to present a non-invidious reason for the adverse
employment action.” Id.
An element of both the direct and indirect methods of proof is an adverse employment
action. This action “must be materially adverse to be actionable, meaning more than a mere
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Kersting, 250 F.3d at 1115 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The standard for a materially adverse action sufficient for a
retaliation claim is somewhat more forgiving than for a discrimination claim, but the action must
be severe enough to dissuade a reasonable employee from exercising statutory rights.” Barton v.
Zimmer, Inc., 662 F.3d 448, 456 (7th Cir. 2011). Material adverse employment may include
“termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less

20

distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities,
or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.” Id. (quoting Crady v. Liberty
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)). Notably, “not everything that
makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Otherwise, minor and even trivial
employment actions that an . . . employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination
suit.” Kersting, 250 F.3d at 1115 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Coffey-Sears utilizes the indirect method of proof in attempting to make out her
ADA retaliation claim. In support of her claim, Coffey-Sears points to four decisions by the
District that allegedly constitute adverse employment actions:
•

Coffey-Sears was not assigned to teach any advanced or Advanced Placement courses
during the 2015-2016 school year despite her requests;

•

Assistant Principal Adam Davis asked if Coffey-Sears would prefer to step down from
the District’s Assessment Team because of her medical issues;

•

The District allowed a student to return to class after she threatened to punch CoffeySears; and

•

Piotrowski issued a memorandum directing her to behave in a professional manner
towards fellow art-teacher, Matt Brod. 6

These incidents fail to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The first three events listed
above simply do not constitute a materially adverse employment action. Teachers receive no
extra pay or other benefits for teaching AP or Advanced courses, and Coffey-Sears experienced
no material detriment to her career as a result of teaching other courses. (PRDSUF ¶ 46.) Indeed,
Coffey-Sears was assigned to teach both Advanced Ceramics and AP 3D Studio Art the very
next year. Any preference Coffey-Sears may have had for teaching the AP and Advanced
6

Coffey-Sears originally raised the Matt Brod dispute as an accommodation claim. However, she did not
provide any evidence of how this dispute related to a request for reasonable accommodation. In an effort
to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court construes the Matt Brod dispute
as a retaliation claim.

21

courses during the 2015-2016 year was purely subjective. Failure to accommodate purely
subjective preferences does not warrant judicial intervention.
Similarly, there is no extra compensation or benefit associated with the Assessment Team
position and there is no evidence that stepping down from the committee would have affected the
terms and conditions of Coffey-Sears’s employment. (PRDSUF ¶ 62.) Most importantly, CoffeySears actually remained on the Assessment Team. Her position never changed. The mere
suggestion that she consider stepping down from the Assessment Team is insufficient to support
a claim of retaliation.
Coffey-Sears’s evidence regarding the threatening student also fails to establish a prima
facie case of retaliation. Coffey-Sears alleges the District retaliated against her because a student
who threatened to punch her was allowed “to return to class for the next several days.”
(AESDMS Ex. 2, Dkt. No. 27-2 at 15 of 110.) However, Coffey-Sears’s own statement admits
that the threatening student was only in her class for a couple of days. This short time period
belies any argument that the action was severe enough to dissuade Coffey-Sears from exercising
her statutory rights.
Finally, the Court turns to the memorandum issued by Piotrowski. Even if this action did
qualify as a materially adverse event, Coffey-Sears’s retaliation claim is undermined by the fact
that a similarly-situated, non-disabled teacher got the same treatment as Coffey-Sears. Matt
Brod, a fellow-art teacher at the same school, was reprimanded in exactly the same way as
Coffey-Sears—i.e., both received memorandums stating that they had acted unprofessionally
towards one another and outlining the District’s expectations going forward. There is no
evidence in the record that Brod has a disability. Thus, the evidence contradicts any notion that
“similarly situated employees without a disability were treated more favorably” than Coffey-

22

Sears. Dickerson, 657 F.3d at 601. Since Coffey-Sears has failed to prove this point, her prima
facie case of retaliation based on the Piotrowski memorandum fails as well.
IV.

Hostile Work Environment Claims
Lastly, Coffey-Sears contends that she was subject to a hostile environment after she

requested a change to the teaching schedule to accommodate an earlier lunch. Specifically,
Coffey-Sears alleges that she was harassed by teachers blaming her for changes to the teaching
schedule.
“Hostile work environment claims are typically associated with sexual harassment rather
than disability claims.” Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 803 (7th Cir. 1999). Indeed, the
Seventh Circuit has “not decided whether allowing a hostile work environment is actionable
under the ADA.” Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594, 603 (7th Cir. 2009). Without
deciding the issue, this Court shall proceed on the assumption that a hostile work environment
claim is cognizable under the ADA.
To prove such a claim, Coffey-Sears must follow the methodology already established in
the parallel area of Title VII litigation. See Silk, 194 F.3d at 804. “Surviving summary judgment
on a hostile work environment claim requires sufficient evidence demonstrating (1) the work
environment was both objectively and subjectively offensive; (2) the harassment was based on
membership in a protected class or in retaliation for protected behavior; (3) the conduct was
severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,
920 (7th Cir. 2016). The third element of the prima facie case for hostile work environment “is
in the disjunctive—the conduct must be either severe or pervasive.” Vance v. Ball State Univ.,
646 F.3d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (emphasis in original). This
means that “one extremely serious act of harassment could rise to an actionable level as could a

23

series of less severe acts.” Hall v. City of Chicago, 713 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 693 (7th Cir. 2001)). A court addressing this
element must consider “factors like the frequency of improper conduct, its severity, whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating (as opposed to a mere offensive utterance), and whether it
unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance.” Boss, 816 F.3d at 920.
Notably, however, the law “does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the
workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). As such,
“[s]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not
amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Silk, 194 F.3d at
807 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A workplace rises to the level of an objectively hostile work environment only if
it is “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2014).
Applying the above standard, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment
for the defendant in Silk v. City of Chicago on a disability-based hostile work environment claim.
See Silk, 194 F.3d at 808. There, the plaintiff, a police officer, received a modified work shift
from his employer to accommodate his sleep apnea. Id. at 795. The plaintiff claimed that after
receiving the accommodation, he was verbally harassed by other officers, including being called
a “useless piece of [vulgarity]” and a “limited duty phony”; was given negative performance
reviews; and was punished through such sanctions as being sent home to get his regulation shoes.
Id. at 805–06. The Seventh Circuit held that this conduct “did not rise to the level of a hostile
work environment.” Id. at 808.

24

The harassing actions alleged by Coffey-Sears are less severe and pervasive than the
conduct in Silk. Coffey-Sears recounts a handful of incidents in which teachers blamed her for
the schedule change in 2013. Coffey-Sears contends that teachers said things like “Why do they
have to be changed for you?,” “Well, why is this happening?,” and “Everything centers around
you. Why should it be that way?” Notably, these comments were made by coworkers, not
supervisors. Even considering these combative coworker comments along with the other
allegations, the picture Coffey-Sears paints is not one of severe or pervasive hostility but of
common workplace disputes. Further, none of these incidents culminated in a tangible
employment action. To the contrary, Coffey-Sears received an overall “proficient” rating for the
2013-2014 year, the highest rating given to any teacher that year. Taken all together, CoffeySears’s alleged mistreatment is not sufficiently severe and pervasive to create an abusive
working environment. Accordingly, the Court grants the District’s summary judgment motion
with regards to the hostile work environment claim as well.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the District’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 25) is
granted in its entirety.
ENTERED:

Dated: March 31, 2017

__________________________
Andrea R. Wood
United States District Judge

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