Sisic v. The Millard Group Inc.

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM Order: Both the Complaint and this action are dismissed. Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 10/29/2015:Mailed notice(clw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ISMETA SISIC,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE MILLARD GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 15 C 8822

MEMORANDUM ORDER
On receiving the Complaint and its attached Ex. A in this Title VII employment
discrimination action brought by Ismeta Sisic ("Sisic") against her ex-employer The Millard
Group, Inc.. this Court spotted what appeared to be an obvious and potentially fatal problem
posed by that filing: It had been made 98 days after the June 29, 2015 signature date on the
EEOC right-to-sue letter that is a precondition to the institution of Sisic's action, even though
both the Title VII statute and the right-to-sue letter's specific terms allow just 90 days from the
date of receipt. That being the case, this Court issued a brief October 26 sua sponte
memorandum order directing Sisic's counsel to file a statement under oath "specifying the date
on which the right-to-sue letter arrived at counsel's office."
What has arrived in response, however, is the attached sworn statement (Dkt. No. 8) from
Sisic's present counsel, the lawyer who signed and filed the Complaint, not from the lawyer who
represented Sisic before the EEOC and was therefore the person to whom the right-to-sue letter
was addressed and transmitted. That won't do -- if the date of receipt of a right-to-sue letter by a
later-retained counsel could convert an untimely filing to a timely one, the 90-day limitation
would lose all meaning.

Under established caselaw the transmittal of a right-to-sue letter to a lawyer who
represents a complaining employee or ex-employee starts the statutory 90-day clock running
(Reschny v. Elk Grove Plating Co., 414 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2005) and cases cited there).
Here nothing suggests that attorney Julie Herrera ("Herrera"), who represented Sisic before the
EEOC so that the agency naturally transmitted the letter to Herrera, was not representing Sisic
when the letter was received (see DeTata v. Rollprint Packaging Prods. Inc., 632 F.3d 962, 970
(7th Cir. 2011) for a discussion of that possibility). Because nothing of that nature is even hinted
at here -- indeed, the attached affidavit by the lawyer who filed this action certainly appears to
negate that possibility -- the record must be treated as reflecting an out-of-time filing of this
lawsuit.
Accordingly both the Complaint and this action must be and are dismissed. If despite the
current filing by Sisic's counsel there is some explanation that calls for a different result,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) provides a nonextendable 28-day window within which to file a motion to
alter or amend this dismissal.

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Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date: October 29, 2015

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ATTACHMENT