Smith et al v. Meeks et al
Filing
98
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Defendants' motions to dismiss 74 and 83 are granted. The federal claims (Counts I-III, VII-VIII) are dismissed with prejudice. The state claims (Counts IV-VI) are dismissed without prejudice. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso on 12/5/2016. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
VANESSA SMITH and G.C., a minor by and through )
next friend and parent, VANESSA SMITH,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
JAMES MEEKS, TONY SMITH, STEVEN GILFORD, )
MELINDA LABARRE, CURT BRADSHAW, LULA )
FORD, CRAIG LINDVAHL, ELIGIO PIMENTEL,
)
JOHN SANDERS, BEATRICE DIAZ-POLLOCK,
)
KATHLEEN FUHRMANN, NAKIA HALL,
)
MAURICE BROWN, KIMBERLY SANDERS,
)
CHRISTIAN ANDERSON, JEANINE GALBRAITH, )
JENNIFER GASBARRO, MIKE TURAY, NATHALIE )
CUNNINGHAM, ELLEN BELOTTI, KOKONA
)
CHRISOS, ADAMANTIA LEFTAKIS, KEVIN VAN )
COTT, KATHRYN BOLSTER, CAROLINE DALY, )
CELIA ARRESOLA, and NICOLE HRAPEK,
)
)
Defendants.
)
No. 15 C 10250
Judge Jorge Alonso
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Vanessa Smith brings this action against numerous employees of the Illinois
State Board of Education (“ISBE”) and board members and employees of the Crete-Monee
Community School District (No. 201-U), claiming that defendants violated her rights and the
rights of her son, G.C., by failing to provide him with a free appropriate public education and
make accommodations for his disability, as required under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab Act”), 29
U.S.C. § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Illinois state law. The ISBE defendants and the
school district defendants have filed separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the defendants’ motions are
granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Vanessa Smith is the birth mother of G.C. G.C. resides with his father and
attends Crete-Monee Middle School, part of the Crete-Monee Community School District, in
University Park, Illinois, as an eighth grader. G.C.’s father has had custody of G.C. since 2009,
when the Circuit Court of Cook County awarded him temporary custody of G.C. until further
order of the court. Smith, who lives in Chicago, has exercised visitation rights for years, perhaps
as far back as 2009, although it is unclear precisely when, how and by what authority she began
to exercise them. (Compare Diaz-Pollock Order, ECF No. 1, at 78-79 (recognizing that the 2009
state-court custody orders did not explicitly award plaintiff visitation rights, and that no order
altered the custody arrangement until 2013), with January 3, 2013, Order, ECF No. 43, at 113
(granting plaintiff’s motion to “change days of visitation” from Tuesday through Thursday to
Friday through Monday)). Pursuant to a state-court order issued on January 3, 2013 (ECF No.
43, at 113), G.C. spent weekends with plaintiff, from 2:30 pm on Friday till 9:00 a.m. on
Monday, and lived with his father during the week. In November 2015, the court ordered G.C.
to “remain in the care of” his father and that “visitation between [plaintiff] and [G.C.] shall be
reserved until further Order of Court,” pending a neuropsychological exam of G.C. (Id. at 11617.)
G.C. has a history of behavioral issues at school, and plaintiff alleges that G.C. has been
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 31.) 1 The
1
The precise nature and severity of the disability is unclear. Plaintiff alleges that “G.C. is currently prescribed
medication for his disabilities” (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 56), without elaborating, but she also alleges that the March 2014
version of his 504 plan provided that “Doctor has not recommended medication at this time” (id. ¶ 204), and she
wrote in a June 10, 2015 email that G.C. has never been medically diagnosed with ADHD (ECF No. 43-1, at 92).
2
school district staff have a plan for accommodating this disability under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, but plaintiff came to believe that the 504 plan was never effectively
implemented and that, in any case, it was inadequate because G.C. needs the broader relief of an
individualized educational program (“IEP”) under the IDEA. The District believed that G.C.
would not benefit from additional special education services under an IEP, and it declined to
create one for G.C.
