Sturdivant v. Butler

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 12/16/2016:Mailed notice(rth, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RAMELL STURDIVANT,
Petitioner,
v.
KIM BUTLER,
Respondent.

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)
) Case No. 15-cv-9405
)
) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner, Ramell Sturdivant, filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of
his constitutional rights at multiple points during the course of his trial. The government now
moves to dismiss Sturdivant’s petition as time-barred. For the reasons set forth below, this Court
grants that motion [14].
Background
Following a jury trial, Sturdivant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
thirty-two years in prison. Sturdivant appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court and the
Illinois Supreme Court, before filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. That writ was denied on June 25, 2012. On December 19, 2012, one-hundred-andseventy-six days later, Sturdivant filed a post-conviction petition in the Circuit Court of Cook
County. Sturdivant’s post-conviction petition was denied, and he appealed that denial to the Illinois
Appellate Court and then to the Illinois Supreme Court, which denied his petition for leave to
appeal on January 28, 2015. Sturdivant subsequently filed the present petition for habeas corpus.

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Although Sturdivant states he filed his petition on September 18, 2015, this Court notes that his
petition was notarized on September 22, 2015 and thus could not have been filed prior to that date.
As is pertinent here, Sturdivant asserts that he was held in segregated confinement at Menard
Correctional Center from March 14, 2014 until March 25, 2015. Although uncontroverted prison
records suggest that Sturdivant exited segregated confinement on March 12, 2015, that discrepancy
need not be resolved in order to rule on the present motion.
While Sturdivant was in segregated confinement, his appointed counsel withdrew from his
post-conviction appeal. Because he was in segregated confinement, Sturdivant was unable to
procure the assistance of jailhouse lawyers in the general population who had previously assisted him
with his legal filings. Accordingly, Sturdivant sought to solicit the aid of legal clerks working for
Menard’s law library. These clerks, fellow inmates with no legal training, provided copying services
for those members of Menard’s population engaged in pending legal matters. The legal clerks that
Sturdivant asked refused to help him, stating either that they had no legal training or that they were
prohibited from assisting other inmates with their legal matters.
On August 24, 2014, a jailhouse lawyer named Travis Weston was admitted to segregated
confinement. Sturdivant promptly sent Weston a “scribe” explaining his alleged mental illness and
his current legal dilemma. Regrettably, Sturdivant also sent Weston all of his legal documents.
Weston did not respond to Sturdivant’s scribe, so after waiting a few days Sturdivant “yelled down
the gallery to other inmates to grab his attention.” Sturdivant then learned that Weston had been
transferred out of segregated confinement while he was in possession of all of Sturdivant’s legal
documents. Because Sturdivant was in segregated confinement, he was unable to contact Weston or
secure the return of his legal papers. Sturdivant had no further contact with Weston until March
2015, when Sturdivant was released into the general population and was again able to contact

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Weston by Scribe. Weston subsequently assisted Sturdivant in researching and preparing this
petition.
After Sturdivant filed this petition, this Court ordered him to show cause why this case
should not be dismissed pursuant to the statute of limitations. Sturdivant responded to that order to
show cause, asserting that the statute of limitations should be statutorily or equitably tolled.
Accordingly this Court discharged the order to show cause. The respondent subsequently filed the
present motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. Despite a lengthy extension,
Sturdivant failed to timely file a response to that motion. Rather than treating the present motion as
unopposed, however, this Court will instead consider those arguments that Sturdivant advanced in
his response to the show-cause order.
Discussion
A one-year statute of limitations applies to habeas petitions filed by state prisoners.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period begins to run on “the date on which the judgment
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review.” Id. The statute of limitations is tolled, however, while an application for state postconviction review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2).
Here, Sturdivant’s conviction became final on June 25, 2012, when the Supreme Court
denied his petition for a writ of certiorari on direct appeal. Thus, the limitations period ran from
that date until December 19, 2012, when Sturdivant filed his postconviction petition. The
limitations period was then tolled until January 29, 2015, when Sturdivant’s post-conviction petition
for leave to appeal was denied. Accordingly, the statutory limitations period expired on August 6,
2015. Sturdivant, however, contends that he is entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling of the
limitations period, based on numerous obstacles that he faced in filing the present petition.
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Sturdivant first contends that he is entitled to statutory tolling. Section 2244 provides that
the limitations period does not begin to run until “the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action.” Here, Sturdivant
contends that multiple state impediments prevented him from filing while he was in segregated
confinement. Specifically, Sturdivant contends that (1) prison policy barred inmate law clerks from
assisting other inmates with their legal problems; (2) prison policy prevented inmates in segregated
confinement from communicating with their jailhouse lawyers who were in the general population;
and (3) prison policy prevented jailhouse lawyers transferred out of segregation from returning legal
papers to “clients” remaining in segregation. Aside from a conclusory assertion that these policies
burdened his right of access under Bounds v. Smith, however, Sturdivant does not identify any legal
authority demonstrating that these policies violated the constitution or federal laws.
The constitution requires that prison authorities provide prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828,
97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). But here, there is no allegation that Sturdivant was denied
access to a prison law library. Moreover, Sturdivant concedes that the inmate law clerks were not
trained in the law; he therefore had no constitutional right to their legal assistance under Bounds. Nor
was it illegal for the prison to interfere in Sturdivant’s contact with his jailhouse lawyer while
Sturdivant was in segregated confinement. Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 1975). And,
finally, this Court notes that Sturdivant has not plausibly argued how his unfortunate decision to
send his legal papers to another inmate, sight unseen, constituted a state-created impediment to the
filing of his petition. Cf. United States v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199, 204–05 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recognizing
that inmates entrust jailhouse lawyers with their legal documents at their own peril).

