Scarber v. United Airlines, Inc. et al

Filing 48

ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 6/10/2016:Mailed notice(wp, )

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION JEROME SCARBER, Plaintiff, Case No. 15 C 9147 v. Judge Harry D. Leinenweber UNITED AIRLINES, INC., TRACEY ROSE, ANNELLA SAHLI, and JEFF SMISEK, Defendants. ORDER Before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Part and to Stay Remaining Proceedings [ECF No. 36]. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the Motion. STATEMENT The Court draws the following facts from the Amended Complaint and assumes they are true. The Plaintiff, Jerome Scarber (“Scarber”), is a flight attendant for United Airlines (“United”). are United and several of its agents. The Defendants In September 2014, United offered certain employees a voluntary retirement package, known as the “early out plan” (or simply, “the plan”). By taking certain administrative steps, qualifying employees could enroll in the plan, retire, and receive a lump-sum payment of $100,000. Scarber wanted in, so he signed a required document, which he refers to as a “waiver,” and submitted it before the deadline. The United administrative agent responsible for processing the waiver told him that he was “all set.” However, when United later released the names of employees who received the early out benefit, Scarber was not included. United later informed him that it did not process his application for the program. Scarber subsequently emailed various United officials (their precise relation, if any, to the plan is unknown), protesting the rejection of his application. Scarber believes he followed the required procedures. He filed suit in this Court, and now alleges in his Amended Complaint that the Defendants violated his rights under an employment governed by ERISA, see, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. the face of the Complaint United’s reason benefit It is unclear on for denying participation in the plan, but that doesn’t matter at this stage. law, Scarber must exhaust his plan administrative remedies him By before proceeding with his ERISA claim. Although ERISA is silent on exhaustion, see, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., the Seventh Circuit has held repeatedly that an ERISA plaintiff must exhaust internal administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See, e.g., Zhou v. Guardian Life Ins., 295 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2002); Wilczynski v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas., 93 F.3d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1996). United’s specific early procedures, out plan including a requires an specific review receives an “adverse benefit determination.” Scarber did not follow these procedures. letter sent by his counsel to the applicant to process follow if he See, ECF No. 12, Ex. A. His Complaint states that a CEO of United and “others” (unidentified) at the company exhausted all administrative remedies, but that is insufficient to prove exhaustion. The plan designates a specific administrator for handling grievances, and it contemplates the exchange of various documents relating to any claims before the administrator makes a final, written decision, which must include the reasons for any adverse determination. Scarber does not dispute that he did not contact the proper plan administrator. Scarber instead argues that United should be estopped from requiring him to exhaust his administrative remedies because it never provided him a copy of the plan. He claims he first read the terms of the plan when United attached a copy to a filing as part of this litigation. See, ECF No. 12, Ex. A. That contention is concerning; however, it does not appear that an injustice has occurred warranting estoppel, because the Defendants contend that “the Plan contains no limitations period” and that Scarber “may still submit a claim under - 2 - the Plan [and] pursue it through the full administrative process.” that is true, there is little harm to Scarber in having If these proceedings stayed while he exhausts his administrative remedies. The Court assumes the Defendants mean there is no time limit in which to file an initial complaint with the plan administrator, because the plan does impose a 60-day window for requesting review of any adverse determination. apparently, the appropriate plan parties See, ECF No. 12, Ex. A, at pages 7-8. agree that administrator, Scarber and never never received determination within the meaning of the plan’s terms. the 60-day clock never started running. that could Scarber lead would be to serious entitled problems to renew contacted an But the adverse That would mean If Defendants mean otherwise, for his them down argument the road, and for estoppel and may) exhaust his request any other available relief in this Court. Because Scarber has not yet (and still administrative remedies as required under law and the terms of the plan, the Court stays these proceedings until Scarber resolves his Complaint administratively. This relating to his negligence claim: includes a stay on proceedings as the Defendants point out, the negligence claim would be moot if Scarber were granted benefits under the plan in the course of United’s internal review. Lastly, Scarber explicitly declines to contest dismissal of his claim under the Illinois Human Rights Act for racial discrimination. The Court dismisses that claim accordingly. The Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in Part and to Stay Remaining Proceedings [ECF No. 36]. Amended Complaint is dismissed. His Count V of the Plaintiff’s claims under ERISA and for negligence are stayed pending his exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court Dated: 6/10/2016 - 3 -

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