On June 17, 2015, purporting to act on behalf of herself and G.C., plaintiff filed an
administrative due process complaint and sought a due process hearing before an ISBE impartial
hearing officer for review of the District’s decision not to create an IEP for G.C. On August 24,
2015, the hearing officer, Beatriz Diaz-Pollock, issued an order in which she explained that
plaintiff did not have the right to raise any substantive complaints concerning G.C.’s IEP or lack
thereof because she was not G.C.’s custodial parent. Promptly thereafter, on September 1, 2015,
plaintiff filed a new due process complaint, this time seeking relief for the District’s failure to
keep plaintiff informed of all developments related to G.C.’s education and permit her to
participate in decisions concerning it. 2
ISBE impartial hearing officer Kathleen Furhmann presided over a closed hearing held
over four days between March 7 and April 4, 2016. On April 18, 2016, she rendered a written
opinion, in which she concluded that the District had erred in sending certain information to
plaintiff’s old mailing address despite the fact that plaintiff had contacted the District to provide
her new mailing address, but the error did not cause the loss of any educational opportunity to
G.C., in part because his interests were always adequately represented by his father, nor did it
2
The record presently before this Court does not definitively show what G.C.’s father’s position was with respect to
these administrative actions or with respect to G.C.’s education generally, but some documents in the record suggest
that he did not believe a hearing was necessary and did not support plaintiff’s efforts. (See ECF No. 43-1, at 50, 99.)
In any case, he did not formally join in plaintiff’s actions complaining of the education G.C. was receiving. (See
ISBE Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A, ECF No. 83, at 47 (internal page 31) n. 45.)
3
significantly impede plaintiff’s opportunity to participate in the educational decision-making
process. (ISBE Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A, ECF No. 83, at 16-59.)
Further, Fuhrmann
found that plaintiff had had substantial access to G.C.’s educational records and she was unable
to identify records that were withheld from her, so Furhmann concluded that the District had not
impeded plaintiff’s opportunity to participate in decisions concerning G.C.’s education by
restricting access to records. Nevertheless, she ordered the District to send to plaintiff at her
current address all notices concerning developments in G.C.’s education, to refrain from
restricting plaintiff’s access to G.C.’s records, and to submit proof of compliance to the ISBE.
Unsatisfied with this resolution of her complaint, plaintiff filed this lawsuit.
ANALYSIS
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief
may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a
complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must
“give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (ellipsis omitted).
Under federal notice-pleading standards, a plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Stated differently, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility
4
standard, [courts must] accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, but [they] ‘need[ ]
not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.’” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665–66
(7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)).
Plaintiff’s complaint consists of eight counts: Count I, violation of the IDEA; Count II,
violation of section 504 of the Rehab Act; Count III, violation of the ADA; Count IV, violation
of the Illinois School Code; Count V, violation of Illinois School Records Act; Count VI,
violation of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disability Confidentiality Act; Count
VII, violation of statutory and constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Count VIII,
retaliation in violation of section 504 and the IDEA.
There are two motions to dismiss pending before the Court, one filed by the ISBE
defendants and one by the District defendants. The District defendants argue that plaintiff lacks
standing to bring claims on behalf of G.C. as the noncustodial parent; plaintiff’s federal claims
must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim; and
the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims in the
absence of a valid federal claim. The ISBE defendants argue that plaintiff lacks standing; her
official capacity claims, other than those brought under the IDEA, violate the Eleventh
Amendment; her individual claim against Fuhrmann is barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial
immunity; she fails to state a claim under the IDEA and, to the extent any such claim arises out
of the actions of Diaz-Pollock, the claim is time-barred and unexhausted because Diaz-Pollock
did not reach the merits in her decision; she fails to state a § 1983 claim against the ISBE
defendants because she does not establish their personal involvement or allege disparate
treatment or the violation of any fundamental right; and she fails to state a claim for retaliation.
5
I.
THE IDEA AND STANDING
Both groups of defendants begin with the issue of standing. The defendants argue that
plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of G.C. because she is not an attorney. Further,
they argue that she cannot make or challenge substantive decisions concerning G.C.’s education,
such as the District’s decision not to create an IEP for G.C. or the ISBE’s review of that decision,
because she is not G.C.’s custodial parent.
In response, plaintiff does not dispute that she is not an attorney, but she argues that she
has the right to bring this suit under Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School District,
550 U.S. 516, 533 (2007), in which the Supreme Court held that the IDEA “grants parents
independent, enforceable rights” in their children’s entitlement to “free appropriate public
education” (“FAPE”).