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Alternatively, Sturdivant contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling. A litigant seeking
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations bears the burden of establishing both that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and
prevented timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).
Here, Sturdivant contends that equitable tolling is warranted in light of (1) his “mental dysfunction
and illiteracy”; (2) the unavailability of assistance from the prison law clerks or jailhouse lawyers; and
(3) his jailhouse lawyer’s inability to return Sturdivant’s legal papers.
This Court does not perceive an extraordinary circumstance that prevented Sturdivant from
filing his petition on time. Although Sturdivant asserts that he suffers from a mental disorder, he
fails to elaborate on the nature or extent of his impairment or to describe in any detail how his
condition actually prevented him from exercising his rights. Absent such explanations, this Court
cannot determine that tolling is warranted. See Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“[M]ental illness tolls a statute of limitations only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from
managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them.”). Similarly,
Sturdivant’s alleged illiteracy, absent more, does not warrant equitable tolling. See Montenegro v. United
States, 248 F.3d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 2001) (denying equitable tolling for a litigant who had limited
education, lacked knowledge of the United States legal system, and had limited understanding of
English), overruled on other grounds by Ashley v. United States, 266 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2001).
Sturdivant’s claim that he could not obtain assistance from prison law clerks or jailhouse
lawyers similarly fails, because it is well established that a lack of law clerk assistance or the
unavailability of jailhouse lawyers does not justify equitable tolling. See Tucker v. Kingston, 538 F.3d
732, 735 (7th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that lack of legal expertise or limited access to a law library are
not grounds for equitable tolling); Malone v. Oklahoma, 100 Fed. Appx. 795, 798 (10th Cir. 2004)
(recognizing that the absence of law clerk assistance did not justify equitable tolling);
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Pittman v. Chandler, No. 07 C 765, 2007 WL 2601258, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2007) (Kocoras, J.)
(holding that equitable tolling was not justified based on prison law clerks’ refusal to answer legal
questions).
Finally, Sturdivant contends that equitable tolling is warranted because he was unable to
retrieve his legal papers from Weston for the duration of his stay in segregated confinement.
Ordinarily, a prison’s arbitrary withholding of an inmate’s legal papers, for a long period of time, can
justify equitable tolling. See, e.g., Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1027–1028 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that a petitioner denied access to his legal papers for nearly 11 months was entitled to
equitable tolling). Here, however, Sturdivant intentionally sent his legal files to another inmate who
was then transferred to another housing unit. It is well established that equitable tolling is not
warranted where a petitioner entrusts his legal papers to another inmate and, through a housing
transfer, loses access to them. United States v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199, 204–05 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, Sturdivant is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 1
When a court dismisses a habeas petition, it must issue or deny a certificate of appealability.
When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
petitioner’s underlying constitutional claims, the petitioner must show both that reasonable jurists
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right
and that reasonable jurists would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling in order for a certificate of appealability to enter. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). On the basis of the foregoing analysis, this Court
concludes that Sturdivant has not established that a reasonable jurist could debate this Court’s

This Court is sympathetic to the challenges faced by incarcerated litigants, especially those housed in segregated
confinement. But Sturdivant was not blameless here; his actions directly or indirectly contributed to many of the
obstacles that caused him to miss the filing deadline in this case.

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procedural ruling dismissing his petition. Accordingly, this Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Sturdivant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed with
prejudice and a certificate of appealability does not issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: December 16, 2016

Entered: _____________________________
SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN
United States District Court Judge

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