Vinegar v. Schwarz et al
Filing
114
MEMORANDUM Opinion: Defendants' motion for summary judgment 103 is granted. Signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 1/22/2019. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice(vcf, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CORNELL VINEGAR,
Plaintiff,
v.
C.O. DAMIAN BRAGGS, and
AMANDA WOOD, As Special
Administrator of the Estate of C.O.
Donald Holyfield,
Defendants.
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15 C 10625
Judge Charles P. Kocoras
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendants’ Damian Braggs (“Braggs”) and Amanda Wood
(“Wood”) as Special Administrator for the Estate of Donald Holyfield (“Holyfield”)
(collectively, the “Defendants”), motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff
Cornell Vinegar (“Vinegar”). For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants’
motion.
BACKGROUND
The following facts taken from the record are undisputed, except where
otherwise noted.
On or about March 23, 2014, Vinegar was temporarily housed at the NRC in
Joliet, Illinois. Holyfield and Braggs were correctional officers and, on this day, were
escorting inmates from the gallery to the yard area. At approximately 9:35 am,
Holyfield handcuffed and escorted Vinegar down a flight of stairs to transport him to
the yard. While being escorted, Vinegar asserts that Holyfield negligently released his
hold of Vinegar, causing him “to fall down … three or four steps.”
As a result of the fall, Vinegar hit the back of his head, knee, and the middle of
his back. Vinegar was not bleeding and had “maybe two” knots on the back of his head.
Holyfield assisted Vinegar back up, and with concern, asked Vinegar if he “wanted to
see the doctor or go to the healthcare.” Expressing tremendous pain, Vinegar answered
in the affirmative.
However, instead of calling a nurse, Holyfield returned Vinegar back to his cell
and proceeded to transport the other inmates. Vinegar, while in pain, remained alone
in his cell for the next three days.
Vinegar claims that when he fell, Braggs was roughly ten yards away escorting
the other inmates. Vinegar alleges that Braggs did not seek him out after the fall.
Vinegar further testifies that he was uncertain as to whether Holyfield and Braggs
discussed what had happened. Vinegar was also unsure as to whether Braggs had
witnessed him fall. Braggs claims that he has no recollection of the incident nor of
Vinegar requesting medical attention.
On March 26, 2014, three days after the fall, “Nurse Jennifer” examined Vinegar.
On the same day, Mary Diane Schwartz (“Schwartz”), a physician assistant, also
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examined Vinegar. This was the first time Vinegar received any sort of treatment for
his fall.
Schwartz thoroughly evaluated Vinegar and immediately entered a “progress
note” in his medical chart. She reported “no pathological findings, no swelling,
erythema, ecchymosis, [or] deformity” and indicated that Vinegar’s knee was stable,
that his neuro was intact, and that he did not suffer from any trauma. Schwartz,
addressing Vinegar’s complaints of “aches and pains,” prescribed him with “capsaicin
cream”1 and Robaxin.2 Schwartz testified that Vinegar’s health had not been adversely
compromised despite not receiving any sort of treatment for three days.
A week later, on April 2, 2014, another medical professional3 examined Vinegar
at the Illinois River Correctional Center. During this examination, Vinegar failed to
disclose his recent fall down the stairs, did not complain of any injuries, and did not
inquire about any further treatment for his head, back, or knee. Since his fall, Vinegar
has not been medically diagnosed with any injuries.
On November 24, 2015, Vinegar filed his original complaint and brought claims
under state law and the Eighth Amendment against Braggs, Holyfield, Schwartz, and
“Nurse Jennifer.” On February 24, 2016, a waiver of service of summons was returned
unexecuted as to Holyfield, indicating that he was deceased. On July 6, 2016, Braggs’
counsel filed a Suggestion of Death on Holyfield’s behalf, indicating he had died on or
1
According to Schwartz, capsaicin cream “is hot chili pepper cream and it’s like Bengay without the menthol.
Robaxin is a muscle relaxant Ms. Schwartz prescribed Vinegar to take three times a day for 30 doses.
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The pleadings do not reveal the identity of the medical examiner who evaluated Vinegar.
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about August 2, 2015. On October 14, 2016, the Court appointed Robert A. Fisher to
represent Vinegar and ordered him to file a motion for substitution regarding Holyfield
within ninety days.
On January 5, 2017, Vinegar filed a motion to appoint Amanda Wood as Special
Administrator of Holyfield’s estate. Vinegar articulated that “[u]pon information and
belief, no estate had been opened for decedent, [Holyfield], or letters of office been
issued,” and that therefore, under 735 ILCS 5/13-209(b)(2), appointment of a special
administrator on Holyfield’s behalf was necessary and proper. The Court granted the
motion.
