Ryan v. City Of Chicago et al
Filing
138
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Signed by the Honorable M. David Weisman on 7/26/2018. Mailed notice (ao,)
Case: 1:15-cv-09762 Document #: 138 Filed: 07/26/18 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:839
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSEPH RYAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, R.L.
MIONSKOWSKI, H. LOPEZ, and
J. MELENDEZ,
Defendants.
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No. 15 C 9762
Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In his third amended complaint, plaintiff asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Chicago
police officers R.L. Mionskowski, H. Lopez, and J. Melendez for their alleged violations of his
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and a state-law claim for indemnification against the City.
Defendants have filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 motion for summary
judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
Facts1
On November 1, 2015, plaintiff filed his original complaint against the City of Chicago
and “unknown officers,” asserting claims arising out of his October 31, 2013 arrest. (Compl., ECF
1.) On April 18, 2017, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint and, for the first time, named
Officers Mionskowski, Lopez, and Melendez as defendants.
(2d Am. Compl., ECF 65.)
Defendants Mionskowski and Lopez first learned about this lawsuit in December 2016. (Defs.’
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Despite having ample opportunity to do so, plaintiff did not file a memorandum in response to defendants’ motion
or a response to their LR 56.1(a) Statement. Therefore, by operation of the Local Rule, plaintiff is deemed to have
admitted all the well-supported facts defendants assert in their LR 56.1(a) Statement. See Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C).
Case: 1:15-cv-09762 Document #: 138 Filed: 07/26/18 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:840
LR 56.1(a) Stmt., ECF 127 ¶ 20.) Defendant Melendez first learned about this lawsuit on May 4,
2017. (Id. ¶ 30.) None of the defendants had any reason to know about the existence of the lawsuit
until they received actual notice of it in December 2016 and May 2017, respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 2128, 31-39.)
Discussion
To prevail on a summary judgment motion, “the movant [must] show[] that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At this stage, we do not weigh evidence or determine the truth of the matters
asserted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). We view all evidence and
draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Reget v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691,
695 (7th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record as a whole establishes
that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770
(7th Cir. 2003).
Defendants contend that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are time-barred.
The statute of
limitations for § 1983 claims filed in Illinois is two years. Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521
(7th Cir. 2001). Generally, “[a] § 1983 claim accrues ‘when the plaintiff knows or should know
that his or her constitutional rights have been violated.’” Hileman v. Maze, 367 F.3d 694, 696 (7th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Kelly v. City of Chi., 4 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiff’s section 1983
claims for excessive force, unlawful search, and Fifth Amendment retaliation accrued at the time
the use of force, search, or retaliation occurred, in this case on October 31, 2013. (See 3d Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 9-20); see also Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that an
excessive force claim “accrues immediately”). A section 1983 claim for false arrest accrues at the
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time a probable cause determination is made, Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2013),
in this case, November 1, 2013. (See Defs.’ LR 56.1(a) Stmt. ¶ 17.) Thus, plaintiff had until
November 2, 20152 to timely file his § 1983 claims.
Plaintiff filed his original complaint, naming the City of Chicago and “unknown officers”
as defendants, on November 1, 2015. He did not identify the officers by name until he filed his
second amended complaint on April 18, 2017–more than three years after the events that gave rise
to his claims. As a result, plaintiff’s claims against the officers are timely only if they relate back
to his original complaint.
According to Rule 15(c), “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the
original pleading” if “the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom
a claim is asserted” and “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and
complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: (i) received such notice of the action that it
will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the
action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). It is undisputed that the individual defendants did not know
or have any reason to know about this suit until well after the 120-day period for service had
expired.3 (See Defs.’ LR 56.1(a) Stmt. ¶¶ 20-28, 30-39.)
In the wake of Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010), the Seventh Circuit
has made clear that:
The only two inquiries that a district court is now permitted to make in deciding
whether an amended complaint relates back to the date of the original one are, first,
whether the defendant who is sought to be added by the amendment knew or should
have known that the plaintiff, had it not been for a mistake, would have sued him
instead or in addition to suing the named defendant; and second, whether, even if
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November 1, 2015 was a Sunday.
In 2015, Rule 4(m) was amended to reduce the time for service from 120 days to 90 days.
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so, the delay in the plaintiff’s discovering his mistake impaired the new defendant’s
ability to defend himself.
Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Technologies Racing Corp., 638 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2011). Because
plaintiff fails at the first stage of inquiry, defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Analysis
of any prejudice to the defendants is unnecessary. Additionally, while some courts continue to
accept the distinction between “mistake” and “lack of knowledge” that had been applied (preKrupski) in the context of relation back under Rule 15(c), this case is governed by Judge Ellis’s
ruling in which she rejected the argument that plaintiff’s lack of knowledge categorically cannot
constitute a mistake for purposes of relation back. (11/17/16 Order, ECF 34 at 2.) Thus, we do
not address the legal merits of defendants’ lack of knowledge argument.
Conclusion
Because the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff’s claims against the individual
defendants are time-barred, and the City’s liability is derivative of that of the individual
defendants, all defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly,
the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment [126] and terminates this case.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: July 26, 2018
___________________________________
M. David Weisman
United States Magistrate Judge
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