Scavelli v. Schaffer et al
Filing
41
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 11/14/2017: This matter is before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion for summary judgment is denied. Mailed notice (ags, )
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURI
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
YITO SCAVELLI,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
MICHAEL SCHAFFER, et
al.,
Defendants.
No. 15 C 11437
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons stated below, the motion for summary judgment is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Vito Scavelli (Scavelli) contends that at2:30 &.ffi., after celebrating
Christmas eve with his family, he was in his house (House) asleep with his wife and
four minor children. Defendant Officer Michael Schaeffer (Schaeffer), allegedly
responded to a call of a barking dog outside at the House. Schaeffer allegedly pulled
up to the House in an unmarked SUV. Schaeffer admits that when he arrived at the
House, he heard no barking dogs outside or inside the House. Schaefer, who is 6'1"
tall and approximately 260 pounds, allegedly proceeded to pound loudly on the front
o'open
the
door of the House with his metal flashlight yelling
ling
door," awaking
Scavelli and members of his family. Scavelli's wife claims she thought someone
was trying to break into the House when she heard the noise. The knocking also
allegedly caused Scavelli's dogs inside the House to start barking, which created
more of an uproar and added to the confusion of the situation. Schaeffer then began
ringing the doorbell next to the front door.
Scavelli allegedly proceeded to the front door. Fearing for the safety of his
family, Scavelli allegedly grabbed his unloaded registered firearm from a shelf.
Scavelli claims he yelled through the door to the individual outside to identiff
himself and Scavelli did not hear Schaefer announce himself as a police officer.
Scavelli allegedly opened the door while holding back one of his dogs. Scavelli
contends that he was disoriented after being awoken at2:30 a.m. on Christmas
morning and he was not sure what was happening, and did not realize at first that
Schaeffer was a police officer since the lighting was bad, he was not wearing a
police officer cap, and he was not wearing a typical police uniform. Scavelli
contends that at no point did he actually point the gun at Schaefer. Schaeffer then
allegedly saw the firearm and screamed at Scavelli "drop the
f
ing gun."
Scavelli yelled back that he had a right to defend his house, but then put the gun
down on a nearby shelf. Schaefer then allegedly attempted to step into the House
and grab Scavelli, but Scavelli was able to push Schaeffer outside and close the
door. Scavelli then allegedly yelled that he wanted a police supervisor on the scene
and called 911. When other officers arrived on the scene, Scavelli was compliant
and did not resist in any way when he was placed under arrest. Scavelli was charged
with assaulting
a police
officer and spent the next three days in jail before he was
able to post bond. In a bench trial, Scavelli was found not guilty of the assault
charges. Scavelli includes in his complaint a false arresVdetention claim brought
under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 (Section 1983) (Count I), a state law false arrest claim
(Count II), a state law false imprisonment claim (Count III), a state law malicious
prosecution claim (Count IV), a state law respondeat superior claim (Count V), and
a state law indemnification claim (Count
VI).
Defendants now move for summary
judgment on all claims.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56@; Smith v. Hope School,560 F.3d 694,699 (7th Cir. 2009). A "genuine
issue" in the context of a motion for summary judgment is not simply a
"metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.
v.
Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material
fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmovin g party ." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U
.5. 242, 248
(
1986); Insolia v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). In ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the record as a whole, in
a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. Anderson,477 U.S. at
ZS,S;
gay v. Cassens
Transport Co.,212 F.3d 969,972 (7th Cir.2000).
DISCUSSION
L Probable Cause
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the false
arrest claims because Schaefer had probable cause to arrest Scavelli. The existence
of probable cause provides "an absolute defense to claims of wrongful or false arrest
under the Fourth Amendment in section 1983 suits." Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 91 1,
919 (7th Cir.2017). An officer has probable cause
"if
the facts and circumstances
within the officer's knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one
of reasonable caution, in believing . . . that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense." Id. (internal quotations
omitted)(quoting Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F .3d 7 49, 7 56 (7th Cir.
2013))(stating that "[p]robable cause is gauged from the vantage point of
a
reasonable officer facing the same situation").
Defendants argue that after Schaeffer had repeatedly pounded on the door to
the House, Scavelli "opened the door with a Rottweiler and a gun . . .
."
(Resp. 5).
Defendants argue that Schaeffer reasonably believed a crime was occulring or was
going to occur and he feared for his safety because "an individual with a gun and
large dog responded to a knock on the door." (Rep.