On February 2, 2017, Vinegar filed his Third Amended Complaint, alleging the
following claims: (1) Count I, a claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment against Braggs and Wood, in her capacity as Special Administrator for
Holyfield’s estate; (2) Count II, a claim for injunctive relief against the NRC Warden,
Randy Pfister, and IDOC Director, John Baldwin, regarding IDOC policy that fails to
provide an “adequate standard of care for elderly or shackled inmates in transit;” and
(3) Count III, a state claim for negligence against Wood, in her capacity as Special
Administrator for Holyfield’s estate, regarding Holyfield’s alleged conduct in causing
Vinegar to fall down a flight of stairs.
On October 3, 2017, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II.
On March 12, 2018, Defendants filed this summary judgment motion as to Counts I and
III.
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LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes all facts and
draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact
arises where a reasonable jury could find, based on the evidence of record, in favor of
the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the Court considers the “record as a whole.” Morgan v. Harris Trust & Sav.
BFank of Chi., 867 F.2d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1989).
DISCUSSION
Preliminarily, a procedural matter requires our attention before we dive into the
pleadings. First, we address the Defendants’ contention that Wood was improperly
appointed as Special Administrator to Holyfield’s estate. Therefore, because Wood is
not the proper party for the underlying action, the Defendants seek dismissal of Counts
I and III as it relates to Holyfield’s estate.
In response, Vinegar claims that the Defendants have waived this affirmative
defense. He further argues that even if this argument has not been waived, Wood was
properly appointed.
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A.
The Defendants Have Not Waived Their Affirmative Defense
Vinegar contends that the Defendants have waived their affirmative defense of
asserting that Wood was improperly appointed as Special Administrator of Holyfield’s
estate. Specifically, Vinegar argues that the Defendants waived this argument because
they failed to assert it earlier in the pleading stage. We disagree.
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires affirmative defenses to
be raised in the pleadings, “a delay in asserting an affirmative defense waives the
defense only if the plaintiff was harmed as a result.” Curtis v. Timberlake, 436 F.3d
709, 711 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, there is no indication that Vinegar has suffered any
harm by the Defendants raising their affirmative defense in this summary judgment
motion. See Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]here the
plaintiff has an opportunity to respond to a late affirmative defense, he cannot establish
prejudice merely by showing that the case has progressed significantly since the
defendants answer his complaint.”).
Vinegar has an opportunity to substantively respond to the Defendants’
affirmative defense and has taken advantage of that opportunity in his response. Also,
Vinegar has been aware of this defense as the Defendants asserted it in their response
to Vinegar’s Third Amended Complaint. Accordingly, because the Defendants have
not waived this affirmative defense, we next evaluate whether Wood was properly
appointed under Section 735 ILCS 5/13-209.
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B.
Wood’s Appointment As Special Administrator To Holyfield’s Estate
Fails To Conform With The Requirements Set Forth Under Section
735 ILCS 5/13-209(c).
The Defendants assert that Vinegar’s claims against Wood should be dismissed
because she was improperly appointed as Special Administrator to Holyfield’s Estate.
Vinegar counters by claiming that Wood was properly appointed under 735 ILCS 5/13209(c) because he exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate an estate for
Holyfield.
Vinegar originally relied on Section 735 ILCS 5/13-209(b), but changes course
in the underlying briefs and now asserts that Wood’s appointment was proper under
Section 735 ILCS 5/13-209(c). Therefore, this Court focuses its analysis on whether
Wood’s appointment conforms with the requirements set forth under Section 735 ILCS
5/13-209(c). Section 735 ILCS 5/13-209(c) states:
(c) If a party commences an action against a deceased person whose
death is unknown to the party before the expiration of the time limited
for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, and is
not otherwise barred, the action may be commenced against the
deceased person’s personal representative if all of the following terms
and conditions are met:
(1) After learning of the death, the party proceeds with reasonable
diligence to move the court for leave to file an amended complaint,
substituting the personal representative as defendant
(2) The party proceeds with reasonable diligence to serve process
upon the personal representative.
(3) If process is served more than 6 months after the issuance of
letters of office, liability of the estate is limited as to recovery to the
extent the estate is protected by liability insurance.
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(4) If no event can a party commence an action under this
subsection (c) unless a personal representative is appointed and an
amended complaint is filed within 2 years of the time limited for the
commencement of the original action.
Section 735 ILCS 5/13 209(c).
