Sharifeh v. Sharif
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr. on 9/28/2017. Mailed notice(cdh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HORACE FOX, JR., in his capacity as the
Chapter 7 Trustee of Debtor’s Estate,
Case No. 15-cv-10694
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.
On appeal from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Illinois,
Bankr. Case No. 09-BK-05868
Judge Jacqueline P. Cox
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is an appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, Case No. 09-B-05868, by Intevenor-Appellant Haifa Sharifeh a/k/a
Haifa Kaj (“Intervenor”), purportedly as executrix of the Estate of her mother, Soad Wattar.
Intervenor appealed from the Bankruptcy Court’s November 25, 2015 order denying her motion
to recuse Bankruptcy Judge Cox [5-1] and order denying her motion to vacate the Bankruptcy
Court’s August 5, 2010 turnover order [5-2]. On September 26, 2016, this Court issued a
memorandum opinion and order  affirming both of the Bankruptcy Court’s orders. Since
that time, Intervenor has filed several motions that currently are before the Court and requested
at times that the Court defer consideration of the motions until all were briefed. Specifically, the
pending motions are as follows: (1) Intervenor’s motion for reconsideration ; (2) Intervenor’s
motion to supplement motion for reconsideration ; and (3) Intervenor’s motion for leave to
file an expert report to include on remand . All of the motions are now fully briefed and
ready for decision.
For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Intervenor’s motion for reconsideration
in part , vacates its prior order  in part as to the appeal from the turnover order (but not
as to the appeal from the recusal order), and remands the case to the Bankruptcy Court with
instructions. The Court denies Intervenor’s motion to supplement motion for reconsideration 
and motion for leave to file an expert report to include on remand , without prejudice to
Intervenor re-filing the same motions in the Bankruptcy Court.
The Court also denies
Intervenor’s request to remand this matter to a new Bankruptcy Court judge for the reasons
explained in its order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s order on Intervenor’s motion to recuse,
see  at 13-17.
This case has a long and complicated history, much of which was set out in the Court’s
prior opinion . The essentials are repeated below to provide context for the disposition of the
Soad Wattar (“Wattar”) was the mother of Intervenor, Debtor Richard Sharif (“Debtor”),
Ragda Sharifeh (“Ragda”), and other children who are not directly involved in this appeal. In
1992, Wattar allegedly established a trust called the Soad Wattar Revocable Trust of 1992
The parties disagree about whether a valid Trust was ever formed and, assuming it was,
which version of the trust agreement is operable. Trustee maintains that a valid trust was never
formed. In the bankruptcy proceedings, Debtor originally relied on a purported amended trust
agreement signed on May 15, 1996 (the “1996 Trust Amendment”), which names Debtor as
Trustee, assigns and coveys to the Trustee all of Wattar’s real and personal property, grants the
Trustee authorization to do all acts of an owner, and grants the Trustee absolute discretion to
litigate any claim in favor of or against Wattar’s estate. See [15-1] (1996 Trust Amendment).
As discussed below, Debtor, Ragda, and Intervenor have since asserted that the 1996 Trust
Amendment was subsequently amended to change the trustee and the beneficiaries.
On February 24, 2009, Debtor filed Bankruptcy Case No. 09-BK-05868 in the
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Intervenor was listed in Schedule F as a
creditor holding an unsecured nonpriority claim in the amount of $49,000 for “2004 Loans.”
[15-32] at 17. The Certificate of Notice dated February 27, 2009, shows that Intervenor was
served notice of Debtor’s filing of the bankruptcy case, via first class mail addressed to 36
Revere Dr., South Barrington, IL 60010-9584. [15-33] at 3.
On August 24, 2009, WIN—a company that had obtained a $655,592 sanctions judgment
against Debtor prior to his filing for bankruptcy—initiated Adversary Proceeding No. 09-00770
against Debtor in the bankruptcy case, naming Debtor both individually and in his capacity as
trustee of the Trust. WIN alleged that Debtor was concealing assets by holding them in the
Trust’s name and that the Trust was Debtor’s alter ego. In his answer to WIN’s amended
complaint, Debtor stated that he was the Trustee of the Trust.