6).
a
Defendants insinuate that
there was somehow something sinister that one of Scavelli's dogs went to the front
door with him after Schaeffer started pounding on the front door in the middle of the
night. It is unclear why Defendants believe that a dog inside its master's home
responding to an intruder in the middle of the night is somehow an indication of an
ongoing or future crime. There is no indication that Scavelli sent the dog to attack
Schaeffer or that the dog even made any attempt to harm Schaeffer. There is, in fact,
evidence that Scavelli put a leash on the dog to restrain the dog before opening the
door. Nor is the fact that Scavelli grabbed his registered firearm in his own house to
defend his home and family any indication of wrong doing. Any reasonable officer
in Schaeffer's position should have found nothing out of the ordinary when such
circumstances unfolded after allegedly pounding on the front door in the middle
the night and yelling "open the
f
of
ing door."
Defendants, in arguing that a reasonable officer in Schaeffer's position would
have had probable cause, also rely on several genuinely disputed material facts.
Defendants contend that Scavelli pointed the gun at Schaeffer, but that fact is denied
by Scavelli. Scavelli also points to evidence that he contends shows that Schaeffer
gave statements at Scavelli's trial, to the dispatch, to felony review prosecutors, and
to the grand jury that are not consistent with the statements provided in this case.
Defendants also contend that Schaeffer announced he was a police officer
when he knocked, but that fact is also disputed by Scavelli. Scavelli and his wife
both claim that they never heard such an announcement by Schaeffer. Even
if
Schaeffer had made such an announcement, a reasonable officer might have
suspected that at2:30 a.m. on Christmas morning there might not have been anyone
awake to hear the announcement. Defendants also contend that Scavelli did not
initially put down his gun when told to do so, and stated he had a right to defend his
home. There are disputed facts as to how long of an interval occurred before
Scavelli complied and set down the gun, and when Schaeffer suddenly lunged
toward Scavelli to grab him. Such facts can only be resolved by the trier of fact.
Defendants cannot obtain summary judgment based on their version of events.
There are not sufficient undisputed facts that would establish that Schaefer had
probable cause to arrest Scavelli.
II.
Qualified Immuniqv
Defendants argue that Schaeffer is protected from liability by the doctrine
of
qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity offers protection to police
officers 'ofrom liability for reasonable mistakes made while performing their public
duties." Estate of Perry v. l(enzel,2017 WL 4l 12409, at*14 (7th Cir.2017). In
determining whether an officer may avoid liability based on the doctrine of qualified
immunity the court should consider
"(l) whether the facts, taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2)
whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation." Id. (internal quotations omitted)(quoting Gill v. City of Milwaukee,850
F.3d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 2017)). Defendants, in arguing for qualified immunify, again
rely on disputed facts. Only the trier of fact can determine whether Schaeffer
announced he was a police officer. Only the trier of fact can determine whether
Scavelli pointed his gun at Schaeffer or the exact circumstances that occurred before
he put down the gun. Defendants also continue to insinuate that Schaeffer
reasonably believed that Scavelli was up to something nefarious when Scavelli
"appeared in the doorway with a gun" and "large dog." (Resp.
8).
Such
circumstances fail to indicate criminal activity, particularly when occurring in
response to loud knocking on a residential door in the middle of the
night. There are
no undisputed facts that show that Scavelli made any threatening movements or
statements that would have indicated to Schaeffer that his safety was in jeopardy.
Defendants have not shown that Schaeffer is protected by qualified immunity in this
case.
III.
Malicious Prosecution
Defendants move for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claims.
For a malicious prosecution claim brought under Illinois state law, a plaintiff must
establish:
"(l)
commencement of criminal proceedings by the defendants; (2)
termination of that matter in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause
for the proceedings; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) resulting damages."
Williams v. City of Chicago,733F.3d749,759 (7th Cir. 2013). Defendants, in
moving for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim again rely on
disputed facts and rely on their own version of the events at issue in this case.
Defendants can rely at trial on Schaeffer's version of events to support their case, but
that is not sufficient to show that no reasonable trier of fact could find for Scavelli or
to show that summary judgment is warranted. According to Scavelli, Schaeffer
made up a false story about the events and, even after the incident, Schaeffer
allegedly chose to continue to pursue the charges against Scavelli and provide false
information to support such charges. It will be for the trier of fact to determine
which set of facts is accurate.
Defendants also argue that they cannot be held liable under the doctrine
of
respondeat superior if there is no individual liability, but as indicated above, there
are disputed facts on that issue. Scavelli is not bringing a Monell claim in this case.
Based on the above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendants' motion for summary judgment
is denied.
Dated: November 14,2017
9
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