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We find that Vinegar failed to comply with the statutory requirements of
subsection (c). Subsection (c) provides, inter alia, that the court must appoint, and
plaintiff must substitute in an amended complaint, a personal representative for the
deceased person’s estate within two years after the limitations period expired. Here,
the Court appointed Wood as a Special Administrator to Vinegar’s estate. However,
Section 735 ILCS 13-209 makes a distinction between “special representative” and
“personal representative.” See Relf v. Shatayeva, 2013 IL 114295, ¶ 28, 998 N.E. 2d 18,
26.4
Under the plain language of section 13-209(c), Vinegar was obligated to proceed
against Holyfield’s duly appointed personal representative, substituting him or her as
the defendant once he learned of Holyfield’s death. Instead, he elected file a motion
asking this Court to appoint Wood as Special Administrator to Holyfield’s estate,
4
Section 735 ILCS 513/209 is divided into three sections. Relf, 2013 IL 114925 at ¶ 25. Subsection (b) is applicable
when “a person against whom an action may be brought dies; and Subsection (c) is applicable when a party
unknowingly sues a dead person. Id. Section 735 ILCS 5/13-209 distinguishes between “’representatives’ or
‘personal representatives,’ on the one hand, and ‘special representatives,’ on the other.” Id. at ¶ 25. Where the
“legislature has employed certain language in one part of a statute and different language in another, we may assume
different meanings were intended.” Id.
“Special representatives” are references only with respect to situations where “no petition for letters of office for the
decedent’s estate has been filed.” Id. “In all other situations, which by inference must be whenever petitions for
letters of office have been filed, the statute refers to ‘representatives’ or ‘personal representatives.’” Id.
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erroneously asserting Section 735 ILCS 5/13-209(b). While this Court granted the
motion,5 Vinegar cannot properly invoke section 13-209(c) because Wood is not a
personal representative of Holyfield’s estate.
However, even assuming arguendo that this Court had the authority to appoint
Wood and that appointment properly conformed to Section 735 ILCS 5-13/209, Counts
I and III against Holyfield’s estate would still be dismissed. For the reasons set forth
below, both Defendants are protected by the qualified immunity doctrine as it relates to
Count I, and sovereign immunity affords Holyfield’s estate protection as it relates to
Count III.
C.
Qualified Immunity
The Defendants seek dismissal of Count I against them in their individual
capacities under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Count I asserts a deliberate
indifference claim under the Eight Amendment against Braggs and Wood, in her
capacity as Special Administrator of Holyfield’s estate.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity shelters government officials from civil
liability in their individual capacities as long as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Kies v. City of Aurora, 149 F. Supp. 2d 431, 425 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
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The Court further notes that this Court lacked the authority to appoint Wood as either a Special Administrator or
Personal Administrator pursuant to Section 735 ILCS 513-209. See Wilson v. Sundstrand Corp., No. 99 C 6944, WL
99745, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (stating that a federal district court “lacks authority to appoint a special administrator.”);
see also Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) (limiting federal court appointments of personal representatives to next
friends or guardians ad litem for infants or incompetents).
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(citing Harlow v. Fitgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Vinegar has the burden of
demonstrating that: (1) a constitutional violation transpired, and (2) the pertinent
constitutional standards were clearly established at the time of the violation. Erwin v.
Daley, 92 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 1996). In assessing the applicability of qualified
immunity to this case, the Court will first examine whether Vinegar has set forth a
constitutional violation.
I.
The Eight Amendment Is Not Applicable To Vinegar’s Claim
Vinegar alleges that Holyfield’s actions in causing him to fall violates his clearly
established constitutional right and is therefore sufficient to defeat qualified immunity.
The Defendants claim that Vinegar did not suffer an objectively serious injury as
contemplated by the Eighth Amendment, and that even if he did, the Defendants were
not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. We agree with the Defendants.
The Eighth Amendment proscription on the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment requires that the government “provide humane conditions of confinement”
and to “ensure that inmates received adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). These principles prevent prison officials
from “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally
interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 117
(1976).
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, Vinegar must satisfy a two-prong test:
“(1) the deprivation alleged must [be] objectively serious; [and] (2) the prison official
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must have exhibited deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety.” Zentmyer
v. Kendal Cty., Ill., 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
An objectively serious need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364,
1373 (7th Cir. 1997).
We find that Vinegar’s allegations of injuries to his “head, back, and knees” do
not rise to the level of an objectively serious medical need. Subsequent to his fall, the
evidence demonstrates that Vinegar did not incur any sort of physical injuries outside
of two bumps on the back of his head that were “not that big,” and proceeded to walk
back to his cell without any sort of physical limitations.
When Schwartz examined him three days later, the evidence details how
Schwartz did not diagnose him with any life-threatening injuries, any abnormality in
his vital signs, any indication of acute distress, any fractures, nor any swelling in his
organs. In fact, Vinegar had only complained of soreness to his left knee, lower back,
and in the back of his head. However, these injuries are inadequate to support a claim
of objectively serious medical need. See Anderson-EL v. O’keefe, 897 F. Supp. 1093,
1096-97 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding no objectively serious medical need where plaintiff
testified to suffering from bruising and soreness throughout his body and that the only
“objective” medical finding was a small scratch that resulted in a prescription for
Tylenol or Advil).