On March 17, 2010, Wattar died in Allepo, Syria.
On May 13, 2010, Debtor’s deposition was taken in WIN’s adversary proceeding. At his
deposition, Debtor produced what he purported to be the Last Will and Testament of his mother
Wattar, dated April 26, 2007 (the “April 26, 2007 Will”) [15-6]. According to the April 26, 2007
Will, Wattar left all of her estate to the Trustee of the Trust acting at the time of her death (i.e.,
Debtor). Id. at 4, § 5.01. The Will named Debtor as executor and Ragda as successor executor
of Wattar’s estate. Id. at 5, § 8.01.
On July 6, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court determined that Debtor had failed to comply with
most of WIN’s discovery requests and granted WIN’s motion for sanctions. See [15-7]; see also
Bankruptcy Case No. 09-05868, Docket Entry 53. As a sanction, the Bankruptcy Court entered
default judgment against Debtor and in favor of WIN in the adversary proceeding.
Bankruptcy Court also entered a declaratory judgment and found that the Soad Wattar Trust was
the alter ego of Debtor, because Debtor treated the Trust’s assets as his own property and,
therefore, it would be unjust to allow him to maintain that the Trust was a separate entity. Based
on its finding that Debtor failed to meet his discovery obligations and violated 11 U.S.C. § 727,
the Bankruptcy Court denied Debtor a discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(a)(6). The
Bankruptcy Court also ordered Debtor to reimburse WIN for the attorneys’ fees that it incurred
filing and prosecuting the sanctions motion. Intervenor was served notice that Debtor had been
denied a discharge in bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Case No. 09-05868, Docket Entry 55.
While Debtor was appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s order, a lawsuit was filed on behalf
of Intervenor (using her married name Haifa Kaj) and her sister Ragda in the Circuit Court for
Cook County, Illinois (No. 2010-CH-30432) seeking a preliminary injunction and an order
compelling Wells Fargo to transfer approximately $700,000 in Trust assets to Ragda. See [15-4]
(amended complaint, file-stamped July 30, 2010). The amended complaint in that action alleges
that, pursuant to an amendment made to the Trust on October 8, 2007 (the “2007 Trust
Amendment”), Ragda became the successor beneficiary of the Trust at the time of Wattar’s death
on March 17, 2010. [15-4] at 4, ¶ 12. The amended complaint further alleged that, on July 21,
2010, Debtor resigned as the trustee of the Trust. [15-4] at 5, ¶¶ 15. The amended complaint
acknowledged, however, that the Bankruptcy Court had already found in its July 6, 2010 order
“that the Soad Wattar Revocable Living Trust was Richard Sharif’s alter ego.” [15-4] at 3, ¶ 7.
The amended complaint requested that the court enter declaratory judgment finding, among other
things, that Ragda was the successor trustee and successor beneficiary to the Trust and that
Debtor had no legal ownership in any of the assets held in the Trust, [15-4] at 8, ¶ 1(e), (f). The
amended complaint did not allege that Intervenor was the executor of her mother’s estate.
4] at 8-9, ¶¶ 1(g), (h). On August 2, 2010, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Agran denied
Ragda and Intervenor’s motion on the basis that the case was subject to the jurisdiction of the
Bankruptcy Court. See [15-14].
On August 5, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s July 30, 2010 motion to
turn over certain assets of the Trust to the Trustee. See [6-8]. In addition, based on its finding
that Wattar transferred all of her assets to the Trust, the Bankruptcy Court ordered Debtor to turn
over all interest in any assets related to Debtor, Wattar, or the Trust. The Bankruptcy Court
further ordered Debtor, Ragda, and Intervenor to cease any act to exercise any control over
property of the estate. [6-8] at 2, ¶ D.