Plaintiff is correct that, under Winkelman, a parent generally has her own enforceable
right to ensure that her child receives a FAPE under the IDEA. However, as the following
discussion will show, a parent’s rights under the IDEA depend in part on her right to make
educational decisions for the child under state law. To determine the scope of plaintiff’s rights
under the IDEA, the Court will examine the basic framework of the IDEA and its administrative
review process, the IDEA definition of “parent,” and the scope of plaintiff’s legal authority to
make educational decisions for G.C. under Illinois law.
A.
IDEA Background
The IDEA is a federal spending statute that assists states in funding education for
disabled students if they comply with a number of requirements. The essential requirement is
that states provide a FAPE to children with disabilities. Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist.,
759 F.3d 266, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)). The “primary vehicle” for
6
providing a FAPE for children with disabilities is the IEP, which must be set down in a written
statement describing the child’s current level of performance, how his disability affects his
performance, measurable annual goals for the child’s educational progress, and the special
education services the school will provide in order to achieve those goals. See S.H. v. StateOperated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(A)). A child with ADHD may qualify as a child with a disability3 who is eligible to
receive an IEP, if his condition adversely affects his educational performance from an academic
standpoint. See generally A.J. v. Bd. of Educ., 679 F. Supp. 2d 299, 308-11 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
In order to receive funds under the IDEA, states must also provide certain procedural
safeguards to protect students’ rights under the statute. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). States must
establish an administrative process to “provide parents with an avenue to file a complaint and to
participate in an impartial due process hearing with respect to ‘any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the[ir] child, or the provision of a free
appropriate public education to such child.’” Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 271-72 (citing 20 U.S.C. §
1415(b)(6)(A) (alteration in original)); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). The statutory scheme
requires parents to play a “significant role” in the evaluation of a child’s need for special
education services, and, as explained above, it grants them enforceable rights in the provision of
a FAPE to their children. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 524, 533. These rights include the right of
parents to obtain judicial review of a school district’s actions, if they are unsatisfied with the
3
The IDEA defines a “child with a disability” as “a child with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments
(including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional
disturbance . . . , orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(1) (emphasis added). Applicable regulations define “other health
impairment” as “having limited strength, vitality, or alertness, including a heightened alertness to environmental
stimuli, that results in limited alertness with respect to the educational environment, [and] that— (i) Is due to chronic
or acute health problems such as asthma, attention deficit disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
diabetes, epilepsy, a heart condition, hemophilia, lead poisoning, leukemia, nephritis, rheumatic fever, sickle cell
anemia, and Tourette syndrome; and (ii) Adversely affects a child’s educational performance.” 34 C.F.R. §
300.8(c)(9)(i) (emphasis added).
7
result of the administrative process. Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. No. 64, No. 00 C 2735, 2002
WL 774300, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2002).
The regulatory definition of “parent” includes “biological” parents, without regard to
whether the parent has full or joint custody of the child, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(a)(1), but not if
the “biological” parent “does not have legal authority to make educational decisions for the
child,” in which case the “parent” is the person who is empowered by “judicial decree or order . .
. to make educational decisions on behalf of [the] child,” 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b). The Seventh
Circuit has explained that a noncustodial parent may retain certain rights under the IDEA,
depending on the nature of the custody arrangement as defined by state law and any applicable
judicial orders. See Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 270 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noncustodial divorced parent retained right to inspect records and discuss child’s educational
progress with school teachers and staff based on terms of divorce decree). However, to the
extent that the applicable state law gives the custodial parent the right to make educational
decisions, the noncustodial parent may not use the IDEA administrative process to “upset
choices committed to” the custodial parent by state law or to challenge an educational decision in
any way that is incompatible with the custodial parent’s exercise of his rights under the IDEA.
See id. at 1149-50.
B.