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To support his contention, Vinegar erroneously relies on Anderson v. Morrison,
835 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2016). In Anderson, the Seventh Circuit found that a
plaintiff had plausibility alleged an Eighth Amendment claim when the defendants
handcuffed the plaintiff and without help forced him to walk down a flight of stairs that
were “slippery with milk,” and had been “clogged with several days’ of accumulated
food and rubbish.” Id. The Court noted that “[f]orcing someone to walk handcuffed
and unaided down stairs needlessly strewn with easily removable milk, food, and
garbage, as [the plaintiff] alleges, poses an unreasonable peril.” Id.
Unlike Anderson, we are presented with a summary judgment motion, and not a
motion to dismiss. Thus, Vinegar has presented this Court with no evidence to show
that the stairs Holyfield walked on were covered with debris or posed any sort of safety
risk. Accordingly, Vinegar has failed to demonstrate to this Court that he suffered an
objectively serious medical need. Because Vinegar has failed to prove he suffered an
objectively serious medical need, we find no need to evaluate whether the Defendants
exhibited deliberate indifference to Vinegar’s medical needs.
As such, qualified immunity defeats Count I because Vinegar has failed to prove
that a constitutional violation transpired.
D.
Sovereign Immunity
I.
State Law Claim of Negligence
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The Defendants invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity in regards to Count
III. Vinegar alleges that sovereign immunity is inapplicable because he is suing
Holyfield in his individual capacity. We disagree.
Because Vinegar raises the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the context of state
law, state immunity rules apply. Benning v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Universities,
928 F.2d 775, 779 (7th Cir. 1991). The Court of Claims Act establishes the Illinois
Court of Claims “as the exclusive forum for ‘[a]ll claims against the State for damages
in cases sounding in tort.’” Hampton v. City of Chicago, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1078
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (quoting 705 ILCS 505/8(d)).
On its face, Vinegar’s claim is not against the state, as the state is not named as
a defendant. Rather, Vinegar has filed suit against Wood, Special Administrator to
Holyfield’s estate. However, Holyfield was a state employee, and Illinois Courts have
“recognized that actions against state employees must sometimes be characterized as
actions against the state.” Fritz v. Johnston, 209 Ill. 2d 302, 310 (2004).
The determination of whether an action is an action against the state depends on
the issues raised and the relief sought. Fritz, 209 Ill. 2d at 310. An action is considered
against the state when there are:
(1) no allegations that an agent or employee of the State acted
beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts; (2) the duty
alleged to have been breached was not owed to the public generally
independent of the fact of State employment; and (3) where the
complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily within that
employee’s normal and official functions of the State.
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Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill.2d 295, 308 (1990) (quoting Robb v. Sutton, 147
Ill.App.3d 710, 716 (1986).
The dispute here centers on the second factor, namely, whether the duty allegedly
breached was not owed to the public generally independent of the fact of state
employment. For the second prong, Illinois law applies the “source-of-duty” test.
Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill.2d 151, 159 (1992) (“where the employee is charged with
breaching a duty imposed on him independently of his State employment, sovereign
immunity will not attach and a negligence claim may be maintained against him in
circuit court”).
We find that Holyfield did not owe a duty to the public generally independent of
his state employment. Holyfield interacted with Vinegar solely because he was a
correctional officer assigned to the NRC in Joliet, Illinois. There was no other
independent reason that brought Vinegar and Holyfield together.
In cases applying source of duty test, “sovereign immunity applies when the duty
exists solely because of the agent’s employment.” Hampton, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
In Currie, the court found that sovereign immunity did not apply to a “defendant police
officer who crashed his squad car into another driver because the defendant’s duty
stemmed from his status as a driver on a public road and not from his status as a police
officer.” Hampton, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (citing Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 161). Similarly,
sovereign immunity does not protect a state doctor because a doctor owes a duty to his
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patients regardless of his status as an employee of the state. Madden v. Kuehn, 56 Ill.
App.3d 997, 372 (1978).
Here, unlike Currie or Madden, any and all of Holyfield’s duties stemmed from
his status as an agent of the state; there was no independent source. Further, unlike a
physician or driver, Holyfield owed no general duty to Vinegar.
Accordingly, we find sovereign immunity applies to Holyfield and enter
judgment in favor of the Defendants as to Count III.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
granted. It is so ordered.
Dated: 1/22/19
_____________________________________
Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge
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