Appeals were taken all the way to the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, Ragda’s
attorney, Garrett S. Reidy, filed a motion in the district court to withdraw as Ragda’s counsel
pursuant to Rule 3.3(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires a lawyer
who knows that his client intends to, has, or is engaging in criminal or fraudulent actions in the
proceeding to take remedial measures, including disclosure to the tribunal if necessary. Mr.
Reidy asserted that in March 2014 he received information which called into doubt whether the
Trust had, in fact, been amended on October 8, 2007. Mr. Reidy expressed concern that the
purported 2007 Trust Amendment was actually “created and executed sometime after Richard
Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection in February of 2009.” [15-30] at 3. Mr. Reidy
stated that he asked Ragda and Debtor to provide him with evidence that this was not so, and
they failed to do so.
The Supreme Court ultimately held that Article III permits Bankruptcy Courts to
adjudicate Stern claims—that is, claims designated for final adjudication in the Bankruptcy
Court as a statutory matter but prohibited from proceeding in that way as a constitutional
matter—with the parties’ knowing and voluntary consent. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,
135 S. Ct. 1932 (U.S. 2015). The case was remanded to the Seventh Circuit. On January 13,
2015, Debtor’s attorney, William Stevens, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Debtor. See
[15-31]. Mr. Stevens referred to Mr. Reidy’s withdrawal and the reasons therefore and stated
that Debtor failed to produce to him any evidence that the purported 2007 Trust Amendment had
been executed before Debtor filed for bankruptcy.
Mr. Stevens attached to his motion a
declaration from the witness whose name is stamped on the first page of the amendment, Stacy
Franceschi. See [15-31] at 5-6. Ms. Franceschi stated that sometime in 2009 she signed the first
page of the purported 2007 Trust Amendment. By affixing her signature to the amendment, she
attested that she witnessed Debtor affix his signature to the amendment on October 8, 2007.
However, according to her declaration, Ms. Franceschi did so only because she was “advised by
Richard Sharif that the reason both of these Exhibits were being back-dated to October 8, 2007
was because two (2) identical amendments made to the Trust which were actually executed on
October 2, 2007 were lost and could not be replaced because one of the persons who served as a
witness had died and that the other person who served as a witness had returned to live in Syria.”
[15-31] at 5, ¶ 5. According to Franceschi, when she witnessed the amendment, it consisted of
one page. Id. at 6, ¶ 8. When Sharif filed the amendment with the Seventh Circuit, it contained
two pages. The second page of the document states that Notary Public Maria Gaud witnessed
Debtor, Ms. Franceschi, and Edward Bontkowski affix their signatures on the first page;
however, according to Ms. Franceschi, Maria Gaud was not present during and did not witness
the others’ signatures. Id. at 5-6, ¶ 7.
On July 8, 2015, Debtor sent a letter to the Seventh Circuit asserting that “[o]ne piece of
evidence [that his attorney] failed to provide or disclose was that I was no longer the trustee [of
the Trust] after 2007, revoked by my mother, Soad Wattar and her attorney.” [15-25] at 1.
Debtor attached a copy of a document titled “Revocation of Trustee to Soad Wattar Revocable
Living Trust of 1992” (the “Revocation of Trustee”). The Revocation of Trustee purported to
show that on November 1, 2007, Debtor resigned as Trustee and Ragda took over as Successor
Debtor’s allegations directly contradicted his earlier representations to the
Bankruptcy Court and appellate courts that he was the Trustee of the Trust at the time he filed for
bankruptcy and that he resigned as Trustee in 2010.
On July 24, 2015, the Seventh Circuit granted Stevens’ motion to withdraw as counsel.
On August 4, 2015, the Seventh Circuit determined that Debtor forfeited any Stern argument by
waiting until his Seventh Circuit reply brief to challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s authority to
decide the alter ego claim. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 617 F. App’x 589, 590-91
(7th Cir. 2015). Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s July 6, 2010
decision that the Soad Wattar Trust was the alter ego of Debtor. The Seventh Circuit also
reinstated the Bankruptcy Court’s award of fees to WIN. Id. at 591.