IDEA Implications of G.C.’s Custody Status Under State Law
In this case, the record shows that G.C.’s father has had custody of G.C. since 2009,
when the Circuit Court of Cook County granted him temporary custody pending further order of
the court, granted him an abatement of child support, and struck plaintiff’s motion for joint
custody. (See Diaz-Pollock Order, ECF No. 1, at 78-79.) The record does not show whether the
state court ever entered an order either making this arrangement permanent or altering it until
8
2013. (Id. at 79.) On January 3, 2013, after plaintiff moved to change her “days of visitation,”
the Circuit Court of Cook County granted plaintiff “visitation/custody” of G.C. on weekends,
and further ordered that “visitation as occurring [at] all other times shall remain under the mutual
agreement of the parties, until further order of court.” (Exhibits, ECF No. 43-1, at 62.)
In her order dismissing plaintiff’s administrative complaint for lack of standing, DiazPollock recognized that the relevant orders of the Circuit Court of Cook County do not clearly
and precisely define the parenting arrangement at issue, sometimes confusingly using terms like
“visitation” and “custody” interchangeably, and they “never expressly outlin[e] the scope of each
parent’s decision-making authority vis-à-vis each other.” (Diaz-Pollock Order, ECF No. 1, at
80.) Nevertheless, she concluded that G.C.’s father clearly had educational decision-making
authority because he had custody of G.C.—and therefore the legal authority to make decisions
related to G.C.’s upbringing—“at all times relevant to [G.C.’s] school attendance.” 4 Although
plaintiff retained her parental right to obtain access to educational records, she lacked
educational decision-making authority and therefore lacked standing to bring a due process
complaint under the IDEA administrative process, according to Diaz-Pollock.
In her April 18, 2016 order, Fuhrmann reached the same conclusion, although she
reasoned differently. Fuhrmann explained that the relevant orders of the Circuit Court of Cook
County demonstrate that G.C.’s father is the custodial parent; plaintiff merely has “visitation”
4
The Court notes that Diaz-Pollock’s reasoning on this point may have been suspect to the extent it was based on
the fact that G.C.’s father had custody of G.C. on weekdays and plaintiff had custody or visitation rights only on
weekends. Diaz-Pollock did not cite, and the Court is unaware of, any authority for the principle that the parent
who has custody of the child during school days is entrusted with all educational decision-making. This
questionable reasoning did not prejudice plaintiff, however, because it did not lead to the wrong result, as
subsequent orders showed. The November 2015 state-court order, which the Circuit Court of Cook County issued
after Diaz-Pollock rendered her decision, shed some additional light on the custody arrangement, and as the Court
will discuss in more detail below, Fuhrmann persuasively reasoned that G.C.’s father, not plaintiff, had educational
decision-making authority because the Circuit Court of Cook County gave him custody of G.C., and the plain
language of the relevant statutes provides that the custodial parent has educational decision-making authority unless
a court order provides otherwise—as in Navin, where the divorce decree explicitly gave the noncustodial parent
rights with respect to the oversight of the children’s education.
9
rights (and even those were “reserved” or suspended by the November 2015 order). (ECF No.
83, at 37.) See 750 ILCS 45/14(a) (“If a judgment of parentage contains no explicit award of
custody, the establishment of a support obligation or of visitation rights in one parent shall be
considered a judgment granting custody to the other parent.”), 750 ILCS 5/607(a) (“A parent not
granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights.”). 5 Under Illinois law, it is
the custodial parent who has the right to make educational decisions, if no court order allocates
decision-making authority differently. See 750 ILCS 5/608(a) (“Except as otherwise agreed by
the parties in writing at the time of the custody judgment or as otherwise ordered by the court,
the custodian may determine the child’s upbringing, including but not limited to, his
education, health care and religious training.”). 6 Plaintiff insists, without explanation or citation
to any order in her state-court case or any other legal authority, that she always had joint custody
of G.C., but the record is to the contrary. Although the custody orders could have been more
precise about the parents’ respective rights, it is at least clear, in light of all the state-court
custody orders and their statutory backdrop, that plaintiff merely had visitation rights, and it was
G.C.’s father who had custody of G.C. and the educational decision-making authority that
accompanies it.
5
These provisions, along with the below-cited 750 ILCS 5/608, have been repealed and replaced, effective January
1, 2016, as part of the Illinois legislature’s revamp of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and
replacement of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 with the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015. The language of the
updated statutes does not appear to make any substantive change that would significantly alter the hearing officers’
or this Court’s analysis of the state-court orders bearing on custody of G.C. See 750 ILCS 46/802(c); 750 ILCS
5/602.5; 750 ILCS 5/602.8; see also 750 ILCS 5/801 (“It is not the intent of the General Assembly to modify or
change the rights arising under any order entered concerning custody or visitation prior to the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly.”).