On September 12, 2015, Intervenor, purportedly as Executrix of Wattar’s estate, filed a
motion for order vacating the Bankruptcy Court’s August 5, 2010 turnover order pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Intervenor asserted that Ragda became
the Trustee of the Trust on November 1, 2007 and attached a copy of the Revocation of Trustee.
Intervenor argued that the Estate was never served with process and therefore (1) the Bankruptcy
Court did not have personal jurisdiction over Wattar’s Estate and (2) the Bankruptcy Court’s
August 5, 2010 order requiring the turnover of property held in the Trust was void.
In his objections to Intervenor’s motion, the Trustee attached the April 26, 2007 Will that
Debtor had produced in his deposition, and explained that the will left all of Wattar’s assets to
the Trustee of the Trust acting at the time of her death (Debtor) and, therefore, Intervenor was
not entitled to notice.
In her reply brief, Intervenor attached—but did not explain the significance of—
documents purporting to be copies of the most recent version of Wattar’s will, dated April 28,
2007 (the “April 28, 2007 Will”). See  at 2-3; see also [6-12] at Exs. U & V. She also
attached an “Affidavit of Syrian Attorney for the Estate of Soad Wattar,” who represented that
the April 28, 2007 will was attached and that he was attempting to obtain a “certified copy of the
order that established the Estate from the courthouse in Aleppo, Syria.” Bankruptcy Case  at 27; [6-12] at Ex. T. The April 28, 2007 Will purports to name Intervenor as Executrix of
The Bankruptcy Court denied Intervenor’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion on the basis that
Intervenor failed to provide any “evidence or information that the property of the bankruptcy
estate dealt with in the August 5, 2010 Order belonged to a person or entity not then before the
Court.” [5-2] at 5. The Bankruptcy Court explained that while Intervenor’ attorney “appears to
allege that [Intervenor] represents a probate estate by indicating that she is an executrix;
however, he also discusses a trust estate without clearly stating who the movant is in relation to a
trust or probate estate. What entity does she represent and by what authority?” [5-2] at 4. The
Bankruptcy Court also noted that, “[i]f movant Haifa Sharifeh is Haifa Kaj who was scheduled
as an unsecured creditor on the Debtor’s Schedule F as a creditor owed $49,000, she had notice
of the bankruptcy case as shown by the bankruptcy Noticing Center’s Certificate of Service at
dkt. no. 9, dated February 25, 2009.” Id. The Bankruptcy Court further explained that the April
26, 2007 Will submitted by the Trustee (which Debtor provided to the Trustee at his deposition)
(1) transferred all of Soad Wattar’s property to the Trust, which was held pursuant to a default
judgment to be the alter ego of Debtor; and (2) did not name Haifa Kaj as its executrix. The
Bankruptcy Court’s opinion did not specifically address the Revocation of Trustee or the April
28, 2007 Will.
Intervenor filed a notice of appeal on November 30, 2015, arguing that the Bankruptcy
Court’s August 5, 2010 Order was void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
owner of the property that was transferred to the bankruptcy estate—the estate of Soad Wattar.
Intervenor also sought reversal of the Bankruptcy Court’s August 5, 2010 order denying
Intervenor’s motion for recusal.
The Court issued a memorandum opinion and order  affirming both of the
Bankruptcy Court’s orders. As to the turnover order, the Court determined that 1) Intervenor
waived her argument that the settlor of a trust is entitled to notice, by failing to discuss or
provide any legal support for her position that due process required Wattar or her estate to
receive notice; 2) the trustee of the Trust, not the settlor, was entitled to notice; 3) the 2007 Trust
Amendment was not properly authenticated, and there were indications that it was not signed
until after Debtor filed for bankruptcy; 4) Intervenor failed to establish that she was the executor
of her mother’s estate because she failed to attach the Syrian court order that purported to
establish the estate and did not raise the April 28, 2007 Will until her reply brief in the
Bankruptcy Court; 5) that the April 28, 2007 Will was irrelevant in any event, because the 1996
Trust Amendment placed all of Wattar’s assets in the Trust, only the Trustee was entitled to
notice, and Intervenor was not the Trustee; 6) Intervenor failed to provide any legal support for
her argument that her due process rights were violated, and therefore waived the argument; and
7) Intervenor had actual notice of Debtor’s bankruptcy because she was a creditor and she filed
the Cook County lawsuit in which she acknowledged the Bankruptcy Court’s turnover order.
Intervenor now moves for reconsideration of the Order denying her Rule 60(b)(4) motion
and for leave to add various documents to the record on appeal.
Intervenor moved to vacate the Bankruptcy Court’s August 5, 2010 turnover order
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the
Bankruptcy Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the property held in the Trust. Rule 60(b)(4)
provides that, “[o]n motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [if] the judgment is void.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(4). “Federal courts considering Rule 60(b)(4) motions that assert a judgment is
void because of a jurisdictional defect generally have reserved relief only for the exceptional
case in which the court that rendered judgment lacked even an ‘arguable basis’ for jurisdiction.”
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010) (quoting Nemaizer v.
Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1986)).
The Court “review[s] the denial of most motions for relief under Rule 60(b) only for an
abuse of discretion.” Philos Techs., Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc., 645 F.3d 851, 854 (7th Cir. 2011).
Since “relief under Rule 60(b) is ‘an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in exceptional
circumstances,’ a district court abuses its discretion only when ‘no reasonable person could
agree’ with the decision to deny relief.” Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir.
2009) (quoting McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000)). While the
court “has no discretion to deny a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate a judgment entered against a
defendant over whom the court lacks personal jurisdiction, regardless of the specific reason such
jurisdiction is lacking,” Philos, 645 F.3d at 854-55, it has discretion to determine in the first
instance whether personal jurisdiction is present.
A motion for rehearing under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8022 is the
bankruptcy counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) and authorizes the district court
to correct “manifest errors of law or misapprehensions of fact.” In re Dvorkin Holdings, 2016
WL 1644323, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2016). “A ‘manifest error’ occurs when the district court commits
a ‘wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.’” Burritt v.
Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 253 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601,
606 (7th Cir. 2000)). A motion for rehearing “‘does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its
own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or
advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the
judgment.’” United States v. Resnick, 594 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bordelon v.
Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000)).
The first error that Intervenor alleges is that the Court erroneously referred to Stacy
Franceschi as the notary of the 2007 Trust Amendment, when in fact she was a witness to that
document. The Court has corrected this reference in the background section of this order but
finds it unnecessary to further address this issue (or any potential significance it may have for the
case) because it is vacating its prior order (to the extent it affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s denial
of Intervenor’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion) and remanding to the Bankruptcy Court for further
The second error alleged by Intervenor is that the Court should have accepted the April
28, 2007 Will “as the valid will,” rather than the April 26, 2007 Will.  at 3. The Court
found, among other things, that Intervenor waived this issue by failing to attach the April 28,
2007 Will to her Rule 60(b)(4) motion in the Bankruptcy Court. However, upon further review
of the record, it does not appear that the Bankruptcy Court expressly ruled on the waiver issue or
specifically addressed the April 28, 2007 Will, which was first cited in Intervenor’s Reply Brief.
With a better understanding that this later will is the lynchpin of Intervenor’s due process
argument, the Court concludes that further development of the record regarding these issues and
any reconsideration of which version of the will is “the valid will, see  at 3, would be best
left for development by the Bankruptcy Court in the first instance. Therefore, the Court will
vacate the portion its earlier opinion affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of the motion to
vacate the August 5, 2010 turnover order and remand the case to the Bankruptcy Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the Bankruptcy Court should
determine (1) whether Intervenor waived her right to rely on the April 28, 2007 Will (by failing
to attach it to her Rule 60(b)(4) motion or to comply with applicable evidentiary rules, or for any
other reason), and (2) if there is no waiver, which version of the will is the controlling one. The
Bankruptcy Court is also free to invite additional briefing and hearing on any other relevant
issues that it previously identified but did not decide—such as laches and issue preclusion—and
to resolve Intervenor’s motion on any of those grounds as the Court sees fit.