6
Act 5 of Chapter 750 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes is the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act,
which may not seem to apply directly in this case because plaintiff alleges that she and G.C.’s father were never
married and never cohabitated. However, Illinois courts have interpreted the provisions of the Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act in harmony with the Parentage Act. See, e.g., Rawles v. Hartman, 527 N.E.2d 680, 682
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that a provision of the Dissolution Act was applicable in a parentage proceeding
because “[a] basic rule of statutory construction is that parts of a comprehensive statutory scheme should be read in
pari materia in order to ascertain the legislature’s intent and to avoid injustice. Statutory provisions related to the
same subject matter should be construed harmoniously where possible. . . . Where two acts in pari materia are
construed together and one of them contains provisions omitted from the other, the omitted provision will be applied
in a proceeding under the act not containing such provisions, where not inconsistent with the purpose of the act.”)
10
Under such circumstances, the noncustodial parent lacks standing under the IDEA to
demand a hearing on the appropriateness of a school district’s IEP evaluation or the provision of
a FAPE. Cf. Fuentes v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 569 F.3d 46, 46-47 (2d Cir. 2009). In
Fuentes, the Second Circuit explained that, where the applicable state-court orders did not
explicitly provide the noncustodial parent with educational decision-making authority, the
noncustodial parent had no right to control educational decisions under New York law (and the
above discussion shows that Illinois law is no different), so he had no right to a due process
hearing concerning the special education services the school district provided to his son pursuant
to the IDEA. Id.; see also Navin, 270 F.3d at 1149-50. This case is indistinguishable from
Fuentes, and the Court is persuaded by its reasoning.
The defendants do not dispute that plaintiff, as a biological parent with visitation rights,
retains the right to access records and receive notices from the District so that she may
participate in educational decisions. If she has those rights, then she has standing to assert her
own claims for violations of those rights, as she did before hearing officer Fuhrmann. However,
the Court agrees with Fuhrmann’s analysis and with her conclusion that, under Illinois law,
plaintiff has no standing to mount a substantive challenge to the manner in which the District
provided special education services to G.C. or its decision not to provide certain such services
under the IDEA. To the extent plaintiff’s IDEA claim is premised on the District’s substantive
decision not to create an IEP for G.C. or its provision of a FAPE, the claim is dismissed.
II.
EXHAUSTION
The IDEA does not preclude other federal causes of action, but the IDEA does contain a
broad exhaustion provision that encompasses even non-IDEA federal claims:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with
11
Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.], title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 791 et seq.], or other Federal laws
protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a
civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this
subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the
same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this
subchapter.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(l). Thus, if the IDEA offers relief for a plaintiff’s injury, then the plaintiff
must exhaust her remedies pursuant to the IDEA administrative process, not only in order to
assert IDEA claims but also to assert claims under other statutes such as the ADA or the Rehab
Act. The Seventh Circuit has explained that the IDEA’s exhaustion provision applies to claims
that are based on “acts that have both an educational source and an adverse educational
consequence.” See Charlie F. ex rel. Neil F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989,
993 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Both the genesis and the manifestations of the problem are educational; the
IDEA offers comprehensive educational solutions; we conclude, therefore, that at least in
principle relief is available under the IDEA [and the IDEA exhaustion provision applies to
plaintiff’s ADA, Rehab Act and § 1983 claims.]”).