The third error alleged by Intervenor is that she cannot be deemed to have received actual
notice of the bankruptcy proceeding, because the Bankruptcy Court did not make any factual
adjudication of this issue. More specifically, Intervenor argues that she never lived at the
Barrington address to which she was mailed notice as a creditor of Debtor; that she might have
been estranged from Debtor and Radga, who both actively participated in the bankruptcy
proceeding and ancillary actions; and that she might not have known about or authorized the
filing of the Cook County action on her behalf in 2010. However, Intervenor has not provided
any competent evidence—such as a sworn declaration—that she did not know about the
bankruptcy case or the Bankruptcy Court’s order requiring Debtor to turn over the proceeds of
the Trust, or that she did not know about or authorize the Cook County action. The courts are
not required to give Intervenor unlimited opportunities to provide proof in support of her Rule
60(b) motion. Nonetheless, since the Court is remanding the case to the Bankruptcy Court, the
Bankruptcy Court is free to explore further whether Intervenor had actual notice of Debtor’s
bankruptcy and the turnover order and to make additional findings in that regard.1
Bankruptcy Court may decide that Intervenor has waived this issue or consider it on its merits
and make factual findings.
The fourth error alleged by Intervenor is that she did not waive her argument that the
settlor of a trust is entitled to notice by failing to cite any legal precedent, because this is a factual
issue that depends on whether the settlor owns any property in the trust. The Court is not
persuaded. Assuming that Wattar did own property that was placed in the Trust, this still leaves
the purely legal question whether the settlor of a trust is entitled to notice before assets of the
Trust are made part of a bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Court determined that the trustee is
the party entitled to notice, and Intervenor has never cited any legal precedent that calls the
Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion into question.
The Bankruptcy Court previously noted that Intervenor had notice of the bankruptcy case by virtue of
having been listed as an unsecured creditor on the Debtor’s Schedule F, citing a February 25, 2009
certificate of service. However, the Bankruptcy Court did not find that Intervenor had actual notice of the
bankruptcy case, nor did the court address the Trustee’s argument that Intervenor’s participation in the
2010 Cook County lawsuit provides convincing evidence of notice to Intervenor of the bankruptcy
proceedings and the turnover order.
The Court now turns to Intervenor’s motions to supplement the record. See , .
The Court denies these motions without prejudice and without expressing any opinion on their
merits. Intervenor is free to address the same issues to the Bankruptcy Court on remand, and the
Bankruptcy Court is free to rule on them as it sees fit.
There is one final issue to which the Court directs the parties’ and the Bankruptcy Court’s
attention on remand. In her Rule 60(b)(4) motion, Intervenor asserted that the 2007 Revocation
of Trustee removed Debtor and appointed Ragda as Trustee of the Trust. See [194-4]. The
Bankruptcy Court determined that “[t]he trust’s trustee, the Debtor Richard Sharif, was the
proper party before the Court as both a debtor and the trustee of the trust whose assets were
sought,” [5-2] at 4, but does not expressly address the 2007 Revocation of Trustee. It would
provide helpful clarity to this Court if the Bankruptcy Court would address this document and its
interplay, if any, with the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that Debtor was the trustee of the Trust
at the time the turnover order was entered. As with the April 28, 2007 Will, the Trustee may
have evidentiary or waiver objections, which he is free to raise.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Intervenor’s motion for reconsideration in
part , vacates its prior order  as to the appeal from the turnover order (but not as to the
appeal from the recusal order), and remands the case to the Bankruptcy Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Court denies Intervenor’s motion to supplement
motion for reconsideration  and motion for leave to file an expert report to include on
remand , without prejudice to Intervenor filing the same motions in the Bankruptcy Court.
The Court also denies Intervenor’s request to remand this matter to a new Bankruptcy Court
judge, for the reasons explained in its order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s order on
Intervenor’s motion to recuse, see  at 13-17.
Dated: September 28, 2017
Robert M. Dow, Jr.
United States District Judge
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