The only claim that plaintiff has exhausted in this case is the procedural IDEA claim
concerning access to records and notice of educational decisions that she litigated before
Fuhrmann. To the extent she raises a substantive IDEA claim based on the provision of a FAPE
to G.C., it has not been exhausted because neither Diaz-Pollock nor Fuhrmann reached the merits
of any such claim. See L.M. ex rel. Mauser v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 28 F. Supp. 2d
1107, 1111 (S.D. Ind. 1998). Both impartial hearing officers concluded that they could not reach
the merits of any substantive IDEA claim plaintiff raised concerning whether the District
12
provided G.C. with a FAPE because plaintiff has no standing to raise any such claim. As the
Court explained above, the Court finds no error in this conclusion. 7
In asserting her non-IDEA federal claims under the ADA, Rehab Act, and § 1983,
plaintiff alleges that G.C. did not receive appropriate evaluation and testing to accommodate his
disability, he suffered discrimination with respect to the educational services the District
provided to accommodate his disability or the lack thereof, and the District took action in
retaliation for plaintiff’s complaints about the District’s alleged failure to accommodate G.C.’s
disability. These claims are all based on “acts that have both an educational source and an
adverse educational consequence,” or, stated differently, a “problem” both the “genesis and
manifestations” of which are “educational.” See Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 993. Because all of these
claims are rooted in the educational services the District provided to G.C., plaintiff was required
to exhaust them via the IDEA administrative process. See Brown v. Dist. 299—Chicago Pub.
Sch., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1084-86 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Loch v. Bd. of Educ. of Edwardsville Cmty.
Sch. Dist. No. 7, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1080-82 (S.D. Ill. 2008); Renguette v. Bd. of Sch.
Trustees ex rel. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043-45 (S.D. Ind. 2008);
see also Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 273-74; J.Q. v. Washington Twp. Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 3d 241,
246-48, 250-51 (D.N.J. 2015). Because plaintiff failed to do so, these claims are dismissed.
III.
IDEA NOTICE AND ACCESS TO RECORDS CLAIM
The remaining properly-exhausted federal claim in this suit is plaintiff’s IDEA claim
concerning the District’s failure to provide plaintiff with notice of educational decisions and
access to G.C.’s educational records.
Because plaintiff does not have standing to bring a
7
Indeed, to the extent that G.C.’s father is satisfied with the education G.C. is receiving, this case illustrates the
problem the Seventh Circuit described in Navin, in which the court explained that a noncustodial parent may
exercise her own rights under the IDEA, to the extent she has any under state law, but she may not undermine and
interfere with the educational decision-making of the custodial parent. 270 F.3d at 1149-50.
13
substantive claim against the District for providing G.C. with inadequate educational services
amounting to the denial of a FAPE, she is limited to seeking relief for procedural violations of
her notice and records-access rights. However, “a plaintiff alleging only that a school district has
failed to comply with a procedural requirement of the IDEA . . . may only seek injunctive relief
for prospective compliance.” C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 66 (3d Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff has already been granted this relief; Fuhrmann ordered the District to provide plaintiff
with IDEA notices at her current address and to refrain from restricting her access to G.C.’s
educational records. Based on Fuhrmann’s written order and the allegations of the complaint, it
appears that the District has acceded to plaintiff’s requests concerning notices and records.
Although plaintiff complains bitterly of the manner in which Fuhrmann conducted the hearing,
the result of the hearing was that Fuhrmann granted plaintiff all the relief that was available to
her for the procedural violations she raised. Because she has already been granted the only relief
she has standing to seek under the IDEA, plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief in this
action.
In their briefs, the defendants raise and discuss a number of other pleading defects in
plaintiff’s federal claims, but the Court need not address these matters because the foregoing
discussion is sufficient to resolve the present motions. Plaintiff’s federal claims, including her
IDEA claim, are dismissed. The dismissal must be with prejudice because, as the foregoing
discussion shows, plaintiff cannot state a claim both that she has standing to raise and for which
any relief is available.
IV.
STATE LAW CLAIMS
Plaintiff raises claims under a number of Illinois statutes: the Illinois School Code, the
Illinois School Records Act, and the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
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Confidentiality Act. The Illinois School Code and Illinois School Records claims appear to
duplicate her federal claims, and the District argues that none of these statutes provides plaintiff
with a private right of action to exercise on behalf of G.C. in any case. The Court has some
doubt about this argument, see 105 ILCS 5/14-8.02a(i), 740 ILCS 110/15, but regardless of
whether there is a private right of action under these statutes, the Court declines to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims because it has dismissed all federal claims in this
suit. Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motions to dismiss [74] and [83] are granted.
The federal claims (Counts I-III, VII-VIII) are dismissed with prejudice. The state claims
(Counts IV-VI) are dismissed without prejudice. Civil case terminated.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: December 5, 2016
______________________
HON. JORGE L. ALONSO
United States District Judge
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